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How has political pluralism and increasingly more competitive elections affected the 
political agency of the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia, and why? This thesis 
compares the political mobilization of the urban poor by political parties and social 
movements in the two countries and shows that the urban poor exercise both 
citizenship and clientship (lack of political autonomy through contingent benefits) 
through these channels. In Kenya and Zambia, the poor constitute the majority of the 
urban population. Their livelihoods are characterized by illegality. They live in slums 
and work in the informal economy, often within trade. After the transition from 
patrimonial one-party rule to formally democratic regimes, the socio-economic 
grievances of these segments have become a rallying point for oppositional parties and 
social movement organizations (SMOs), offering promises of collective benefits.  
 
This explorative study is based on process-tracing within and across cases, and draws 
extensively on interview material from fieldwork stays. Zambia was considered a 
“most-likely” case for enhanced citizen-based agency for the urban poor: the country 
had a successful pro-poor, populist party, a legacy of cross-ethnic societal 
mobilization, and a substantial urban population. Kenya was considered a “least-
likely” case, and it was at the outset expected that the urban poor would be engaged 
primarily as clients. This was due to the predominance of multi-ethnic coalition 
building, a legacy of societal mobilization through ethnic brokerage, and a smaller 
urban population.  
 
The thesis concludes that through opposition parties and SMOs, the urban poor have 
achieved a hybrid form of political agency in both countries, constantly navigating 
between acting as clients and as citizens. Hence, the political processes in the two 
countries are converging. Hybrid agency is explained by two contradictory 
mechanisms for resource mobilization by these organizations. To challenge ethno-
clientelist, incumbent governments, they need to generate legitimacy by (promises of) 
providing collective benefits to the urban poor, which reflects citizenship. However, 
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they also have strong incentives to generate material resources by only providing 
contingent benefits, which reflects clientship. The study inductively identifies three 
types of power asymmetries that political parties and SMOs forge towards the urban 
poor which serve to clientify them: lack of information, lack of (collective) decision 
making power, and lack of freedom from coercion restrain the ability of the urban poor 
to engage as autonomous citizens. In the electoral sphere, hybrid agency has been 
created in the form of Latin American-style neopopulist party linkages (with an ethnic 
component remaining in the Kenyan case). In the civil society sphere, hybrid agency 
has been created in the form of “extraverted,” member-based movements.   
 
Regarding the interaction between party politics and social movements, opposition 
parties and SMOs have not developed strong institutional ties to each other. This can 
be attributed to the political parties’ reliance on clientelist resources, and the 
extraverted strategy of the SMOs. Furthermore, SMOs are found to operate on a 
broader scale than do opposition parties: slum-dwellers jointly versus tenants, or 
informal traders versus street vendors. Neopopulist strategies have been successful in 
garnering the vote of the urban poor in the capital cities. SMOs struggle to establish a 
sustainable resource base aggregated from their constituents, sometimes leading to the 
exclusion of more marginalized groups (tenants and street vendors). However, if SMO 
mobilization of the urban poor is seen as a threat to the clientele base of politicians, the 
latter will often seek to co-opt or fragment the SMOs.  
 
Hence, the agency of the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia is found to be of a hybrid 
character due to neopopulist parties, extraverted movements and political co-optation 
(hybrid movements). Consequently, the urban poor often find themselves in 
contradictory, even self-defeating, political processes when they attempt to engage in 
both structures. The findings indicate that in pluralist, competitive regimes in Africa 
where the “poor” constitute the urban majority, not only ethnicity, but also the socio-
economic interests of the urban poor are used for establishing clientelist linkages, 
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1. Introduction: political significance of the urban 
poor 
Today, the majority of the world’s population lives in urban areas. Over 800 million 
people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America live in slums, defined as urban areas 
characterized by some combination of tenuous dwelling structures, overcrowding and 
lack of access to adequate water and sanitation facilities (Fox 2013: 191).  Three and a 
half billion people worldwide earn their livelihoods in the informal economy. Bayat 
(2000: 534) considers the unemployed, underemployed, casuals, street subsistence 
workers, street children and members of the underworld to belong to what is 
interchangeably referred to as the “urban marginal,” “urban disenfranchised” or the 
“urban poor.” Their lives are characterized by social exclusion, informality and 
criminalization, as both slum-dwelling and informal work operate outside the law.  
One hundred years ago, a mere five percent of Africans lived in cities—today, the 
figure is approximately 40 percent (Oppenheimer and Spicer 2011).1 Several African 
cities are now in the megacity bracket, and some countries have annual urbanization 
rates higher than 10 percent (Siegle 2011: 21). The population of sub-Saharan Africa is 
also young, with more than 70 percent below 30 years of age (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa 2010). According to the African Center for Strategic 
Studies 2011 Report (Siegle 2011: 21), these young people are the most educated in 
the history of Africa, and have broad access to information technology.2 The report 
states that this young continent “creates a vitality and dynamism conducive to 
change,” as youth are “typically the vanguard of reform for a society — less willing to 
accept persistent inequities and the misuse of power” (Siegle 2011: 21). However, that 
                                              
1 Behind the aggregated statistics there is considerable variety among countries. According to the United 
Population Division (2009), Burundi has the lowest share of urban population (only 11 percent), while Gabon 
ranks highest, with an urban population of 86 percent. Despite the controversies surrounding urbanization 
statistics (Potts 2009), it is generally accepted that urbanization growth rates are high in many African countries 
in Africa. 
2 Average primary school enrollment has increased from 59 percent in 1999 to 77 percent in 2009, with similar rises in 
secondary and tertiary enrollment levels. 
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may be an overtly optimistic scenario, in view of the reasons for such a young 
population: poverty.  
According to Oppenheimer and Spicer (2011: 14), the majority of urban dwellers in 
sub-Saharan Africa live in slums,3 without durable housing or legal rights to their land. 
Joblessness is endemic across Africa, especially among the young (Oppenheimer and 
Spicer 2011: 14-15).4 Unprecedented growth in many African countries during the past 
decade has not translated into formal jobs (Oppenheimer and Spicer 2011: 15). 
According to the World Bank (2015b), 46.8 percent of the population in sub-Saharan 
Africa lives on less than $ 1.25 a day (although the number is decreasing).5As noted by 
a South African Minister, Collins Ohm Chabane,6 in the foreword to a report on youth 
unemployment, the poverty and joblessness that young Africans are facing “is a recipe 
not only for lost opportunity, but for political instability and economic chaos” (The 
Brenthurst Foundation 2011: 10). 
The demographic, economic and social composition of the continent is changing 
rapidly—as is the political landscape. This thesis presents a comparative study of the 
changing political mobilization and agency of the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia, 
following the introduction of (formal) liberal democracy in these countries. Since the 
early 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan African countries have introduced multiparty 
elections, and many have opened up for a more pluralist civil society, in response to 
internal and external pressures for democratic reforms. Given the growth of urban poor 
in a context of increasing political competition and pluralism, it is relevant and urgent 
to consider what kind of political agency—citizenship or clientship—the urban poor 
exercise through new democratic channels. Hence, the research question driving this 
study is the following: 
                                              
3 In this study, I will use the terms “Africa” and “sub-Saharan Africa” interchangeably. However, when applying the former 
term, this does not include North-Africa.   
4 In some countries, youth unemployment and underemployment are as high as 80 percent, also in relatively well-performing 
states such as Mozambique and Ghana. 
5 The percentage of the global population living on less than $1.25 a day (PPP) dropped from 36.4 to 14.5 between 1990 and 
2011 (World Bank 2015b).  
6 Minister in The Presidency, Performance Monitoring, Evaluation and Administration. 
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How and why has the introduction of formal liberal democracy affected the political 
agency of the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia?  
Three strands of literature have been influential for understanding political 
mobilization of the urban poor (or the lack thereof) after the Third Wave of democracy 
swept the continent.7 First, the theoretical and normative premise for multiparty 
democratic rule is that political parties reflect and are accountable to the interests of 
social bases in society (Lipset 1994). If political parties functioned according to these 
normative assumptions, we might thus expect them to respond to the urban poor’s 
socio-economic grievances, especially when they constitute the majority urban 
population. A few studies have identified the emergence of pro-poor, populist 
opposition parties (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Resnick 2014), which suggests 
political parties have started to become more representative of and accountable to the 
urban poor.     
However, a burgeoning literature on neopatrimonialism, competitive authoritarianism 
and hybrid regimes in Africa indicates that political parties have relied predominantly 
on ethno-clientelism in order to secure political and economic privileges (Erdmann 
and Engel 2007; Svåsand 2013; Walle 2003). In general, ethnic identities, rather than 
socio-economic interests of the urban poor, have been considered the glue for 
upholding these neopatrimonial regimes. Thus, party competition has not provided a 
political space for the urban poor to advance their interests as citizens.  
 A third strand of literature on social movements finds that grassroots- driven social 
movements, with transnational networks, may serve as powerful tools to counter the 
negative effects of neoliberal globalization and non-responsive political regimes on the 
urban poor (Ballard et al. 2005; Batliwala 2002; Lindell 2010; Mitullah 2010). 
Domestic affiliates to transnational movements for slum-dwellers and informal traders 
may provide an alternative political channel for the urban poor to engage as 
                                              
7 The literature on party linkages by Kitschelt (2000) and Stokes et al. (2013) will provide a framework for understanding the 
various ways that political parties and voters engage. 
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autonomous citizens.8 However, Larmer (2010) holds that recent movements on the 
continent are of a hybrid nature, intermarrying Western ideas, funding, methods and 
forms with domestic variants. Social movements are often shaped by the 
neopatrimonial political order they operate in (Waal and Ibreck 2013). How can a 
comparative study of Kenya and Zambia shed light on the determinants for political 
agency of the urban poor under supposedly democratic institutions?  
Kenya and Zambia formally transitioned to liberal democracy in the early 1990s, and 
the former one-party governments have been ousted through the ballot-box. Both 
countries hold relatively competitive elections and have developed highly diverse and 
pluralist civil societies. And in both countries, the “poor” constitute the majority of the 
urban population. These factors make Kenya and Zambia relevant cases for analyzing 
how and why the political agency of the urban poor has changed with the introduction 
of fundamental democratic institutions, understood as multiparty competition and 
political pluralism.  
Despite their similarities, Zambia arguably represents a “most likely” case for citizen-
based agency of the urban poor, while Kenya could be considered to represent a “least 
likely” case. In Zambia, the major opposition party (Patriotic Front) that emerged in 
the 2000s has been found to have a populist strategy that targeted the urban poor, 
adding a new type of socio-economic cleavage to the party system that had previously 
been characterized by ethno-clientelism (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009; Cheeseman 
and Larmer 2015; Resnick 2014). Although a pro-poor component has been identified 
also in the Kenyan opposition party (Orange Democratic Movement), Kenyan party 
politics are generally perceived as being based predominantly on multi-ethnic 
coalition-building (Arriola 2013; Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Elischer 2010).9   
These differences could be attributed to several factors. For almost a century, the 
urban population of Zambia has been one of the largest on the continent (40 percent), 
                                              
8 However, these scholars, as well as others, find that dependency on external actors is seen as producing its own problems 
for democratic engagement with the urban poor (Larmer 2010; Pommerolle 2010; Wit and Berner 2009).  
9 Both Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) and Resnick (2014) identify a pro-poor populist dimension to the largest Kenyan 
opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement, but the former find that ethno-clientelism still dominates.  
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whereas the Kenyan urban population is only about a quarter (25 percent) of the total 
(World Bank 2016b). As a rural bias has persisted in African electoral systems, this 
also reduces the salience of urban issues (Boone and Wahman 2013). Additionally, the 
Kenyan one-party state actively prevented cross-ethnic organizational bases from 
emerging within civil society, especially within the labor movement (LeBas 2011), 
and the country has been ridden by ethnic violence throughout the last century. By 
contrast, the Zambian one-party state relied more on corporatist ties to its substantially 
larger urban constituencies, and cross-ethnic organizational bases have been built in 
urban areas over time, especially within the influential labor movement (Cheeseman 
and Larmer 2015; LeBas 2011).10  
Hence, in the African context, Kenya could be considered a least likely (though 
possible) case for the urban poor to be mobilized in national-level politics as citizens, 
whereas Zambia could be considered a most likely case. However, as there has been 
limited exploration of what kind of agency it is that the urban poor exercise through 
political parties, we do not know whether mobilization in the two countries represent 
diverging or converging patterns, and the factors that contribute to either. 
In addition to political parties, social movements that seek to mobilize the socio-
economic interests of slum-dwellers and informal traders outside the electoral arena 
have emerged in Kenya and Zambia the last two decades. These SMOs aspire to 
decriminalize the urban poor’s livelihood strategies, and advance the rights and 
interests of their constituents. They do so by organizing the urban poor through 
membership, with corresponding rights and duties. These movement organizations rely 
on external support and are formally autonomous from the state and political parties, 
which may provide the urban poor with an alternative to political (ethno-) clientelism. 
However, there has been limited comparative research of what kind of agency they 
provide for the urban poor in practice. Furthermore, we do not know how movement 
mobilization interacts with electoral politics: whether SMOs enable the urban poor 
                                              
10 Although the Zambian one-party state was also built on a patronage machine, the country was less ridden by politically-
induced ethnic violence than Kenya 
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from escaping political clientelism, or whether these movements become permeated by 
the neopatrimonial order.  
In order to answer the overall research question, I have divided it into four sub-
questions: 
a) How are the urban poor mobilized by political parties and movement 
organizations in terms of collective benefits? 
b) How do political parties and movement organizations mobilize resources?  
c) What power asymmetries are forged between the urban poor and political 
parties/movement organizations?  
d) How does the interaction between political parties and movement organizations 
affect the political agency of the urban poor? 
As there have been few comparative studies of how the dual mobilization by political 
parties and social movements affect the political agency of the urban poor on the 
continent, this study has been of an explorative nature. During fieldwork stays in 
Kenya and Zambia I have interviewed grassroots activists, representatives from 
political parties and social movements, government officials, journalists, donors, 
brokers, vigilante groups and others, to understand these political dynamics. The 
analyses of why various constituencies of the urban poor are mobilized, and how, are 
to a large extent based on this interview material. However, the study also relies on 
secondary sources, especially for capturing political processes over time. By 
systematically comparing these political processes in the two countries I endeavor to 
provide a more holistic explanation of the political agency that today’s urban poor 
exercise through presumably democratic channels in Kenya and in Zambia. 
1.1 Brief history of the illegal city and the urban poor   
Before delving deeper into what political agency entails (the dependent variable), as 
well as its determinants, a more thorough description of today’s “urban poor” and their 
historical origins is in order. As the urban poor have received limited attention in the 
newer democratization and party literature on sub-Saharan Africa, it seems pertinent to 
show that urban poverty is a global phenomenon with shared features and a long 
political history. First and foremost, the “urban poor” is a socio-demographic category 
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that refers to those living in poverty in urban areas. This is a largely amorphous group 
of individuals who turn to all kinds of livelihood strategies. There is enormous variety 
in the specific socio-economic challenges and the political barriers facing these 
individuals, across continents and countries. However, there are also surprisingly 
many similarities. If the lives of the urban poor today were to be characterized by one 
common denominator, it is illegality. They live and work outside the law.  
In the 1970s, the relation between formal laws and regulations, and the informal set of 
rules and popular mechanisms for justice known as “legal pluralism,” began to 
develop within urban law. Fernandes and Varley (1998: 10) argue that urban 
legislation performs important functions in structuring and producing social space and 
shaping conditions for everyday life in the cities. Tranberg and Vaa (2004: 7) consider 
extra-legal housing and unregistered economic activities as constituting the informal 
city. In contrast, the formal city consists of the urban government and its agents, 
institutions, rules and regulations gradually introduced in order to control urban space 
and economic life. The formal city includes registered segments of the urban economy 
and buildings and infrastructure that have been established legally. Kamete (2004) 
argues that there is a dialectic between the informal city and the formal city: an 
enduring love–hate relationship.11  
The legal and institutional frameworks governing the use of land and urban living are 
often elitist and exclusionary. However, the informal city is not exclusively the domain 
of the poor, and better-off segments also engage in illegal land occupation and 
construction, at times reaping extraordinarily high profits (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 8). 
The same applies to informal production and trade of goods and services, whereby 
entrepreneurs can enrich themselves rapidly, sometimes by exploiting workers without 
contracts. Growing numbers of workers in the formal economy are now supplementing 
their income by engaging in informal activities (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 7). For the 
urban poor, however, illegality is often the only option. The sheer scale of illegality in 
                                              
11 The latter represented by large established enterprises and the urban planning and management system. 
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sub-Saharan African cities makes the “law” an appropriate focus for urban research 
(McAuslan 1998; Leduka 1998, cited in Leduka 2004).  
The role of law in creating illegal cities for the African urban poor has a long history. 
It is well-established that colonial administrations in African colonies implemented a 
racially segregated system to cultivate and extract resources from colonized land under 
a repressive, hierarchical, imperialist system. According to Mamdani (1995, referred in 
Brown 2005: 82), colonial “citizens” were governed by civil law, and were able to 
own and rent (crown-) land on the basis of individual private property rights. Lands of 
African “subjects” were governed by customary law, and Africans were required to 
live on these communal lands unless employed elsewhere as temporary labor. The 
colonial administration actively sought to keep the African majority in rural areas 
where they could be ruled indirectly through chiefs, by restricting their presence in 
cities to temporary labor migration (Burton 2005).  
According to Burton, most forms of African urban livelihood strategies were made 
illegal during colonialism. The presence of poor and unregulated workers did not fit 
into the racist modernization model envisioned, and was perceived to threaten law and 
order. Across the colonies of the British, Belgians, Portuguese and Dutch, it was 
common to have laws that made it a crime for an African to enter cities without a valid 
permit as a temporary job-seeker/employee or to reside in certain areas.12 Breaches of 
these laws constituted a significant proportion of crimes in the colonies (Burton 2005: 
25-26).13  
 “Post-colonialism” refers to how the process and outcome of independence from 
former colonizers, which—as much as this emerged as a political struggle against the 
colonial state—ended up with the successor state adopting and continuing colonial 
                                              
12 Regardless of work status, mobility was circumscribed by municipal by-laws that forbade African presence in certain 
sections of the town at night and required Africans to carry a light at all times everywhere else between nightfall and sunrise 
(Burton 2005). 
13 While the city and its rapidly urbanizing population were heavily restrained and regulated by colonial authorities, they 
were paradoxically also hiding places for escaping various forms of authority and domination. Burton (2005) writes that in 
the period 1919 to 1941, of the various fugitives to be found in Das es Salaam, most prevalent were tax-dodgers. 
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aspects (Dabashi 2012).14 In most former British colonies, constitutions were based on 
the Westminster model, through extensive involvement by the former colonial 
government. The racial component was removed, but many of the legal, administrative 
and political features were kept, including a hierarchical, centralized state model that 
could maintain political control through indirect rule. The ethnic component of politics 
was continued, developing into what was to become known as the “patrimonial state.” 
The aim of political control led to the continued undesirability of large urban masses 
considered less easily contained through patrimonial politics. Legislation on urban 
livelihood activities and living was therefore retained, with some modifications. The 
concentration of political power in the president and the one-party state simply 
transferred private property from colonial hands to domestic political elites who set 
about controlling this valuable resource in a highly discretionary manner.  
The one-party regimes met their fate in the face of the political and economic crises 
culminating in the 1980s. As a result of internal and external pressure for replacing 
these increasingly repressive and economically failing political systems, most African 
countries embarked upon processes of economic and political liberalization. The 
World Bank and the IMF made their aid conditional on the existence of such 
liberalization programs. The economic restructuring processes, with their emphasis on 
reducing the public sector, and liberalizing and privatizing state enterprises and 
services, followed a neoliberal trend known as the “Washington consensus,” which 
rose to become the global economic paradigm following the fall of the Soviet Union 
(Goldman 2005). Reconstruction of property regimes regulating urban space was 
integral to the new economic strategy. Drawing on liberalist theories, the approach 
emphasized the rule of law (and order), a dichotomy between the formal and the 
informal, and public–private partnerships guided by private initiative. According to 
Brown (2001), such planning regulations and economic development policies created 
physical spaces that did not consider the needs of the urban poor, because priority was 
given to investors.  
                                              
14 The former colonial masters were heavily involved in the transition process and sought to keep close political and 
economic ties with the new political elites in these newly liberated states. 
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In the interface between illegality and urban poverty, two subgroups among the urban 
poor stand out due to their size: slum-dwellers and informal traders. In Zambia, 74 
percent of the urban population are slum-dwellers (UN-Habitat 2015) and in Kenya, 
the number is 71 percent (UN-Habitat 2013). The Zambian trade industry accounted 
for the second largest share of employed people (12.2 percent) after agriculture, of 
whom 89.3 percent were the informal sector (Central Statistical Office 2013: 10). 
Within non-agricultural urban work in Kenya, 61 percent is informal, and 38 percent is 
within informal trade (WIEGO 2011: 2). However, the Kenyan and Zambian figures 
reflect a global trend. 
1.1.1 Slum-dwellers: structure owners and tenants 
A slum is an unplanned and unregulated settlements with relatively low rents 
(Bocquier et al. 2009), substandard housing and poor infrastructure (Gulyani et al. 
2010). Durand-Lasserve (1998) divides the term “illegal settlement” into two broad 
categories: illegal subdivision, which refers to settlements established on private or 
public land that has been subdivided to produce individual plots for sale or rent, 
without respecting permits, planning regulations and legal titles; and land invasion, 
which refers to when land is occupied for housing purposes without the permission of 
the owner. The first situation increases the difficulties of city governments trying to 
install services and legalize tenure in such areas. The second category affects the 
residents in terms of security of tenure, sale or mortgage of property, and access to 
infrastructure and services (Durand-Lasserve 1998: 235). Hansen and Vaa (2004: 9) 
add a third: construction or use of housing without permission and in contravention of 
building codes.  
Most urban residents in the cities of the developing countries find it difficult to obtain 
land and housing through established legal or formal processes (Leduka 2004: 176). 
Durand-Lasserve (1998: 243) notes that urban planning norms concerning design, 
construction and servicing standards are ill-adapted to the needs of most of the 
population. Together with conventional legal and procedural norms, they exacerbate 
social segregation by “creating” illegality. Laws categorize—or stigmatize—illegal 
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settlements as areas falling outside the law, whose residents are liable to legal 
sanctions.  Durand-Lasserve see the origins and organization of illegal settlements as 
consequences of legal requirements that the low-income population cannot hope to 
meet (Durand-Lasserve 1998: 246).  
The World Bank became one of the leading advocates of land registration and titling 
programs in Africa (Boone 2007: 572).15 Formalized and individualized land was 
expected to facilitate the buying and selling of land property for the urban poor; and 
property was to be used as collateral to spur investment, production and labor.16 Thus, 
privatization was assumed to contribute to empowering the poor (Soto 2003). As a 
consequence of these policies, housing in many informal settlements became 
commercialized and a range of housing sub-markets emerged (Amis and Lloyd 1990, 
cited in Hansen and Vaa, 2004). In many settlements, rental accommodation became 
the major form of tenancy. Privatization of urban space was turned into a resource and 
tool for international and domestic elites, while common spaces were increasingly 
enclosed and made inaccessible for the urban poor (Brown 2005: 88-93). The results 
were greater speculation and corruption, squatter displacement, erosion of common-
pool resources and rising conflict levels in the slums.  
A large proportion of Africa’s urban population today is living in unauthorized and un-
serviced settlements (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 7). In some cities, up to 90 percent of the 
new housing stock is provided informally (Oppenheimer and Spicer 2011: 14). Illegal 
settlements in Africa are different from illegal settlements in Latin America and Asia 
(Durand-Lasserve 1998). First of all, the proportion of the urban population living 
under such conditions is much higher in Africa. Second, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in African tenure systems and their relationship to state law, as 
customary law17 continues to play a major role in urban land management. No housing 
                                              
15 Already by the early 1970s, the World Bank decided to lend capital for housing projects in Third World cities, especially 
site-and-service schemes, but also improvements for upgrading squatter areas (Seymour 1975: 74). 
16 In 1996, the second UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) urged transparency, decentralization, local 
government, citizen participation and empowerment, credit access, regularization of self-built housing, and revision of 
institutional and legal frameworks for informal settlements (Hansen and Vaa 2004).  
17 Customary law accords usufruct rights to agricultural land collectively to a particular group (extended family network, or 
people who cleared the land); in theory, these rights cannot be sold. 
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policy in African cities can afford to ignore customary tenure, due to the enormous 
demand and the lack of practical alternatives (Durand-Lasserve 1998: 236).  
1.1.2 Informal traders: marketers and street vendors 
The term “informal economy” was coined by the British anthropologist Keith Hart 
(1973) and grew in significance after the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
adopted it (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 10).18 The term was embraced by the ILO and 
policymakers as a proof of an entrepreneurial spirit among the poor that was to be 
facilitated (Nustad 2004: 45). The ILO began facilitating the development of micro-
enterprises in the informal sector (Hansen and Vaa 2004). However, Marxist-oriented 
writers saw the “informal economy” as a bourgeois term that precluded class relations 
(Nustad 2004). Hart himself later criticized the usage of his concept where 
development economists were employing it in ways that “appealed to the sensibilities 
of an intellectual class who could not grasp what the economic activities in question 
positively represented” (Hart 1992: 217, cited in Nustad 2004: 59).   
According to Nelson (1979: 27), dualist theory assumes that informal sector jobs are 
usually poorly paid  and dead-end. By implication, most informal-sector workers 
would prefer formal-sector jobs. As this is increasingly difficult because of the 
continuous influx of urban workers and low creation of formal jobs, the informal 
sector becomes (according to dualist theory) a breeding ground for frustration and 
anger, social disruption and political instability.  
When the idea of an informal economy was launched in the 1970s, many emerging 
states in Africa were seeking to organize their economies with development policies 
aimed at regulating the proliferation of the informal economy. However, the collapse 
of the state in the 1980s and 1990s led to a general informalization of the economy 
(Hansen and Vaa 2004: 11). Structural adjustment programs had severe consequences 
                                              
18 Keith Hart based his characterization on what he considered the meaningless official figures on the “not economically 
active” population usual in statistics at the time. Thus, “informality” is not in itself a characteristic of an activity, but is 
signified by being left out by a definition that is “formal” (Nustad 2004: 45). Several social scientists began questioning the 
useful of this dichotomy, as it was closely tied to and intertwined with the formal economy. Nustad (2004) argued that a rigid 
definition of the informal as a sector separate from the formal should be avoided, but that the dichotomy was nonetheless 
useful, as informal activities are defined by the formal intervention. 
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on unemployment and poverty for many people, with greater social inequality across 
urban space (Lourenco-Lindell 2004: 84). Hansen (2004) found that political and 
economic liberalization led to more antagonistic and substantively different relations 
between the informal economy and government. The “free market” gave priority to 
foreign investment and big capital, whereas the informal sector became subject to 
control and regulations. Thus there emerged a misfit between the rhetoric of the free 
market and localized efforts for sustaining livelihood (Hansen 2004: 63). 
Lourenco-Lindell (2004) highlights the importance of distinguishing between informal 
activities, depending on type, level, resources and local context. Informal economic 
activities include small manufactures, street vending, informal transport, and other 
precarious jobs. Within the domain of trade, Lourenco-Lindell (2004) identifies two 
strategies: accumulation and survival. Lucrative businesses that straddle the 
formal/informal divide are very different from daily survival struggles through small-
scale trading. Informal traders in African countries for which data are available 
contributed between 85 and 99 percent of total employment in trade, and between 46 
and 70 percent of total value added (Skinner 2008a: 7).  
Street trade is among the largest subgroups in the informal economy (Brown et al. 
2010).19 Millions of people around the world make a living by selling goods on the 
streets, and the surge is expected to continue, particularly in Africa (Skinner 2008a).  
While the informal sector is estimated to account for 60 percent of all urban jobs on 
the continent, it accounts for 90 percent of all new urban jobs. After home-working, 
street trade is estimated to provide the largest share of these jobs (Skinner 2008a: 5). 
Street vendors are usually found in the lowest bracket of the income chain, and face 
similar hurdles as an occupational group. Street vending has been illegal since colonial 
times, seen as a nuisance and source of crime, dirt and disease. However, policies 
regarding street vending have been changing, from eradication towards formalization, 
partly promoted by the World Bank’s “rule of law” agenda. However, informal traders 
may also operate from informal markets, not only on the streets. Also informal 
                                              
19 Urban dwellers rely on cash income and markets to meet their basic needs and are more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices 
than (subsistence) farmers (Siegle 2011: 21).  
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markets are criminalized, as these fall outside the law and formal regulatory 
framework. 
To sum up: most urban dwellers who live in slums earn a livelihood in the low-income 
part of the informal economy, with the majority engaging in informal trade. The two 
social categories largely overlap, but not necessarily, as both the slums and the 
informal economy are very diverse. Nevertheless, the urban poor across the African 
continent face similar challenges pertaining to how legislation and policies establish 
their livelihoods as illegal, making life in urban areas highly precarious.20 The socio-
economic grievances that follow from illegality could potentially manifest in various 
political conflicts mobilized through democratic channels.      
1.2 Explaining political agency of the urban poor    
1.2.1 Political agency of the urban poor: the dependent variable  
The conceptualization of the dependent variable draws mostly on literature on other 
regions than sub-Saharan Africa. The concept of “subalternity” was developed by 
Gramsci (1975, referred to in Green 2010), as pertaining to political, socio-economic, 
linguistic, racist, sexist or other forms of subordination. For Gramsci, subaltern groups 
needed to become self-aware, organize and engage in political struggle to transform 
their social position (Green 2010: 19). Green contrasts Gramsci to Gayatri Spivak, 
who viewed the “subalterns” as not merely oppressed, but so displaced as to lack 
political organization and representation. If they achieve this, they ceased to be 
subalterns, hence her famous remark: “the subaltern cannot speak” (Spivak 1988). 
Bayat (2000: 534) applies the term “subaltern” to characterize marginalized and 
deinstitutionalized groups in Third World cities.  
Democratization may facilitate conditions for subalterns to engage on a collective 
basis without fear of state repercussions. According to Schmitter and Karl (1991: 115), 
                                              
20 Rules and regulations on rights to housing versus work in urban space operate through different modalities.The need to 
share a work space together with others versus the need for a place to live require different forms of legislation and 
regulation. However, ignoring either dimension for the urban poor necessarily affects the same group on the other dimension 
as well. 
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citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. While all regimes have rulers 
and a public, only democracies have citizens. Modern democracies also require 
representatives—whether directly or indirectly elected—to carry out the real political 
work. The central question therefore is how the political class or elite is chosen and 
held accountable. In addition to the electoral channel for representation, civil society 
features a vast apparatus for specialized representation based on functional interest, 
such as interest associations and social movements.  As noted by Schmitter and Karl 
(1991: 116), autonomous civil society groups can restrain the arbitrary actions of 
rulers, but also contribute to forming civic-minded citizens. They may serve as 
intermediaries between individuals and the state, capable of resolving conflict and 
controlling the behavior of their members without public coercion.  
This study ultimately seeks to explain why the political agency of the urban poor takes 
the form of “citizenship,” “clientship,” or a combination: “hybrid agency.” Taylor 
(2004: 213), in her exploration of political relationships between people and politicians 
in Latin America from the 1820s up to the present, distinguishes between political 
agency understood as “clientship” or as “citizenship.” She considers citizenship as 
founded upon autonomous political agency, which combines the tools and framework 
of citizenship (formalized legal rights and responsibilities) with a sense of identity as a 
political being. Citizenship “is predicated on an assumption of equality between leader 
and masses, politician and voter” (Taylor 2004: 215).  
Clientship, by contrast, is seen as the location and expression of agency under political 
clientelism  (Taylor 2004: 214). Clientship is premised not on political equality, but on 
inequality; not rights, but favors; not democracy, but negotiated authoritarianism; not 
formal relationships, but personal ties. It concerns power relationships between parties 
recognized as being inherently and sharply unequal.  Importantly, however, clientship 
is considered a form of agency, as opposed to Spivak’s subalternity conceptualization 
where subalterns have no voice or agency. Clientship is also based on reciprocal 
relationships, as opposed to non-engagement or exit. 
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In line with Taylor’s reasoning, Fox (1994: 153) argues that an important indicator of 
whether subordinated people transition from clientelism to citizens is whether “poor 
people get access to whatever material resources the state has to offer without having 
to forfeit their right to articulate their interests autonomously.” Stokes et al. (2013: 6-
7) consider clientelism as contingent distribution, in contrast to programmatic 
distribution. Thus, citizenship is premised on autonomy and political equality with 
regards to pursuing programmatic benefits, as opposed to clientship, which is premised 
on nonautonomy and political inequality through contingent benefits.  
According to Taylor (2004), clientship or citizenship is forged through the relations 
that political parties establish with voters. These dichotomous forms of political 
agency—citizenship and clientship—will form the basis for the dependent variable in 
this thesis. However, it will be extended to also cover such relationships between the 
urban poor and other organizations claiming to “represent” their interests: more 
specifically, social movement organizations (SMOs). Following Schmitter and Karl’s 
(1991) reasoning, the study will consider whether social movements, as intermediaries 
between individuals and the state, contribute to forming citizens.  
1.2.2 Why mobilize the urban poor? 
Why would political parties or SMOs mobilize the urban poor? The “urban poor” have 
long been the subject of political unease and confusion. Within mainstream Marxism, 
the urban poor were considered the Lumpenproletariat and later a reserve army of 
labor, understood as the “dangerous classes” who were politically non-committed and 
thus a potential threat to the interests of the true working class (Bayat 2000: 536). 
During colonial times, British official perceived Africans in Dar es Salaam as an 
aggregate mass about which, one official complained in 1930, “[w]e know less … than 
we do of remote tribes”  (Burton, 2005:12).21 In the first two decades after Tanzanian 
independence, the post-colonial authorities scathingly referred to the unemployed, 
underemployed and informally employed persons from the city as “parasites,” 
                                              
21 Although structured around imperialist and racist colonialization, the urban administrations’ attitudes towards the new 
urban masses in Africa bore resemblance to the Victorian anxiety of the British bourgeoisie towards the urban poor in 
industrializing British cities (Burton 2005). 
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“loiterers,” and “enemies of the policy of socialism and self-reliance” (Burton 2005: 
4). In the 1960s, US social scientists were concerned about the growing urban 
underclass in the Third World, believed to be a breeding ground for radical guerrilla 
movements and a potential threat to the existing order (Bayat 2000).  
By contrast, Bayat (2000: 534) proposes viewing the activism of the urban poor 
(“subalterns”) in Third World cities today as a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary.” 
The modern state is not for them: it imposes costly conditions which they perceive as 
impossible or undesirable to meet. “Quiet encroachment” refers to non-collective but 
prolonged direct action by individuals and families to ensure the basic necessities of 
their lives, such as shelter and (informal) jobs, sometimes by illegal means (Bayat 
2000: 536).22 Bayat explains the lack of collective demand-making by lack of 
organizational power, often due to political repression in developing countries.   
During the last two decades, however, many developing countries in Africa have 
opened the political space for more democratic contestation. This study will employ 
the lens of resource mobilization theory (Edwards and Gillham 2013; McCarthy and 
Zald 1977) to analyze why the introduction of multiparty elections and political 
pluralism may induce political parties and SMOs to mobilize urban poor 
constituencies. The Resource Mobilization School is concerned with “the dynamics 
and tactics of social movement growth, decline and change” (McCarthy and Zald 
1977: 1213). Social movements must possess resources—such as legitimacy, money, 
facilities and labor—in order to work towards goal achievement: “resources must be 
controlled or mobilized before action is possible” (ibid.: 1220–1221). However, this 
study will apply the resource mobilization framework to social movements and 
political parties alike.  
Edwards and Gillham (2013) make a distinction between resource access and resource 
types. Resource access may be obtained from either internal sources (self-production 
and aggregation from constituents) or external sources (co-optation or patronage). A 
                                              
22 While episodic collective action occurs in these fleeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology and structured 
organization, Bayat does not consider this a “social movement.”  
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type of resource that political parties and SMOs may produce is legitimacy (by 
provision of collective benefits), in turn resulting in votes, membership, labor or other 
forms of support. However, material resources may also be generated from 
constituents through clientelism (understood as contingent benefits).  
Multiparty elections have been central in recent democratization processes. While 
contentious collective action can come about through revolt or revolution,23 political 
elites may prefer granting political openings for democratic participation in order to 
stem political discontent and instability. Ideally, political parties are intended to 
represent and integrate the electorate; to aggregate interests and recruit and train 
political leaders; and to make government accountable, controlling opposition and 
dissent (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 4). Indeed, this has been considered, in normative, 
democratic terms, as the raison d’être of political parties. If political parties functioned 
according to these normative assumptions, we might expect to find socio-economic 
grievances from a growing segment of the urban poor to be reflected in party politics.  
However, there has been limited emphasis on the role of the urban poor in national 
politics in sub-Saharan Africa, where ethno-clientelism has been considered to 
predominate (Posner 2005; Walle 2003). Ethno-clientelism has been a tool for political 
elites to maintain their power and interests through divide-and-rule tactics, and is a 
legacy of colonialism and the one-party regimes that followed. Nevertheless, a few 
case studies, mainly from Zambia and Kenya, find that opposition parties have begun 
mobilizing the urban poor through populist promises (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; 
Resnick 2014). Resnick (2011) argues that opposition parties may target the urban 
poor through populist promises in order to out-compete incumbent ethno-clientelist 
parties, using Zambia as an example.24 This can be seen as an example of how 
opposition parties that lack material resources can generate legitimacy through the 
promises of collective benefits, in order to become competitive. Also Cheeseman and 
Larmer (2015) find that opposition parties in Zambia and Kenya seek to mobilize the 
                                              
 
24 However, Resnick does not explore in depth how the Zambian opposition party interacts with urban poor constituencies.  
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urban poor through populist promises, but conclude that ethno-clientelist party 
machines continue to dominate Kenyan party politics.25 Thus, the urban poor in these 
studies are seen as predominantly mobilized through either ethno-clientelism (Kenya) 
or populist promises by opposition parties (Zambia).  
The literature on neopopulist mobilization of the urban poor in Latin America, on the 
other hand, considers the urban poor to be mobilized through a combination of 
populist appeals and clientelism (Levitsky 2007; Weyland 2003), but without the 
ethnic component typically associated with clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Typically, these parties use brokers to distribute clientelist rewards and punishments to 
followers (Stokes et al. 2013). Thus, neopopulist parties can be considered to generate 
legitimacy through promises of pro-poor, collective benefits, while generating (or 
securing) material resources through contingent benefits. Without delving deeper into 
how the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia interact with political parties, we cannot 
know whether these constituencies are linked to political parties simply through pro-
poor appeals for collective benefits, neopopulism, or ethno-clientelism.  
While political parties in sub-Saharan Africa generally have not been expected to 
mobilize the political grievances of the urban poor, another type of organization has 
given rise to more positive expectations (Batliwala 2002; Lindell 2010; Millstein et al. 
2003; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007; Mitullah 2010). The past two decades have seen 
the emergence of transnational social movements working for the rights and interests 
of the urban poor. Especially two transnational social movements have been seen as 
influential in representing and organizing the sub-segments of slum-dwellers and 
informal traders:  Slum/Shack Dwellers International, and Streetnet International.26 
These organizations claim to be by and for the urban poor. Due to their grassroots-led, 
member-based organization, these movements have been considered a more 
                                              
25 The emergence of such pro-poor, populist parties is attributed to the existence of an influential urban political economy, 
and how the combination of pro-poor and ethnic appeals has enabled opposition parties to challenge the party machine of the 
incumbent (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). 
26 These transnational umbrella organizations have shaped, networked and organized grassroots associations across the globe, 
creating “glocal” social movements. Both are rooted in grassroots affiliates of the urban poor, but engage with government 
bodies and international agencies to produce political change that is supposed to reflect the interests of their constituencies. 
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democratic, representative and accountable alternative for promoting the interests of 
the urban poor than political parties or top–down, technocratic development 
interventions led by international agencies.27 Both have domestic affiliates in Kenya 
and Zambia.  
Although clientelism has typically been associated with party politics, the 
phenomenon has also been identified within civil society, including SMOs. External 
actors (donors) may be important sources for material resources for SMOs, through 
co-optation and patronage. SMOs may also be co-opted by political parties, resulting 
in hybrid movements (Waal and Ibreck 2013). Pommerolle (2010) argues that the 
“extraversion” of social protest—reaching out to the international sphere—may 
reproduce political inequality and/or coercion between domestic SMO actors, between 
external and domestic actors, as well as between SMOs and the state, resulting in a 
form of reforming authoritarianism. Funding and other resource flows to civil society 
organizations in sub-Saharan Africa from donors or individual politicians, may turn 
SMOs into patrons vis-à-vis their constituents (Wit and Berner 2009). However, there 
is limited knowledge on how these movements engage with the urban poor in Kenya 
and Zambia, and how movement mobilization interacts with party politics.  
Hence, even if the socio-economic interests of the urban poor are mobilized by 
opposition parties and SMOs in the two countries, we still do not know what kind of 
agency they provide for their constituents. Mobilization of the urban poor can be 
motivated by a need to generate legitimacy through the provision of collective 
benefits, but also from incentives to generate material resources through contingent 
benefits. While the former is associated with citizenship, the latter reflect clientship. In 
order to know which of the two types of agency that political mobilization of the urban 
poor entails, we need to know how political parties and SMOs engage with the urban 
poor. 
                                              
27 The latter have often been criticized for being positioned within the neoliberal model themselves, and failing to represent 
the interests of the urban poor adequately. 
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1.2.3 Main theoretical argument and empirical findings  
Creating clients or citizens through power asymmetries  
What determines whether the urban poor act as citizens or clients? Why may a person 
find it difficult, or near-impossible, to turn down an offer of clientelist rewards and 
instead choose citizen-based agency? Hickey and Bracking (2005: 851) argue that the 
differing ways in which poverty and the poorest are politically “represented” 
contribute to explaining the ways in which politics both reproduce and reduce 
poverty.28 
A main theoretical contribution of this study will be to identify inductively how 
relationships are forged between the urban poor and their representative 
organizations—whether political parties or SMOs—which create citizenship or 
clientship. By turning to an understanding of relations as mechanisms (Tilly 2001), the 
emphasis is placed on actively invoked power asymmetries that prevent the urban poor 
from acting as citizens through presumably democratic channels. I identify three types 
of power asymmetries that restrict how constituents can enact agency as citizens 
through political parties or SMOs: lack of information; lack of collective 
decisionmaking; and lack of protection from coercion. Information, decisionmaking 
and coercion represent three different sources of power. Low power asymmetries 
allow the urban poor to act as autonomous citizens. High power asymmetries prevent 
them from escaping clientelism. Figure 1 illustrates how mechanisms of power 




                                              
28 However, Hickey and Bracking (2005) advocate for relocating poverty reduction within a broader political project of 
justice, as they consider the gaining of a voice and material progress to require more than political representation as such.  
29 The level of abstraction—three power asymmetries at a nominal scale (high/low)—allows for identification of such 
asymmetric relations either between individuals, individuals and their “representative” organizations, or overall grassroots 
constituencies and their “representative” organizations. Several relational mechanisms could probably be added to Figure 1, 
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Figure 1: Creating political agency through power asymmetry between representative 
organizations and constituents 
The first type of power asymmetries concerns the structuring of information flows 
between representative organizations and their grassroots. Creating barriers to access 
information, withholding or manipulating information, secrecy and non-
transparency—all are classic tools for maintaining clientelist resources and 
dependency. Without access to essential information, the grassroots become inherently 
dependent on their representatives. When the grassroots are not allowed the same 
insights into the organizational processes as actors further up in the social movement 
or party structure—for instance regarding budgets and decisionmaking—this creates 
power asymmetries that can reinforce patron–client relations, by keeping the 
grassroots ignorant and open to manipulation.  
This can become especially problematic in settings where aid flows create incentives 
for rent-seeking behavior and corruption, or where politicians seek to protect their 
political and economic privileges. The focus on the importance of access to 
information is nothing new, and is reflected in the increased attention on 
“transparency” from the donor community (Ghosh and Kharas 2011). In this study, I 
focus on the need to take this ideal to its ultimate conclusion. Only when information 
on organizational processes travels all the way to the end beneficiaries can the 
grassroots turn the torch upwards to shed light on the activities of their superiors, both 
organizational leaders and donors, thereby enforcing accountability both ways.  
Information Decisionmaking Coercion 
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The second type of power asymmetries concerns the structuring of decisionmaking 
power.30 First and foremost, the criteria for membership (inclusion) have important 
bearings on the ability for grassroots constituencies to enact agency. Another 
fundamental mechanism for leveling out decisionmaking asymmetry is to allow 
members to collectively elect representatives (and stand for elections)—which has 
typically not been the case with professional, technical expert staff at non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), or many political parties in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Collective decisions or vetoes regarding utilization of resources, agenda setting and 
strategies also belong under this bracket.  
Decisionmaking asymmetries can be seen in connection with the mode of exchange 
characteristic of clientelism, which is based on contingent benefits (Stokes et al. 2013). 
To understand how contingent benefits work, we must identify the mechanisms 
through which decisions over resources are made, thus whether procedures are in place 
to make decisions on benefits less contingent, and more procedural and collective. 
Accountability for the use of these resources shifts towards the funders if mechanisms 
are not in place for turning accountability towards the grassroots. If the grassroots do 
not have a say in determining how organizational resources should be strategically 
spent, and who the representatives that make executive decisions on their behalf 
should be, they are more easily turned into clients who merely respond to the whims of 
their funders.  
A third type of power asymmetries concerns coercion. The (threat of) use of coercion 
may come in many forms, from brute violence to physically restraining movement, 
through for instance access to police and security personnel, and exploitation of the 
court system. When grassroots do not want to comply with efforts to make them into 
clients, severe imbalance in their ability to apply force vis-à-vis their representatives 
can produce clientship. In countries with authoritarian legacies and high levels of 
corruption, elites may resort to coercion to ensure compliance, especially when access 
                                              
30 I considered letting “participation” constitute the second set of mechanisms. However, because participation without 
decision-making power is a mechanism that could be used to deprive people of agency, employing such a conceptualization 
could mean covering up power asymmetries rather than exposing them.  
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to coercion is linked to the financial resources to pay for such services. However, 
coercion is also a tool used by the urban poor grassroots as a last resort when other 
political channels are closed, for instance through violence and riots. 
Without information, collective decisionmaking power or freedom from coercion, the 
grassroots have a difficult time acting autonomously. Such power asymmetries do not 
appear out of nowhere: they are created and maintained. However, they can be 
invoked deliberately or unwittingly. For the grassroots to act as autonomous citizens 
through their representative organizations, all three forms of asymmetries need to be 
addressed. Deprived of information, collective decisionmaking power and protection 
from coercion, they have few tools to counter attempts to make them clients.   
As will become evident throughout the thesis, mechanisms of power asymmetry are 
extremely flexible and dynamic. In the empirical world, relations between 
representative organizations and their constituents consist of a multitude of fluctuating, 
gradual, multilayered and sometimes contradictory mechanisms, although some may 
have more significance than others. They may also emerge at different levels. When 
the urban poor are partly subjected to patron–client relations, and partly allowed to 
engage as autonomous citizens, their agency can be considered as being of a hybrid 
nature. Hybrid agency means that the urban poor are simultaneously engaged in 
political processes that enhance and undermine their agency as citizens. To advance 
their interests, the grassroots navigate between citizen-ship and clientship, using the 
tools at hand.  
Often, discreet or “hidden” measures to reinforce dependency are more relevant for 
understanding how clientship is maintained in supposedly democratic systems that 
cannot rely on direct up-front repression. Rich, in-depth empirical analysis can help in 
assessing the extent to which the engagement of the urban poor is characterized by 
clientship or citizenship.  Power asymmetries may operate simultaneously and 
reinforce each other. Control over decisionmaking regarding financial resources is 
facilitated by the withholding of information. The ability or incentive of a patron to 
use coercion may derive from his/her ability to make decisions on financial resources.  
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Lastly, the interaction between political parties and SMOs may affect the political 
agency of the urban poor. For instance, if the door is closed for acting as autonomous 
citizens through political parties, but open in an SMO, acting as clients for a political 
patron may be considered the best option in the electoral sphere, while simultaneously 
engaging as citizens through the movement (or the other way around). The urban poor 
may thus find themselves being pulled in both directions. However, if a political party 
effectively co-opts an SMO, the agency of the grassroots will also be affected. As 
political parties control government, citizen-based movement engagement can succeed 
in advancing full citizenship to the urban poor only by creating pressure on (potential) 
governing parties to do the same.    
Main empirical findings: hybrid agency through neopopulist parties and 
extraverted, member-based SMOs 
Prior to the 1990s, the populations in Kenya and Zambia, as in most other sub-Saharan 
countries, were governed by patrimonial one-party regimes, founded on ethno-
clientelism. However, despite Kenya having a larger rural population and a legacy of a 
more ethnicized civil and political society than Zambia, the urban poor have risen to 
national prominence in both countries during the last two decades. This study will 
show how the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia have obtained a hybrid form of 
political agency through multiparty competition and political pluralism, whereby they 
constantly navigate between citizenship and clientship. Within the electoral sphere, 
hybrid agency is exercised through engagement with opposition parties that 
increasingly resemble the neopopulist parties found in Latin American countries. 
Within the civil society sphere, hybrid agency is exercised through extraverted, but 
member-based social movements.  
In both Kenya and Zambia, the opposition parties mobilize voters through pro-poor 
appeals, with promises of low cost (public) housing and an end to evictions and slum 
clearances, as well as through promises of trading space for informal vendors. Thus, 
opposition parties address the socio-economic grievances that follow from 
criminalization of slum-dwelling and informal trade. While the Zambian opposition 
party won the presidency through its mobilizing strategy, the Kenyan presidential 
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opposition candidate gained the majority in the capital, and the party dominated the 
poorer urban areas.  
At the same time, these political parties transformed these socio-economic grievances 
of the urban poor stemming from illegality into clientelist assets. Politicians reduce 
their expenditures and protect their own, vested economic interests by clientifying the 
urban poor. Clientelist brokers were used to informally redistribute trading space and 
slum-housing, often through coercive and violent measures, to reward supporters and 
punish opponents. Thus, programmatic components of cheaper housing or access to 
trading space became intertwined with clientelism. While the importance of ethnicity 
in political clientelism was found to be reduced, especially in Zambia, clientelism 
continues alongside programmatic promises to the urban poor. In Kenya, however, 
ethnic marginalization and socio-economic grievances are perceived to overlap 
(structure owners versus tenants), which blurs the distinction between socio-economic 
and ethnic interests.   
In the civil society sphere, Kenyan and Zambian SMOs also mobilized the socio-
economic grievances of the urban poor that derive from the criminalization of slum-
dwelling and informal trade. By providing their members with rights and obligations, 
and through (sometimes successful) work to provide collective benefits, in the form of 
laws, policies and programs, these movements could be considered to enhance the 
urban poor’s ability to engage as citizens. However, their dependence on external 
material support, as well as the incentives these SMOs create for rent-seeking, has also 
made these SMOs provide contingent benefits to their constituents, turning the latter 
into clients. Sometimes, their membership requirements have also led to the exclusion 
of the more marginalized: tenants and street vendors.   
As Kenyan and Zambian SMOs generally adhere to pluralist ideals and depend on 
external support, while the opposition parties use a neopopulist strategy towards the 
urban poor, they have not established strong (institutionalized) ties to each other. 
Furthermore, although both SMOs and opposition parties have endorsed an overall 
pro-poor strategy, the two types of actors target different sub-constituencies of the 
 35 
urban poor. The Kenyan opposition party has predominantly mobilized the tenants 
through its neopopulist strategy, while the SMOs seek to unite tenants and structure 
owners. In Zambia, the opposition party has mobilized street vendors through its 
neopopulist strategy, while the SMOs seek to unite all informal traders. When SMOs 
begin challenging the foundations of political clientelism in slums and informal 
markets, they have faced problems of political co-optation. Consequently, the urban 
poor may find themselves in contradictory and sometimes self-defeating political 
processes if they engage in both structures.  
The main findings of this study are captured in Figure 2.  
Scope conditions: 
 
   
 
POS: 



















   
Figure 2: Explaining hybrid agency of the urban poor31  
 
The empirical analyses will show that there are many similarities pertaining to how 
opposition parties and SMOs mobilize the urban poor. The introduction of multiparty 
competition and political pluralism led opposition parties and SMOs to engage in two, 
contradictory patterns of resource mobilization. On the one hand, opposition parties 
and SMOs increasingly need to rely on (promises of) provision of collective benefits 
to the urban poor in order to generate legitimacy. The organizations’ access to material 
                                              
31 It is important to note that “urban poor majority” only refer to the urban population, and not to the total, national 
population.  















resources depends on a legitimate claim to represent these constituents in order to 
obtain their votes, membership subscriptions or other forms of endorsement in the face 
of competition. On the other hand, opposition parties and SMOs generate more 
material resources for themselves by providing contingent benefits to the urban poor.  
How these contradictory patterns of resource mobilization affect the agency of the 
urban poor will depend on the relative importance of the power asymmetries that are 
forged between these “representative” organizations and their constituents. Thus, 
while opposition parties and SMOs have incentives for treating the urban poor both as 
clients and as citizens, it is only by looking into how these constituents are actually 
engaged that we can find out if they have the opportunity to act as autonomous 
citizens. This study finds that opposition parties and SMOs, by only providing limited 
access to information and collective decisionmaking, and through the use of coercion, 
limit their constituents’ ability to engage as autonomous citizens in advancing their 
socio-economic interests through democratic channels, resulting in hybrid agency. 
The remainder of the thesis will follow the structure of Figure 2. Chapter 2-4 will 
introduce the theoretical and methodological frameworks. Chapter 5-6 will provide an 
historical account of the criminalization of the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia, and 
how the transition from patrimonial one-party rule to multiparty competition and 
political pluralism potentially functioned as a political game changer. Chapter 7-8 will 
analyze how opposition parties over time developed both programmatic and clientelist 
linkages to the urban poor, resembling Latin American neopopulism. Chapter 9 will 
discuss how social movements provided an alternative political channel for the urban 
poor through membership with formal rights and obligations, but simultaneously 
forged their own clientelist relations to their constituents, due to dependence on 
external support. Chapter 10 demonstrates how political parties and SMOs operate at 
different scales and with weak links to each other, but also how politicians seek to co-
opt or fragment these movements if the latter are perceived as a threat. Lastly, Chapter 
11 concludes and discusses implications of the study. We begin by examining the 
theoretical expectations regarding political mobilization of the urban poor, as 
expressed in the literature.  
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2. Party linkages and the urban poor  
According to Lipset (1994: 14), “political parties themselves must be viewed as the 
most important mediating institutions between the citizenry and the state.” What of the 
urban poor? If they constitute a substantial segment of the urban population, are they 
expected to become relevant political constituencies for competing political parties—
and if so, why and how do political parties mobilize these segments? Specifically: do 
political parties engage the urban poor as citizens, or as clients?32  
A useful approach for understanding political agency of the urban poor in competitive 
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa is through the lens of party–voter linkages. This chapter 
presents the theoretical framework for understanding party–voter linkages in countries 
that hold competitive elections and have a majority of poor in their urban population. I 
will use Kitschelt’s (2000) three linkage types—clientelist, programmatic and 
charismatic—as a starting point for exploring whether and how the urban poor are 
expected to be mobilized by political parties in these contexts, and the factors that may 
account for variation in linkage strategies. 
Kitschelt operates with three types of linkages through which politicians are 
accountable and responsive to citizens in democratic polities. The definitional 
difference between the linkage mechanisms is procedural in terms of mode of 
exchange between constituencies and politicians (Kitschelt 2000: 850).  To be able to 
analytically distinguish between different citizen-elite linkages, Kitschelt draws on 
Aldrich’s (1995) account of political problem-solving by political parties to address 
collective action and social choice problems in democracies. Problems of collective 
action are solved through investment in the party administrative-organizational 
infrastructure. This facilitates resource pooling and reduction of information problems 
towards voters. Social choice problems are solved through techniques of programmatic 
unity building that aggregate the positions and preferences of individual politicians 
                                              
32 In the subsequent theory chapter, this literature will be combined with social movement theory to provide a fuller picture of 
the political agency role that the urban poor are expected to play in these competitive, neopatrimonial regimes, and the kind 
of political agency that this dual mobilization (by political parties as well as social movements) provides for the urban poor. 
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into a joint preference ranking supported by multiple politicians (program) (Kitschelt 
2000: 847-848).  
Stokes et al. (2013: 6-7) have developed a conceptual scheme of modes of distributive 
politics, which can be useful to combine with Kitschelt’s theory on linkages. They 
make two main distinctions: programmatic versus nonprogrammatic distribution; and 
unconditional benefits versus conditional exchanges. Programmatic distribution entails 
distribution that is formalized and public, and which shapes actual distribution of 
benefits or resources.33 Such an understanding of programmatic distribution is in line 
with Kitschelt’s understanding of programmatic linkages, and can also be viewed as a 
linkage based on the premise of engaging constituencies as citizens. Nonprogrammatic 
distribution is conceptualized as having either no public criteria of distribution, or that 
such public criteria are subverted by private, usually partisan, ones (Stokes et al. 2013: 
6-7). If receiving nonprogrammatic benefits is not contingent on the political support 
of individuals, distribution is considered partisan-biased—in the form of unconditional 
benefits to individuals, or pork-barrel politics. If, on the other hand, distribution is 
contingent, it is considered clientelistic: the constituencies are engaged as clients.  
In the subsequent sections, I discuss the three party-voter linkages in greater depth, as 
well as theoretical expectations as to why political parties may opt for different linkage 
strategies towards the urban poor. The focus will be on how multiparty competition 
has restructured resource mobilization for incumbent and opposition parties, and the 
expected implications for the agency of the urban poor.  Only a few studies in sub-
Saharan have identified the existence of pro-poor (populist) parties, and ethno-
clientelism has been considered to predominate. The chapter will therefore also draw 
on literature on neopopulist party mobilization in Latin America that seeks to explain 
the reasons why the urban poor may become an important political constituency.   
                                              
33 In the study’s overall analytical framework (Chapter 4), programmatic distribution by political parties equals collective 
benefits. Hence, collective benefits by political parties can be compared to collective benefits provided by SMOs.  
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2.1 The prevalence av ethno-clientelist party machines   
Politicians who invest only in administrative-technical infrastructure, but not in 
interest aggregation and program formation, make bonds with followers through 
direct, personal and typical material payments (Kitschelt 2000: 849). Kitschelt divides 
such clientelist linkages into two types of exchange. In resource-rich but vote-poor 
constituencies, politicians receive money in exchange for material favors to be 
distributed after winning political office. By contrast, vote-rich but resource-poor 
constituencies receive selective material incentives before and after elections in 
exchange for votes. Such material incentives may be anything from gifts to public 
housing and low-level public-sector jobs. According to Stokes et al. (2013: 13), 
clientelist distribution may take the form of either patronage, which they define as 
contingent benefits directed at party members, or vote-buying or turnout-buying, i.e. 
contingent benefits directed at voters. Hence, clientelism is used to mobilize both 
financial and political support from resource-rich and resource-poor constituencies 
outside the party apparatus, as well as support within the party, through the 
distribution of various types of contingent benefits.  
Traditionally, influential European scholars such as Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and 
Downs (1957) have assumed that it is programmatic linkages that matter for 
democratic accountability and responsiveness (Kitschelt 2000: 846). Kitschelt 
disagrees with the common distinction in the literature that clientelist politics 
necessarily undercut democratic accountability while programmatic politics create it. 
Rather, he claims, clientelist politics in democratic polities can create tight bonds of 
accountability and responsiveness. Although clientelist exchange is reciprocitory and 
voluntaristic, Kitschelt nonetheless considers it to be asymmetric, characterized by 
exploitation and domination. According to Stokes et al. (2013: 13), on the other hand, 
it is the fear of punishment that turns clientelist distribution into votes. Their 
understanding of clientelism is closer to coercion, and hence non-democratic. Also 
Erdmann and Engel (2007: 107) see patron–client relationships as characterized by a 
limited redistributive element, where the power-balance and major benefits are skewed 
towards the patron. Whether or not clientelism can be considered a (inferior) 
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democratic form of accountability and responsiveness, there is general agreement that 
the difference between programmatic and clientelist linkages concerns the mode of 
exchange, with clientelism premised on contingent benefits. This is the understanding 
of clientelism used in this study. Although clientelism is usually considered a problem 
for democratic accountability and responsiveness, and a typical feature of non-
democratic regimes, clientelist linkages can be found in both democratic and 
authoritarian settings: they are not solely a component of non-democratic regimes.34  
When people are linked to political parties mainly through clientelism, their political 
agency can be considered one of clientship, in line with Taylor’s (2004) reasoning. 
They are rewarded on a personal, informal basis, contingent on what they can deliver 
for their political patrons, in a relationship of domination. Clientelist relationships may 
range from direct, face-to-face relations to modern, anonymous machine politics that 
involve competition between providers. The ability of political parties to establish 
clientelist linkages is seen as requiring heavy investment in administrative 
infrastructure of political machines that reach from the national to the municipal level 
(Kitschelt 2000: 849). Stokes (2005: 325) considers the ability of political parties to 
monitor constituents’ votes, reward them for support and punish them for defection, as 
sustaining the “perverse” form of accountability in machine politics. 
To deal with information demands to deliver benefits and hold voters to account, party 
machines hire armies of intermediary brokers (Stokes et al. 2013: 19). Stokes and co-
authors construct their model of clientelism around the behavior of three types of 
individuals—party leaders, brokers, and voters. Brokers “are local intermediaries who 
provide targeted benefits and solve problems for their followers; in exchange, they 
request followers” participation in political activities such as rallies—and often 
demand their votes” (Stokes et al. 2013: 75). Brokers are engaged in sustained and 
frequent interactions with voters, observing their individual behavior and gaining 
knowledge of their inclinations and preferences. It is the brokers that hold the 
(imperfect) local knowledge required for conditional distribution of benefits to voters. 
                                              
34 Stokes et al. (2013) and Kitschelt (2002) show how clientelism has been a dominant feature of party politics in 
democracies such as the USA, Great Britain, Switzerland and Italy in certain periods. 
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Party leaders, on the other hand, are generally understood as elected officials at higher 
levels of government or the upper echelons of a nonelected party hierarchy.35 They do 
not engage in face-to-face contact with sets of voters.  
Stokes et al. (2013) develop a model of rent-seeking brokers whereby brokers trade off 
the benefits of capturing rents from political leaders against the detrimental impact of 
rent seeking on their party’s probability of victory. Brokers are seen as having their 
own interests and objectives which they can pursue by capturing rents—and their 
informational advantage allows them to do so. For instance, whereas party leaders 
prefer to use public monies to persuade swing voters, brokers prefer to reward loyal 
voters. The logic of the game then becomes as follows: 
1. A broker organizes a network of followers, promising each follower a certain 
benefit if the voter participates in the network.  
2. Leaders in a political party observe the sizes of brokers’ networks and decide 
on which to hire, and then distribute resources to that broker 
3. If the political party successfully wins, the broker distributes resources to voters 
in the network, and extract surplus as rents, in addition to the continuation value 
of the party being in power (Stokes et al. 2013: 77-78). 
My interest is in brokers and voters in the bracket of the “urban poor.” Political 
clientelism provides both brokers and voters with a choice and opportunity to engage 
politically to obtain benefits and advance their personal interest. However this political 
channel excludes those who lack such informal, personal reciprocity ties: resources are 
distributed only to those seen as acting in the interest of their political patron. Voters 
and brokers may have some limited agency to hold politicians accountable and 
responsive as regards selected material benefits that would otherwise not be available, 
but ultimately as personal rewards for acting in the interest of their patron, rather than 
having politicians acting primarily on their behalf.  
In the literature on urban poor and clientelism, there are clear regional variations. The 
relationship between clientelism and the urban poor has mostly been explored in Latin 
America. Because this is a comparative case study of Zambia and Kenya, it is useful to 
                                              
35 Brokers are not necessarily excluded from seeking elected positions, for instance in municipal councils. 
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begin by assessing how clientelism has been understood to work through ethnic party 
politics in sub-Saharan Africa, before moving on to expectations regarding its 
relationship to the urban poor. On the African continent, ethno-clientelism has 
generally been seen as a means to underpin authoritarian or neopatrimonial rule. 
Erdmann and Engels define neopatrimonialism as follows:  
(…) a mix of two types of political domination. It involves a conjunction of patrimonial and 
legal-rational bureaucratic domination. The exercise of power in neopatrimonial regimes is 
erratic and unpredictable, as opposed to the calculable exercise of power embedded in 
universal rules (…). Public norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their 
social practice is often personal and informal. Finally, neopatrimonialism corresponds with 
authoritarian politics, whereas legal-rational domination relates to democracy (Erdmann and 
Engel 2007: 114).36 
Central for analyzing the political agency of the urban poor in sub-Saharan Africa is 
how party competition was introduced in the early 1990s through multiparty rule. It 
was the formal transition from a one-party state to a nominally democratic regime that 
resulted in these neopatrimonial systems. Since the third wave of democracy swept the 
continent, the hybridity of sub-Saharan African political regimes and their sustained 
authoritarian legacies have been extensively researched. This research has centered on 
the connected issues of  the continued strength of the presidency and corresponding 
lack of check and balances, with weak judiciaries, legislatures and opposition parties 
(Albaugh 2011; Brown and Sriram 2012; LeBas 2011; Rakner and Svåsand 2007; 
Rakner and Walle 2009; Walle 2003); and the methods and tools through which 
incumbent governments seek to maintain their authoritarian grip on power (Albaugh 
2011; Basedau et al. 2007; Collier and Vicente 2012; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; 
Levitsky and Way 2012; Mueller 2011). Hence, the implicit or explicit assumption is 
that politicians are office-seeking and seek to maintain their political (and economic) 
privileges by continuing to engage in authoritarian practices, even when operating 
under nominal democratic rules. 
                                              
36 In the 1970s, “patrimonialism” was employed in terms of social capital as a way of explaining political cohesion in African 
societies. Today, “neopatrimonialism” is regarded as “a functional threat to the peaceful political development of African 
states and the development of societies in general” (Erdmann and Engel 2007).  
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In neopatrimonial political systems, clientelist linkages between political parties and 
citizens are held to function in a less accountable, less responsive manner than what 
Kitschelt indicated they might do in democratic polities. Erdmann and Engel (2007) 
see clientelism and patronage as integral to neopatrimonialism,37 as they were for 
patrimonialism. They differentiate between patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, 
with more complex hierarchical relationships in the latter system, where networks of 
brokers at various levels connect the “little man” to the “big man.” This contrasts with 
the direct dyadic exchange relation between the two under traditional patrimonialism. 
Uncertainty underpins neopatrimonial systems, creating dependency among clients 
who need protection and other resources in a situation where public institutions do not 
create predictable patterns of protection and benefits. This makes clientelism an 
essential tool for upholding a certain type of political regime.  
Scholars writing on party systems, democratization and elections in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s and 2000s have emphasized how ethnicity has constituted the 
predominant cleavage for party formation and party systems, whereas social cleavages 
of a programmatic or ideological character have been less pronounced (Basedau et al. 
2007: 284; Eifert et al. 2010; Walle 2003). Most scholars have moved away from 
Horowitz’s (1986) way of understanding ethnicity as primordial identities, and rather 
point to the instrumental links between regionalism, ethnicity and electoral systems for 
sustaining clientelist and redistributional linkages with constituencies (Basedau and 
Stroh 2011; Eifert et al. 2010; Posner 2007). While colonial politics laid the 
foundation for a cleavage structure based on ethnicity along tribal and language lines, 
ethnic cleavages have proven to be flexible tools for political elites. Posner (2005: 23), 
for instance, shows how political elites in Zambia and Kenya adopted to multi-party 
politics by changing their emphasis from local-level ethnic identities during the one-
party era to regional-level identities, so as to secure electoral success under 
multipartyism. Erdmann (2004: 81) has found that, instead of each ethnic group 
forming its own party, the most regular feature of party formation has been based on 
                                              
37 In line with Stokes et al. (2007), they understand clientelism as the exchange or brokerage of services or resources in 
exchange for political support, often in the form of votes. 
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multiple ethnic groups and ethnic identities that require a variety of multi-ethnic 
coalition building and parties. Eifert et al. (2010) conclude that political competition 
through elections actually heightens the salience of ethnicity, at the expense of other 
class and occupational identities. They attribute this cyclical trend to the usefulness of 
ethnicity for politicians seeking election.  
Several scholars emphasize that the limited state capacity to deliver social services in 
African countries makes it difficult for political leaders to provide their constituencies 
with tangible clientelist benefits (Bleck and Walle 2012: 5), as is the case with 
machine politics. Levitsky and Way (2002: 62), writing on competitive 
authoritarianism, note how resource scarcity has made it increasingly difficult for 
leaders to sustain the patronage networks that previously undergirded authoritarian 
state structures, such as co-optation or repression of opposition voices. Walle (2007), 
in his examination of the likely evolution of political clientelism in new multiparty 
electoral regimes of sub-Saharan Africa, argues that structural characteristics of a 
country, such as low economic development and state capacity, determine the nature 
of clientelist politics (Walle 2007: 50-51). He sees it as more useful to understand 
African clientelist politics as primarily a mechanism for accommodating and 
integrating a fairly narrow political elite, rather than mass party patronage. Most 
material gains are limited to this elite, while the stronger link between political elites 
and the citizenry is ethnic identity (Walle 2007: 66-67). Voters do not expect any 
direct benefits from their votes, but rather feel that only a fellow co-ethnic will defend 
the group as a whole.  
However, Walle (2007) also indicates that as political competition increases, elites will 
pay more attention to welfare benefits, constituency services and civil service 
positions, leading to more responsive forms of clientelism. Thus, through political 
competition, clientelist distribution that resembles the clientelist party machine of 
Latin America and Europe might be expected. Koter (2013: 225) adds that in (African) 
clientelist and nonprogrammatic settings, local leaders with strong ties to the 
population present politicians with an alternative to ethnic vote mobilization, and 
enable them to create more diverse electoral bases. “When intermediaries serve as 
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gatekeepers for access to resources, clientelist networks may not correspond with 
ethnic solidarities” (Koter 2013: 226). Also in sub-Saharan Africa, the nature of 
clientelism is expected to be changing, through political competition, away from 
simple ethno-clientelism, in order to quell mass protest and increasing political 
discontent.  
 Stokes et al. (2013) have made a unique contribution with regard to cross-regional 
comparative analysis of poverty and clientelism, and indicate an association between 
poverty and vote selling among individual citizens. Using survey evidence from 
African and Latin American countries, they find substantially higher levels of vote 
buying in poor democracies, as well as differences between poor and rich world 
regions, and poor and rich countries within regions. They also find that poor 
individuals are preferentially targeted by party machines to sell their votes (Stokes et 
al. 2013: 158). They attribute this to the diminishing marginal utility of incomes: the 
higher the income of a voter, the less the additional gift or payment will be 
appreciated, compared to the added value of more programmatic policies (Stokes et al. 
2013: 170).  
Hence, to return to the resource mobilization school (McCarthy and Zald 1977), 
politicians may use clientelism because it is the cheapest way of gaining votes 
(reducing the loss of political and economic resources), especially in situations of 
scarcity.  Nevertheless, the urban poor have not been a major focus in research on 
clientelist linkages in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethno-clientelism is “the norm,” while the 
salience of the urban poor in sustaining neopatrimonial regimes is downplayed.  
2.2 Absence of programmatic parties  
Programmatic linkages are created through political investment in both procedures of 
programmatic conflict resolution and organizational infrastructure (Kitschelt 2000: 
850). Voters are compensated only indirectly from programmatic linkages, through 
packages of policies without selective incentives. These policies impact voters equally, 
regardless of which party they voted for, making it possible for them to act as 
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autonomous citizens without fear of reprisals. When packages of policies are durable 
and enable voters to identify interparty difference based on simple underlying 
principles, they constitute political cleavages (Kitschelt 2000: 851). African parties 
and party systems are characterized by weak institutionalization. Rakner and Svåsand 
(2007: 1114) find that political parties have poor organizational capacity, lack a 
national structure, have inadequate communication between the central party 
leadership and lower units, dormant organization between elections and few 
organizational resources. In addition, they are heavily dependent on the party leader 
and lack mechanisms for internal democratic processes (Rakner and Svåsand 2007).  
For political parties to be mediating institutions between the citizenry and the state 
(Lipset 1994: 14), these parties must be founded on underlying support bases from 
social groups that are affected by the same structural conditions or factors. Bleck and 
Walle (2012: 4) hold that political issues have traditionally been conceptualized as 
concerned with specific positions in a policy spectrum typically relating to specific 
societal cleavages—for instance regarding economic redistribution along a left–right 
axis. Such positional issues, they argue, stand in contrast to valence issues, where there 
is consensus around the desired policy goals and objectives, and where partisan 
disagreement concerns competence and delivery of such goals.  
The urban poor have generally not been considered relevant targets or agents of 
programmatic parties: it is the working and middle classes that have been viewed as 
the main actors for such change. These classes are seen as the product of processes of 
economic growth and industrialization. Rather than expecting political cleavages to 
emerge from a constituency of the urban poor, within this tradition it is their entry into 
employment that has been expected to trigger such party cleavages. Political parties 
based on the capital/labor cleavage (Lipset 1994), influenced by Marxist thinking of 
the exploitation of the proletariat (employed wage laborers), have dominated party 
systems in Europe (Kitschelt 2000). The class conflict has also formed the basis for 
social security schemes and tripartite agreements and representative bodies between 
the state, workers and employers. With distinct economic interests that facilitated 
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collective identities, such social bases were transformed into party political cleavages 
through political mobilization.  
In Africa, this capital–labor conflict instead laid the foundation for many (socialist) 
one-party states, while African social security systems, trade unions and tripartite 
arrangements resembled the arrangements in Europe. Still, party systems based on the 
capital–labor cleavage do not seem to have materialized after the introduction of 
multiparty systems. Several countries have achieved high rates of growth and more 
diversified economies. The growing African middle class is estimated at some 85 
million households — a figure expected to double in 10 years (Oppenheimer and 
Spicer 2011: 18). However, the great majority of the labor force is poor informal 
workers and unemployed—in Marxist terms, the Lumpenproletariat. Due to macro-
economic reforms, the base for the African labor movements, understood as 
employees, have shrunk instead of expanding (Rakner 2001).  
Furthermore, Boone and Wahman (2013) find that patterns of apportionment that were 
introduced prior to the third wave established a long-lasting bias in favor of rural 
voters. As older, dominant parties found themselves faced with increasing organized 
resistance from the cities, they fell back on rural electoral strongholds. Only when the 
urban-based opposition has been able to garner support in key regional, and 
predominantly rural constituencies have they been able to win national elections 
(Boone and Wahman 2013: 35). Rural support can isolate unions, urban professionals, 
intellectuals and the urban poor, by the use of rural strongmen, loyal to and dependent 
on the ruling party, while the opposition parties remain too weak to have national 
outreach. This pattern, argue Boone and Wahman, predates economic liberalization, 
and African urbanites are persistently underrepresented.   
Although industrialization has been limited, and there is a rural bias in electoral 
systems, many African countries are experiencing high rates of urbanization, which is 
also believed to impact on the relationship between the urban poor and politicians. 
Stokes et al. (2013: 175-176) show how relationships between brokers and political 
leaders become altered through factors associated with urbanization (which they 
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ascribe to both industrialization and/or economic development). They claim that 
understanding the micro-logic of broker-mediated distribution between party leaders 
and brokers can contribute substantially to explaining the macro-history of clientelism: 
its rise, fall, and potential reappearance. Stokes et al. (2013: 181-187) argue that, under 
certain conditions, non-clientelistic spending on voters that cuts out the brokers can 
become more attractive for vote-maximizing political leaders.38  
The larger the electorate, the more attractive are programmatic strategies expected to 
be, due to the smaller returns to scale of mediated strategies with brokers. Moreover, 
when voter voices are opaque to brokers, the former can defect from the implicit 
agreement in the bribe, and the electoral returns from clientelism will be reduced. As 
voting behavior can be monitored at lower cost in rural communities and small towns, 
industrialization or urbanization reduces monitoring opportunities. Higher literacy 
rates allowing for newspaper outreach, as well as through the media, reduce the cost of 
circumventing brokers and communicating directly to voters (Stokes et al. 2007). In 
sum, declining efficiency of using brokers may be the result of many changes 
associated with urbanization that complicate interactions between clients and brokers.   
Despite the apparent lack of programmatic parties in sub-Saharan Africa, scholars 
increasingly find that Africans vote on the basis of considerations of economic 
performance and policy programs. In his study of Ghanaian voters, Lindberg (2012: 1) 
finds that expectations of receiving clientelist favors from a regional or local politician 
do not automatically translate into votes for the latter. Rather, voters accept clientelist 
benefits, but they cast their votes on the basis of the performance of the national 
economy and government policies. Bratton et al. (2012) find that voters make their 
decisions on the basis of ethnic, economic and partisan considerations, but even more 
on the basis of their evaluation of government policy as to unemployment, inflation 
and income distribution. Lindberg and Morrison (2008: 121), in their study of Ghana, 
                                              
38 Four conditions that influence the electoral return to either clientelist or non-clientelist strategies are returns to scale; 
discernibility of vote choice; numerical weight of low-income voters in the electorate; and the costs of mass communication 
(Stoket et al. 2007). 
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find that the majority of voting citizens consciously evaluate the past performance or 
the promised policy programs of candidates or parties.  
Bleck and Van de Walle (2012) claim that, while it is true that elections in Africa 
rarely appeal to class cleavages, this should not be confused with an absence of 
substantive electoral debate over issues. They find that valence issues—issues in 
which everyone (or the majority) of the electorate can agree as a good or bad thing—
overwhelmingly dominate the discourse of political parties in Africa. They explain this 
valence strategy as a response to the overwhelming uncertainties that political parties 
face regarding the preferences of their electoral constituencies, institutional instability 
or reversal, and credible commitment to policy programs due to constraints on the state 
(Bleck and Walle 2012: 3). However, they also find tentative evidence that opposition 
parties are more likely to take a stance than are incumbents. Opposition parties are 
seen as having more to gain from position appeals, since they cannot out-compete the 
incumbent party on clientelist resources.  
To sum up, urbanization makes it more difficult for clientelist party machines to secure 
compliance among voters of the urban poor. Although their vote may be cheap, this 
sector is also difficult to monitor and more exposed to information. The larger the 
urban electorate, the more attractive are programmatic or non-clientelist benefits 
expected to be. Furthermore, African voters increasingly make their decisions on the 
basis of policies regarding unemployment, taxes and other economic indicators. Still, 
while scholars indicate that non-ethnic parties are on the rise, and offer various 
explanations for these shifts, few have considered the urban poor as a target group for 
programmatic parties. There are few programmatic parties, compared to catch-all 
(valence) or ethnic parties. This is usually attributed to lack of industrialization and a 
small working class (understood as those formally employed). Furthermore, 
programmatic parties are costly, in terms of building organizational capacity and 
infrastructure. Hence, the political agency of the urban poor is not perceived or 
expected to be expressed through programmatic parties. While most theories on 
clientelist or programmatic linkages in sub-Saharan Africa have assumed (explicitly or 
implicitly) a lack of agency or significance of the urban poor vis-à-vis political leaders 
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and parties, an emerging literature on populist (charismatic) linkages, drawing mainly 
on Zambia, is placing the African urban poor at the forefront. 
2.3 Neopopulist parties and the urban poor  
Kitschelt’s (2000) last party linkage is founded on charisma. When politicians address 
neither the challenge of programmatic conflict resolution nor organizational 
infrastructure, only a charismatic authority of one or a few individuals can hold the 
party together (Kitschelt 2000: 849). Such individuals must have unique personal skills 
and powers of persuasion that make followers believe in their ability to create a better 
future. Charismatic leaders give promises to all people, to maximize their own room 
for personal discretion. Such authority is grounded in the asymmetry between leaders 
and followers, but also in directness.  
Kitschelt pays less attention to this linkage, as he considers it a non-durable, temporal 
phenomenon which soon will require one of the two other forms of linkages. However, 
he discusses the possibility of combining the three linkages within a political party, 
and whether there is a trade-off or mutual reinforcement between them. Clientelism 
and programmatic linkages are considered hard to combine for several reasons. First, 
universalistic principles of procedural programs militate against informal, 
particularistic resource allocation. Second, clientelist exchanges before elections may 
drain available resources or reduce the incentive to pursue such programs, given the 
nature of a coalition built around clientelist linkages. Charismatic linkages are seen as 
less compatible with clientelism or programmatic linkages because the latter two result 
in either the routinization of party machines, or programs that tie the hands of the 
charismatic leader. However, he finds all linkage mechanisms to be compatible, in 
smaller amounts (Kitschelt 2000: 854-855).  
Charismatic leadership is usually considered an essential component of populism. 
Populism, however, is a contested concept that has been used to explain political 
parties in a range of different contexts, and across the right–left spectrum. 
Furthermore, the assumed relationship between programmatic, charismatic (populist) 
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and clientelist components within populist parties will vary (Cheeseman and Larmer 
2015; Jansen 2011; Levitsky 2007; Resnick 2014; Taylor 2004). According to 
Weyland (2003: 1096), scholars who define populism in substantive terms, as 
concerning the social and economic content of policies and how this defines, for 
instance, the relationship between different classes, see populism and neoliberalism as 
incompatible. Others define populism as a strategy that can emerge at both ends of the 
left–right spectrum.39  
This study draws on Weyland (2003: 1096) and his definition of populism “as a 
political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government 
power based on direct, unmediated, non-institutionalized support from large numbers 
of mostly unorganized followers.” Weyland sees a populist strategy as anti-
organizational, based on low levels of institutionalization. However, he adds that 
politicians may also approximate populism, but combine it with other political 
strategies. This definition of populism as a political strategy makes it easier to 
distinguish between populist strategies that are combined with programmatic linkages, 
and those that rely on clientelism, as the latter two linkages do not become an integral 
part of populism itself. Weyland’s definition also facilitates the identification of causes 
of and changes in linkage strategies.    
Weyland justifies his conceptualization of populism as a political strategy precisely on 
the grounds that neopopulist leaders in Latin America, upon assuming office, have 
switched their substantive policy orientation, while continuing their populist tactics. 
These tactics have included direct connections to unorganized mass bases, the use of 
opinion polls, the bypassing of interest organizations, attacks on the political class and 
other elites, threats of plebiscites and other majoritarian instruments for surpassing 
                                              
39 Resnick (2014: 11) understands populist strategies as an amalgam of Kitschelt’s (2000) three party-voter linkages. In her 
view, a populist strategy relies on some key programmatic components around social inclusion, a charismatic leader, and the 
use of selective benefits. Cheeseman and Larmer (2015: 5) emphasize the centrality of economic grievances and the 
charismatic leader’s self-positioning as “one of the people,” who can defend them against experts and elites (but with a 
highly under-institutionalized party). Jansen (2011: 81–82) defines populist mobilization as “any sustained, large-scale 
political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, 
while articulating an anti-elite, nationalistic rhetoric that valorizes ordinary citizens.” Jansen proposes a shift away from the 
concept of populism to populist mobilization. Such a refocus avoids the treatment of populism as a thing that make scholars 
search for its true nature or essence. By focusing on means rather than ends, we can understand populist mobilization as a 
political practice that politicians and their supporters engage in. 
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opposition, the strengthening of personalistic leadership and concentration of power, 
as well as transgression of liberal norms and trampling on institutionalized rules 
(Weyland 2003: 1102). 
Events typically seen as having triggered “classic” Latin American populism that 
targeted the working class include economic depression and introversion, urbanization, 
and delegitimization of “oligarch” regimes (Knight 1998: 240). In the 1980s and 
1990s, however, environmental conditions relating to changes in the global economy 
and economic shocks eroded Keynesian models and traditional state interventionist 
and pro-labor policies, while debt-crises reduced governmental leverage vis-à-vis 
international financial institutions (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). The resultant 
expansion of the tertiary and urban informal sectors, Burgess and Levitsky argue, 
weakened class identities and labor as an electoral base in Latin America. These 
sectors’ fragmentation and heterogeneous forms of work, identity and interests were 
seen as conducive to a new form of populist mobilization. Environmental changes 
called for labor parties to adopt market liberalization, weaken their links to unions and 
appeal to new electoral constituencies. Party success hinged on being able to adapt and 
pursue such strategies (Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 884).   
Burgess and Levitsky understand successful populist party adaptation “as a set of 
changes in strategy and/or structure, undertaken in response to changing 
environmental conditions that improve a party’s capacity to gain or maintain electoral 
office” (2003: 883).  They adopt a two-level framework that places party leaders at the 
intersection between environmental and intraparty dynamics. The former shapes 
incentives for adaptive strategies, while the latter affect the capacity to implement 
those strategies. Important intraparty factors that determine party capacity to adapt 
include the fluidity of the party hierarchy, as well as the autonomy of office-holding 
leaders vis-à-vis party authorities, unions and other intraparty actors. Leadership 
turnovers and renovation, less restrained by bureaucratized party hierarchies, have 
facilitated rapid change. Autonomous party leaders that could make changes without 
extensive consultation proved more flexible than leaders accountable to lower-levels, 
activists or affiliated unions (Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 887–888). 
 53 
Also Weyland (2003) emphasized this unexpected synergy between neoliberalism and 
neopopulism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Populist tactics were considered to 
promote drastic market reform, while neoliberal attacks on existing political and 
economic interest strengthened personalistic leaders. Due to economic crises, a quick 
fix implemented by charismatic populist leaders could provide a promising recipe 
(Weyland 2003: 1095).  In societies where organizations already existed that made 
some sectors loyal and less susceptible to populism, populist leaders targeted the 
largely unorganized poor to win mass backing, thereby marginalizing existing 
organizations (Weyland 2003: 1098). This anti-organizational bent was shared by 
neoliberalists who wanted to protect the market from special interests and rent-seeking 
groups. Neopopulist leaders could carry out market reforms, while neoliberal 
reformers and international financial institutions benefitted the informal sectors and 
poor with targeted social emergency and anti-poverty programs. In this way, 
neopopulists in fact extended social programs and political participation to previously 
excluded groups—showing that these sectors were crucial for presidential election 
victory.  
Although far-reaching programmatic change permitted Latin American populist parties 
to survive in the neoliberal era, Burgess and Levitsky (2003: 907) note that their 
linkages to subaltern constituencies, such as informal sector workers and urban 
popular organizations, were more likely to rely on clientelist and media-based 
linkages—and, by implication, that their “imperfect” representation of these popular 
sectors would soon be over. Later, Levitsky (2007: 206) was to argue that working 
class-class decline and growth in urban informal poor made clientelist linkages more 
successful. Levitsky (2007: 225-226) found that many labor-based populist parties 
opted for clientelist linkage strategies towards a labor force which was becoming 
increasingly informalized and impoverished. For instance, local party organizations in 
Argentina began to serve as “problem-solving networks” that could arrange anything 
from wheelchairs to disability pensions, scholarships, funeral expenses, odd jobs, road 
pavement and other forms of social services.  
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These networks also provided social control in urban poverty zones during economic 
crisis periods, via neighborhood brokers that combined persuasion and intimidation to 
defuse protest (Levitsky 2007: 218).  Levitsky found that the ability of political parties 
to transition from labor-based populism to clientelist machine politics resulted from 
access to a politicized state bureaucracy, high levels of electoral competition, and 
weakening of party-union linkages, which were replaced with informal patronage-
based organizations. Clientelistic linkages contributed to dampening popular protest as 
well as securing votes for market-reforming parties.40   
In the recent populist literature on sub-Saharan Africa, the focus has mainly been on 
how new populist strategies of opposition parties fuse or combine a leftist, populist-
programmatic appeal to urban poor constituencies with ethnic appeals. Resnick (2014: 
8) set out to explain when and why the urban poor support opposition parties in 
African democracies, using Zambia as a case. Her basic assumption is that the urban 
poor face distinct challenges in securing improved welfare, while political parties want 
to win votes. She argues that opposition parties that tap into the urban poor’s 
grievances are more likely to win their support. Populist strategies are “well-suited to 
this task” as they, according to Resnick’s conceptualization, represent an amalgam of 
Kitschelt’s (2000) three party-voter linkages. In a region dominated by personalist 
linkages and vague catch-all messages, a populist strategy helped an opposition party 
to distinguish itself on an issue much in demand with a policy message that resonated.  
However, rather than party machines, Resnick considered clientelism to be used by all 
parties in the urban areas, to buy votes or turnout through the distribution of smaller 
(and cheaper) gifts. As such gifts had fewer strings attached, she finds that clientelism 
exercised less control on the urban poor than classic party machines. Hence, 
opposition parties relied on a substantive policy appeal to the masses to challenge 
incumbents. By simultaneously using ascriptive (ethnic) identity for mobilization in 
rural areas, the opposition party managed to maximize votes (Resnick 2014).  
                                              
40 It should be noted that scholars such as Taylor (2004) consider clientelism to have underpinned party linkages between 
politicians and voters in Latin America ever since the early 1800s.   
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Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) support the argument that a few opposition parties in 
Africa have had electoral success by combining ethnic and populist appeals. They 
claim that political parties can succeed by identifying and incorporating shared 
narratives of exclusion that are experienced by different communal (ethnic) and 
interest groups—a strategy they term “ethnopopulism.” The apparent contradiction of 
appealing to both the “subaltern” poor against the wealthy, as well as an ethnic identity 
(which could be seen as undermining the appeal to the overall poor), could be 
overcome—not simply by using populist discourse in urban areas and ethnic appeals in 
rural areas, but by fusing such appeals (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 2).  
However, they add, such opportunities were restrained by the structure of society and 
past legacies of political mobilization, especially regarding the reach of the urban 
political economy and the politicization of ethnicity.41 While ruling parties have 
usually managed to retain power in rural areas through ethnic appeals as well as 
patron–client networks and control of traditional leaders, urban voters appeared more 
receptive to populist appeals. In support of Stokes et al.’s (2007) urbanization 
argument, Cheeseman and Larmer attribute this divergence between urban and rural 
populations to greater freedom of information, population density and alternative 
institutional frameworks such as trade unions that empowered the opposition parties in 
the cities (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 4).42As Resnick (2014), they found the 
Zambian opposition party to mobilize the urban poor through populist promises. 
However, the Kenyan opposition party, although having pro-poor components, was 
mainly considered to engage the urban poor through an ethno-clientelist party machine 
(Cheeseman and Larmer 2015).  
 
 
                                              
41 Ethnopopulism was considered most feasible when urban areas had comparatively higher economic and political 
significance, and patterns of rural-urban-rural migration and remittances bridged the divide between rural and urban voters. 
42 A new form of populism, whose substantive content can be more associated with far-right populism in Europe—anti-gay 
and anti-immigration—has, according to Vincent (2011) also emerged in sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by Zuma’s ANC 
in South Africa. 
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*** 
Since the introduction of multiparty competition, ethno-clientelist party machines in 
sub-Saharan Africa have occasionally been challenged by opposition parties that rely 
on a populist message with programmatic components to the urban poor, in 
combination with ethno-clientelism (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Resnick 2014). 
Such an opposition strategy has been considered to increase the chances of success in 
countries with an influential urban economy and large segment of urban poor. 
However, neither Resnick nor Cheeseman and Larmer have explicitly linked the 
populist strategy of the Zambian opposition to clientelism. In Kenya, Cheeseman and 
Larmer (2013: 44) considered the ethnopopulist strategy of the opposition to resemble 
a political machine founded on ethnic patron–client relations where ethnicity trumped 
populist linkages.    
While populism towards the urban poor is not explicitly linked to clientelism in sub-
Saharan Africa, neopopulism in Latin America is. Its neopopulist parties appeal to the 
socio-economic grievances of the urban poor, but establish non-institutionalized, 
personalist ties to these constituencies, underpinned by clientelism (Burgess and 
Levitsky 2003; Levitsky 2007). Machine politics mediated by brokers is expected 
when such linkages provide a cheaper (but effective) way to secure the vote of the 
urban poor than programmatic linkages (Stokes et al. 2013). Given that resource 
mobilization for party politics in sub-Saharan Africa usually has been based on ethno-
clientelism, I propose that a similar strategy to that of neopopulist parties in Latin 
America might be possible, if there is a break with ethno-clientelism at all. 
I have not found literature that delves more deeply into how the urban poor exercise 
agency through pro-poor, populist parties in sub-Saharan Africa, and for what reasons. 
Drawing on Kitschelt (2007) and the literature on Latin American populism, the 
theoretical expectation is that populist parties engage the urban poor as clients or 
citizens based on the relative importance of clientelism as a material resource, as 
opposed to programmatic linkages as a source of legitimacy. The methods chapter 
(Chapter 4) explains how I will study this in the Kenyan and Zambian contexts, by 
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looking at how political parties mobilize the urban poor constituents by generating two 
types of resources: legitimacy through (promises of ) providing collective benefits; 
and/or material resources through contingent benefits.     
For a deeper understanding of the political agency that the urban poor have achieved 
through political competition and pluralism, we need to consider another type of actor 
that has surfaced—social movement organizations. By incorporating the role of social 
movements in aggregating and mobilizing collective interests of the urban poor, we 




3. Social movements by and for the urban poor  
The literature on party linkages has dealt mainly with two types of actors—voters and 
political parties—with the exception of intermediary brokers who connect the former 
two through clientelist exchanges. However, other intermediary actors, such as SMOs, 
can also contribute to establishing and maintaining programmatic linkages between 
parties and voters (as was the case with the “old” labor movements), or otherwise 
exercise political pressure on politicians and governments to make them responsive 
and accountable to citizens. In this chapter, the focus is on social movements that 
aspire to being by and for the urban poor. Are these movements likely to provide the 
urban poor with an alternative political channel to engage as citizens to advance their 
interests? And how can movement mobilization be expected to interact with party 
politics?  
Social movement theories have flourished in recent decades. The plethora of 
conceptualizations and theoretical frameworks makes it necessary for researchers 
engaging with social movement theory to carefully articulate their understanding and 
utilization of shared concepts. There has been a tendency in the literature to equate 
social movements with social movement organizations (SMOs).43 However, Diani and 
Bison understand social movements as a type of collective action process (see 
Appendix A), defining social movements as “networks of informal interactions 
between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or 
cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani and Bison 2004: 
282). Their understanding of social movements will be used in this thesis to assess 
whether there exist social movements for the urban poor in Kenya and Zambia, as well 
as the SMOs that constitute these movements.   
                                              
43 Amenta et al. (2010: 288), for instance, in their review of the literature on the political consequences of social movements, 
define political social movements as ‘“actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social 
transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political actions”. In their conceptualization, 
social movements may be combined into social movement industries or families. See also Tilly and Tarrow (2007) on 
movement networks. 
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Diani and Bison’s first dimension—conflictual versus consensual action—concerns 
the presence or absence of any conflict with clear opponents, as opposed to consensus-
based collective action (Diani and Bison 2004: 282).44  The second dimension 
distinguishes between dense and sparse networks existing between individuals and/or 
organizations engaged in collective projects. Only through dense networks between 
actors is a collective action process elevated from the organizational level to the 
movement level. The third dimension concerns strong versus weak collective identity 
between the actors. First and foremost, this dimension helps us distinguish between 
those organizations/actors that work merely in their own interests (instrumental) from 
those with a shared commitment and purpose beyond their own organization based on 
collective goals. Finally, Diani and Bison’s (2004) conceptualization opens up for 
including political parties as actors in collective action processes, including social 
movements. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007), a framework for understanding 
electoral mobilization for political change that does not allow for political actors as 
part of the networks of social movements can obscure what is required for successful 
movement impact.45  
From the existing literature, I have identified three phases of civil society engagement 
relevant for understanding mobilization around urban poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: 
member-based movements (interest groups) highly integrated into the one-party 
structures, often through corporatism; a pluralist, autonomous civil society dominated 
by professionalized NGOs, with weak ties to the urban poor; and member-based but 
autonomous social movements for the urban poor. The differences are not clear-cut, 
and legacies from previous phases are reflected also in current setups.  
                                              
44 By defining movements in conflictual terms, one identifies targets for collective efforts, immediately framing it in political 
terms. This clearly differentiates social movements from other segments of civil society and development agents that often 
frame their activities around “consensual” development goals and service delivery as a supplement to or as partner to the state 
or other actors. Often in the development discourse, objectives are shared by all stakeholders (valence issues): the curbing of 
unemployment; supporting and empowering the youth; democracy; anti-corruption; and poverty reduction. Social 
movements, on the other hand, are concerned with conflict, or opposing interests and objectives.  
45 Applying Diani and Bison’s social movement definition in practice is challenging, as it is inherently difficult to draw 
boundaries as to which actors should be considered part of any social movement. I nonetheless believe their 
conceptualization offers a good reflection of the messy realities of blurry and shifting boundaries between political actors. 
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Movements of the third type are often affiliated to transnational movement umbrellas 
that seek to organize the urban poor around joint interests globally, with two of the 
most prominent being those of slum-dwellers and informal traders. This theory chapter 
discuss whether such movements that are supposed to be formed and led by the poor 
themselves provide an alternative political channel for the urban poor to advance their 
collective interests as citizens (Batliwala 2002), but also how these movement 
structures may create their own patron-client relations due to dependence on external 
support (Pommerolle 2010; Wit and Berner 2013), or political co-optation.  Again, 
expectations as to the kind of agency these social movements provide for their urban 
poor constituents, and for what reasons, will be seen in light of how SMOs mobilize 
resources: legitimacy through collective benefits; or material resources through 
contingent benefits.    
3.1 Social movements under one-party rule  
During the one-party era in Africa, relations between the state and economic interest 
groups in society were often characterized by institutionalization with limited 
autonomy from the state. Interest groups would typically include trade unions, 
business associations and farmer associations (Rakner 2001). Politicians and 
administrators, anxious to promote controlled urban development, were dismissive of 
the initiatives of the urban poor to provide themselves with an income and a home 
(Burton 2005: 3).  
Despite one-party regimes’ efforts to co-opt and control civil society, sub-Saharan 
Africa social movements have long been intertwined with opposition politics (Waal 
and Ibreck 2013: 304). According to De Waal and Ibreck (2013: 310), although 
African social movements often do not fit standard definitions, non-violent, “informal” 
and spontaneous mobilization has produced progressive results to change political 
outcomes or hold political leaders to account. They hold that this has been the case for 
anti-colonial, independence movements, pro-democracy movements, and the Arab 
Spring.  In response to negative experiences with co-optation, control and repression 
under previous authoritarian one-party regimes, African labor movements often took 
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on pivotal roles in democracy struggles, becoming the breeding grounds for 
opposition—as they also had done in the independence struggles (Larmer 2010; LeBas 
2011; Rakner 2001).  
LeBas (2011) highlights the different roles African trade unions have played for 
opposition to authoritarian rule, and attributes this to their organizational mobilizing 
structures.  She differentiates between regimes where trade unions were able to 
develop cross-ethnic and increasingly autonomous structures (Zambia, Zimbabwe), 
and those where trade unions were built on ethnic brokerage, and the regimes 
effectively contributed to the internal fragmentation of these organizations (Kenya). 
These legacies left differing opportunities for alignment and mobilizing structures for 
parties opposed to authoritarian rule. LeBas finds that strong opposition parties in 
Africa emerged from the combined factors of authoritarian legacies (which either 
facilitated or obstructed cross-ethnic social organizational infrastructure), as well as 
party strategies that polarized the party landscape. By polarizing conflict, parties 
strengthened party cohesion and grassroots commitment that could serve as a bulwark 
against party fragmentation and mobilizational decline (LeBas 2011: 250-251).  
While the urban poor were typically not the main targets of any of these organizations, 
these segments increasingly became integrated in mobilization against authoritarian 
rule and economic malfunctioning. Cheeseman and Larmer (2015: 6) hold that the 
impact of urban-based radicalism in electoral politics has been surprisingly neglected 
(using Zambia as an example) in countries where a highly influential trade union 
structure and labor leaders usually appealed to an undifferentiated urban poor, 
including workers (employees) but not restricted to them. The Western bias for 
looking for class, they claim, has sidetracked scholars from recognizing the 
importance of political leaders in maintaining political stability by granting 
concessions to urban interest groups.  
Under one-party rule, urban alliances of opposition parties and civil society 
organizations increasingly broke with the one-party machine of the incumbent when 
its patronage sources dried up as a consequence of economic mismanagement. These 
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alliances then engaged in broad-based mobilization against the one-party regimes, 
which resonated with the urban poor (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). However, there 
was considerable variation in the degree to which these traditional social movements 
produced urban, cross-ethnic mobilizing structures that could form the basis for more 
durable linkages between political parties and movements over time. Furthermore, the 
urban poor were mobilized by both trade unions and opposition parties in a more ad 
hoc manner during these democracy struggles.  
3.2 Political pluralism and extraversion (NGOs) 
The introduction of political pluralism represents a critical juncture for civil society by 
changing its political opportunity structure. A key change that occurred across the 
countries that transitioned to nominal democracy in the early 1990s was the infusion of 
pluralist ideals of civil society. Civil society and the state cut their institutionalized 
ties. Political liberalization was guided by the normative ideal of political pluralism as 
multiple sources of authority, autonomous from the state. Freedom of association 
would ensure that civil society groups could form to provide a voice for a range of 
societal groups (Rakner 2001).  
In the wake of democratization pressures in sub-Saharan Africa, aid resources flowed 
into NGOs. Pommerolle (2010) uses the term “extraversion” to describe the dynamic 
between mobilized groups in Africa and their international partners (donors and 
NGOs). She argues that the “extraversion” of social protest—extending to the 
international sphere—can become a resource and refuge for protesters, but also a new 
source of coercion. First, Pommerolle highlights how internationalization is subject to 
social and political competition, which creates winners and losers. Second, she finds 
that the concrete modalities of the relationship between actors from the North and the 
South tend to reproduce existing inequalities, where Northern models win out (as 
regards themes and tools). Third, the similarities among international actors, in terms 
of modalities of implementation, vocabulary, skills demanded, and political and 
economic reforms introduced, contributed to a “reforming authoritarianism” (Dabène 
et al. 2008, referred to in Pommerolle 2010: 277), reproducing the established order.   
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In a similar vein, Larmer (2010: 256) points out how the mutually enforcing 
ideological wave of economic and political liberalist policies led to a decline in state 
capacity, combined with the promotion of a civil society consisting largely of 
externally funded NGOs. These developments made civil society organizations 
accountable to external agents and not to state agents. Consequently, since the 1990s, 
popular struggles have manifested as movements for “democracy” and “human rights” 
(Englund 2006), referred to in Larmer 256).  
Rakner (2001), in her case study of Zambia, found that political and economic 
liberalization resulted in a plurality paradox: whereas political liberalization led to a 
proliferation of civic associations, the corporatist links between the state and economic 
interest groups that had been granted some real influence in the previous authoritarian 
regime were weakened. Waal and Ibreck (2013) hold that social struggles in Africa 
often have been misinterpreted through Western lenses and understandings of the 
significance and role of “civil society.” They see the concept as normatively laden; “in 
practice this space has been largely colonized by groups engaged in service delivery 
roles, acting on behalf of or complementary to the state rather than representing 
popular concerns”(Waal and Ibreck 2013: 306).  
Nevertheless, attention to the socio-economic grievances and participation of the urban 
poor has increased in recent decades, due partly to NGOs and development agencies. 
A poverty reduction agenda was set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(Duncan et al. 2003: 4) based on the UN Millennium Development Goals. Poverty, as 
such, can thus be considered to have been established as a valence issue, with 
equitable economic growth and empowerment (through participation) as main aspects. 
Still, Azevedo (1998: 264) finds that while “participatory planning” had been 
promoted by development agencies and governments already in the 1970s, it was 
mostly seen as being of a restricted or instrumental nature. Objectives of such 
programs have been to involve the community in decisions concerning the application 
of limited resources for specific projects, so as to eke out those resources by using free 
or under-paid labor and increase government legitimacy (Azevedo and Prates 1995, 
cited in Azevedo 1998: 264). Azevedo holds that the attraction of such programs to 
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low-income groups would evaporate if government agencies fulfilled their legal 
functions by providing a basic minimum of social services.46 Similarly, Millstein et al. 
(2003: 465) claim that although “participation” has become a buzzword in 
international development agencies, in practice, such participation often resembles 
consultation, with decisions and implementation remaining with the state and/or 
international partners.  
Thus, while political pluralism lead to a plethora of autonomous civil society 
associations, most notably through the spread of NGOs, the extraversion of civil 
society organizations has turned the accountability of these actors upwards. Pluralist 
ideals and extraversion have impacted the agendas and themes of civil society, 
sometimes in ways expected to depoliticize social protest and reproduce existing 
power asymmetries and inequalities. The liberal democratic model envisioned and 
implemented by democracy promoters has served to structure resource flows in ways 
that make domestic actors dependent on and accountable to international actors, while 
weak links have been established to the urban poor grassroots.   
3.3 Social movements by and for the urban poor? 
Since the late 1990s, a new type of transnational social movements has emerged in the 
developing world, held by their protagonists to function differently from traditional 
development partners such as NGOs and international and bilateral development 
agencies (Weru 2004: 62) as regards democratic representativeness and accountability. 
These movements have been seen as tools for countering various negative effects of 
economic liberalization and privatization policies, and for paving the way for political 
change and transformation that can benefit the poor and marginalized (Ballard et al. 
2005; Bieler 2012; Kapoor 2007; Köhler and Wissen 2003).47 These movements often 
                                              
46 According to Azevedo (1998), service provision by the state generally does too little to counter social inequality because 
management tends to be corrupt, inefficient and clientelistic. However, he does not accept some of the “current fashionable” 
interpretations of the relationship between the state, market and society, and believes that urban social and economic 
problems can be solved only by the state and by complex, pro-active and democratic political and institutional arrangements. 
47 Transnational social movements have also been created to address a range of other issues that are not of a socio-economic 
character.  
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frame their struggle around a rights discourse. As the introductory chapter highlighted, 
extra-legality has become the norm for many people, due to legislation that is 
incompatible with creating a home and a livelihood.  
Batliwala (2002) argues that transnational, grassroots-based social movements that are 
formed and led by poor and marginalized groups function differently because their 
priorities and agendas are generated by the grassroots member organizations, and not 
intermediary NGOs at the national and international levels. In order to empower the 
voices of the poor in policymaking, outside activists, such as international NGOs, must 
reposition their leadership roles over time, to democratize and be accountable to the 
poor (Batliwala 2002: 408).  
Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2007) find that strong local ownership of initiatives that give 
local organizations central roles in project development and management ensure more 
accountable and representative community organizations that are also more effective 
in addressing urban poverty. The organizational structure of such networks facilitates 
collective decisionmaking. Such federations challenge the exclusion of the urban poor 
from development processes typically designed and managed by professionals, by 
developing their own collective organization and agency and demonstrating their 
capacities (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007: 498). This is also considered to give them 
greater legitimacy and representativeness in the eyes of policymakers and multilateral 
institutions. 
Due to their transnational nature, these social movements are also held to have 
developed greater capacities than their “elite” counterparts for influencing public 
policy even up to the international level, while keeping the locus of power and 
authority in the communities and not in intermediary NGOs (Batliwala 2002). Recent 
social movements that address urban conflict are often characterized by their 
internationalist orientation, their broad range of issues and diversity, as well as their 
“glocalization”—the dialectic organization across scales from the local to the global 
(Köhler and Wissen 2003: 942; Lindell 2009). By embedding urban conflicts in a 
broader frame of global movements, a space is created for exchanging experiences and 
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collectively develop strategies to challenge power relations across scales (Köhler and 
Wissen 2003: 950).  
Mitullah (2010) and Lindell (2009; 2010b) find that through the support of 
transnational organizations, initially weak local organizations of informal workers 
have been able to organize, lobby and influence policy to their advantage. Local 
organizations that engage in joint action with support from transnational organizations 
become visible and are recognized by governments and other development partners, 
leading to their inclusion in local and national processes—ultimately influencing their 
own working environment and livelihoods.48 In a world that is becoming increasingly 
integrated with various loci of power at the local, national, regional and international 
levels, transnationality is considered instrumental in enabling aggrieved, marginalized 
groups to impact on policies that affect them (Batliwala 2002; Lindell 2010; Millstein 
et al. 2003; Mitullah 2010). The “glocal” scope unites members and affiliates from a 
range of countries and provides grassroots members with resources.   
Despite their aspirations to representation and accountability, in practice it may be 
difficult to distinguish transnational social movements from more elitist NGOs and 
development agencies, and the borders are fluid and overlapping. A challenge that 
follows with their increasing influence over and involvement with professional NGOs, 
donors, political parties, government and international financial institutions,  is thus to 
remain accountable and grassroots-led. These social movements may embody their 
own elite and power structures, and come to reflect the power asymmetries in the 
global world, where Western ideas and organizations often dominate framing and 
activities (Ballard et al. 2005; Batliwala 2002; Brown et al. 2010; Davis 1999; Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite 2007). Hence, the problems of extraversion seem to be emerging 
also in social movements for the urban poor. Various power asymmetries have been 
identified within these movements, informing my own conceptualization in the 
introductory chapter.  
                                              
48 For instance, is UN-Habitat seeking to put in place program that draw on the federations’ experience and engage these 
groups (Mitlin and Satterhwaite 2007: 499). 
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First, while transnational networks may strengthen and enhance the political clout of 
grassroots actors, Mitullah (2010: 200-201) notes that transnational organizations also 
tend to overlook the potential for building strong foundations with a well-resourced, 
knowledgeable and well-networked constituency at the local level, which leads to 
dependency and non-sustainability. Cleaver (2005) finds that even when the poor 
articulate their interests autonomously from the state, the very poorest experience 
clusters of interlocking disadvantage, with the consequence that increased association 
and participation at community level are not necessarily beneficial to them. Social 
relationships, collective action and local institutions may structurally reproduce the 
exclusion of the poorest.  
According to Brown et al. (2010: 680), formal and informal traders’ organizations 
have failed to achieve lasting impact because they have failed to grasp the complexity 
of grassroots associations of the marginalized poor. Millstein et al. (2003: 465) find 
that while NGOs may function as key assets for community organizations, 
partnerships between NGOs and community organizations are often characterized by 
uneven power relations, calling into question the ability of NGOs to represent the poor 
in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner.49 
Wit and Berner (2013) argue that, from the perspective of the poor, the benefits 
offered by NGOs and donors are as particularistic (to be competed for) and temporary 
as those of politicians. They conclude that NGOs can at best strive to be better and 
more reliable patrons. In a study of three Indian cities, they found that the 
“partnerships” between municipal agencies, NGOs and slum organizations (CBOs) 
often were characterized by vertical relations of patronage and brokerage that hinder 
horizontal mobilization, as the poor face conditions of scarcity and competition. 
Community-based organizations (CBOs) may in fact block progress, by controlling 
and capturing benefits to misuse them for private (political) interest. As most 
“representatives” of the urban poor were found to be established local leaders, the 
programs ended up being participatory or empowering for the poor in name only. 
                                              
49 Brown et al. (2010: 678) find that also traditional associations for street trading can be far from representative, and 
significant groups of poor traders may be denied entry. 
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Municipal agencies, donors, NGOs and CBOs thus become part of a system of vertical 
dependency relations (Wit and Berner 2009: 927).  
Hence, Pommerolle’s (2010) three challenges of extraversion—competition in the 
international sphere between different protest actors, modalities in relationships 
between actors from the North and South that reproduce inequalities between the two, 
and similarities in (Northern) modalities of implementation that tend to reproduce the 
established order—have all been found to reproduce political inequality in the 
movements for the urban poor, and lead to problems of clientelism (Wit and Berner 
(2009). 
I now turn to two transnational social movements that have risen to global prominence 
during the past decade—Shack/Slum dwellers International and Streetnet 
International. Much of the literature on social movements draws on studies of these 
organizations or their affiliates and network partners. Slum/Shack Dwellers 
International and Streetnet International have been instrumental in shaping, 
networking and organizing grassroots across the globe, creating “glocal” social 
movements. They are rooted in grassroots affiliates of the urban poor, but engage with 
government bodies and international agencies to produce political change that reflects 
the interests of their constituencies.   
3.3.1 Shack/Slum-dwellers International and its affiliates 
Shack/Slum-dwellers International (SDI) is a transnational network of federations of 
slum/shack dwellers or homeless groups, and their support NGOs (Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite 2007: 488). SDI (founded 1996) is the outcome of a process that begun 
in 1988 between organizations of slum and shack dwellers and their partner NGOs in 
Asia and Africa (Batliwala 2002: 402-404). The head office of the Secretariat is in 
Cape Town, South Africa.  
In 2015, the network had member organizations from 33 countries in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America (Shack/Slum Dwellers International 2015). By 2011, there were 14 
mature national federations affiliated to the network. Mature federations have achieved 
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national or citywide scale and have worked with governments to secure and develop 
land for the urban poor. In each country, the affiliate organizations come together at 
the community, city and national level. SDI focuses on the localized needs of slum-
dwellers, and promotes a common agenda of creating “pro-poor” cities that addresses 
the exclusion of the poor from the economic and political structures (Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International 2015). Shack/Slum Dwellers International (2015) employs a 
seven-point methodology of inclusive cities, savings, enumerations and mapping, 
exchanges, partnerships, slum upgrading, and focus on women.   
SDI together with the International Institute for Environment and Development 
established the International Urban Poor Fund in 2001 (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007: 
488) The fund supports improvements in secure tenure and basic services developed 
through grassroots initiatives. It provides small grants to support savings groups that 
are formed by low-income urban dwellers to secure land for housing, by obtaining 
tenure for land they occupy or alternative sites, or to upgrade their homes and services. 
Between 2001 and 2007 it had channeled the equivalent of USD 4.6 million to more 
than 40 grassroots initiatives and activities in 17 countries. These initiatives are 
designed and implemented by local savings groups that serve as the base organizations 
for slum/shack dwellers’ organizations (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007: 488).  
In 2010, the International Urban Poor Fund had funded the construction of 4000 
homes, secured tenure for 30,000 families and supported 100 projects in 16 countries 
(Shack/Slum Dwellers International 2015), as well as contributing to policy change 
regarding the reduction of minimum plot sizes, building regulations to enable low-cost 
material and design, land-sharing with landowners, state house subsidies, 
establishment of joint committees for informal settlements, and emergency relief. The 
fund is intended to be very flexible as to what it supports, and where. Decisionmaking 
on allocations is embedded within SDI, where all federations are represented. Since 
the federations have direct control over capital, this enables them to negotiate as a 
potential partner with formal bodies such as governments and banks (Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International 2015). 
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SDI has also built a global platform for slum-dwellers to engage directly with 
governments and international organizations to change policies and strategies.50  In the 
network, NGO partners are required to play a supportive rather than leading role vis-à-
vis the federations. They are not allowed to represent the grassroots federation in any 
public policy forum unless authorized to do so alongside federation leaders. SDI’s 
partners include other networks, multilateral organizations, academic institutions and 
funders—among them the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, 
Misereor, the Sigrid Rausing Trust, Tides Foundation, Norad, Sida, and the Skoll 
Foundation (Shack/Slum Dwellers International 2015).51 UN-Habitat has also begun to 
draw on the federation’s experience when implementing programs, as with the UN 
slum-upgrading facility (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2007: 498-499).  
3.3.2 Streetnet International and its affiliates 
Informal traders and street vendors are usually found in the lowest bracket of the 
income chain, and face similar hurdles as an occupational group (Brown et al. 2010). 
According to Skinner (2008a: 14), research available on street trade in Africa indicates 
that many traders are not affiliated with any union or organization. Existing trade 
organizations usually focus on the three following concerns: financial services, 
lobbying, and advocacy, particularly at the local level and for product-specific issues.  
Research conducted by War on Want together with the Workers’ Education 
Association of Zambia in four African countries  (referred to in Skinner 2008), 
concluded that most such organizations were established in specific markets or trading 
areas for dealing with urgent issues, such as police harassment and disputes among 
vendors. To a large extent, trade organizations had confrontational relations with local 
                                              
50Millstein et al. (2003) find that the South African Homeless People’s Federation, an affiliate of SDI, has utilized political 
relations at various levels to mobilize land and subsidies for housing for its members, as well as influence the formulation of 
housing policy. It has participated in the process of turning de jure rights to adequate shelter into de facto rights for the urban 
poor. 
51 SDI’s full list of partners includes: the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, United Cities and Local Government Africa, 
Women in the Informal Economy: Globalizing and Organizing (Wiego), Cities Alliance, Global Land Tools Network; 
academic institutions: International Institute for Environment and Development, Society for Participatory Research in Asia, 
Institute for Policy Alternatives, African Centre for Cities, Association of African Planning Schools, World Urban Campaign; 
and funders: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Ford Foundation, Misereor, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Tides Foundation, Norad, 
Sida, and Skoll Foundation. 
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government, but many also negotiated with government bodies (Skinner 2008a: 14-
15).  
The Bellagio International Declaration of Street Vendors (1995) called for coordinated 
national and international action to support street traders and policies that protect their 
rights (Brown et al. 2010: 671). The Declaration led to the launch of Streetnet 
International in Durban, South Africa, in 2002. By 2008, Streetnet had a membership 
of 300 street-vendor associations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America; it draws heavily 
on the international trade union movement (Brown et al. 2010: 671). Member-based 
organizations that directly organize street and market traders are entitled to become 
Streetnet affiliates (Skinner 2008a: 16). These include unions, cooperatives or 
associations that directly organize street vendors, market vendors and hawkers 
(Streetnet International 2015).  
The International Congress is the supreme governing body of Streetnet, and consists of 
the members of the international council and delegates elected from each member 
organization. International Congresses decide on reports, formulate policy and decide 
on resolutions submitted by members and the Council, approves amendments to the 
Streetnet constitution, and decide on financial position and progress (Streetnet 
International 2015). 
Streetnet seeks mainly to build the capacity of street-trader organizations to strengthen 
their organizational and advocacy ability. This is done through leadership training, 
exchange visits, documentation and dissemination of evidence. Streetnet also assists in 
expanding organizing efforts to the national level, to influence national policy (Skinner 
2008a: 16). In addition, it conducts advocacy for the rights of street vendors in 
international bodies such as ILO and international trade union federations, and 
mobilizes for international campaigns to promote policies and actions to improve the 
working and living conditions of its members (Streetnet International 2015).52  
                                              
52 A recent major campaign was directed against “world-class cities” that tend to remove traders from the scene when hosting 
major events. 
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Resolution 22 (Streetnet International 2015), from the Third International Streetnet 
Congress meeting in Benin lists five demands, including that governments and urban 
local bodies shall respect and protect the rights of street vendors, and ensure their 
livelihoods by including them in urban policies. The network also wants 
developmental and infrastructure projects to be planned, implemented and executed in 
participatory processes with street-vendor organizations and vendors of affected 
natural markets, and not relocate markets.  
Streetnet demands that unions representing street vendors be included in social 
dialogue forums and tripartite negotiations that formulate urban policies and projects, 
as well as provide input to budgeting processes and decisions on educational facilities, 
electric power, security and other necessities (Streetnet International 2015). National 
trade union federations pay increasing attention to organizing the informally 
employed—through initiatives directly aimed at organizing them, encouraging 
appropriate affiliates to organize, or by supporting or expanding existing organizing 
efforts (Skinner 2008a: 15). However, there are also tensions between the trade union 
federations and informal workers’ associations. 
Thus, both Streetnet International and Shack/Slum-dwellers International conform to 
Diani and Bison’s (2004) conceptualization of a social movement as being 
characterized by collective identities, dense networks and conflictual action. 
3.4 Pulling the overall argument together: Interaction 
between social movements and party politics 
Because of the nature of urban conflicts, much research on the relations of these 
movements to party politics have focused on the local (municipal) and provincial 
levels. Recent trends towards decentralization have also provided new political 
opportunities for popular urban movements to target local authorities (Millstein et al. 
2003). However, my study is concerned with exploring how social movements relate 
to electoral politics at a general level: whether and how such SMOs interact with 
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party–voter linkages. Few studies have made this explicit link between these 
movements and electoral politics. 
Much research on social movements has focused on extra-institutional mobilization 
strategies and protest, and not on influence through electoral politics which may 
provide more long-term and coherent outcomes than immediate responses (Amenta et 
al. 2010: 297). The political leverage of social movements is expected to increase 
through connections with political parties and electoral activity, or by occupying state 
positions. If the formation of a new political party seems a less effective way to have 
political impact, for instance in a majoritarian system, an alternative may be to 
establish enduring connections between movements and a main political party or 
certain political candidates (Amenta et al. 2010: 292).53   
Bleck and Walle (2012), writing on valence issues in African elections, find that civil 
society is more likely to raise positional issues than political parties. Ballard et al. 
(2005) argue that contemporary social movements (in South Africa) provide a 
counterbalance to promote the needs of the poor when political systems fail to provide 
a (Leftist) alternative. Both Streetnet International and Slum-Shack-Dwellers 
International have aggregated collective identities and socio-economic interests, which 
they have turned into tangible law and policy propositions. These issues could be 
accommodated into a political party program. As social movements of slum-dwellers 
and street vendors seek to mobilize and organize the interests of groups that represent 
a substantial share of voters in urban areas (and sometimes nationally), these interests 
could emerge as salient issues also in electoral politics.  
3.4.1 Dismantling the ethno-clientelist party machine: a joint 
cause? 
According to Amenta et al. (2010: 296-297) and Benford and Snow (2000), social 
movement framing is most influential when it can identify problems and propose 
credible solutions. The state itself is not necessarily the adversary of movement 
demands, but may be targeted to assist the movement in its struggle against other 
                                              
53 For instance, appointment to state positions is a far more common inclusion outcome in the USA. 
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societal forces, as has typically been the case for labor movements (Amenta et al. 
2010: 291). While the general observation is that it is the needs and demands of the 
dominant classes (and not the poor) that lead to changes in for instance property 
legislation, laws may also be changed due to pressure from the populations affected, 
for instance through elections (Durand-Lasserve 1998: 250). Although a frame is 
plausible and culturally resonant for both the social movement agents and their 
constituencies, there might still be a problem if the framing happens to clash with the 
interests of policymakers. A government can ratify or seek to undermine emerging 
collective identities, as well as create new ones. The willingness of political actors to 
assist constituencies is assumed to be affected by electoral considerations and party 
systems.  
A main reason why the interaction between political parties, especially incumbent 
parties, and movements for the urban poor could be conflictual or non-collaborative, is 
because these movements in practice seek to dismantle the clientelist relations between 
the urban poor and political elites through decriminalization and legal rights. 
According to Svåsand (2013: 270), few parties in new democracies have emerged out 
of social movements or networks of voluntary associations. Instead, parties have been 
constructed by political entrepreneurs that employ extensive clientelism to connect the 
actors inside the party.54 Political elites have also been found to manipulate grievances 
of the urban poor to win elections through clientelism (Boone 2011; Hansen 2004; 
Linehan 2007). As discussed previously, state–society relations between these 
constituencies and the state existed before the formation of the newer transnational 
movements, and have often been embedded within the (neo)patrimonial system.  
Political elites can use clientelism to maximize votes, but also to protect their own 
economic interests, if these are at odds with the interest of the urban poor. For 
instance, Monteiro (2001, cited in Lourenco-Lindell, 2004: 92) finds that many 
informal businesses at the largest market place in Bissau are owned by “invisible” 
                                              
54 Nevertheless, he argues that perceptions of the party as an endangered species are exaggerated, because there is no credible 
alternative for solving “the collective action problem arising from the need for delegation in large-scale communities” 
(Svåsand 2013: 270). Even if political parties do not fulfill their democratic functions, the political party that wins elections 
becomes the government. 
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owners who work in the central and local government. Thus, if these social 
movements do not yet have a large membership, their potential members and the 
interests they represent can become a threat to politicians—both their material interests 
and their electoral base. Furthermore, the resources intended to accrue to the urban 
poor through social movements also become attractive for politicians to leverage 
power and accumulating wealth, which may encourage politicians to try to co-opt the 
movements and use them for political purposes.  
Variations in political regimes are expected to impact both the nature of the social 
movements themselves, and their relationship to the state. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 57) 
find that high-capacity democratic regimes have fostered the bulk of the world’s social 
movements. Collective benefits, in particular, are considered more difficult to achieve 
in a non-supportive political regime with limited administrative capacity. Whether 
subsuming to force or opportunism, SMOs, like other civil society actors, are prone to 
become involved in clientelism and corruption. Larmer (2010) holds that recent 
movements on the continent are of a hybrid nature, intermarrying Western ideas, 
funding, methods and forms with domestic variants. Waal and Ibreck (2013: 307) find 
a fundamental challenge in identifying relationships and actors of mobilization due to 
the blurring of boundaries between the formal and informal systems, which applies to 
public–private distinctions, commercial and administrative, licit–illicit, and rule of law 
versus patronage orders. The patronage system that sustains the ruler often permeates 
civil society, and relationships between political, economic and social elites are 
therefore fluid and informal. Hence, Waal and Ibreck (2013) also finds that African 
social movements are characterized by hybridity. 
For these reasons, Waal and Ibreck argue that there are “significant constraints on 
establishing the large-scale, sustained and voluntaristic social movements that can 
effect transformative change” (2013: 309).  Broad-based popular movements are weak 
and prone to co-optation and collapse. While movements may initially represent 
popular concerns and interests, these fail to transcend the regressive tendencies of 
hybrid orders once in power (Waal and Ibreck 2013: 306). Rather than systemic 
change, alternative patronage networks develop that are not autonomous. Studies of 
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the mobilization of street vendors confirm these points. While higher democratic levels 
and state capacity have facilitated the ability of street-vendor movements to affect 
political outcomes, informalization within state and society have made movements 
more vulnerable vis-à-vis the state (Kapoor 2007; Lindell 2008; Skinner 2008b).    
However, because opposition parties do not have access to the spoils of office, they are 
at a disadvantage when it comes to access material resources for political campaigning 
vis-à-vis the incumbent party. They need to pursue a strategy that can out-compete the 
ethno-clientelist party machine of the government party (Resnick 2010). Thus, as with 
the social movements, opposition parties also have an interest in challenging the 
incumbent party machine. LeBas (2011) notes that even though the traditional labor 
movement in sub-Saharan Africa (as elsewhere) has been weakened since the 1990s, 
other member-based social organizations may provide grounds for durable party 
mobilization—for instance, churches, agricultural cooperatives or savings groups.  
This argument is supported by Brown et al. (2010: 679), who offer an example from 
Dakar where traders’ associations have had success by becoming highly politicized 
and exponents of pro-poor urban policy. Both social movements and opposition parties 
could benefit from alignment and joint mobilization. Social movements may want to 
throw their weight behind opposition parties that campaign on a programmatic 
platform that aligns with the interests and objectives of the movement. Similarly, 
opposition parties might seek to build alliances with and draw strength from a social 
movement with a joint cause that can mobilize their target constituencies (Cheeseman 
and Larmer 2015).55 However, even if opposition parties and SMOs could benefit from 
joining forces, the actors have reasons not to develop strong (institutional) ties to each 
other.   
3.4.2 Extraversion and neopopulism: consensus on weak ties  
Civil society skepticism towards party affiliations originates from negative 
experiences under authoritarian, one-party rule, but is reinforced by the pluralist 
                                              
55 Indeed, Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) found that the Zambian opposition party benefitted from aligning with civil society 
prior to the 2011 elections. 
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paradigm of an autonomous civil society, promoted in developing countries after the 
Cold War (Rakner 2001), where the state, market and civil society constitute separate 
spheres.56 Kapoor (2007: 564-565), for instance, holds that successful informal labor 
unions must be apolitical and autonomous, so that their democratic structure and self-
management are not threatened in a market economy where rights struggles entail 
continuous bargaining and negotiation with the “power elite.”  
Another trend in the international sphere is a rights-based approach, based on litigation 
and policy input. A heightened focus on human rights, and the rights-to-the-city 
discourse that have been adopted by many social movements, may contribute to 
political parties appearing less relevant or appropriate agents of change. As many 
interest conflicts pertaining to the urban poor are seen as being rooted in legal 
problems, legal remedies are sought, instead of solutions in the political party arena 
(Gauri and Gloppen 2012). Thus, for various reasons, SMOs for the urban poor could 
be expected to take an explicit nonpartisan and autonomous stand towards political 
parties and the government.  
Neither are opposition parties necessarily expected to seek institutionalized 
collaboration with social movements. While political parties may benefit from riding 
on a wave of civil society mobilization when in opposition, they might prefer not to 
develop very close, institutionalized ties to these actors. In Latin America, the old 
populist parties drew on institutionalized ties to labor (and were more Leftist 
programmatic), whereas the new neopopulist parties preferred unmediated linkages to 
the urban poor, based on clientelism. These neopopulists would rather see the labor 
unions and other interest organizations weakened, so that they can act more 
independently.  
Similarly, opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa might prefer a neopopulist strategy 
when targeting the urban poor, as this would make them more flexible upon assuming 
office. Rakner (2001) found that the weakening of links between economic interest 
                                              
56 In the West, new social movements have featured an ideological orientation that sees modern democracies as 
unrepresentative. Therefore, these have an anti-institutional tactical orientation and a non-hierarchical organizational 
structure, preferring to stay outside normal political channels (Picardo 1997: 415). 
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groups and the state in Zambia following political and economic liberalization in the 
early 1990s served to increase the autonomy of the newly elected MMD government 
party from society. As a consequence, the government could bypass economic interest 
groups, and instead establish direct, populist linkages towards voters.  
It should be noted that political parties might not consider the movements for the urban 
poor a relevant or viable ally also for other reasons. Through large-scale mobilization, 
a social movement can demonstrate that a substantial segment of the electorate support 
its cause (Giugni, 2007, cited in Amenta et al. 2010:299). However, if social 
movements must struggle to draw members from the segments they claim to represent, 
there will be fewer incentives for a political party to forge closer ties with such 
organizations, and the movements will have less leverage to push for this. This lack of 
a strong membership-base could reflect a failure of these organizations to resonate 
properly with the interests of their constituents. For instance, Hooper and Ortolano 
(2012: 99), in their study of slum-dweller movements in Dar es Salaam, found that 
property owners were significantly more likely than renters to participate in risky and 
time-consuming mobilization, due the nature of the expected payoffs and a greater 
belief in efficacy and connection to space. Social movements can also be dominated by 
middle-class educated activists who profess a radical political agenda but without any 
links to the poor they claim to represent (Larmer 2010: 254). Thus, opposition parties 
can be more in touch with the interests of the urban poor constituencies.   
*** 
Under one-party rule, economic interest groups, particularly trade unions, were closely 
tied to the patrimonial regime. Although the urban poor were only mobilized ad hoc 
by these organizations, the latter’s varying opportunities to develop autonomous and 
cross-ethnic structures is expected to affect their ability to mobilize broad-based 
support among the urban population as opposed to ethnically fragmented urban 
support (LeBas 2011). However, political pluralism opened up political space for an 
autonomous and diverse civil society to emerge that could potentially overcome the 
ethno-clientelism that had been constructed by some one-party states.  
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Initially, this new form of civil society, dominated by externally funded NGOs, was 
more concerned with promoting democracy and human rights through advocacy, or 
engaged in service delivery, and did not develop strong ties to the urban poor. Over the 
last decade, however, transnational social movements for the urban poor have emerged 
in sub-Saharan Africa, as they have elsewhere in the developing world, in response to 
the failure of governments to address the hardships of the urban poor. Globally, SMOs 
for slum-dwellers and informal traders have sought to organize their constituents 
through formal and active membership in a bottom–up, democratic manner. If doing 
so, these movements have a legitimate claim to represent the interests of their 
constituents, and provide citizen-based agency.  
Such SMOs are generally not engaged in party politics, and maintain their autonomy 
from the state and political parties. The government has become the target for 
implementing policy and legal change to improve the socio-economic interests of the 
urban poor. However, SMOs for the urban poor, as other civil society organizations, 
often depend on mobilizing resources from international networks and funders. This 
extraversion may produce inequalities between external actors and domestic actors 
(Pommerolle 2010), accountability to external actors (Larmer 2010) and patron–client 
relations due to rent-seeking (Wit and Berner 2009). 
Regarding the interaction between party politics and SMOs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
expectations differ according to whether the political party in question is in office or 
opposition. If political elites (especially incumbent parties) feel that their political 
and/or material interests are threatened by SMO efforts to organize the urban poor (for 
instance, if this threatens politicians’ clientelist base), attempts to repress or co-opt the 
movements may be expected, which could result in hybrid movements (Waal and 
Ibreck 2013). Regarding opposition parties, these may benefit from aligning with 
organizational structures within civil society in order to build a strong grassroots 
foundation and broad-based support, which can enable them to compete with 
incumbent parties (LeBas 2011; Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). However, because of 
the extraverted nature of these SMOs, and the clientelist nature of party politics 
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generally, neither opposition parties nor SMOs are expected to prefer strong 
(institutionalized) links to each other.   
As with party politics, we still have limited knowledge on what kind of agency the 
urban poor in Kenya and Zambia enact through SMOs and the reasons why. The same 
applies to how the interaction between these social movements and party politics 
varies within and across these countries, and its implications for agency. The next 
chapter presents the analytical framework for answering these questions.  
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4. Methodology, case selection and data   
 
In his concluding section on the literature on African political history, Larmer claims 
that Western progressive analysts have tended to identify social forces or movements 
that can form the basis of transformative, radical political changes, “usually of the kind 
that they themselves have already preconceived” (Larmer 2010: 260), only to end up 
disappointed that the moment they had predicted did not in fact manifest itself. Wiarda 
finds that “the vast bulk of our social science findings, models and literature, which 
purport to be universal, are in fact biased, ethnocentric, and not universal at all” 
(Wiarda 1981: 163).57 The liberal tradition typically assumes a certain degree of 
unilinear development into some predefined and “good” end-result, in terms of 
development or modernization, and often specifies the social and political institutions 
that will enable such outcomes (Wiarda 1981).58 While counteracting theories of an 
African state have also developed, these sometimes suffer from essentialism. Wiarda 
(1981) distinguishes between neutral ideas of change vs. value-laden ideas of 
“development” or “modernization,” and warns against not being explicit or conscious 
about the lack of objectivity when applying such concepts in research.  
There are several challenges associated with “traveling” concepts and theories—i.e. 
transferring the application of concepts constructed for and within one empirical 
context to a different context. Traveling concepts may lead to false or limited scientific 
conclusions. This is problematic for several reasons. Not only does science impact on 
how researchers understand the world: powerful research traditions impact how 
societies are constructed (Wiarda 1981). This is especially evident in sub-Saharan 
Africa. An explorative and more grounded methodological approach opens up 
possibilities for analyzing political processes as they actually unfold, rather than on the 
basis of how they are preconceived. By combining exploration (inductive) with theory-
                                              
57 These theories often build on experiences of Western Europe and the United States, and may have limited explanatory 
power for the rest of the world.  
58 Moreover, several concepts that initially were more abstract or metaphorical, such as “democracy”, have, through research 
and the aid industry, been standardized into more specific and measurable indicators, which narrow the understanding of 
what democratic institutions may look like in reality. 
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based assumptions (deductive), the researcher can more easily uncover dynamics that 
are less biased, normative or predetermined. This has been the starting point for this 
study of political agency of the urban poor.  
4.1 Combining process tracing and comparative analysis 
within a social movement framework 
This study aims to describe and explain the political mobilization of the urban poor by 
political parties and SMOs, as well as the political agency of the urban poor that such 
mobilization entails. While the former is analyzed through process-tracing over time, 
within and across countries, the latter is analyzed on the basis of relational 
mechanisms that may exist at any given time. Process-tracing is applicable at both the 
macro- and the micro-level. 
George and Bennett (2005) see causal effects and causal mechanisms as equally 
important components of explanatory causal theories. The process-tracing method 
“attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain or causal 
mechanisms—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable” (George and Bennett: 2005: 206). Causal mechanisms must be 
linked to each other in a certain way in order to explain an outcome.  A causal 
mechanism may be necessary, but not sufficient, for explanation, as it interacts with 
other mechanisms that together produce an effect. While some causal mechanisms 
contribute to an effect, others may counteract it. Thus, theories based on causal 
mechanisms depend on context and complexity, and often fall within middle-range 
theorization (George and Bennett 2005). A value of process-tracing is that it can 
inductively identify omitted variables (George and Bennett 2005: 221). Through 
inductive process-tracing, the researcher may discover an unexpected piece of data 
indicating both a hypothesis and, subsequently, process-tracing tests (Mahoney 2012). 
According to Mahoney (2012), process-tracing can be used for testing hypotheses in 
the social sciences, by combining pre-existing generalizations with specific 
observations from within a single case. While hypothesis testing is not an objective of 
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this study, Mahoney’s way of thinking can shed light on the underlying logic of the 
method applied to establish descriptive and causal inferences, and its component parts. 
Process-tracing tests can establish that: 1) an initial event or process took place; 2) a 
subsequent outcome also occurred; and 3) the former was a cause of the latter 
(Mahoney 2012). Mahoney’s tests are based on logic, whereby differing criteria can 
judge the strength of the tests through necessary and sufficient conditions. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions mean that generalization is limited by scope 
conditions that specify the parameters to which they apply (Mahoney 2012: 16).59 I 
return to the implicit and explicit assumptions and expectations of this study in the 
sections below, for both political processes that occur over time at the macro-level, as 
well as political processes among actors at any given point in time, given certain scope 
conditions. 
The process-tracing approach will be combined with an analytical framework drawn 
from social movement theory that can be applied both to party and SMO mobilization 
of the urban poor. Social movement theory is concerned with understanding both what 
is happening, and why things are/are not happening. Theories on  framing (Benford 
and Snow 2000) of social movements, resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 
1977) and political opportunity structure (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tilly and Tarrow 
2007) offer analytical tools for understanding how and why these collective actors 
mobilize the way they do, as well as the expected political outcomes of such 
processes.60 Amenta et al. (2010) claim that it is mainly through qualitative analysis 
one can address big questions about major, structural shifts in politics, and social 
movements’ role in this shift.  
                                              
59 The hoop test proposes that a specific piece of evidence (observation) must be present for a hypothesis to be valid. Failing 
the test therefore eliminates the hypothesis, whereas passing the test does not necessarily confirm the hypothesis. The 
smoking gun test proposes that if a given piece of evidence is present, the hypothesis must be valid. Passing the smoking gun 
test provides strong support of the hypothesis, but failing it does not eliminate the hypothesis. Through these tests we can 
evaluate hypotheses that propose that a certain event or process actually occurred (descriptive inference), as well as whether 
there is a causal connection between two or more events or processes (causal inference). Causal mechanisms permit and/or 
generate the phenomenon under study. If there is considerable doubt, these tests become “straw in the wind” tests that merely 
provide some supportive evidence for a hypothesis, without being decisive (Mahoney 2012: 2-3).  
60 According to Tilly and Tarrow, the analysis of non-occurring contention is also relevant, as there are “oceans of apathy” in 
modern politics. It can be relevant to explain why contentious politics do not occur, based on counter-factual logic; or it may 
form the basis for comparative analysis of cases with different outcomes (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). 
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4.1.1 The process under study: did mobilization of the urban poor 
occur?  
In line with Mahoney’s (2012) argumentation, it is necessary to establish that the 
phenomenon studied here—political mobilization of the urban poor—has in fact 
occurred in the cases in question, in order to establish descriptive inference. To 
analyze political mobilization of the urban poor in Zambia and Kenya over time, the 
analysis is focused at the meso-level—examining whether “representative” 
organizations like political parties and SMOs have emerged that mobilize 
constituencies of urban poor.   
Benford and Snow’s (2000) understanding of social movement framing processes 
sheds light on how collective identities, networks and conflictual action are created 
through “collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). Movement actors 
are understood as agents who actively engage in producing meaning for constituents, 
antagonists, bystanders and observers. Three core tasks of this framing are to articulate 
a diagnosis—the source of a problem, and attribution of blame or responsibility, 
protagonists and antagonists; a prognostic framing to articulate a proposed solution to 
the problem and the strategies for achieving this goal; and a motivational framing, 
providing the rationale for engaging in collective action—the agency (Benford and 
Snow 2000: 615-617).61 Although collective action frames are commonly associated 
with social movement research, they can be applied to political parties as well.  
Amenta et al. (2010: 290) divide the assessment of social movement impact on 
political processes to establish collective benefits into four: agenda setting; legislative 
content; passage; and implementation.62  They also add state policies, which they 
                                              
61 Their understanding of collective action frames resonates both with the articulation of collective identities and conflictual 
action in Diani and Bison’s (2004) typology. 
62 A challenge with social movement studies is to determine to what extent a political outcome resulted from social 
movement mobilization, and hence, whether the social movement had political impact. Initially in the literature, theoretical 
determinants of political impact of social movements equaled those explaining determinants of mobilization, such as 
framing/strategies, mobilizing structures, and context (McAdam et al. 1996, cited in Amenta et al. 2010: 295). While the two 
former theoretical explanations are endogenous to the social movement itself, the latter is external. According to Amenta et 
al. (2010: 288), political consequences are external to social movements, not under their direct control. To assess whether 
movements are effective or their degree of influence, one first needs to specify what influence means. Previously, the 
emphasis was on gaining new benefits or acceptance. Subsequently, the focus turned to the structural or systemic level, such 
as extension of democratic rights or the formation of new political parties, or to the intermediary level, for instance policy 
change.   
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define as “institutionalized benefits that provide collective goods in a routine fashion 
to all those meeting specified requirements”—for instance, social expenditure 
programs. While this study is not concerned with assessing the political impact of 
social movements per se, Amenta et al.’s four types of collective benefits can be used 
to identify what actors aim to achieve at the national, political level for various 
constituencies of the urban poor: put differently, their collective action frames. Their 
categorization will therefore be used to establish how political parties and SMOs 
mobilize various constituencies of the urban poor through articulation and promises 
(framing) of collective benefits.  
4.1.2 Case selection: A most-likely and a least-likely case 
As there has been limited research on the political agency that the urban poor enact 
through political parties and SMOs in Kenya and Zambia (and elsewhere on the 
continent), as well as the determinants of agency, an explorative research design is 
useful. Process-tracing takes equifinality into account, opening for alternative paths to 
similar outcomes (political agency). When the criteria for controlled comparison 
cannot be met—as is often the case— “process-tracing can help to assert whether each 
of the potential causal variables in the imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be 
ruled out as having causal significance” (George and Bennett 2005: 214).  
My comparative research design does not follow the strict logic of comparative 
methods, such as a most-similar-systems-design, that seek to resemble an experiment. 
This is because the outcomes for the dependent variable—political agency—were 
uncertain. Instead, I have based my case selection on one “most likely” and one “least 
likely” case, within a universe of cases where political mobilization of the urban poor 
was deemed possible. In an ideal “most-likely” case, a single variable is of such high 
value that its underlying causal mechanism should strongly determine an outcome 
(George and Bennett 2005: 253).63 Thus, if the outcome does not occur, the 
hypothesized causal mechanism is “strongly impugned.” In contrast, if a causal 
                                              
63 If other independent variables point towards the same outcome as the extreme variable, the case should be considered 
“crucial” (George and Bennett 2005).  
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mechanism still predicts the outcome in a “least likely” case for a single causal 
mechanism, where other hypotheses offer different predictions, this case offers strong 
support for the mechanism (ibid.). Cross-country comparison of a least-likely and a 
most-likely case makes it possible to analyze whether similar or diverging processes 
emerged, and potential causes of these patterns.    
As opposed to statistical analysis, adding on variables in qualitative process tracing is 
not a problem even though cases are few, as long as there are enough observable 
implications.64 Rather, it is the complexity of the theory that can become problematic, 
and whether there is enough empirical evidence to assess the theory. To avoid a theory 
with excessive types and outcomes, George and Bennett (2005: 248) propose three 
strategies for reducing “the relevant universe of all possible combinations of variables, 
or types”—the so-called property space. The first criterion for limiting this space is to 
remove the types that are not socially possible. Second, theoretically overdetermined 
outcomes are less theoretically informative, unless the outcome goes counter to the 
most-likely case design. The third strategy is to identify which types and cases are 
most suited to the research objective.  
The relevant scope conditions for political mobilization of the urban poor form the 
basis for choosing cases. The scope conditions considered relevant for this study were 
that the cases previously had a patrimonial authoritarian regime, and that they had a 
substantial segment of urban poor (although I do not operate with a specific threshold 
for the latter).65 As a main concern is to analyze whether the urban poor are mobilized 
as clients or as citizens, a previous political and institutional culture for patronage 
seems relevant. Further, national-level political mobilization of the urban poor is 
unlikely if they constitute only a marginal proportion of the electorate.  
Although both Kenya and Zambia meet these initial scope conditions, they can be 
considered to represent a least-likely case (Kenya) and a most-likely case (Zambia) for 
                                              
 
65 As seen in Table 1, Kenya has a substantially lower national poverty rate than Zambia. However, the percentage of people 
living in slums is almost equal.  
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political agency of the urban poor. Studies from Zambia have found that the main 
opposition party successfully mobilized the urban poor through pro-poor, populist 
promises (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Resnick 2014). In contrast, Kenyan party 
politics are generally characterized as based on multi-ethnic coalitions (Arriola 2013), 
whereby also the opposition party functions as an ethno-clientelist party machine in 
urban areas (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015).   
Table 1: Urban population statistics for Kenya and Zambia 
 Kenya Zambia 
Total population (millions) (2013)66 43.7 15.2 
Percentage urban population67   25 40 
Slum to urban population (percentage) (2001 estimate) 7168 7469 
Percentage of population living below USD 1.90 a day (2011 PPP)70  33.6 (2005) 60.5 (2006) 
 
The national aggregate (Table 1) shows that the urban (poor) population in Zambia is 
substantially larger than that in Kenya. Kenya has a population of 43.7 million, of 
which 25 percent are urban (World Bank 2016). The Zambian population is 
approximately 15.2 million, of which 40 percent are urban (World Bank 2016). In 
addition, Zambia has been one of the most urbanized countries on the continent for 
almost a century, which has been attributed to its large mining industry (Rakner 2003). 
A possible determinant for diverging patterns of mobilization is that as both countries 
have majority electoral systems (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2012), 
the urban population is simply not large enough in Kenya to make viable a political 
strategy aimed at capturing the votes of the urban poor, as opposed to building a multi-
ethnic coalition, based on rural constituencies. This argument is in line with Boone and 
Wahman’s (2013) findings of a prevailing rural bias in African electoral systems. 
Kenya’s rural bias might have been aggravated by the fact that the country introduced 
                                              
66 World Bank. 2016a. "Data: Poverty." 
67 World Bank. 2016b. "Data: urban population (% of total)." 
68 UN-Habitat. 2013. "Countries: Kenya." 
69 UN-Habitat. 2015. "Zambia: Statistics on Urbanization." 
70 World Bank. 2016a. "Data: Poverty." 
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a federalist structure through the new constitution of 2010, which increases the 
importance of regions and rural constituencies.   
Regarding the second scope condition, a common feature of the authoritarian regimes 
that prevailed up until the “democratic” wave that swept the continent in the 1990s 
was that these were patrimonial systems built on ethno-clientelist networks. However, 
the Kenyan one-party state actively prevented cross-ethnic organizational bases from 
emerging in society, especially within the labor movement (LeBas 2011). The country 
is perhaps the foremost example of how multiparty politics in Africa resulted in the 
continuation and even aggravation of ethnic conflict, where orchestration of ethnic 
violence was instrumentally used by political elites to build ethno-regional 
constituencies. By contrast, the Zambian one-party state relied more on corporatist ties 
to its substantially larger urban constituencies (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; LeBas 
2011). Although the Zambian one-party state was also based on a patronage machine, 
the country was less ridden by politically induced ethnic violence than Kenya, and 
cross-ethnic organizational bases had been built over time, especially within the 
influential labor movement (LeBas 2011).   
Hence, I find that in sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia can be considered a most-likely case 
for citizen-based agency for the urban poor, due to its urbanization levels, cross-ethnic 
organizational structures and presence of a successful pro-poor, populist party. Kenya 
could be considered a least-likely case for the opposite reasons. The expectations with 
regards to political agency of the urban poor in the two countries that are drawn from 
existing literature are summarized in Table 2.  




Scope conditions:  Least likely Most likely 
Incumbent party: Ethno-clientelist party machine 
Urban population: 25% 40% 
Pre-existing organizational  
mobilizing structure 
Ethnic brokerage Cross-ethnic 
Party mobilization Multi-ethnic coalition Pro-poor populist party 
Political agency: Ethno-clientelism? Citizenship? 
 89 
4.2 The dependent variable: political agency of the urban 
poor 
The “urban poor” are the potential grassroots constituents of political parties or 
SMOs, either as voters or as members of these organizations. However, even if SMOs 
and political parties produce collective benefits for their constituents, we do not know 
what kind of political agency the urban poor can enact through these representative 
organizations. Returning to Mahoney (2012), it is necessary to describe the outcome 
variable—the political agency that the urban poor enact through their representative 
organizations. As discussed in the introduction, citizenship is defined as autonomy and 
political equality with regards to pursuing programmatic benefits, as opposed to 
clientship, which is premised on nonautonomy and political inequality through 
contingent benefits. 
Rather than simply describing political agency, however, the study seeks to explain 
how citizenship or clientship is created and maintained. Tilly (2001) identifies three 
types of mechanisms in political processes: environmental, relational and cognitive.71 
Whereas environmental mechanisms are externally generated and apply to settings 
rather than actors, relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups or 
networks.72  Identifying alterations in relationships makes it possible to specify what is 
to be explained. Tilly (2001) considers relational mechanisms to have uniform 
immediate effects; the aggregate, cumulative and long-term effects will vary 
depending on initial conditions and combinations with other mechanisms.  
Through inductive empirical analysis, three types of power asymmetries (relational 
mechanisms) between representative organizations and constituents have been 
identified that account for the micro-processes of political mobilization. Mechanisms 
that restrain the grassroots constituents’ ability to access information and 
decisionmaking power, and to protect themselves from coercion, produce clientship. 
                                              
71 Tilly considers mechanisms as explaining salient features or episodes, or their differences, by identifying robust 
mechanisms of a relatively general scope within these processes. 
72 Cognitive relations are alterations of individual and collective perception, and are not relevant for this study. 
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Equal access to information, collective decisionmaking, and freedom from coercion 
enable citizen-based agency.  
Because such power relations between any given representative organization and its 
urban poor constituents are complex, the agency that the urban poor can enact through 
their representative organizations may be of a hybrid nature, depending on the strength 
of the relational mechanisms at play. For instance, while a representative actor can 
provide the grassroots with collective decisionmaking powers, and refrain from 
subjecting them to coercion, the representative may at the same time withhold or 
manipulate the information that will inform the grassroots’ decisions.  
The empirical chapters will inductively identify (and enlist) mechanisms of power 
asymmetry between political parties/SMOs and their constituents, that contribute to 
clientifying the urban poor. However, particular mechanisms that enable the urban 
poor to engage as citizens will not be enlisted in the same way, as these are reflected in 
the formal procedures and practices that political parties and SMOs claim to follow. 
The identification (enlisting) of power asymmetries in the empirical chapters cannot 
establish the magnitude or frequency of each of these at the aggregate, national level. 
Rather, these findings are meant to demonstrate the variety of power asymmetries that 
are employed, and reveal patterns that point in the direction of either clientship or 
citizenship.  
4.3 Explaining political agency of the urban poor: structure 
and agency  
4.3.1 Independent variables: multiparty competition and political 
pluralism 
Political opportunity structures (POS) are commonly used to explain how the external 
environment affects the relative success or failure of social movements. POS are seen 
as increasing or limiting the prospects for mobilization, type of claims, strategies and 
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political impact of social movements (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1458).73 The 
proposed trigger for changes in political agency of the urban poor at the national level 
is the introduction of two essential features of liberal democracy: multiparty 
competition, and political pluralism. Multiparty elections produce competition for 
votes among political parties. Political pluralism cuts the (authoritarian) ties between 
the one-party state and interest groups, and allows for competition and diversity also in 
the sphere of civil society.   
Both Kenya and Zambia introduced formal, multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. 
They belong to the relatively small cluster of African countries that since their 
democratic transition have held increasingly competitive elections, without being 
interrupted by regime breakdowns in the form of coups or civil war (other examples 
are Benin, Ghana, Malawi and Senegal). Both countries have experienced democratic 
turnovers of the incumbent party since multiparty rule was introduced; the electoral 
races have often been tight, which further indicates democratic competitiveness. 
Additionally, the two countries have developed an increasingly vibrant and diverse 
civil society sector operating in a wide range of areas, including religion, gender, 
human rights, as well as economic interest groups.   
Nevertheless, although Kenya and Zambia are more democratically competitive and 
pluralist than the average on the continent, they still belong in the bracket of 
neopatrimonial or hybrid regimes—combining formal rules and procedures with 
informal, authoritarian practices. Their governments have not refrained from harassing 
opposition politicians, civil society or the media, and have sometimes applied laws and 
regulations in a rather repressive manner. In 2014, Zambia and Kenya were ranked as 
only “partly free” by Freedom House (2015a, b), with scores of 3.5 and 4, 
respectively.   
                                              
73 There are problems with POS frameworks, as noted by Meyer and Minkoff (2004: 1461): such frameworks are often 
unclear as to the importance of general political opportunities relative to issue- or constituency specific factors; they have 
unclear expectations regarding the effect of political opportunities on different dependent variables; and they employ 
different conceptualizations of the mechanisms through which political conditions translate into collective action. In order to 
be meaningful, POS frameworks need to be specified. 
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 Electoral competition and political pluralism as such cannot tell us why or how the 
political agency of the urban poor has changed. While it can be established that 
political competition and pluralism are present, and that political parties and social 
movements (sometimes) mobilize the urban poor, we must examine the causal 
mechanisms that link the former to the latter in order to establish causality.    
4.3.2 Two causal mechanisms of resource mobilization: clientelism 
and legitimacy 
Resource Mobilization Theory has been seen as a “partial” theory because it takes as a 
given societal difference in development and political structure. McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) downplay the importance of grievances and deprivation, arguing that any 
grievance may or may not be mobilized, and instead focus attention on the 
mobilization process itself.74 They contrast their perspective from previous theories 
that hold assumptions regarding support base, strategy and tactics, as well as relations 
to society at large. First, the supposedly aggrieved population does not necessarily 
constitute a movement’s support base, which provides it with necessary resources. 
Supporters (in terms of providing resources such as money, facilities, labor) may not 
even have a commitment to the underlying values of the movement. Second, strategies 
and tactics are not only concerned with the authorities, but also with mobilization and 
engagement with other actors, which may give rise to dilemmas. Third, instead of an 
emphasis on the effects of the environment upon social movements, the latter are 
considered to utilize the societal infrastructure at hand (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 
1216–1217).   
Edwards and Gillham (2013) expand on previous work on resource mobilization 
theory, including that of McCarthy and Zald (1977), to explain how social movements 
mobilize constituents to active participation. Edwards and Gillham (2013: 2-5) 
distinguish between resource access and resource types. Resources may accrue from 
self-production; aggregation from constituents; appropriation/co-optation; and 
patronage. Resources can also be divided into types: moral; cultural; human; material; 
                                              
74 In fact, McCarthy and Zald compare social movements to political processes of interest aggregation but which are at the 
margins of the political system, rather than with existing party structures. 
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and social-organizational.75 The impact of source constraints will depend on the mix of 
resource access and type (Edwards and Gillham 2013: 4–5). However, Edwards and 
Gillham do not include clientelism as a type of material resource that can be 
aggregated from constituents. I argue that clientelism can be used to keep resource 
costs for mobilization low (based on the logic of Stokes et al. 2013), as well as for 
rent-seeking and protection of politico-economic privileges. 
In analyzing SMOs and political parties, I will examine how they mobilize support 
(votes, members, volunteers) by either producing legitimacy (moral resource) or 
clientelism (material resource), as well as how they generate resources externally 
through co-optation or patronage. Emphasis will be placed on whether these 
organizations rely on legitimacy through provision of collective benefits or rely on 
clientelism through contingent benefits (both potentially resulting in votes, 
membership, or labor aggregated from constituents). I will also investigate how 
political parties and SMOs generate material resources through external actors in the 
form of co-optation or patronage. The mobilization of grassroots support through 
provision of collective benefits means citizen-based engagement, whereas 
mobilization through contingent benefits entails clientship.  
Mobilization is motivated at the actor (often personal) level. Hence, while the trigger 
for political mobilization of the urban poor is analyzed at the structural level—the 
introduction of liberal democratic institutions—the causal mechanisms that link this 
structural change to political agency is considered to be the restructuring of resource 
mobilization for political actors (under new democratic rules). Structural changes are 
seen as producing change in the relations between representative organizations and the 
urban poor, due to how these affects actors’ resource mobilization.  
                                              
75 Resources may accrue from self-production (human resources through training and development of moral 
authority/legitimacy), aggregation from constituents (converting resources from individuals to collective resources, such as 
volunteers, members, individual contributions), appropriation/co-optation (agreed co-optation of resources produced by other 
organizations) and patronage (external actors provide substantial financial support and exert a degree of control over 
spending and sometimes policy decisions and operations). Resources are divided into moral resources (legitimacy, integrity, 
solidarity); cultural resources (artifacts and products such as conceptual tools and specialized knowledge on how to carry out 
specific tasks, such as protests, meetings, or mobilization); human resources (labor, experience, skills, and leadership); 
material resources (financial and physical capital, such as monetary resources,  property, offices etc.); and social-
organizational resources (infrastructures, networks and organizations) (Edwards and Gillham (2013: 2-5).  
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The potentially contradictory effects of party competition/pluralism on political 
agency can be understood as what Jon Elster (1998) defines as Type B mechanisms.  
Elster argues that, in the absence of general laws, we can identify a particular causal 
pattern recognizable across situations that can provide an intelligible answer to the 
question “why did he do that?” (Elster 1998: 52). Elster distinguishes between Type A 
and Type B mechanisms.76 Type B mechanisms concern the triggering of two causal 
chains (resource mobilization) that affect an independent variable (electoral 
competition/pluralism) in opposite directions, leaving the net effect (agency) 
indeterminate. On the intra- or interpersonal level, the exact course of events will 
depend on the relative strength of the various mechanisms at work.77 If two types of 
mechanisms are evenly mixed, there might not be an observable net effect even though 
individuals are strongly affected by both, as they may be affected in opposite 
directions (Elster 1998). Hybrid agency can be considered to reflect an indeterminate 
net effect, resulting from two opposing, causal chains of resource mobilization. 
By combining analytical tools drawn from social movement theory and process-tracing 
methods, the empirical analyses will assess whether political mobilization of the urban 
poor by an SMO or political party has occurred, as well as identify the exogenous 
(POS) factors (multiparty competition/pluralism) and subsequent causal mechanisms  
(resource mobilization) seen as affecting the political agency of the urban poor.     
4.4 Data 
This study aims at saying something about causal processes and mechanisms that 
might be applicable beyond the two cases of Kenya and Zambia, while acknowledging 
the obvious limits to the generalizability of a comparative case study. The comparative 
framework can help in identifying certain patterns of political mobilization that might 
be expected in countries with similar scope conditions. Moreover, the comparison can 
contribute to distinguishing context-dependent effects on political agency from more 
                                              
76 Type A mechanisms concerns the indeterminacy of which (if any) of several causal chains that will be triggered, but that 
are mutually exclusive (scared animals either freeze or flight). 
77 The underlying assumption is that statistical explanations cannot be used to account for individual cases. 
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general causal patterns. Through transparency as regards data collection and 
utilization, this study can be replicated and the validity of the findings assessed.  
4.4.1 Fieldwork data and time dimension 
A challenge with the research design is that it purports to say something about political 
mobilization and agency of the urban poor at the national level—whereas a large bulk 
of the data (especially interviews) is drawn primarily from the capitals, Nairobi and 
Lusaka.78 Due to project limitations and the type of data required for parts of the 
empirical analyses, it was not possible to analyze several other cities in each country. 
Nevertheless, as the focus is on how representative organizations mobilize the urban 
poor through strategies that supposedly apply nationwide (legislation, policy, 
programs), these political processes are assumed to operate with somewhat similar 
dynamics across various urban areas, with certain regional differences. Much of the 
data material was gathered in the course of four fieldwork stays, two in each capital 
(2x2 weeks and 2x4 weeks). In first visits, I focused on exploring and remaining open 
to ideas and evidence that might diverge from my initial theoretical preconceptions. 
Analysis of these initial data informed the second fieldwork stays.  
My entrance point into the political processes to be studied differed for the two cases. 
My first fieldwork in Zambia was conducted one year after the latest (2011) general 
elections, whereas my first fieldwork in Kenya came half a year prior to the latest 
(2013) general elections. The second fieldwork in Zambia was carried out two years 
into the presidential term, while my second fieldwork to Kenya was one and a half 
years after the elections. This made the political contexts I observed inherently 
different from one another. The Kenyan fieldwork stays enabled me to observe the 
political context at two points in the electoral cycle that were more contrasting than the 
case in Zambia. Regarding the before/after dimension of Zambian elections, I had to 
rely on second-hand observations and information provided after a time-lag, both of 
which might affect the reliability of the information. Knowing in advance that this 
would be a challenge, I made efforts during the first fieldwork stay to capture the 
                                              
78 A few trips were made to other cities, such as Nakuru (Kenya) and Kitwe (Zambia). 
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before/after dimension by posing questions that contrasted expectations before the 
elections to the perspective on politics one year later.  
In addition, international events resulted in Kenyan politics taking a somewhat 
different direction from what had been anticipated, as the International Criminal Court 
decided to prosecute two of the main political candidates for the 2013 presidential race 
before the election campaign started. Furthermore, Kenya’s 2013 general elections 
would also be the first under the country’s new constitution, which had established a 
federalist structure with devolved government. Another major difference between the 
political processes that evolved in the two cases was that the opposition had won the 
previous elections in Zambia, whereas the status quo basically remained in Kenya. 
Hence, while my fieldwork in Zambia focused on one major change that had already 
occurred—the victory of the opposition—the data-collection process in Kenya had to 
deal with other political changes.   
4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews (and participant observation) 
Collection and utilization of interview and observation data  
Interviews were semi-structured, with questionnaires for different categories of actors 
or experts. In total, 96 persons were interviewed, and three focus group discussions 
were carried out (see Table 5 in Appendix B). The questionnaires for the second 
fieldwork stays were based on findings from the first. Sometimes, the same 
respondents were interviewed several times and would bring me to different activities. 
In these cases, interviews took the form of conversations over longer periods of time.  
Respondents were identified and approached in a variety of ways. Those who were 
identifiable from personal contacts or websites were contacted via e-mail, telephone or 
office visits. Others were identified through snow-balling, whereby interview 
respondents put me in touch with others. Care was taken to secure balanced 
representation, with respondents from different organizations, political parties, 
geographical areas, age groups, gender, and with opposing positions on contentious 
issues. Most interviews were planned beforehand, but some were decided 
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spontaneously, on the spot. In a few cases, several respondents were interviewed 
together due to circumstances, for instance limited time.  
Interview data were collected for several analytical purposes. During the first 
fieldwork, a main objective was to identify the most contentious issues pertaining to 
the urban poor, and the political actors involved in mobilization processes from the 
grassroots to the elite level. Choices were made as to which (overlapping) sub-groups 
among the urban poor to focus on, and alternatives could have been informal workers, 
idlers, youth, transport workers, or other groups. It should be acknowledged that the 
choice of other sub-groups could have resulted in different conclusions. For instance, a 
focus on informal workers, rather than informal traders, could have yielded different 
findings.  
The second fieldwork stays focused on processes and mechanisms. In the empirical 
analyses, the interview material constitutes the main bulk of data for explaining 
relationships between the different actors, the mechanisms through which these 
relationships are formed and maintained, and how this affects the political agency of 
the urban poor. Obtaining such data from other sources is difficult, as research on the 
political linkages between these grassroots constituencies, SMOs and political parties 
has been limited.  
In analyzing the interview material, I took care to note whether issues had been 
brought up by me or by the respondent. A respondent is likely to talk about and have 
an opinion on any issue that is brought up by the interviewer, even though this issue 
may be far down on the priority list of that respondent, or the organization she/he 
represents. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that several of my respondents are 
actors who have an interest in getting positive exposure, or in strengthening their own 
image as an important actor (and one who might deserve donor funding). Rather than 
claiming to present facts regarding the operation of these organizations, I focus on 
self-representation. By referring to their own framing of issues, perceptions and 
opinions, and relationship to other actors, I can show the conflicts and uncertainties 
involved in political mobilization. If the objective had been to get to the “truth” of 
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these disputes, that would have necessitated a completely different research design and 
different data—all very resource-demanding.  
Another challenge was how to differentiate between when respondent were speaking 
on behalf of their organization and when personal perspectives or experiences were 
provided, especially in a context where political issues can be highly sensitive and 
controversial. The representative organizations—whether political parties or SMOs—
are usually treated as a holistic entity, although I recognize that these collective actors 
often are highly personalized. Because almost all the interview respondents have been 
anonymized, I refer to a political party or SMO interchangeably by its name or by the 
name/title of its leaders in the empirical analyses, in line with what other writers have 
done, or as I deem appropriate. However, claims made by interviewees are always 
contingent on the individual and on timing. Opinions may differ among representatives 
of the same organizations and over time, especially in a political context that depends 
on donor trends, and where politics change rapidly within a semi-authoritarian system. 
Therefore, I use the interview data mostly to uncover conflicts and dynamics that in 
sum may represent something of a more general nature. 
To avoid burdening the text with repeated statements that a given piece of data has 
been collected from a certain individual, a few, or many, I urge the reader to bear in 
mind that the large bulk of the data analyzed build on interviews. General statements 
about relationships, mechanisms and processes are drawn from a limited set of 
respondents and observations. Such data limitations are inherit to qualitative, semi-
structured interview and observation data. For example, providing information about 
whether, say, five or twenty respondents claim that PF cadres allocate space for street 
vendors in exchange for political support is irrelevant, as this is not a quantifiable 
measure in any case. Rather, logic and reason provide the foundations for making 
inferences. When diverging and contradictory perspectives emerge, this is explicitly 
noted in the analysis.  
Although participant observation as a method has not been systematically used for data 
collection, observation of some events has proven valuable for shedding light on the 
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topic at hand. For example, observing how the office of the Area MP in the Kanyama 
slum works in practice is useful for understanding actual interaction dynamics between 
slum-dwellers and the government, instead of relying on official documents on how it 
is supposed to function. As the MP and staff were usually not present, and the office 
lack resources, it was clear that this office had limited capacity to implement programs 
and engage with the citizenry.   
Ethics and interviews 
In line with ethical guidelines, all interview respondents were informed about my 
status and objectives as an academic researcher, either verbally or in writing. 
Anonymity was optional, although the majority had no problem with providing full 
identity. All respondents were offered contact details and the opportunity to withdraw 
their contribution at a later point.   
In the end, however, I decided to keep almost all respondents anonymous, and I have 
not provided their full names, only their “titles”. There are several reasons for this. The 
most fundamental concern is the general insecurity and vulnerability of opposition 
politicians, human rights activists, and especially youth activists. Exceptions have 
been made when the information provided is also provided publicly by the same 
informants, which, as a consequence, makes my referring to them by title no greater 
risk to them than they have imposed on themselves. While most respondents consented 
to the use of their full names when quoting them, a few were afraid of the exposure. 
As activists are well-networked in the capital cities and information flows rapidly, I 
deemed it risky to provide some names, as it could then be easier to also identify 
others. While most of my respondents are probably unlikely to be at risk as a 
consequence of the information they have provided for this thesis, the unpredictable 
behavior of political-economic elites in these regimes makes considerations of future 
risk important as well. Some of my interviewees belong to organizations listed in the 
table, while the organizations of others are not named. Furthermore, as some 
respondents provided certain information off the record, I found it difficult to draw the 
boundary between how to present their public position versus confidential information. 
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Another reason for anonymity is that social engagement over some time may result in 
certain biases, whereby some respondents appear more trustworthy than others. There 
is a danger of exposing individuals or organizations to allegations not sufficiently 
supported by evidence. The corroboration of interview data from a broad range of 
anonymous respondents into more general mechanisms minimizes such problems. This 
strategy also made it possible to conclude that the interview data had reached a 
saturation point (Guest et al. 2006). The interview data used to inform the analysis of 
clientelism within civil society are not drawn from experiences in the identified SMOs 
for slum-dwellers or informal traders, unless when provided by leaders of umbrella 
bodies that have not required anonymity. This is because these networks are small. 
Interview data concerning clientelism are drawn from the experiences of other civil 
society organizations and grassroots activists, on the assumption that such experiences 
apply to relationships between actors in all civil society networks and movements. 
Whether such problems are particularly pronounced in the social movements of street 
vendors and slum-dwellers than in other civil society structures must remain an open 
question.  
Some respondents had multiple roles, due to analytical shifts between personal 
opinions/experiences and formal representation; or issue-sensitivity, which led me to 
refer to individual respondents in multiple ways. Some interviews were recorded; other 
respondents were reluctant to be taped, so I relied on written field notes. As can also 
be seen from Table 5 in Appendix B, the types of informants from the two countries 
are not balanced. Some organizations or offices would not respond or could not find 
time for an interview.79 In such cases, I have attempted to draw on other data sources. 
Some contacts were very helpful in facilitating many interviews and providing access 
to environments that were not readily accessible in other areas. This was especially the 
case regarding access to grassroots activists and brokers, where I had greater success 
in Nairobi than in Lusaka. This imbalance will also be reflected in the empirical 
chapters.    
                                              
79 The success rate would probably have been higher if more time had been available.  
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My fieldwork experiences challenged any ideals of remaining a neutral observer and 
interviewer. I believe this is a reflection of the type of data sought, the interview 
respondents, and the political context they were embedded in.80 Several of my 
respondents would before, during or after the interview enquire as to how the 
interview would benefit their cause, even I had sought to communicate that the only 
output would be an academic publication that might or might not be considered of 
relevance to them. One party member asked for information and contacts for a sister 
political party in Norway, others wanted information about relevant funding 
institutions in Norway. Some offered to write me a full report on their political 
organization. A youth activist pulled out a notebook and pen as the interview began, 
telling me that as he could not afford an education himself, he used any opportunity to 
teach himself and that he was learning from the questions asked. Some respondents 
used the interviews for airing personal frustrations that were not part of my 
questionnaire, and asked for advice that was not for me to provide.  
Not only in the interview situation but also as an observer, I would sometimes become 
an actor or be given a role in events beyond my control or awareness. My presence in 
forums or meetings had an impact (although I was often unaware of that), depending 
on who had invited me and for what reasons. This especially concerned a corruption 
dispute within an organization where my sudden presence was not appreciated. The 
mere fact of my appearing at two supposedly public occasions spurred skepticism 
regarding my motives and objectives. However, had I not accepted invitations to such 
meetings, there would have been a significant loss of insights into internal power 
dynamics and strategies between grassroots activists and their umbrella organizations.  
On the issue of clientelism and corruption, it soon became apparent how quickly 
people are being woven into social networks, and how blurred the lines are between 
legit and problematic favors. After hours of being conducted around a slum with a 
                                              
80 Interviews were conducted in two countries which have experienced massive influxes of foreign researchers as well as aid 
in recent decades. Often the two are interlinked, as donor institutions or NGOs also send researchers into the field as part of 
developing the policy and programs that they will fund. Second, some of the main interview targets were urban youth 
activists. They were eager for any opportunity to acquire knowledge and skills and get connected with income opportunities, 
as well as getting their voices heard. Other actors, such as politicians or NGO staff, may have their own interests in meeting a 
researcher. 
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self-proclaimed guide who offers voluntary assistance, it feels wrong not to share a 
lunch, provide public transportation, or proof-read an application. Exploiting almost 
free labor happens so naturally that one does not even notice it. Even a foreign 
researcher soon experiences how informal bonds of reciprocity are continuously 
sought established through sustained interaction in a context where everyone depends 
on everyone else. Mutual assistance is not based exclusively on self-interest or 
opportunism but also on growing loyalty and trust in a setting of high human 
insecurity.  
1.3.3. Secondary sources, media, statistics and official documents 
To trace political processes over time, I have made extensive use of secondary sources. 
Analyses of the evolvement of party linkages towards the urban poor, as well as 
changing patterns of state–civil society relations and political mobilization by social 
movements over time, draw heavily on previous research in these areas. Statistics and 
reports from international agencies such as the World Bank and the UN provide 
information on urbanization, poverty, slums and the informal economy, and the 
various development interventions by government and donors aimed at addressing 
such challenges. Government laws and regulations have been fundamental for 
understanding the “illegality conditions” of the urban poor. Official documents from 
governments, political parties and organizations have been consulted for information 
on framing, objectives and agendas, work activities and achievements. Party 
manifestoes provide information on party platforms and programs.  
I have analyzed election data by disaggregating voting patterns along the urban–rural 
divide, as well as at the constituency and ward level in the capital cities, to highlight 
how the urban poor vote. During the research period, more than 200 newspaper 
articles from the countries’ main online newspapers were collected, covering recent 
political events and processes. Triangulation of data from various sources has been 
done to the extent possible. This is important as civil society and the media in both 
countries are considered highly politicized. However, in some areas—notably, 
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clientelism within SMOs—my analysis had to rely on only a few sources, as data 
availability was limited.  
The type of data is rich, but with anecdotal material on specific cases, combined with 
more general empirical data and secondary literature. There are cut-off points 
pertaining to level of abstraction, generality and anonymity before the data material 
starts to lose value in terms of explanatory power, credible evidence or sufficient 
detail. Often, the power asymmetries forged between the grassroots and political 
parties/SMOs develop in quick and complex series of events, or through carefully 
engineered processes that would be interesting to present in more detail. However, it is 
also important not to lose track of the big picture. Presenting a significant number of 
organizations comes at the expense of in-depth analysis of each one. I have found this 
approach useful, given the overall goals of this study, but recognize the trade-off.    
Real-time political dynamics, as well as my varying opportunities for accessing 
different types of information and respondents in the two countries, have resulted in 
unbalanced data on certain aspects. This will be highlighted in the empirical analyses 
when relevant, but I do not believe that the overall findings and conclusions have been 
seriously affected.     
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5. The urban poor in Zambia and Kenya 
The “poor” constitute the majority of the urban population in Zambia and Kenya, and 
are the focus of this thesis. In this chapter, these segments will be assessed in terms of 
their socio-economic bases, as well as their status within the legal and regulatory 
framework.  As this group is heterogeneous, not all aspects of urban poverty can be 
covered here. Preliminary conclusions from my initial fieldwork as well as the 
secondary literature indicated that slum-dwellers and informal traders might be the 
most relevant sub-groups to focus on. 
The urban poor have received limited attention as a political constituency in the 
literature on African party politics. Chapter 5 will consider how the criminalization of 
slum-dwelling and informal trade, which has its roots in colonialism, over time has 
produced distinct socio-economic groups that could potentially be politically 
mobilized. It will show how conflicts of interest exist between these segments and 
other economic groups, which may sometimes overlap with political elites,81 but also 
among informal traders and slum-dwellers themselves.   
5.1 Zambia 
5.1.1 Slum-dwellers and illegality 
Socio-economic base 
To begin with, the use of the term “slum-dweller” was contested by a few of my 
Zambian interview respondents (among the more elitist segments).82 The term was 
considered to have negative connotations and to be alien to the Zambian context, 
where people usually referred to “compounds” and not “informal settlements” or 
“slums.” “Slum” was seen as being a donor term, whereas Zambia’s “compounds” 
were considered to have more mixed socio-economic and ethnic groups. However, a 
                                              
81 That being said, other sub-groups of the urban poor might also play a part in political mobilization, most notably informal 
transport workers. In terms of socio-economic marginalization and illegality, these other sub-groups arguably share some 
features with slum-dwellers and informal traders, while differing in other aspects. 
82 Geographer at the University of Zambia. Oct 3, 2012, Lusaka. 
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representative of the slum-dwellers’ movement felt that “a spade should be called a 
spade,” and added that if the government stated that Zambia does not have slums, it 
was trying to normalize the abnormal.83 I will use the two terms interchangeably.  
In 2001, 74 percent of the Zambian urban population was estimated to live in slums 
(UN-Habitat 2015). Typical Zambian slums characterized by poverty, as indicated by 
respondents and secondary literature, would be Kamanga, Freedom Compound, 
Chibolya, Misisi and parts of Kanyama. In Kanyama compound, there was a mix of 
low- and high-cost housing, although most residents were considered vulnerable 
people or idlers.84  Misisi, another illegal settlement in Chawama constituency that has 
consistently been threatened with demolition, has been identified as one of the five 
worst slums in sub-Saharan Africa (Resnick 2014: 123). 
According to the Zambian government’s own estimates on urban population growth, 
there will be a need for about 1.3 million new dwellings between 2011 and 2030—one 
constructed every two minutes of the working day for 19 years (UN-Habitat 2012: 1). 
In its Zambian urban housing sector profile, the UN-Habitat report states that if plot 
sizes were to follow the recommendations of the Fourth National Development Plan 
(15 dwellings per hectare), 87,000 hectares (an area almost four times the size of 
Lusaka) would be required only for residential land (UN-Habitat 2012: 2). Most of the 
housing “need” is from households with limited or no formal employment, very low 
incomes and no social security safety-net from the state. Only thirty percent of the 
urban population has piped water and 17 percent have toilets.  
Of the total Zambian housing stock, 80 percent was owned by private individuals and 
real estate (UN-Habitat 2012: 13). Land in Lusaka was considered to have become a 
“hot cake” (very lucrative), as the owners become “instant millionaires”.85 This has 
made private land very expensive. Another feature of land in Lusaka is the presence of 
dolomite outcrops, which impede formal development as it is almost impossible to dig 
                                              
83 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
84 Former Ward Chairman in Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
85 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
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service trenches in the hard bedrock (UN-Habitat 2012: 13). As this land had been 
avoided in formal planning, it was left open for the growth of informal settlements, 
like Kanyama.  
After institutional housing was sold off in the 1990s, most landlords were left with 
only a few dwelling units, and there are few large private-sector landlords—in contrast 
to the situation in Nairobi (UN-Habitat 2012: 145). Many landlords build extra 
dwellings beside or behind the main dwelling, which would often be a former council-, 
mine- or government-owned house. These plots are more efficiently used and cheaper. 
Landlords often live close by the dwelling. The owners are often retired civil servants, 
such as former councilors, politicians, party chairpersons, police or army officers, or 
retired government officials, although civil servants may also be tenants.86  
However, most tenants are not formally employed, but work at trading in the markets. 
Young households often need cheap rental housing, which is usually provided by 
home-owners letting a room in their dwellings. UN-Habitat (2012: 4) considers rentals 
in the informal areas to be reasonably priced. In Lusaka, dwellings rent for USD 33–56 
per room per month in informal areas and USD 200–600 per room per month in 
medium-cost neighborhoods (UN-Habitat 2012: 66). However, several interview 
respondents felt that rent levels in Lusaka’s slum as a problem. Moreover, informal 
settlements are demolished if the land is to be developed for other purposes (Zambia 
Land Alliance 2008). Slum-dwelling in Lusaka is thus characterized by tenure 
insecurity with threats of demolition, and where landlords, who often hold public 
offices, set the rates.  
Legal and regulatory framework 
The legal basis for today’s conflicts of interest concerning slum-dwelling was laid 
during colonial times. Lusaka is a planned city and its location was chosen because it 
                                              
86 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
Marketer/shoe seller at Soweto Market. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
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was a hub for road networks and the railway connecting the former Belgian Congo and 
South Africa (Mulenga 2003: 2). After being designated the new capital and 
administration center in 1931, the city began to grow rapidly. The original city plan 
provided mainly for colonial government administration and did not anticipate any 
large-scale industrialization or influx of Africans. Population growth took off after the 
African Housing Ordinance was adopted in 1948, as it allowed African families to 
reside in towns. Up to that point, only temporary African employees had been allowed 
in cities; and women and children had not been allowed to accompany their husbands 
or fathers (Mulenga 2003).  
Large employers, such as the mines, provided housing directly for their workers 
(Seymour 1975: 72). Other employers were allocated houses for their workers in 
townships set up by local authorities. Most of Lusaka’s African housing areas during 
colonial time were tied to employment with white landowners, and were referred to as 
the “compounds” of these farmers and contractors (Myers 2006: 274). However, by 
the 1940s, a near-majority were living in what became labelled “unauthorized” 
compounds, as housing provision was far from adequate. The emerging slums housed 
a mix of ethnicities, from northern, eastern and southern areas of the country (Mulenga 
2003). Migrants began squatting on privately held land (often owned by European 
settlers), or public land. However, unauthorized compounds were, according to 
colonial policy, to be demolished, and their residents repatriated (Seymour 1975: 72). 
Many African residents became informal tenants, paying rent to property owners in 
order to set up their own temporary structures.  
These dynamics continued after independence. From the 1960s onwards, council 
housing for workers lagged far behind demand, and average rent equaled half the 
income of a typical squatter. Consequently, the government provided housing for the 
middle and upper classes, while the only alternative, squatting, was illegal (Seymour 
1975: 73). Different regulatory responses emerged to the growth of informal 
settlements that grew out of the rapid urbanization. The socialist-oriented government 
initiated a public housing program (Mulenga 2003), and initiated legislation that 
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distinguished between authorized and unauthorized informal settlements: the Housing 
(Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act of 1974.  
According to Mulwanda and Mutale (1994), slum-upgrading schemes of the 1970s 
were called “World Bank schemes” and not were fully accepted as Zambian policy. 
Schlyter (1998: 265) writes that the Act was introduced in order to enable legalization 
and upgrading of squatter areas without plots being formally surveyed and without 
houses being demolished and then rebuilt according to building regulations.87 The Act 
provided for issuance of certificates of title and occupancy licenses that gave security 
of tenure. Authorized slums would get facilities such as infrastructure, water and 
sanitation, roads and drainage. At the same time, it was declared that new squatter 
areas should not be allowed, and occasional demolitions continued. Squatters living in 
settlements that remained unauthorized were left to their own devices; they also 
experienced harassment from the authorities, who saw them as undesired and illegal 
elements. After the World Bank schemes of the 1970s, few new upgrading projects 
were initiated. With the deteriorating economy in the late 1980s, housing and 
settlement improvements no longer featured on the agenda (Schlyter 1998).  
Following Zambia’s multiparty transition in 1991, new land and housing reforms were 
introduced. Included in the MMD liberalization reforms were a market-based land 
policy, resulting in the 1995 Land Act. This land market reform was one of the key 
conditionalities set by the international donors for assistance to the Zambian 
government in restructuring its debt (Brown 2005: 84). According to Boone (2007: 
574), the 1995 Land Act aimed at the full commodification of land. It significantly 
increased the property rights of title holders of state land, facilitated the buying and 
selling of land rather than improvements on land, restricted the state’s ability to 
repossess undeveloped land, and eased ownership for foreign investors. District 
                                              
87 An agreement was signed with the World Bank on a loan for upgrading that affected some 70 percent of the squatters in 
Lusaka. 
 109
officers processed applications for leasing of state land or for the conversion of 
customary land to state land, subject to final approval from the Ministry of Lands.88  
Brown (2005: 85-86) considers this transformation of public land to private land an 
irreversible action.89 Prior to 1991, people did not own their houses but were tenants; 
now the MMD government sold houses in all towns to sitting tenants, or gave them 
away.90 Privatization policies encouraged the sale of institutional housing at “give-
away prices,” which in turn made low-income formal prices highly distorted (UN-
Habitat 2012: 67) —so the informal sector became the only solution for low-income 
households to own dwellings.91 While the Land Act was claimed to strengthen the 
poor and the communities, the privatization process was often initiated at the top and 
not at the bottom (Brown, 2005). As UN-Habitat (2012: 10) reported, “within city 
boundaries, the chiefs are represented on appropriate committees of the local authority 
to allocate and develop land but, in the majority of the country (94 per cent of the land 
area), they carry out the land allocation.”  
According to Schlyter (1998: 260), a draft National Housing Development Program 
was made available in 1996, which could be considered an adaptation of 
recommendations given by international bodies and experts. The World Bank had 
recommended recognition of “illegal” areas and a liberalization of land, housing and 
rental markets in its 1994 Zambia Poverty Assessment. According to People’s Process 
on Housing and Poverty in Zambia (PPHPZ),92 the National Housing Policy had good 
objectives in addressing housing adequacy, and even won an award in 1996 for best 
policy. The problem was implementation. While the policy stated that 15 percent of 
the national budget should go to housing, this was not done.  
                                              
88 The Act also established a Lands Tribunal to protect leaseholders and customary land tenure, which merged the former 
distinction between trusts and reserves into “customary areas” (Boone 2007). 
89 The underlying rationale was to make land more secure and transform it into collateral so that Zambians could access 
credit, much in line with de Soto’s (2003) claim. 
90 Information and Publicity Secretary in MMD. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
91 Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Dec 5, 2013, Lusaka. 
92 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
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However, a process began in the late 1990s for revising the country’s spatial planning 
and land development registration (Berrisford 2011). Especially the Swedish 
development agency, SIDA, provided support to the urban development sector from 
1997 to 2009. In 2006, an agreement with SIDA was concluded, and a consultant team 
was appointed to evaluate existing legislation. In the same period, Germany (GTZ) and 
Japan (JICA) provided technical support to decentralization processes that impacted 
urban planning and governance. JICA was engaged in work on urban infrastructure 
planning, and supported the Lusaka City Council’s city planning. China provided 
support to urban infrastructure and housing projects through loans and technical 
support (Berrisford 2011).  
Today the Ministry of Local Government and Housing has the mandate to provide 
housing for the poor.93 Housing for the lower-income bracket in semi-urban and rural 
areas is financed through public–private partnerships, via grants or loans, generally as 
housing cooperative schemes. The government also subsidizes building materials. 
Because loans are usually tied to employment, getting a guarantor can be a problem 
for people in need of housing. Housing financing and construction fall under the 
national housing authority, which is part of the Ministry.94 The Office of Housing and 
Social Services at Lusaka City Council (LCC) provides housing and upgrading, as 
well as social services in informal settlements.95  
Because the market mechanism has created high rental prices in the housing market, 
the LCC has been trying to get housing bonds, to rent out and sell low cost houses. 
This project, however, requires the assistance of the central government. The City 
Council has advertised a tender to get companies like Standard, JP Morgan or other 
local companies engaged in upgrading housing in informal settlements, but needs 
permission from the government to evaluate these tenders. As Lusaka City Council 
depends on the Ministry for Local Government and Housing and international donors 
                                              
93 Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Dec 5, 2013, Lusaka. 
94 Its strategy is based on the housing policy from 1996, the Land Act, as well as the Town and Country Planning Act, 
Sanitation Act and Building Act. 
95 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
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for virtually all of its budget, its policies and programs “remain tethered to outsider 
and minority agendas” (Myers 2006: 297).  
The current trend in slum upgrading thus focuses on building houses through public–
private partnerships, but without rent regulation to ensure that sitting tenants can 
afford to remain living in the new structures. Slum upgrading is mostly concerned with 
the development of housing structures that protect primarily the rights of previous 
structure owners, whereas tenants depend on the market mechanism for rent levels and 
have to move elsewhere (to new informal settlements) if rates are unaffordable. 
Unauthorized informal settlements are illegal, and slum-dwellers have no legal rights 
if their dwellings are slated for demolition.  
5.1.2 Informal traders and illegality 
Socio-economic base 
In 2012, the Zambian working-age population (age 15 and older) was estimated at 7.8 
million (Central Statistical Office 2013:2). Zambia’s total employed population was 
5.3 million, of whom 55.8 percent were working in the agriculture sector. While the 
national unemployment rate was only 7.9 percent (2012), that figure hides the 
considerable underemployment. The formal sector employs some 550,000 workers, 
with the remainder operating in the informal economy. Of those working in private 
businesses and farms or in private households, 89.8 and 99.5 percent (respectively) 
were informally engaged (Central Statistical Office 2013). Only 62.7 percent of 
workers in local government and 73 percent of workers in parastatals were formally 
employed, which shows how widespread informality is.  
Predominantly urban provinces—such as Central, Copperbelt, Lusaka and Southern 
provinces—had relatively higher proportions of formal jobs. In the Copperbelt and 
Lusaka provinces, over a third of employed persons were in the formal sector. 
However, “formal sector employment” only means that it is registered with the tax and 
licensing authorities, or that it is public: it does not include social security benefits, 
 112
which are only for “formal employment.” (Central Statistical Office 2013: 8).96  In 
urban areas throughout Zambia, the unemployment rate is 15.3 percent, compared to 
3.1 percent in rural areas. Young adults are especially vulnerable to unemployment, 
with the highest rate (16.3 percent) recorded among 20–24-year-olds (Central 
Statistical Office 2013: 2). Unemployment was generally higher among females, with 
those aged 15–19 showing a 35.8 percent unemployment rate.  
After agriculture (56 percent), the trade industry has the second largest share of 
employed people (12.2 percent). The trade industry has a workforce of 652,143 
persons, 89.3 percent of whom are in the informal sector (Central Statistical Office 
2013: 10). Trade accounted for the highest percentage share (24.5 percent) in the urban 
areas of Lusaka Province. In Lusaka’s informal sector, 61 percent are involved in 
trade, with street vending the dominant occupation (Resnick 2014: 122). Street 
vendors purchase their commodities from Lusaka-based wholesalers or local retail 
shops. The majority of Lusaka’s street vendors are young males (Hansen and Vaa 
2004). They come from low-income residential areas, and have poorer access to 
education and health facilities. Still, most of them had basic education or more. Street 
vending could be considered “a refuge for school leavers who had not found formal 
jobs” (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 71).  
Zambian informal traders, and street vendors in particular, often find themselves in 
conflict with formal traders operating from recognized markets, formal business, the 
government and other users of city space (Hansen 2004, 2010). Traders in the formal 
markets, such as the New City Market, have faced competition from vendors who 
operate from the streets. As they are not charged fees, informal traders are blamed for 
out-competing the formal traders on price. For instance, when the New City Market 
opened in 1997, conflicts between inside and outside vendors, the police and City 
Council escalated to the extent that the street vendors’ provisory tuntemba structures 
were burned. Many vendors have also been uprooted and displaced when 
redevelopment of markets, malls and other plans have been initiated. 
                                              
96 The latter category includes entitled annual paid leave, trade union membership, payment of income tax and written 
contracts. 
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Legal and regulatory framework 
The criminalization of informal vending and trade activities began with the British 
colonial administration. The colonialists were directly hostile to economic activities 
outside the realm of colonial control and planning, and actively sought to prevent an 
independent urban labor force from getting established (Hansen 2004: 63). The 
colonial policies that restricted small-scale informal business and trade in urban areas 
were to a large degree continued under the post-colonial government. Nevertheless, 
informalization increased from the 1970s onwards, as the result of the scarcity of basic 
commodities due to a strict import and currency regime under President Kaunda. It 
was termed the “Black Market” (Hansen, 2004: 63). 
Legally speaking, not much changed for Zambia’s street vendors after the introduction 
of multiparty democracy in 1991. The regulations of the 1992 (2006) Local 
Government Act Section 84 (Street Vending and Nuisances) (No. 2) clearly 
criminalized informal street vending and trading by prohibiting the “sale of local 
produce in any street or in any public place, other than a market established by the 
Council, except with the permission of the Council.” The Act also specified other 
livelihoods that were prohibited, including unauthorized tire repair along street 
premises, the operation of unlicensed taxis, and unlicensed tailoring business along 
streets (Laws of Zambia 1992/2006). In addition to the act of conducting vending or 
trade itself, the work areas often lacked sanitary facilities such as toilets or rubbish 
bins, which made it difficult for vendors or traders to avoid committing other offences. 
The Markets and Bus Stations Act of 2007 (Parliament of Zambia 2007) placed the 
authority to establish markets and bus stations with the Minister of Local Government 
or a local authority (with the approval of the Minister), which could choose to enter 
into public–private partnerships. All markets were to be under the control and 
management of the local authority in the area or a management board. The local 
authority could also designate a market street for a specific period, for instance in 
response to applications from individuals or cooperatives. The local authority, in 
consultation with the Minister, was given the authority to demolish, reconstruct, close 
or move a market or bus station after notifying the manager.  
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Persons selling good in markets were obliged to pay fees, stallage or levy as prescribed 
by the local authority or the management board. Non-compliance was an offence 
punishable by fine or imprisonment. Inspectors were appointed by the authority, to 
ensure compliance. The authority (or management board) issued licenses and permits 
to peddlers, hawkers, marketers for the market or market streets. Management boards 
were to have 8–11 members appointed by the Minister, with at least two 
representatives for the Ministers, three persons representing marketers (elected), one 
representative of the local authority, one consumer or commuter from an association 
relevant for markets in the area, and one community member. However, the Minister 
had the authority to reject proposed representatives.97 The management boards were 
responsible for formulating policies and guidelines, providing annual business plans 
and services such as water, sanitation, security, electricity, building infrastructure, 
property protection and trading places for market users; further, for generating 
revenues and promote community involvement. They also prevented vending and 
illegal trading.  
When licensed, a Zambian trader is obliged to pay taxes and fees, but he or she will 
also gain more security and stability in operations by being entitled to an allocated 
space. To enforce compliance with the regulations, a new magistrate court was 
established to deal with breaches of the acts and regulations. These regulations 
provided the management boards and inspectors with considerable powers over the 
traders. They also required an effective and capacitated city council. Except for a 
provision on the right to life in Article 11a, as well as rights of association and other 
civil and political liberties, no other articles in the Zambian Constitution provide for 
economic or social rights (Constituteproject.org 2014).  
Thus, according to the law, informal traders are engaged in illegal activities, and have 
no individual social and economic rights. Legal trading, on the other hand, means 
under the control of a market board and inspectors which monitor allocation of space 
and other privileges in the markets, as well as charges and fees collected by these.  
                                              
97 Management board members held office for three years, but could be re-appointed. 
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5.2 Kenya 
5.2.1 Slum-dwellers and illegality 
Socio-economic base 
According to the Kenya 1999 Population and Housing Census Analytical Report on 
Housing Conditions and Household Amenities (Republic of Kenya 2002, referred to in 
Bocquier et al. 2009: 57), 4.8 percent of the Kenyan population rented government 
housing. In urban areas, 10 per cent of households lived in public housing. The 
majority of households depended on the private formal and informal markets and 
market forces (Bocquier et al. 2009). UN-Habitat (2013) estimates that 71 percent of 
the urban population lives in slums. In Nairobi, 90 percent of slum-dwellers were 
tenants (UN-Habitat 2006).  
Nairobi serves as a temporary base for migrants.98 The housing market appears to be 
mainly targeted to this mobile population who seek affordable housing in order to 
maximize the gains from migration (Bocquier et al. 2009: 77). Ethnicity, language and 
religion are seen as key factors for aiding or restructuring the assimilation of 
newcomers (Bocquier et al. 2009: 7). Another factor is commuting time and closeness 
to income activities. These new migrants rely on relatives or friends, to keep 
expenditures low and access living space (and work). Often, however, what was 
intended as a temporary housing arrangement becomes permanent, due to limited 
options.   
While half of male migrants acquired their first independent housing by age 24 or had 
got independent housing after five years, 45 percent of male Nairobians (people who 
were born or moved to Nairobi before the age of 15) still did not have independent 
housing (as tenant or owner) by the age of 30. Self-employment increased the chances 
of having independent housing (Bocquier et al. 2009: 67), but the greatest difference 
was between those in the informal and the formal sectors. While many migrants tended 
                                              
98 In the census, “migrants” referred to individuals who came to Nairobi after the age of 15. Half of the male migrants came 
to Nairobi when they were 20 or 21 years old. 
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to stay with relatives (ethnic group), they were likely to move out if they got 
employment.  
Urban land is defined as either public or private. Informal settlements are by definition 
unlicensed settlements on land that is owned either by the state or private actors. As 
these informal settlements have often existed for decades, an informal system of land 
management has developed. Persons referred to as “landowners” in slums would in 
many instances be more correctly seen as structure-owners: they have built housing 
structures, but do not own the land on which the structure is built. According to the 
law, these structure owners are still squatters occupying land, as are the tenants who 
live in these structures. 
A main conflict over urban land in Nairobi concerns squatters versus public or private 
developers. The constant threat of eviction is one of the main challenges facing 
squatters in the informal settlements. When squatters occupy public land, they are 
allowed to stay there at the mercy of the government, and usually only if they are not 
blocking a modernization project. As one respondent put it: “The land is eaten up by 
modernization.”99 The local administration carries out evictions, sometimes in alliance 
with traditional leaders such as village chiefs. Evictees are rarely provided alternative 
land and housing, unless through non-transparent methods via the chiefs, their agents 
or the Nairobi City Council (NCC).1 However, according to UN-Habitat (2006: 15), 
the number of evictions has been reduced from the 1990s; 80 percent were carried out 
by private land “owners,” and only 20 percent by the NCC, the Ministry of Lands and 
Housing, or the Ministry of Public Works.  
Several conflicts of interest that divide Nairobi’s slum-dwellers as a group stem from 
differences in preferred tenure rights. The first major sub-conflict line is between 
tenants and landlords/structure owners, formal or informal.100 This conflict is also 
expressed in the desire for privatization of titles through market mechanisms 
                                              
99 Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
100 I will use these two terms interchangeably. Although slum “landlords” usually do not hold a formal title to the land, and 
therefore simply own the structure on the land, in practice, the term “landlord” is applied to structure owners as well.   
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(landlords) versus government provision of housing and regulation of the rental market 
(tenants). Whereas 90 percent of Nairobi’s slum-dwellers are tenants, only half of 
these feel that their tenure is reasonably secure, according to UN-Habitat (2006: 15).  
As most of the housing stock in Nairobi is private, informal and undersupplied, and 
prices are determined by market demand, being a landlord can be highly profitable, 
while the high prices in the rental market negatively affect the poor tenants. Landlords 
“can charge 10,000 for a room with nothing.” 101 Huchzermeyer (2008) sees the ever-
growing slums in connection with the larger land and housing market in Nairobi, and 
especially the distorted rental market that creates incentives for landlordism and the 
trading of housing into the middle class.102 However, according to Macharia (2007: 
157), landlords in Nairobi are usually politically influential individuals in the formal 
economy, whereas tenants are subjected to extremely exploitative practices and unable 
to complain to the government precisely because they are illegal settlers. 
The issue of ethnicity is also highly confounded with the conflict dimension of 
landlords–tenants in Nairobi. For instance, most house-owners in Kibera are perceived 
to be Kikuyu. Luo and Luhya residents center their grievances on the demands of 
allegedly Kikuyu “landlords” (LeBas 2013: 245). To many Luos, the Kikuyu are seen 
as running everything, while the Luo must pay them for rooms, water, electricity, as 
well as being shop-owners, creating perceptions of exploitation (Smedt 2009: 594). 
Also in Mathare, there has been economic sabotage between the Kikuyu and Luo/Lua, 
who were considered to be split along the lines of landlords and tenants.103  
A second (ethnic) sub-conflict (in Kibera) concerns those groups that prefer 
community titling. The Nubian community, as a minority ethnic group, sees a direct 
connection between lack of community ownership, poverty, and political 
                                              
101 Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
102 Huchzermeyer (2008) claims that utilization and regulation of council-owned land and housing stock, and protecting 
existing slum housing from new market opportunities ensuing from slum upgrading could benefit the urban poor and secure 
them affordable housing. 
103 National Cohesion and Integration Commission. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
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marginalization.104 The Nubians were originally brought by the British colonialists 
from Sudan, and resettled in Kibera. As the Nubians are not indigenous, and do not 
have a rural “home” area as other Kenyan tribes have, community land titling in 
Kibera is considered fundamental for protecting and empowering them.105  
Hence, as in Zambia, most Kenyan urban slum-dwellers are tenants with highly 
insecure tenure, due to high rates set by the informal markets, and constant threats of 
eviction and demolition. However, in contrast to Zambia, landlords in Nairobi are seen 
as belonging to one tribe that discriminates against tenants of other tribes, giving the 
conflict an ethnic dimension. Furthermore, minority tribes prefer community titling, as 
they feel that neither private nor public housing interventions benefit them. 
Legal and regulatory framework 
 The sub-conflicts that exist among Kenyan slum-dwellers are closely related to the 
legal and regulatory framework that has developed over time. An important document 
for the regulation and planning of Nairobi’s urban space was the 1948 Master Plan, 
which was based on a system of racial zoning developed by the British colonizers. 
This was the only comprehensive plan for Nairobi for decades (Gatabaki-Kamau and 
Karirah-Gitau 2004). The racial zoning laws set administrative constraints on what 
was otherwise a free land market in the urban areas. Housing provision, to the degree 
that it existed at all, was limited to those employed by Europeans, while the Vagrancy 
Act provided for the demolition of informal settlements.  
According to Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004: 160–161), racial segregation 
was simply replaced by socio-economic segregation after independence. The 
combination of labor policies, housing policies and economic relations stemming from 
the colonial and post-colonial period led to an expansion of informal settlements. 
These policies resulted in a lack of land that was affordable and appropriately located 
                                              
104 The Nubian Rights Forum. Oct 18, 2012, Nairobi. 
105 While the Nubians would lose out in the marketplace to better-resourced investors, they also expect to be bypassed in 
government programs because, unlike the dominant ethnic groups, they do not have their own political representatives.  
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for low- and medium-income groups. The problem was aggravated by massive urban 
growth from independence onwards. The removal of restrictions on movement, 
combined with the introduction of individual property rights in African reserves, 
fueled the housing shortage (Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau 2004: 162). This 
process forced rural African families who lost out in the rural market transfer to move 
to the cities. While the post-colonial government initially allowed informal settlers to 
construct shacks, as these were located outside the central business district, it soon 
began demolishing slums close to the Nairobi city center, adopting the colonial 
rationale of law and order (Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau 2004: 164).  
The government of Kenyan African National Union (KANU) stepped up production of 
housing for rent through the National Housing Corporation of Kenya (NHCK). The 
NHCK was created in 1967 to replace the colonial Central Housing Board, and was 
intended to channel funds for low-cost housing to local authorities, housing 
cooperatives and other organizations (Syagga 2000; Syagga and Olima 1999, cited in 
Bocquier et al. 2009). During the 1970s, employers were required to provide housing 
for their employees, who in turn had to pay rent at non-market rates (Bocquier et al. 
2009: 54). These employers were state corporations like Kenya Railways, Kenya Posts 
and Telecommunications, as well as the government. As the Nairobi population and 
workforce grew, it became increasingly difficult for employers to meet demand. 
Employees had to look for private rental housing, while being entitled to housing 
allowance. From the mid-1980s, the housing stock had fallen well behind demand. 
From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, informal settlements continued to increase in 
number, from around 50 to 130 settlements in Nairobi (Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-
Gitau 2004: 164).  
Prior to political liberalization, the KANU government has begun a process of 
economic liberalization, based on economic restructuring programs prescribed by the 
international financial institutions. This restructuring also applied to the NCC, which 
until then had been in charge of urban planning. The Council was abolished and 
replaced by a president-headed commission from 1983 to 1992, which facilitated a 
rapid liberalization and privatization of the city (Linehan, 2007: 26). The problems of 
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corruption and kleptocratic practices that had ridden the city administration for years 
served to legitimate these reform initiatives (Linehan 2007: 27). According to Klopp 
(2000: 8), the economic restructuring processes of the 1980s contributed to intensify 
irregular allocations of public land to private actors and land-buying companies in 
Kenya, popularly termed “land-grabbing mania.” Poor recording led to inequitable 
land management that discriminated against the poor and was subject to corruption 
(UN-Habitat 2006). Individuals acquired private titles illegally, including land where 
squatters had been living for decades.  
The Physical Planning Act of 1996 placed planning responsibility with the local 
authorities.  The Directorate of City Planning (DCP) was intended to coordinate 
development activities, including slum upgrading, micro-enterprises and municipal 
reforms. According to UN-Habitat (2006: 8), the DCP found this mandate 
overwhelming in practice. Actual expenditure for housing from the central government 
was also reduced. The private sector was not able to fill the gap for subsidized 
housing; even settlement upgrading schemes targeting low income groups, initially 
meant for ownership, in practice become rental schemes (Bocquier et al. 2009).  
Although adequate housing has always featured in national development plans, there 
had been no major shifts in housing policy since independence, and even less progress 
in implementation. Furthermore, there were no pro-poor land policies (UN-Habitat 
2006: 14). As the informal settlements were never included in the city Master Plans, 
there were no budget allocations for services and development in these settlements.106 
Instead, the slums were governed by a mix of legal and extra-legal rules and 
authorities, such as customary rules, tribal villages, private property owners, public 
laws and public–private slum upgrading projects (Bocquier et al. 2009). Although 
slum residents have tried to resist being evicted and displaced, title-holders have 
usually won in court, as land occupants have no legal right to be heard (Otiso 2002: 
262). 
                                              
106 Amnesty International. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
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5.2.2 Informal traders and illegality 
Socio-economic base 
About 84 percent of Kenya’s population works in the agricultural sector (CIA 
Factbook 2015). In 2013, 17 percent of youth (ages 15–24) were unemployed (World 
Bank 2015a). The informal sector constitutes 82.7 percent of total employment (Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics 2015: 67-68). Within formal sector employment, 
manufacturing and wholesale and retail sale constitute 15.7 percent of total private 
employment. Within non-agricultural urban work, 61 percent is informal, and 38 
percent is within informal trade (WIEGO 2011: 2). Informal trade employment has 
been considered to constitute 85 percent of total trade employment, and contributes 
with 62 percent of total trade value added (Skinner 2008a: 7).  
According to ILO estimates, 416 294 street vendors were operating in Kenya in 1999. 
Street vendors were held to constitute eight percent of the non-agricultural labor force, 
of which 33 percent were women (Skinner 2008a: 7). However, Linehan (2007: 29) 
claims that employment in street trade grew from 5.1 million in 2002 to 6.8 million in 
2006, a rise of 33.4 percent. WIEGO’s survey (2011) estimated 220,000 urban street 
traders, of whom 63 percent were women. Morange (2015: 251) stated that in the 
2000s, half of Nairobi’s working population was employed in the informal sector, of 
which 20–25 percent was street traders.  According to Morange, there were between 
50,000 and 100,000 street traders in the Nairobi metropolitan area, and 30,000 in 
central Nairobi. WIEGO (2011: 2) found that 51 percent of informal workers were 
involved in trade in the coastal areas, whereas in Nairobi and other urban areas, 
informal trade stood at around 35 percent. In Nairobi the percentage of street traders 
was found to be seven percent (WIEGO 2011: 2).  
Regardless of the discrepancies in estimates on the numbers of informal traders, Lyons 
and Snoxell (2005: 1080) found that trading in Nairobi was no longer an interim 
occupation for young men seeking gainful employment in other sectors. Both men and 
women were in trading for the long term. Fifty-two per cent of first jobs were 
introduced by a relative who was often a host; 32 per cent of traders had come to 
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Nairobi with savings and had no help. Only 16 per cent had initially been helped into 
work by (non-family) friends (Lyons and Snoxell 2005: 1082). According to Morange 
(2015: 258), the majority of street traders in the Central Business District (CBD) area 
live in Githura and Kayole.  
Within the area of trade, workers move between trade and vending in formal and 
informal markets as well as the streets, depending on the opportunities and restraints 
they encounter. A typical example is the Kenyata Market, close to Kibera (Lyons and 
Snoxell 2005: 1080). The municipality adopted it in 1988, and shops were bought by 
hospital employees and local hawkers. Many of the original beneficiaries remained as 
landlords, while the businesses were owned and run by tenants. However, along the 
street and taxi rank outside the market gate, a further 400 stallholders were operating 
without formal tenure. These were tolerated by municipal inspectors, who extracted 
informal payments from time to time. There were also hawkers in the area selling their 
wares.  
As in Lusaka, Nairobi’s street vendors and marketers have a conflict of interest, as 
street vendors are seen as taking customers away from formal traders who pay fees and 
are immobile (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014). Formal businesses find street vending 
problematic due to competition and congestion. According to Macharia (2007: 159), it 
has especially been the well-established businesses in downtown Nairobi—like 
retailers, restaurants and grocery stores—that have been in conflict with informal 
sector businesses. The government has usually responded by arresting or fining the 
latter. There have also been suspicions of arson, for instance when Gikomba Market 
was set on fire in 2000. Accusations circulated that formal sector operators set the 
market on fire to kill off competing second-hand clothing business (Macharia 2007: 
153). Also Robertson (2007: 26) makes the case that the propertied classes in Kenya 
have ruthlessly exercised the property crime of arson against poor, small-scale traders.  
The legal and regulatory framework 
Also Kenya had its Vagrancy Act (from 1922), meant to restrict Africans from moving 
to the cities in large numbers and seeking permanent settlement and employment. 
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Since colonial times, such by-laws have been used to impose fines for hawking, 
spitting and urinating in public, and jaywalking. After first being the responsibility of 
the central government under the African Affairs Officer and Commissioner, street 
trade became a municipal affair in the 1930s (Morange 2015: 250). Municipal bylaws 
accelerated in the 1960s, when the Askaris (City Council) started harassing street 
traders, demolishing their operations and fining the traders. In the 1970s, the 
government became more tolerant of small and medium enterprises: indeed, the 1973 
Metropolitan Growth Strategy recognized street trading as an important livelihood 
strategy and a result of unemployment (Morange 2015: 251). Plots were earmarked for 
55 markets in the metropolitan periphery. In 1992, a division of informal trading was 
even created within the Ministry of Planning and National Development—but in 
practice, much remained the same, and street clearances continued.  
According to Klopp (2000: 8), the economic restructuring processes in the 1990s, 
through the privatization of public goods, extended into many public sites, including 
markets. Existing public markets in urban areas, often located in central, valuable 
areas and hence attractive for investors and developers, were being privatized in an 
irregular manner. The people who had been using the markets lost their right to use 
these urban spaces, as priority was now accorded to business interests. Demolition and 
evictions of former market-users were carried out jointly by council police, regular 
police and private security personnel in order to transfer the land to its new private 
owners (Klopp, 2000: 12).  
The new liberalist paradigm for regulating the use of urban space for work was 
reflected in the government’s development plan—Kenya Vision 20130—that drew up 
a long-term policy strategy for national and regional planning (Linehan 2007: 24). The 
plan was prepared jointly by the Kenyan Economic and Social Council (NESC) and 
the international consultancy firm McKinsey and Company. The plan featured a 
neoliberal strategy which deregulated markets and favored the use of private business 
interests, in policy development and in the delivery of public services. The same 
applied to the 2006 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy, which greatly expanded the 
role of the private sector in devising urban policy. The declared main goal was to 
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establish Nairobi as a regional and global service hub, and as one of the most attractive 
cities to live and do business in (Linehan 2007: 25). This strategy of public–private 
partnerships and privatization was in line  with the conditions set by the World Bank 
for its loans and funding, in which the role of government should be one of “steering,” 
while private actors should deliver.  
Reforms that affected street vendors/hawkers in this long-term strategy and vision of 
the city involved funding to resettle hawkers in smaller, permanent markets citywide; 
improvement of policing and enforcement of NCC bylaws; cleaning up the city and 
enforcement of health and sanitation regulations; securing all public parks and their 
rehabilitation; as well as pedestrianizing the central business district and reducing 
vehicular traffic (Linehan, 2007: 27). Revised by-laws from 2006 stated that anyone 
found buying goods from a hawker in “non-designated” areas would be arrested 
together with the seller (Linehan 2007: 30). Fines from by-laws were seen as the third 
most important source of income for the Askaris, who also used these laws to extract 
bribes from locals and street vendors (Linehan 2007: 29).107  
According to Linehan 2007), the urban strategies towards street vendors display a 
distinct political and ideological vision of urban land development where hawkers and 
street vendors were excluded. As Linehan argues, reclaiming the city center and sub-
centers from hawkers effectively pushed the slums back into the slums. Informal trade 
remained illegal.  
*** 
In this chapter we have seen how the urban poor in Zambia and Kenya have latent 
socio-economic grievances with a potential for being politically mobilized. These 
grievances are linked to the illegality of their housing and livelihood strategies, which 
are often the only viable options. Due to this illegality, the urban poor are harassed, 
criminalized, penalized and marginalized under the current legal and regulatory 
                                              
107 Despite the size and importance of Nairobi (generating 45 percent of Kenya’s GDP), the financial capacity of the City 
Council was extremely limited, largely because of poor resource management and a weak revenue collection system (UN-
Habitat 2006: 9). 
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framework. Although the framework had its roots from colonialism, which was kept 
largely intact by the post-colonial states, the transition to a “neoliberal” economic 
model through liberalization and privatization upheld the illegality of the predominant 
livelihood strategies of the urban poor. We have seen that the urban poor have 
conflicts of interest with other (more affluent) economic groups, whether formal 
businesses and marketers, or landlords. As one respondent noted, the pressing issues 
were economic inequality and insecurity, not poverty per se.108 Moreover, these more-
affluent economic groups often overlap with political elites at local and higher levels. 
However, not all latent socio-economic conflicts are necessarily politicized, especially 
not up to the national level.  
First of all, as the overall urban population has always been substantially larger in 
Zambia than Kenya, urban issues might have more salience at the national political 
level in Zambia, especially due to the rural bias in African electoral systems (Boone 
and Wahman 2013). A few other differences between the two country cases have also 
been identified. In Zambia, the proportion of informal traders relative to the overall 
urban working population appears higher than in the more diversified urban economy 
of Kenya.109 Second, while the majority of urbanites in both countries live in slum 
dwellings, and tenants make up a large bulk of these, the conflicts of interest between 
landlords and tenants have assumed a more specifically ethnic dimension in Kenya 
than in Zambia. Such differences may impact on whether and how the socio-economic 
grievances of the urban poor become important in political mobilization. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, both slum-dwellers and informal traders have played a part 
in political mobilization since independence. However, their political role and the 
nature of their struggles have changed over time.  
 
                                              
108 Inuka Ni Sisi!. March 28, 2014, Nairobi. 
109 As the chapter has shown, estimates of the proportion of informal traders and street vendors compared to the overall 
informal economy or the total labor force differ.  
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6. From independence to a democratic transition: 
multiparty competition and political pluralism as 
game changers 
Chapter 6 covers the nature of urban politics from independence and up to the first 
period of formal, liberal democracy.110 Prior to their democratic transitions, Kenya and 
Zambia were authoritarian regimes increasingly sustained through ethno-clientelism.  
This chapter will discuss whether the transition to multiparty competition and political 
pluralism functioned as a game changer for the political agency of the urban poor. 
The first part will look at how the patrimonial regimes sought to contain political 
opposition from both the urban poor and middle- and upper class groups through the 
introduction of de jure one-party states, and how the latter groups coalesced around a 
democracy struggle in response. The second part will consider whether the 
introduction of multipartyism and political pluralism resulted in the urban poor 
becoming important political constituents for the new government parties and/or civil 
society.   
The analysis will show that neither the new incumbent parties, nor civil society, 
provided a democratic channel through which the urban poor were engaged as citizens 
in the first era of formal democracy. This is attributed to how both the government 
parties and civil society had mobilized the urban poor in an ad hoc manner, but had 
other main priorities. The government parties sought to consolidate their power 
through ethno-clientelism. The NGO-dominated civil society prioritized democracy, 
human rights and service delivery.   
                                              
110 However, it is important to highlight that the introduction of democratic institutions, such as competitive elections and 
political pluralism, may co-exist with authoritarian practices (hybrid regimes). 
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6.1 Zambia  
6.1.1 The patrimonial state: ethno-clientelist machines, state 
corporatism and urban opposition 
When the United National Independence Party (UNIP) came to dominate politics from 
the onset of the First Republic, conflict and competition occurred within the party 
(Szeftel 2000: 209). Clientelism was used as an important mechanism through which 
political supporters obtained access to Zambian state resources in return for helping 
their patrons gain public office (Donge 2008: 71). Szeftel (2000: 208) holds that at the 
heart of each of the three political crises that resulted in new constitutions (i.e. the 
proclamation of new republics) in Zambia was the management of state patronage, and 
how to structure the manner in which particularistic interests could access public 
resources.  
Political reform did not alter the structural determinants of corruption: regional (and 
ethnic) networks were built into the party organization, and relations between local 
political brokers and their clients were the bedrock of regional factions (Szeftel 2000: 
209). According to Szeftel, party and government positions had to be constantly 
distributed between the various groupings to keep the factions in check and sustain the 
coalition, where influence and spoils depended on being able to reward one’s own 
followers. Private accumulation was coupled with access to public office (Szeftel 
2000: 22). UNIP even promoted itself by proclaiming that “it pays to belong to UNIP,” 
and resorted to “rent-a-crowd charades” for President Kaunda’s tours (Zukas 2002, 
referred to in Myers 2006: 297).  
Despite the ethno-clientelist foundations of the regime, the Zambian urban population 
has always been important in driving through political change. With the development 
of the country’s copper industry into one of the largest mining complexes in the world 
from the mid-20th century, Zambia became one of the most industrialized and 
urbanized new nation states in Africa (Rakner 2003: 44). The importance of urban 
interests, especially the unionized mineworkers, was a matter of continuing political 
tension and debate (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). Unionized urban workers were 
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considered a potential political challenger to UNIP after independence (Rakner 2003: 
49). They played an important role in the independence movement, and subsequently, 
UNIP sought to co-opt the urban workforce.  
The UNIP government built a strong, centralized trade union movement, the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), to strengthen its penetration of society (LeBas 
2011: 80). However, these attempts at co-optation contributed to strengthening the 
trade union movement, financially and organizationally (Rakner 2003). In addition to 
union autonomy, the trade union movement developed a cross-ethnic, mass-based 
movement structure (LeBas 2011). It provided a network of “weak ties” that linked 
individuals from different regions and ethnic groups, which facilitated information and 
action (LeBas 2011: 146).  
The collapse of copper export earnings in the 1970s and Zambia’s developmental state 
model resulted in economic decline which severely affected human development. By 
1970, the level of strike activity and worker militarism had become so high that UNIP, 
through the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, introduced mandatory affiliation to one 
central union congress (ZCTU) and a policy of one industry, one union (Rakner 2001: 
527). Even more importantly, following internal splits that threatened its majority, 
UNIP imposed one-party rule in 1971. The introduction of the one-party state brought 
Zambia close to state corporatism, as all interest groups were designated as belonging 
to the state, and only non-political associations were allowed to register outside the 
UNIP (Rakner 2001: 527).  
The trade unions became increasingly hostile to the failed state corporatist model of 
the one-party state and an authoritarian and unjust patron–client political system 
(Rakner 2003). The structural adjustment programs that UNIP carried out in 
conjunction with the IMF and World Bank dominated the antagonistic relationship. 
Throughout the 1980s, the ZCTU leadership continuously resisted UNIP’s attempts to 
co-opt them into party structures. Tensions resulting from high illegal strike activity 
led to detentions, and ZCTU consolidated as the main opposition force (Rakner 2001: 
528). Hence, the representatives of the urban work force became opponents of the one-
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party regime. LeBas (2011: 108) argues that although the ruling party UNIP 
occasionally interfered in the operations of the union center, it never abolished these 
organizations’ autonomy from the state and party. As the workers retained control of 
the union, the elected oppositional leadership allowed unions to play a role in 
organizing resistance to the state’s economic policies and the authoritarian system (see 
below).  
The pro-democracy forces eventually coalesced around a newly formed opposition 
party, The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The MMD elite represented 
an alliance of business, labor, academics and civil society (LeBas 2011). The 
opposition party protested against the effects of failed economic policies of the 
socialist regime and the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs, and sought to 
oust the incumbent regime and introduce democracy through a new constitution. Prior 
to the democratic transition, ZCTU put its organizational resources at the disposal of 
the MMD (Rakner 2001: 528). However, popular protest was characterized by fairly 
fragile links between opposition party elites and mass constituencies (LeBas 2011: 
108). The trade union movement was not actively involved in planning and 
coordination of protest, nor did it coordinate campaigns with other social actors 
preceding party formation (LeBas 2011: 162, 171).  
According to Bratton (1994, cited in Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009), it was UNIP’s 
failure to maintain relations with the trade union movement that undermined its hold 
on power in the 1980s. However, Levitsky and Way (2012: 874) attribute the 
implosion of the UNIP to its party organization, which was mainly consolidated as a 
patronage-based machine, vulnerable to the crises of the post-Cold War world. 
According to Levitsky and Way, UNIP did not have roots in a violent struggle, and 
had not built up a cohesive party with strong organizational structures, ideology, and 
identities. Rather, it was a broad coalition of factional interests spanning ethnic, 
regional and ideological groups, heavily reliant on patronage. The ruling party did not 
have strong ties to the coercive security forces either, compared to many ruling parties 
elsewhere in Africa. When the patronage machine ran out of resources, there was no a 
strong polarizing identity that could contain cohesion, and the system quickly 
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disintegrated (Levitsky and Way 2012: 874). UNIP suffered large-scale defection in 
the face of economic crisis and internal and external pressure to democratize (Levitsky 
and Way 2012). Sensing the shifting tide, UNIP officials defected to the opposition, 
bringing along their resources, experience and constituencies.  In the transitional 
elections in 1991, the MMD won a landslide victory. 
Slum-dwellers and informal traders   
The Zambian slum-dwellers have constituted a political force ever since independence. 
However, the patterns of slum-dweller party mobilization have been contradictory, and 
it is difficult to delineate where programs or ideology ended and clientelism begun. 
Already in the late 1950s (in the colonial era), the District Commissioner was busy 
collecting hut rents from unauthorized settlements (Myers 2006: 300). This practice 
was controversial, and the colonial Director for African Affairs was frustrated that the 
practice created additional complications by perpetuating unwanted slums (Mulwanda 
and Mutale 1994: 305).  After independence, expatriates increasingly lost control over 
the squatter settlements.  
After independence, multipartyism was introduced in Zambia. According to Myers 
(2006: 303), the process of carving Lusaka into “firm wedges and sectors” began 
under UNIP rule.111 UNIP officials condoned and sometimes encouraged the formation 
of squatter settlements, because these populations provided a massive base of political 
support (Seymour 1975: 72). City councilors feared the political repercussions of 
demolition of the fast-growing settlements, although their policy and attitude towards 
squatters were almost identical to those of the colonialists.   
As squatters were considered a source of political support, this undermined the efforts 
of the Squatter Control Unit to control the development of unauthorized settlements. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, townships and compounds supported either UNIP or 
the opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), and rarely tolerated the 
other party in their strongholds (Myers 2006: 303). The Kalingalinga compound, for 
instance, had strong ties to the ANC. As a consequence, the model site-and-service 
                                              
111 The process accelerated through party politics from the 1990s and onwards (Myers 2006). 
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scheme of the UNIP government in the late 1960s and early 1970s, east of 
Kalingalinga in Mtendere, was filled with UNIP loyalists who had been living 
uncomfortably in Kalingalinga (Myers 2006).  
In 1970, the demolition of 517 shelters in Nguluwe provoked evictees to threaten a 
boycott of forthcoming local government elections, and in 1972, squatters in Chipata 
compound threatened to quit UNIP en masse when faced with the threat of eviction, 
which effectively ended the process (Mulwanda and Mutale 1994: 305). Mulwanda 
and Mutale (1994: 305) argue that the political allegiance of the urban masses was of 
great importance for UNIP’s continued rule, increasing the former’s power and 
freedom to occupy vacant land. In 1972, however, when the one-party state was 
established, the squatters lost much of their political leverage, as opposition parties 
were abolished (Mulwanda and Mutale 1994: 307). 
Nevertheless, squatters still had influence at lower political levels. Although the 
official UNIP stance was against squatting, party officials established branches in all 
squatter areas in the 1970s where local UNIP leaders allocated plots to illegal settlers 
(Mulwanda and Mutale 1994). Since UNIP members still had to compete for office at 
local level after the introduction of the one-party regime, they strategically mobilized 
the urban poor by allocating plots to them, while also requiring them to pay service 
charges.  
In the 1970s, political pressures built up within the party, because an extension of 
Lusaka’s  city boundaries made councilors heavily dependent on the squatter vote 
(Seymour 1975: 73). According to Seymour, this was why the city council began to 
push for an upgrading policy, which appeared as the cheapest, if not only, response to 
the squatter challenge.112 After a loan application was submitted to the World Bank, 
secretive and protracted negotiations followed; in 1974, a loan of 26 million kwacha 
was announced for upgrading (Seymour 1975: 74). The government saw upgrading as 
a means of bringing squatters under its control. Only selected settlements would be 
                                              
112 The idea itself had been introduced by Swedish architects who visited Zambia in 1969, and was actively promoted by the 
organization known as Social Action in Lusaka (SAIL). 
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upgraded—others would be demolished and resettled into site-and-service schemes 
(Seymour 1975: 76). As squatters were also expected to contribute towards the 
purchase of the land from private owners, upgrading tended to exclude the poorest 
segments and those who could not afford the site-and-service schemes. Squatters were 
also excluded from participation in the formulation and execution of plans (Seymour 
1975: 76).  
When President Kaunda continued campaigns of demolishing squatter settlements to 
be relocated into service settlements (often only on paper), this triggered widespread 
resistance (Mulwanda and Mutale 1994). Squatters in Lusaka and Kitwe threatened not 
to vote for their MPs or ward chairmen. In 1986, there were also violent encounters. 
One encounter between squatters and a council demolition squad and riot police in 
Mazyopa township in Lusaka, after the squatter structures had been demolished, left 
two youth dead (Mulwanda and Mutale 1994: 308-309). The one-party state 
increasingly used demolitions and relocations to control the squatters.  
In addition to squatter settlements, markets were strategic places for party recruitment 
during the UNIP era, and their management was a target for political maneuver 
(Hansen 2010: 18). UNIP used the Market Act, often through the co-operative 
societies, to take control over the allocation of stands in markets through its youth 
wing. Party membership became a prerequisite for access to land, and stand-holders 
paid fees and levies to the UNIP. While laws prohibiting street vending had been more 
or less consistent since the colonial era, informal street vending politics were also a 
feature throughout this period.  
Although less has been written about these political dynamics, Zambian street vendors 
consistently contested the legislation intended to prevent them from conducting their 
activities in urban spaces (Hansen 2004: 63). Subversive activities began already 
during the colonial era, when especially women would provide illegal goods and 
services to the African urban population. During the Second Republic, the police 
would periodically arrest and fine such “black marketers,” or confiscate their property 
(Hansen 2004: 63). Continuous confrontations between traders and state agents 
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marked this period, as traders would usually ignore legislation forbidding them to 
practice their trade (Hansen 2004: 63).  
In the 1980s, Michael Sata became the public face of UNIP’s attempts to “clean up” 
the city through organized vigilante attacks on street vendors, and deportations to rural 
areas (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 624). As part of the opposition struggle, an alliance 
between the labor movement, the urban unemployed and informal sector workers took 
shape, although this alliance was more affective or emotional than institutionalized 
(LeBas 2011: 154). Informal workers were politicized through unplanned contentious 
actions against shared economic hardships. “Bread riots” protested the economic and 
social costs of the structural adjustment programs. The opposition party, MMD, was 
thus able to channel into the mood of the urban workforce in both the formal and 
informal sectors. 
To sum up, after independence, Zambian political elites competed for the political 
support of the urban poor, often through the use of clientelism. Through the 
introduction of the one-party regime, however, UNIP sought to contain political 
contention at the local political level and within the party structure. Over time, the 
regime became increasingly hostile to slum-dwellers a as well as informal traders.  
Already in 1975, Seymour (1975) predicted that urban planning in Lusaka would 
sharpen squatters’ awareness of latent class-based conflicts of interest. Mulwanda and 
Mutale (1994) claim that many of those who voted UNIP out of office in 1991 were 
squatters who felt betrayed by the party; these authors also predicted that the Third 
Republic would enhance squatter power, as ignoring the plight of over half the 
population in major cities and towns would be political suicide. In addition, the 
opposition party, MMD, gained strength through mobilizing workers from the formal 
and the informal sectors. The urban poor thus played a role in putting an end to the 
one-party state. However, the mobilization of the urban poor by the MMD was ad hoc: 
there was no clear program, and the linkages were weak.   
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6.1.2 Transition to formal democracy – ethnoclientelism and civil 
society detachment  
Multiparty competition and the structuring of national party politics 
around ethno-clientelism (1991–2006) 
The 1991 Zambian Constitution was the result of a compromise between UNIP and the 
MMD (Rakner 2003). A presidential system with a unicameral National Assembly 
(150 seats) was put in place, and the President was to be elected by a plurality vote for 
a five-year term, with a term-limit of two periods (International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES) 2013b). Members of the National Assembly would be 
elected by plurality vote in single-member districts, with eight additional members to 
be appointed by the President. All would serve five-year terms, and tripartite elections 
were to be held simultaneously for the presidency, parliament and local government. 
The Local Government Act of 1991 made the local authorities more independent of 
the party structure by establishing elected councilors and mayors (Hansen 2010).  
In terms of MMD party building, links between local branches and the national 
leadership had not been well-developed, and local activists were not involved in party 
decisionmaking or policy formulation (LeBas 2011: 219). According to LeBas, little 
thought had been given to how the allied groups that formed the MMD would govern 
and make collective decisions—and internal divisions soon began to emerge, resulting 
in the first split-offs. The MMD national leadership controlled the selection of 
parliamentary candidates, often businessmen or former UNIP politicians, while many 
trade union activists were excluded. LeBas (2011) attributes this partly to the limited 
resources available in the initial phase of party building, but the pattern continued also 
after the MMD took office. In 1993, the MMD Organization Committee reported that 
party structures were eroding due to poor information flows, lack of resources and 
non-payment of salaries (LeBas 2011: 221). Authoritarian carry-overs from the UNIP 
era became more frequent, targeting dissenting opinions both within and outside the 
party.  
From 1991 to 2006, the party system was dominated by the MMD. Despite the party’s 
promises of a highly participatory constitution-making process after gaining office, it 
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ended up rejecting many of the recommendations that were produced by an 
independent commission when passing a new constitution in 1996 (Ndulo and Kent 
1996). The MMD conducted a program of typically right-wing, market-friendly 
policies (Rakner 2003). Nevertheless, during the first one and a half decades of 
democracy, the party system in Zambia was characterized by ethno-regional political 
cleavages and personalistic party politics (Larmer and Fraser 2007; Posner 2007). 
Larmer and Fraser (2007) have attributed the majority won by the MMD in the 2001 
election to the proliferation of opposition parties with constituency bases in their own 
home districts. There was an absence of substantive policy alternatives in the party 
system. Posner (2007)  claims that all public office holders at all levels in Zambia were 
expected to assist members of their own ethnic communities, which made voters and 
politicians alike give weight to the ethnic dimension of politics rather than other 
political aspects.  
The former single party, UNIP, became increasingly marginalized under the new 
multiparty system. In the 2006 elections, it entered into a political coalition with the 
largest opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND). The 
MMD presidential candidate, Mwanawasa, won in 2006 by a larger margin than 
previous elections, which was interpreted as an endorsement of his “good governance” 
policies of economic growth and debt management (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 611). 
However, it was the party’s ability to consolidate the rural vote throughout the country 
that secured its 2006 victory. By contrast, the opposition coalition emerged as a 
“narrow ethno-regional bloc” (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 621).  
During the first one and a half decades of multiparty rule, there were thus no 
substantive policy changes in the party system in Zambia: ethno-clientelism prevailed. 
However, the emergence of Michael Sata as the leading opposition candidate with 29 
percent of the vote was another significant outcome of the 2006 elections (Resnick 
2010). His new party, the Patriotic Front (PF), had opted to go it alone for these 
elections, rather than joining the opposition coalition. As will become evident in the 
next chapter, a pro-poor party platform had begun to take shape.  
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Civil society pluralism – service delivery, democracy and human rights   
The nature of Zambian civil society, and its relationship to the state and political 
parties, changed profoundly when the one-party state was abolished. This change was 
characterized by the dismantling of corporatist structures, and the growth of a pluralist 
civil society, dominated by NGOs. Although civil society continued to be regulated by 
Acts carried over from the old regime (Kaliba 2014: 8),113 this did not prevent the 
development of an increasingly more pluralist civil society, largely thanks to external 
donor funding.   
Rakner (2001) has argued that a pluralist paradox resulted from simultaneous political 
and economic liberalization in Zambia, leading to the proliferation of civic 
associations, with the weakening of corporatist links between the state and economic 
interest groups. In the 1990s, the trade unions declined in political influence, while 
there was a rise of civic associations and NGOs working in diverse areas of service 
provision, democracy, human rights, pro-women and pro-poor change (Duncan et al. 
2003: 40). Approximately 390 non-governmental associations in a wide range of fields 
were registered in 1993, the majority Lusaka-based. Few organizations combined work 
at the grassroots with work at the national policy level, however, and very few had 
national membership or national constituencies (Rakner 1998: 252).  
Many national NGOs were more active in advocacy than in service provision (Duncan 
et al. 2003: 41). Growing insistence from the international community on civil society 
participation in policy processes contributed to civil society organizations (CSOs) 
beginning to participate formally and actively in the Consultative Group meetings 
formerly restricted to the government and official aid agencies (Duncan et al. 2003: 
41). One example is the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR). This network 
was created to provide input to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, as a demand 
from donors.114 Over time, advocacy for the inclusion of socio-economic rights into 
                                              
113 Five pieces of legislation had dealt with the registration, organization and regulation of NGOs activities: the Companies 
Act (Cap.388), the Lands and Deeds Registry Act (Cap. 185), the Trustee Act, 1898 of the United Kingdom, the Societies 
Act (Cap. 119), and the Adoptions Act (Cap. 54) (Kaliba 2014: 8). 
114 The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
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the Bill of Rights, through constitutional reform processes, also emerged.115 NGOs 
(networks) such as CSPR promoted capacity-building among the poor.116  However, 
most NGOs still lacked a strong grassroots foundation.   
According to Duncan et al. (2003: 39), the Zambia churches took on an increasingly 
important pro-poor role in the 1990s, seeing this in connection with the withering 
away of grassroots bases of political parties and the decline of industrial trade unions. 
Especially the Catholic Church was well organized at community level and enjoyed 
sufficient funding and staffing from overseas.117 At least two-thirds of Zambians were 
believed to be affiliated with some church. Most churches were in contact with poor 
people, able to mobilize and communicate with them, and provide some safety nets for 
the most vulnerable (Duncan et al. 2003: 39-40).  
There were also a myriad of community-based organizations, ranging from parent–
teacher associations, neighborhood health committees and community schools, to land 
associations and farmers’ associations (Duncan et al. 2003: 41). However, CSO 
effectiveness was considered to vary greatly, depending on the leaders. While some 
sought to pressure the government to improve service delivery, others were supported 
by donors to raise awareness. Duncan et al. (2003: 42) have noted that it was probably 
only through community-based organizations that the voices of the poor stood any 
chance of being heard.118  
Hence, Zambian civil society became increasingly diverse and autonomous after the 
introduction of formal democratic institutions. Initially, the urban poor were catered 
for mostly through advocacy and service provision: they were not themselves active 
                                              
115 Expert at Panos Institute Southern Africa. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
116 The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
Zambia Council for Social Development. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka. 
117 Today, the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR)  started publishing a monthly cost of living index for Lusaka. 
118 However, Duncan et al. (2003) did not see NGOs and CBOs as an alternative to the government as a solution to pro-poor 
change, and argued that the best donors could do was to identify and promote responsible NGOs, encouraging links between 
them and grassroots organizations. 
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agents of political change. However, the political space had been opened, and, after the 
turn of the century, more grassroots-based movements for the urban poor emerged.   
6.2 Kenya 
6.2.1 The patrimonial state: ethno-clientelist machines and urban 
opposition 
In contrast to Zambia, the patronage system in Kenya prior to democratization in the 
1990s relied heavily on polarizing ethnic identities (through violence). This ethnic 
polarization was also reflected in organizational life. Electoral violence along ethnic 
lines can be traced back to pre-colonial and colonial times (Rutten and Owuor 2009). 
Ethnic conflicts in Kenya are closely related to the history of land rights and access, 
and questions of who had been there first (indigenousness). Before the 20th century, 
the Kikuyu, Maasai, Luo and Kalenjin, as well as smaller groups, had engaged in more 
and less aggressive conflicts with each other as well as within their own groups, over 
the fertile land necessary for pastoralism and agriculture. However, the European 
colonialists’ interest in cultivating precisely such lands, and their deliberate policies 
for creating a pool of cheap labor, led many—the Kikuyu in particular—to migrate to 
the fertile Rift Valley region (Rutten and Owuor 2009: 308-309). Both the moderate 
and the radical (Mau Mau) Kenyan nationalists that emerged prior to independence 
were fighting the colonialists’ segregated system of land-holding. The violent Mau 
Mau rebellion against the colonial power was defeated by 1956.  
When the British, toward the end of their rule, decided to allow Kenyans to own land, 
conflicts emerged on questions of customary land rights versus the purchase of land 
based on private property rights. As the latter was promoted mostly by the Kikuyu, 
tribal interests were based upon land as an economic interest (Rutten and Owuor 2009: 
310).  This conflict intensified; already in the 1961 (pre-independence) elections, 
political party branches of KANU (Kikuyu and Luo) and Kenyan African Democratic 
Union (KADU) (Kalenjin and Maasai) armed their supporters for defense against 
perceived intrusions or attacks from the other side. In the Rift Valley, “the 
communities that felt the most threatened by the possible influx of landless Kikuyu 
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peasants into the Rift Valley under a KANU government tended to support the 
federalist policies of KADU” (Muigai 1995, 166–7, cited in Rutten and Owuor, 2009: 
311).  
KANU, the political party that negotiated independence with the British, was not 
founded on violent struggle. Led by Jomo Kenyatta, it was considered a more elitist 
party of moderates and conservatives (Levitsky and Way 2012: 878). Like UNIP in 
Zambia, it represented a coalition of ethnic and ideological groups, and former Mau 
Mau activists were sidelined. KANU incorporated political elites into a coalition 
mainly through patronage, making it prone to factionism and defections. As ties to the 
security apparatus had not been forged through violent struggle, these were also based 
on ethnic appointments in the leadership (Levitsky and Way 2012: 879). 
According to Boone (2011: 1322), the government sponsored settlement schemes and 
land-buying companies on land owned by the state in the 1960s and 1970s. The land-
tenure system created opportunities for politicians and state agents to manipulate land 
allocation and land rights for political control over populations settled in the Rift 
Valley. From 1960 to 1966, approximately half of this land was (re)acquired by the 
government, parceled up and transferred to Kenyan smallholders through settlement 
schemes. Nonindigenous groups were the main beneficiaries, especially the wealthier 
Kikuyu. Indeed, this allocation of land in the Highlands has remained the deepest and 
most divisive issue in Kenyan politics (Boone 2011).119 The resettlement schemes also 
had a class dimension, where those who could pay soon began accumulating land at 
the expense of the poor (Kanyinga 2009: 341). According to Kanyinga, “the landed 
elite are in control of both the politics and economy in the highlands and finance 
violence more often to deflect attention from inequalities in land ownership to 
inequalities in distribution of political power” (2009: 341).  
At the same time, an ideological component was introduced by politicians such as the 
KANU Vice-President, Oginga Odinga. Odinga and a former Mau Mau detainee, 
                                              
119 As Kenya’s colonial system gave each formally recognized ethnic group its own separate ethnic homeland (“native 
reserve,” or Tribal Trust Area), in which groups members could claim customary rights, the divisive issue was what to do 
with the fertile areas where the colonial state had removed tribal or customary rights (Boone 2011). 
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Bildad Kaggia, criticized Kenyatta’s conservative economic policies and wanted 
greater redistribution to benefit the poor (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 39). When 
they were removed from their party posts in KANU in 1966, Odinga and his 
supporters formed a rival party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). They advocated a 
socialist model, but had an ethnic support base among the Luo and Kikuyu 
(Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 40). However, the KANU regime systematically 
suppressed cross-ethnic social mobilization structures, in favor of ethnic brokerage, 
co-optation and fragmentation. In the 1960s, only ten percent of the population was 
urban; trade union membership was marginal, and was effectively co-opted into the 
ruling party by 1965 through the creation of COTU (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 
40). The KPU was thus unable to rally a mass constituency. 
Still, the formation of the KPU soon led the KANU government to introduce measures 
towards a de facto one-party system. In the KANU state, the manipulation of tribal 
sentiments to distract attention from politically opportunistic behavior became more 
systematic (Rutten and Owuor 2009: 313). President Moi, a Kalenjin who succeeded 
Kenyatta (Kikuyu) after his death in 1978, “nurtured Kalenjin ethnic nationalism as 
Kenyatta had done to Kikuyu nationalism” (Rutten and Owuor 2009: 313). Upon 
taking over the party leadership, President Moi began strengthening and centralizing 
the KANU party structure (Levitsky and Way 2012: 879).  
From the 1980s onwards, pressure for multiparty and economic reform increased due 
to the growing discontent with economic and political oppression, among the urban 
middle and working class (Mati 2012: 68). Mass protests, workers’ strikes, student 
protests and a proliferation of social movements and civil society organizations 
emerged at the end of the Cold War era. The Moi-KANU regime was exposed as 
vulnerable, which opened up strategic opportunities for former hardliners and 
conservative forces (Mati 2012: 68). Unlike the case in Zambia, it was the churches 
and the legal community that came to lead the civil society-based pro-democracy 
struggle in Kenya (VonDoepp 1996: 38).   
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The trade union federation, COTU, remained silent while discontent against 
authoritarian rule and economic crisis mounted (LeBas 2011: 99). Union leaders 
merely issued statements in support of the ruling party, and did not participate in 
forming opposition parties. LeBas attributes this to the labor-repressive policies of the 
state in the decade following independence, which had weakened structures of union 
affiliates and created a small and fragmented membership base. Kenyan unions lacked 
ties across ethnic and geographical lines, which made coordination of protest and 
campaign difficult. The political parties relied on ethnic networks, as the political 
elites did not have access to mobilizing structures beyond ethnicity (LeBas 2011: 244).  
The first responses from Moi came in the form of harassment, arrests and 
assassinations of activists, as well as the introduction of new legislation for further 
oppression. Police killed demonstrators and activists, both prior to the multiparty 
transition and throughout the period of Moi rule (Klopp and Zuern, 2007: 133). In 
1990, former KANU notables Rubia and Matiba joined opposition leader, Oginga 
Odinga, in launching the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) (Levitsky 
and Way 2012: 879). A government crackdown resulted in Western sanctions, and 
Moi proceeded to legalize the opposition and call for multiparty elections in 1992. As 
a consequence, “ruling-party politicians began to defect en masse to the opposition” 
(Levitsky and Way 2012: 879). As popular pressure built up for a transition to 
multipartyism and the release of political opponents from prison, so did ethnic 
tensions, and clashes occurred in the wake of the transitional 1992 elections. 
Nevertheless, President Moi and KANU managed to secure re-election, through the 
orchestration of ethnic violence and intimidation.  
Slum-dwellers and informal traders 
During its early years, the KANU regime extended its political patronage to squatters 
along the banks of the Nairobi river and other nearby areas (Macharia 1992: 228). 
However, this honeymoon soon ended: Kenyan leaders wanted to maintain “law and 
order” in the overcrowded capital, and demolitions were reinstated. A widespread 
patronage tactic that centered on conflictual land use among slum-dwellers emerged 
soon after independence (Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau 2004: 162). Ties to 
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incumbent politicians determined whether informal settlements (often structured as 
tribal villages) would be tolerated or demolished. As with rural land, tenure security on 
urban land became dependent on patronage politics, and urban villages were used 
strategically as political bases during elections (Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau 
2004: 162).  
Also informal workers have been a source of political instability and patronage. In 
Kenya, any discussion of the informal sector must take into account the “Jua Kali.” 
The term, which translates as “hot sun,” was initially associated with blue-collar 
workers like metal workers and blacksmiths, who usually conducted their work in the 
open air (Asaka 2010). Gradually, the term has become used interchangeably with the 
informal sector, accommodating further work activities such as hawking and informal 
micro- and small enterprises (MSE). Jua Kalis mainly produce for people who are 
poor, except in the case of farming tools and some products for construction industries. 
Already in the colonial 1950s, arson was used to control hawking as an occupation, but 
also to control hawkers as individuals (Robertson 2007: 27). The politicization of 
hawker control created continuous tensions among poorer traders, formal business and 
the government. According to Robertson, the struggle over and in urban markets was a 
key element in the 1950s emergency declared by the British to fight urban and rural 
guerillas. The colonial authorities took steps to remove these threats, realizing that 
markets could serve as meeting places for the Mau Mau rebels. Measures included 
arrests, destruction and removal to camps, sometimes as retaliation against attacks on 
colonial collaborators.  
In the early years of the KANU regime, few KANU leaders expressed concern for the 
disadvantaged in the lowest income groups. President Kenyatta even referred to the 
urban poor as “lazy” or “useless” (Macharia 1992: 229). However, some sections of 
the informal economy received considerably more assistance from the government 
because of their influential political patrons. Macharia found that the growth of the 
Kenyan informal economy depended on an expansion of skills, facilities and capital 
through specialization, which was likely to have an ethnic and cultural base. This was 
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used for political mobilization. Kenyatta favored the matatu operators (Macharia 1992: 
233). These could even come to the head of state with requests not to be harassed by 
the city council (Kinyanjui 2010).  
When President Moi succeeded Kenyatta, he initially took a more relaxed stance 
towards the urban poor than his predecessor and would claim that the mwananchi (the 
common man) was behind him, as the “political climate in the late 1970s and early 
1980s did not favor either the clearance of slums or the harassment of those engaged in 
small economic enterprises” (Macharia 1992: 229). Moi’s populist appeals were 
initially aimed at the lowest income groups, who saw Moi as “their savior” (Macharia 
1992: 229). Moi encouraged the Jua Kali sector to organize into associations in 1985.  
The government-initiated Jua Kali structure ran from the Permanent Secretary, via the 
director of the local department and area deputies down to the grassroots/district 
level.120 The Jua Kali Association was to implement government policy and “be the 
eyes of the government.”121 However, Moi favored the metal artisans, as they 
facilitated the saving of valuable foreign currency. Vendors continued to be harassed 
(Macharia 1992: 234). 
Klopp (2000: 7) argues that when the Kenyan political elites were faced with declining 
patronage resources in the 1980s, they began seeking alternative sources that often 
amplified corruption and violence. Land-grabbing was used by Moi and his clients as 
patronage resources to maintain control during the transition to formal democratic 
arrangements, as less international scrutiny was directed to public land. Coupled with 
fears that a change of government would end their access to land, officials accelerated 
their accumulation of public land and rents on land allocations. This triggered violent 
resistance in both rural and urban areas (Klopp 2000: 8).  
According to Murunga (1999: 183), the informal economy became open to political 
manipulation due to its illegality. However, also opponents of the state, including 
                                              
120 The government also formed a Ministry for Science and Applied Technology and a Department of Micro- and Small 
Entreprises. 
121 Jua Kali Kamukunji Area Association. Oct 27, 2012, Nairobi.. 
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activists for reform and political pluralism, targeted the informal economy in order to 
direct popular revolt against the state. As noted by Murunga (1999: 191), the “informal 
economy began to serve as a medium of disseminating information on political 
pluralism,” but it also engaged in violent protests. The state responded with political 
repression in the form of slum demolitions and razing of nearby illegal kiosks, as with 
the demolition of Muoroto and Kibagare in 1990. These brutal slum clearances were 
conducted because the slums were perceived as a harboring and creating political 
opponents to the one-party regime (Macharia 1992: 232). The Kikuyu were considered 
the main targets for the demolitions of Muoroto and Kibagare, although the state 
legitimized this as an attack on increasing crime. The slum-dwellers responded by 
rebuilding the shanty town in weeks. There was an outrage against the violence and 
brutality through which the demolitions were carried out. Youths, hawkers, bus drivers 
and kiosk owners joined to fight the city police (askaris) (Murunga 1999: 184).  
Despite the ethnic polarization, evictions of slum-dwellers fueled public animosity 
toward the KANU government, thereby undermining political stability and security 
(Otiso 2002: 261). However, instead of concentrating on the problems of poverty, 
shelter and unemployment to rally support, political proponents of reform and 
multipartyism rallied the urban crowds to focus on the corrupt and repressive 
government, often through ethnic appeals (Murunga 1999: 187). Economic issues were 
set aside. Nevertheless, Murunga (1999) found that the growing number of protests 
and violence contributed to KANU opening up for multipartyism.  
To sum up, the KANU regime, throughout its rule, used the socio-economic 
grievances of slum-dwellers and informal traders as clientelist assets. However, in the 
1980s, the brutalizing effects of autocracy as well as the poverty resulting from 
repressive economic policies and mismanagement on the urban masses led to urban 
violence (Murunga 1999: 167). Murunga found that urban violence contributed to 
democratic reforms. In Nairobi, the perception that the government endorsed slum 
demolitions cost KANU considerable political goodwill (Throup & Hornsby 1998, 
referred to in Otiso 2002: 261). KANU consistently performed poorly in elections in 
city/urban constituencies with substantial slum populations—which, according to 
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Otiso (2002), come at price in an era of multiparty politics.   Nevertheless, KANU 
leaders and the opposition targeted different groups of the urban poor, in order to 
divide and rule on the basis of an ethnic logic.  
6.2.2 Transition to formal democracy – ethnic violence and civil 
society detachment  
Multiparty competition and the structuring of national party politics 
around violent ethno-clientelism  
Ethnic clashes occurred in the wake of the transitional 1992 elections as well as during 
the 1997 elections (both of these won by Moi and KANU). Each time, ethnic conflict 
centered on claims for land, and the illegitimate occupation of land by “migrants” 
(Rutten and Owuor 2009: 315). However, political instability and expulsion of 
communities also correlated with voters perceived to be problematic for securing 
KANU’s re-election. Brown and Sriram (2012: 247) argue that the ethnic attacks can 
most accurately be characterized as state-induced violence. They were organized and 
financed by senior government and ruling party officials, to attack members of ethnic 
groups who lived in zones dominated by the ruling party but who were believed to 
support the opposition. The opposition was portrayed as Kikuyu. By using land 
conflicts as a basis for creating ethnic tension, KANU managed to feed into the fears 
of land-dependent communities (Klopp and Zuern, 2007: 138). 
Although Moi had courted the Kikuyu in late 1970s, he shifted strategy and sought 
cooperation with the Luo through Oginga Odinga (1993–94), and later with his son, 
Raila Odinga (1998–2002), through the latter’s party, National Development Party 
(NDP) (Ndegwa 2003: 150). The NDP collaborated with Moi in exchange for 
government-controlled resources. Raila Odinga and others were included in Moi’s 
cabinet in 2001, and thereafter formally joined KANU. Odinga became KANU’s 
Secretary General (Ndegwa 2003: 150).  
Several factors resulted in KANU’s strategy eventually backfiring. International media 
attention and civil society groups in collaboration with opposition parties used 
KANU’s resort to violence to delegitimize the government. In 1997, landmark mass 
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protests threatened to derail elections, and forced Moi to concede to minimal electoral 
law reforms and an agreement to set up a commission to review the Kenyan 
Constitution through an Act of Parliament (Mati 2012: 69). KANU’s patronage 
resources were also drying up, because of slow growth and donor pressure (Levitsky 
and Way 2012: 879).  
Mounting internal dissent broke the KANU coalition, and when President Moi 
announced his retirement, the party experienced a succession crisis. When Moi 
appointed Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) as his successor, senior officials and “ethno-
regional barons,” including Raila Odinga (at the time General Secretary) abandoned 
the party and went over to the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 
together with the Liberal Democratic Party (Levitsky and Way 2012: 879). By 2002, 
half of the 1990s-KANU elite had joined NARC, which could draw on their 
organizational and financial resources (Levitsky and Way 2012: 879). NARC and its 
leader, Mwai Kibaki (also a Kikuyu) won the elections—which also meant that the 
2002 elections were not marked by anti-Kikuyu violence and rhetoric.  
Upon assuming office, however, the NARC coalition was not committed to party 
building or links to mass constituencies (LeBas 2011: 238). Instead of building strong 
ties to popular constituencies, the coalition parties used vote-buying and youths in 
ways that undermined accountability. The parties did not maintain offices or other 
presence in local areas in-between elections (LeBas 2011: 238). NARC also 
abandoned its campaign promise of a new constitution within 100 days, and made 
radical alterations to the draft produced through the National Constitutional 
Conference, before presenting it for referendum (Mati 2012). 
The NARC coalition broke when its interethnic coalition based on a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Kibaki’s National Alliance of Kenya and Odinga’s LDP—
providing for equal sharing of cabinet posts and other high-level positions in addition 
to consensus-based decision-making—was cancelled by Kibaki and his (mainly 
Kikuyu) aides (Chege 2008-130). Kibaki proposed to dissolve the NARC and build a 
strong governing party and a two-party system. Odinga’s LDP broke with NARC, and 
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became the protagonist behind the newly formed Orange Democratic Movement 
(together with KANU), an opposition movement to the draft constitution. As a result 
of mobilization by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Kibaki’s constitutional 
draft was rejected in the 2005 referendum with 57 percent voting against. Kibaki 
accepted the defeat, but dissolved the cabinet, and excluded the LDP in the process 
(Chege 2008). 
Prior to the 2007 elections, the ODM began to build a nation-wide party machine, 
based on economic marginalization and anti-Kikuyu sentiments, turning its grassroots 
campaign into a “forty-one tribes against one” (Chege 2008: 133). The alliance 
included William Ruto, the Kalenjin leader, and focused on majimbo—regionalism. 
Kibaki and his advisors launched the Party of National Unity (PNU) in September 
2007, three months before the elections. The PNU had no strong grassroots network, 
and its campaign headquarters were weak and underfunded (Chege 2008). According 
to LeBas (2011: 237), of all the political parties that contested the 1992 elections, only 
KANU bore any resemblance to its current form by 2007, whereas the other opposition 
parties had fragmented, changed leadership or constituency base, and altered their 
names several times. There was a lack of solid roots to grassroots constituencies; party 
defections reached high levels, and the parties had little control over who contested 
parliamentary and local elections (LeBas 2011). Nonetheless, LeBas finds some traces 
of consistency, especially regarding how people living in Kisumu and Nyanza, the Luo 
heartland, referred to all the Odinga-led parties by the name “Chama,” which means 
simply “the party.” With politicians relying on ethnic vote blocs, there was less need to 
invest in party structures (LeBas 2011).  
As the 2007 elections approached, the ODM political rhetoric became increasingly 
anti-Kikuyu (Rutten and Owuor 2009: 316). The national-level political competition 
was framed along broad ethnic cleavages, with the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin center 
stage, and other smaller ethnic communities allying with one of these groupings. By 
2007, violence in party primaries and imposition of candidates had become systematic 
(LeBas 2011: 239-240). When the 2007 electoral results were announced in President 
Kibaki’s favor, this immediately sparked waves of violence in rural as well as urban 
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areas that continued for months. Odinga’s supporters had expected him to win, and felt 
that the elections must have been fraudulent. 
There was a mixture of spontaneous protest and more organized, politically supported 
militias on both sides. Brown and Sriram (2012: 248) distinguish four forms of 
violence: (1) spontaneous rioting by Luos, mainly in Nyanza Province, after the 
Electoral Commission announced the presidential results; (2) premeditated attacks in 
the Rift Valley and urban slums on Kikuyu and other ethnic groups associated with the 
incumbent government, often through the use of private militias; (3) revenge attacks, 
mainly in Nairobi, Central Province and the Rift Valley, by members of the Kikuyu 
and related ethnic groups against opposition-supporting ethnicities, also including the 
use of militias such as Mungiki; and (4) police shooting of unarmed demonstrators, 
mainly in Nairobi. The latter three types of violence were considered possible crimes 
against humanity (Brown and Sriram 2012: 248).  
The severe post-election violence of 2007 had two major political implications. A new 
constitution was finally passed, through a 2010 referendum; it established the 
framework for devolution, as well as the creation of commissions (including a land 
commission) to address the underlying root causes of the violence. Second, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to prosecute the instigators of the post-
election violence for crimes against humanity. These processes will be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 7, and seen in light of how they affected the general elections in 
2013. For now, it suffices to say that a fundamental change with the new 2010 
Constitution was the devolution of powers through the establishment of a bicameral 
Assembly, as well as a reduction of executive powers (Kramon and Posner 2011). To 
win the presidency, a candidate had to receive over 50 percent of the total vote and at 
least 25 percent of the vote in half of the country’s 47 counties (International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems 2012).122 
                                              
122 The new 2010 Constitution introduced a bicameral National Assembly, with a Senate (67 seats) and a National Assembly 
(349 seats). Senators are elected through a qualified plurality system with specific proportional representation requirements 
that include reserved seats for women, youth and personspeople with disabilities. Members of the National Assembly are also 
elected by qualified plurality vote, withwhile proportional representation requirements to facilitate minority representation. 
Twelve “appointed members”members’ are nominated by parliament through party lists, in proportion to nation-wide vote 
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Civil society focus on democracy and services  
As in Zambia, the introduction of nominal democracy in Kenya led to a more 
pluralistic civil society, despite strong government regulations. The NGO 
Coordination Act No. 19 of 1990 established a governmental agency and a self-
regulatory agency to govern NGOs: the NGO Co-ordination Board, and the Kenya 
National Council of NGOs (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 8). The former consisted of 20 
government appointees, five of whom would be recommended by the NGO Council, 
while the latter was given power to adopt its own structure, rules and proceedings. The 
Act established that the Board could refuse registration to an NGO if its proposed 
activities were not in the national interest, if the applicant had provided false 
information, or if the Council recommended that the applicant should not be 
registered.123 NGOs would be guilty of an offence if they operated without 
registration, and could face stiff penalties (Kameri-Mbote 2000). The NGO 
Coordination Regulations of 1992 also prohibited NGOs from becoming connected to 
any groups of a political nature established outside Kenya without the Board’s 
consent.124 In addition, the Companies Act and the Societies Act included some laws 
of direct relevance to NGOs. Enacted in the colonial setting, these had been used in the 
single-party era to curtail political pluralism (Kameri-Obote 2000: 9). 
Despite these laws and regulations, there began a grand influx of NGOs. Kenyan civil 
society became increasingly pluralist, with NGOs (development work), CBOs, 
religious organizations, trade unions, professional associations, self-help groups and 
numerous other voluntary organizations (Kanyinga 2011: 89). According to Kanyinga, 
not a single sector in the economy was without the presence of CSOs, and NGOs were 
recognized as important development partners of the government. Between 1974 and 
2008, the number of NGOs mushroomed, from around 100 to 6000 (Brass 2012: 209). 
Some had broad and multiple thematic angles—such as governance and human 
                                                                                                                                             
share, representing special interests such as youth, minorities, and disabilities. In addition, 47 women must be elected in the 
47 counties (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2012).   
123 In addition, the registration fee stood at 10,000 Kenyan shillings, which could be too high for small NGOs. 
124 However, an NGO could seek recourse in the High Court as a final arbiter in case of disagreement between the NGO and 
the relevant minister. 
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rights—whereas others were more specialized. NGOs in the 1990s were considered to 
benefit from a cooperative environment with the government, which provided access 
to relevant information and communication exchange (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 13). On 
the other hand, the government was often critical of, or violently opposed to, NGO 
advocacy campaigns against government policy, for instance through demonstrations 
and strikes (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 13). 
In contrast to Zambia, the transition to multiparty rule in Kenya did not result in the 
ousting of the former single party, KANU, until almost a decade later. Kenyan civil 
society groups therefore continued to be a fundamental driver for further 
democratization in the 1990s onwards, acting “as the training ground for opposition 
politics and political leadership in general” (Kanyinga 2011: 89). According to Press 
(2012), “foot soldiers” played an important role in social movements for democracy 
and human rights in the 1990s. These young activists worked for veteran activists in 
organizing mass demonstrations for constitutional reforms (Press 2012: 446).125 
Indigenous civil society groups also contributed to putting an end to the post-election 
crisis in 2007: they participated in global and regional advocacy to highlight the crisis, 
providing objective information about causes and consequences of the crisis, and 
putting pressure to bear on the two sides (Kanyinga 2011).  
In the course of the past two decades, NGOs have become increasingly 
professionalized and often work as development partners for the Kenyan government. 
Jennifer Brass (2012) has noted how NGOs sit on national policymaking committees; 
their plans and budgets get integrated into national policy; and the government learns 
and copies the NGOs’ participatory, accountable approach. She concludes that Kenyan 
service provision has become more democratic through the integration of former NGO 
leaders into government; the incorporation of a range of voices in government 
                                              
125 These “foot-soldiers” were often not the speakers visible at demonstrations, but worked intensely behind the scenes, 
planning for security, intelligence and mobilization. They often took the greatest risks, as supporters of the regime paid 
vigilantes to attack demonstrators. The foot-soldiers were often poor, students or unemployed. While sometimes serving as 
body guards for veteran activists, they also worked in recruitment and planning, and often had more radical demands than 
their senior counterparts, but enjoyed minimal legal support or protection (Press 2012). 
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decision-making; NGO lobbying; and by government copying the approaches 
employed by NGOs (Brass 2012: 209).  
Hence, although the KANU party was not ousted through the introduction of 
multiparty rule, Kenyan civil society became increasingly more autonomous and 
diverse from the 1990s onwards. Over time, many NGOs became highly 
professionalized. They often engaged in democracy and human rights advocacy, or as 
service providers. However, as will become evident in Chapter 9, also social 
movements for the urban poor began emerging in the 1990s. 
*** 
In both Zambia and Kenya, the regimes that emerged after independence were 
underpinned by patronage along ethno-regional networks in order to manage dissent. 
However, both informal trade and slum-dwelling were sources of political contention. 
The one-party states were a result of incumbent governments trying to eliminate 
opposition and gain control of the urban constituencies. The socio-economic 
grievances of the urban poor, due largely to their illegal status, were initially used as 
political tools for mobilization in favor of the incumbent party. The authoritarian 
regimes used patronage to control informal traders and slum-dwellers through 
punishments and rewards.  
In the 1980s, however, opposition forces in Kenya as in Zambia were able to capitalize 
on the grievances of the urban poor to mount pressure for democratic reforms.  With 
economic crises unfolding, and the authoritarian governments no longer able to sustain 
their patrimonial networks, lower- and middle-class groups coalesced around the 
demand for democracy. However, no clear political programs or organizational links 
were developed for the urban poor, who were mobilized in an ad hoc, 
noninstitutionalized manner.  
Eventually, formal democratic institutions were put in place that allowed for 
multiparty competition and a pluralistic civil society, autonomous from the state. The 
major critical juncture that is central to this study is the introduction of these core 
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democratic institutions, and how they affected the political agency of the urban poor. 
Initially, however, the impacts were not evident. The transition to multipartyism 
quickly reverted to ethno-clientelist party politics. Due to how the former one-party 
regimes had structured their relations to society, ethnic conflict became more 
pronounced and divisive in Kenya than in Zambia (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; 
LeBas 2011)—but ethno-clientelism remained in both countries. Within civil society, 
traditional interests groups, such as the trade unions, were weakened with the 
dismantling of the one-party state. The influx of foreign aid brought a massive growth 
in NGOs. Nonetheless, these NGOs focused predominantly on democracy, human 
rights and service provision, and had weak links to the urban poor.  
To conclude, then, the urban poor did not achieve a prominent political role in the 
beginning of the “democratic” era. Nevertheless, there was a fundamental difference: 
the new incumbent governments now faced competition, while political pluralism had 
opened up political space for competing demands that originated from outside the 
sphere of electoral politics. As will be shown in the next chapters, this gradually paved 
the way for an increasingly important role for the urban poor in national politics, by 
creating new opportunities for opposition parties and civil society to mobilize support. 
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7. Evolving populist and programmatic linkages 
between the urban poor and opposition parties 
“…a song they want to hear…”126 
Although the first democratically elected incumbent parties continued their 
predecessors’ strategy of establishing ethno-clientelist party machines, some scholars 
have noted the emergence of opposition parties that have appealed to the urban poor 
through programmatic and populist components (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; 
Resnick 2014). However, systematic, cross-country comparisons of party linkages that 
address various sub-groups of the urban poor have been lacking.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the kinds of collective benefits (programs) political parties offer 
the urban poor, and whether this strategy has contributed to generating grassroots 
support, in terms of votes (research questions a/b in the introduction). The chapter 
covers the evolution of programmatic and populistic party linkages towards the urban 
poor from the onset of multipartyism and up until the most recent general elections in 
both countries. In the Zambian case, where the opposition party won the 2011 
elections, there will also be a short assessment of the performance of the new 
incumbent party as regards its promises of collective benefits. It will be argued that the 
introduction of programmatic promises by opposition parties have been used to 
generate legitimacy, by portraying themselves as siding with the urban poor vis-à-vis 
an unfriendly government party. 
7.1 Zambia  
7.1.1 A successful populist strategy (2001–2014) 
After the MMD gained power in 1991, the political party embarked upon an economic 
restructuring program, supported by the international financial institutions. Cuts in 
public spending and public jobs resulted in massive movement of workers into the 
                                              
126 Member of Parliament (UPND). Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka 
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informal economy, and reduced the scope for state intervention. According to the 
World Bank (2000, cited in Kazimbaya-Senkwe 2004: 102), the Zambian 
government’s plan for the public service was to reduce the number of civil servants 
from 115,000 to about 10,000–12,000 between 2000 and 2010, which would have 
implications for the rate of formally employed and not least for the functions and 
scope of the state. During the 1990s, membership in the Zambia Confederation of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) fell by almost 80,000 workers (Muneku 2002; ZCTU 2001, 
cited in Resnick 2010: 8). Prices increased for major necessities like water, electricity 
and staple foods, while service delivery remained substandard and expensive (Times of 
Zambia 2007, 2008, cited in Resnick, 20010: 9).  
The urban poor did not benefit much from the macro-economic changes of the MMD 
government, and poverty increased rapidly. Noting the widespread dissatisfaction with 
the market-friendly policies of MMD, the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, eyed a 
political opportunity to mobilize the grievances of the urban poor (Resnick 2010: 7). 
Sata had been in the political game for a long time. He had been a member of the 
former single party, UNIP, but defected to the MMD in its founding year. When 
Mwanawasa was selected by President Chiluba as his MMD successor, Sata founded 
the Patriotic Front (PF). In 2001, Sata had mainly sought to build a support base 
among his fellow Bemba-speaking communities in areas neglected by the MMD. After 
receiving only three percent of the vote, he started to reach out beyond the Bemba 
community (Copperbelt) and build a pro-poor populist strategy (Cheeseman and 
Hinfelaar 2009: 64).   
The PF campaign slogan of “lower taxes, more jobs, more money in your pockets” 
resonated with what the urban poor had listed as their top problems in surveys 
(Resnick 2014). The 2006 PF manifesto stressed labor protection, increased minimum 
wages and the revitalization of tripartite arrangements, as well as improved working 
conditions in the mines (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 626). Such a platform and campaign 
resemble classic Leftist populism. In addition, Sata portrayed himself as a common 
man without higher education, as someone who understood the plight of the people. 
His electoral campaigns were carried out largely in the “compounds,” where he used 
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symbolism and theatrical acts (Larmer and Fraser 2007; Resnick 2010). In the 2006 
elections, the PF won all the urban parliamentary seats of the capital Lusaka, with 
significant gains in the Copperbelt region. The opposition party took control of the 
majority of the urban municipal councils after the elections (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 
611–612).   
Following the death of President Levy Mwanawasa in 2008, the presidential elections 
in the same year saw a combination of ideological, populist and ethnic linkage 
strategies from the PF (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 75). In the controversial 
elections, the MMD’s Banda won with 40.1 percent of the vote, against the PF’s Sata, 
with 38.1 percent. As Sata was considered to have a large support base among urban 
youth, the lack of a fresh voter registration process was of particular concern 
(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 70). Breaking down the 2008 vote to constituency 
level (low-density, medium-density and high-density, combined with province), 
Cheeseman and Hinfelaar found that Sata’s support base was both “ethnic” and 
“populist.” He won all high-density areas, as well as the majority in medium-density 
areas. However, he also received a significant proportion of support in low-density, 
Bemba-speaking constituencies in rural areas, which represented about 38 percent of 
his votes, compared to 30 percent from medium-density areas, and 32 percent from 
high-density areas (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 73).  
Larmer and Fraser (2007: 613) posit that Sata transformed pre-existing popular 
concerns—health and safety standards in Chinese-owned mines, the shortage of 
market stalls for informal traders, inadequate urban housing, and the disorganized bus  
stations—into a common set of problems under a populist platform. Sata transformed 
the Zambian party system from 2004 to 2008, by placing the living conditions of the 
urban poor at the center of politics, highlighting and polarizing the differences 
between the PF and the MMD (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 64). Resnick’s (2014: 
138-142) survey results (2008) demonstrate that Sata was the candidate favored by 
those who saw the party manifesto as the primary factor in voting decisions. 
Furthermore, the majority of respondents considered “positions on social and 
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economic issues” to be the main distinction among Zambia’s political parties, followed 
by “personality of party leader,” and “no difference.”  
Still, Posner’s (2007) assumption that, in a multiparty system, ethnic cleavages are 
based on broader identity markers such as language seems to hold, as Sata also won 
the Bemba-dominated constituencies of Luapula and Northern provinces. In the 2008 
presidential elections, Sata received a third of his support from his rural, ethno-
regional “heartlands” (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 53). Rather than campaigning 
on explicit rural politics as well as urban issues, Sata and his party chose to rely on 
ethno-linguistic identity, instigating fears in Bemba-speaking communities that other 
political groups would exclude them from politics (Resnick, 2014: 9–12). A lack of 
party institutionalization and heavy reliance on Sata’s populist charisma was evident 
also in the 2008 elections.  
The PF populist strategy paid off in the 2011 elections.127 Michael Sata won the 
presidential elections with 42.85 percent of the vote, while Rupiah Banda (MMD) 
came second with 36.15 percent. In the parliamentary elections, the PF won 60 seats 
(38.25 percent), while the MMD got 55 sets (33.56 percent) and the UPND 28 (16.99 
percent) (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2013b).  
Table 3: Presidential elections: Votes received, by province 








Central  225,933 28.28 48.21 20.82 
Copperbelt 503,075 67.88 26.22 3.57 
Eastern 321,657 18.46 72.60 3.33 
Luapula 206,458 73.54 22.90 0.43 
Lusaka 402,049 55.94 30.76 11.29 
Northern 377,771 64.18 32.16 0.78 
North-
Western 
173,253 10.85 50.21 35.24 
Southern 373,549 6.59 19.15 71.41 
Western 188,519 23.12 33.20 28.21 
Total 2,772,264 42.24 35.63 18.28 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia 2011c) 
                                              
127 Zambia has a population of approximately 14.2 million, with 5.16 million registered voters as of September 2011. 
Average turnout was 59.77 percent. In the presidential elections, actual votes cast were 2,789, 340 of 5,167, 154, with turnout 
slightly lower for the National Assembly elections. Controlling for persons eligible to vote, the population in Zambia under 
the age of 18 was estimated at 7.52 million in 2012. While some 77 percent of eligible voters registered, only slightly more 
than 40 percent of the adult population actually voted (IFES 2013b).   
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We can note clear regional patterns in voting at province level (Table 3). Sata (PF) 
performed strongly in Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern Provinces and Lusaka, with an 
absolute majority. Banda (MMD) did well in Eastern Province and in North-Western 
Province. Hichilema (UPND) had his stronghold in Southern Province with 71.41 
percent. Sata performed poorly in Southern Province (6.59 percent), where also Banda 
received his lowest share of votes (19.15 percent). Except for Luapula, Sata and the 
Patriotic Front did best in the most urbanized areas.  
Lusaka Province had the highest share of eligible voters (19 percent), followed by 
Copperbelt (17 percent).128 Disaggregating voting patterns down to constituency level 
(Table 4) within Lusaka Province shows that Sata won in all constituencies within 
Lusaka District, which is also where more than three quarters (79 percent) of the 
provincial population lives (Zambia Central Statistical Office 2011: 6). 
Table 4: Presidential elections: Votes received per constituency in Lusaka Province 
Constituency Votes received 
(N) 






Kafue 24,611 35.26 36.92 24.14 
Feira 7,115 33.05 52.89 10.19 
Chilanga 16,820 33.35 37.14 26.42 
Chongwe 25,509 28.37 57.39 10.58 
Rufunsa 9,632 13.68 66.12 14.89 
Chawama 34,619 60.26 26.86 11.31 
Kabwata 40,342 64.05 21.09 11.69 
Kanyama 38,552 56.86 26.20 15.35 
Lusaka 
Central 
32,450 62.42 25.78 10.35 
Mandevu 56,924 65.15 28.77 5.10 
Matero 54,762 68.49 24.58 5.84 
Munali 58,014 60.76 28.01 9.88 
Total 402,049 55.94 30.76 11.29 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia 2011c) 
Except for Western Province, the party affiliation of elected MPs within provinces 
(Table 2 in Appendix A) was highly consistent with party affiliation of the preferred 
presidential candidate. While some seats were distributed across political parties, in 
Lusaka, the only four seats won by the MMD were outside Lusaka District. The PF 
                                              
128 Of the total number of eligible voters in Lusaka Province, Lusaka District had the largest share, 81.7 percent. Other 
districts in the province shared the remaining 18.2 percent share of eligible voters (Kafue, Feira, Chilanga, Chongwe and 
Rufunsa do not belong to Lusaka district) (Zambia Central Statistical Office 2011). 
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would not have gained a parliamentary majority, however, if UPND and MMD had 
decided to join forces.  
Lastly, only PF candidates were able to win local government seats within Lusaka 
District (Table 5). The data show that the PF won all of Lusaka district in the 2011 
general elections at all levels, and also dominated Zambia’s second largest urban and 
industrial center, the Copperbelt.129 However, also in the 2011 presidential elections, 
the PF won the incumbency through what Resnick (2010) described as a minimum 
winning coalition, by mobilizing the urban poor, combined with extra rural votes 
through ethno-linguistic appeals (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015).  
Table 5: Distribution of seats based on political party, 2011 local government elections, Lusaka 
Province130 
Constituency PF seats MMD seats UPND seats Others  Total 
Kafue 5 4 0 1 10 
Feira 4 11 0 0 15 
Chilanga 1 3 0 0 4 
Chongwe 1 9 0 0 10 
Rufunsa 0 6 1 0 7 
Chawama 4 0 0 0 4 
Kabwata 5 0 0 0 5 
Kanyama 3 0 0 0 3 
Lusaka 
Central 
4 0 0 0 4 
Mandevu 7 0 0 0 7 
Matero 5 0 0 0 5 
Munali 3 0 0 0 3 
Total 42 33 1 1 77 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia 2011a) 
Once in office, however, the PF seemed to struggle to deliver on its promises.  
According to FODEP,131 there had been no visible changes after one year in office, 
and PF was seen to be unprepared and overwhelmed by the task of governing.132 This 
perception was shared by a representative of the NGO network, the Civil Society for 
                                              
129 These election data, however, do not enable us to distinguish between the urban poor as opposed to other segments of the 
electorate in urban districts.  
130 At national level, elections in 35 wards were postponed while 11 wards were unopposed. 
131 FODEP. Oct 2, 2012, Lusaka. 
132 A broader analysis of budget transfer and the passage and implementation of policies by the PF would be useful to verify 
or disconfirm the accuracy of such perceptions.  
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Poverty Reduction,133 who said that although there was some commitment to equality, 
and the PF had met with civil society to discuss social and economic rights, the party 
did not know what to do. Its attempt to implement a minimum wage brought confusion 
and caused layoffs, because there had been limited consultation with employers and 
workers. However, the PF government was considered to prioritize road infrastructure 
in the urban compounds because of votes, while resources were not redistributed to 
rural areas.134 The PF also removed all user fees for health care across the country, but 
this decision was not matched with budget transfers.135 Although health fees were 
removed, there were long queues and the quality and resources were inadequate.136 An 
MP (UPND) said that seeing PF’s mistakes had also been a lesson for them.137 
Councilors who had made promises discovered upon entering office that there were no 
resources.138 These initial efforts of the PF to deliver on its electoral promises indicate 
some commitment to its programmatic promises of collective benefits in a Leftist 
political direction. However, weak party organization and lack of government capacity 
seemed to inhibit its ability to deliver.   
The PF mobilized urban voters across the board in the 2011 elections. The next 
sections examine more closely how its programmatic and populist linkages towards 
sub-groups of the urban poor—slum-dwellers and street vendors—have developed 
since the introduction of multiparty rule, as that may indicate strengthened  political 
agency of these grassroots constituencies.  
Street vendors and a populist linkage  
Subversive activities by street vendors, which emerged already during colonial times, 
continued after the introduction of multiparty democracy in Zambia. Despite a legal 
                                              
133 The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Zambia Council for Social Development. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka. 
136 Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection. Oct 5, 2012, Lusaka. 
137 Member of Parliament (UPND). Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka.  
138 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
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and policy framework that had been consistently hostile to street vending, more 
friendly approaches to street vendors occasionally surfaced. The issue of street 
vending emerged on the national political agenda soon after the (re-) introduction of 
democracy in 1991 (Hansen 2004). Shortly after being democratically elected, 
President Chiluba (MMD) established a Vendors’ Desk at State House, with a deputy 
minister to attend to the needs of vendors. This illustrates the significance street 
vendors had already at that time.  
Chiluba saw the increase of street vending in connection with economic liberalization 
policies, and positioned himself on the side of the street vendors, against the current 
state policy of removing and prohibiting street vending (Hansen, 2004: 62–65). In 
response to President Chiluba’s support, thousands of vendors set up trade in the 
streets of Lusaka in the late 1990s. This affected traffic and pedestrians, and led 
several businesses and international organizations to relocate their offices out of the 
city center. Thus, despite MMD’s implementation of privatization and liberalization 
programs, of which formalization was an integral component, the government was 
inconsistent in applying these policies towards street vendors.   
President’s Chiluba’s positive attitude to street vending took a sharp turn, however, 
after he returned from Israel, deeply impressed by “ultra-modern, open-air public 
markets,” and increasingly worried about investments (Hansen, 2004: 65). 
Subsequently, the MMD initiated the “Make Zambia Clean and Healthy Program,” 
aimed at promoting personal and environmental cleanliness, whereby one component 
was the “re-enforcement of by-laws.” The strategy was based on the “transformation 
of the informal sector operators into formal micro- and small scale entrepreneurs” 
(Hansen 2004). Chiluba reverted to clamping down on street vending activities, and 
tried to relocate vendors to formal, regulated markets, in accordance with the neo-
liberal paradigm.  
President Mwanawasa (MMD) continued the “Keep Zambia clean” policy, but with a 
more lax attitude than his predecessor (Hansen 2004).  In response, street vendors 
slowly became visible in the street picture again, while government clampdowns 
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occurred every now and then. The implementation of the first privately managed New 
City Market, however, led to relocations of and demonstrations by street vendors. Due 
to competition between insiders and outsiders, Lusaka City Council invoked a rule that 
no street vending was allowed closer than 200 meters to the market (Hansen, 2004: 
66). Nevertheless, the inside vendors soon left this new market, complaining about 
high rents and loss of income. Relations between the street vendors and the MMD 
government thus fluctuated between amicable and hostile during the two first decades 
of multiparty rule. Increasingly, however, the various MMD governments sought to 
curtail street vending, so as to promote modern, formal markets and a clean city. 
Michael Sata had been the architect of UNIP’s Street Vending and Public Nuisances 
Act in the 1980s (Resnick 2014: 78). When Sata broke with the MMD and started 
building his own opposition party, however, he distanced himself from the MMD’s 
policies towards street vendors and actively sought to mobilize this constituency. In 
2008, he launched his campaign from Matero Market, where the PF offices are also 
located. The promise of lower taxes also resonated with informal workers who, 
although not paying income tax, still paid monthly or daily fees for market stalls or 
tuntembas, as well as value-added tax on consumer goods. Sata also argued for 
unemployment benefits. He derided the MMD’s harassment of street vendors, and 
advocated for adequate places to sell (Resnick 2014: 78). Resnick’s 2008 survey 
showed that the belief that the incumbent MMD was performing poorly as regards 
creating job opportunities was the most statistically significant factor that drove voters 
to support Sata. In 2009, when the opening of the New Soweto Market was delayed 
due to political conflict over allocation of stands, street vendors crowded the streets 
(Hansen 2010: 23). The PF filed an injunction in court against the government’s plan 
to remove these street vendors yet again.  
In the 2011 election campaigns, the MMD manifesto (2011) emphasized the party’s 
achievements in constructing modern markets in Lusaka and market sheds in all 
provinces, as well as its “Make Zambia Clean and Healthy Program.” Also highlighted 
were the construction of modern shopping malls, markets and parks. Interestingly, the 
PF manifesto (2011) made no explicit mention of the laws criminalizing street 
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vendors. Whether Michael Sata had promised street vendors, prior to the 2011 
elections that they would be allowed to operate freely with disregard for the law was a 
source of disagreement among my interview respondents.  However, PF did base its 
electoral appeals on the broad constituency of the urban poor, promising them more 
money and jobs, as well as less tax. Street vendors made up a large bulk of this 
constituency. They were also considered to have played a pivotal role in the PF’s 
electoral campaign: “When vendors take political sides, people are believed to listen.”   
139 The street vendor grassroots mobilized people to support the PF in their 
communities, markets and stations.140 In the 2011 elections, “all cadres among street 
vendors were perceived to support the PF.”141 During the campaigns, the street 
vendors rioted and were mobilized for rallies.  
The PF mobilized the street vendor constituency mainly through a populist approach, 
rather than programmatic linkage. One of the first things President Sata did after 
winning office in 2011 was to publicly denounce the injustices inherent in the current 
legal system towards the street vendors, again giving them the green light to pursue 
street-vending activities (The Post 2011), as President Chiluba had done in his time. 
The new president made it clear that he would ignore the by-laws that criminalized 
street vending until the government had found other solutions for those struggling to 
earn a livelihood. In this way, President Sata bypassed the local government and laws 
enacted by the Zambian Parliament. This move sparked considerable controversy in 
government and parliament, both because of President Sata’s disregard for existing 
laws and because of the predominant view of street vending as an undesired element in 
urban space. By implication, the street vendors were now under the direct protection of 
the party leadership. Yet, the PF had no coherent program of policies and legislation to 
secure and institutionalize the rights and interests of street vendors.  
                                              
139 Geographer at the University of Zambia. Oct 18, 2013, Lusaka. 
140 FODEP. Oct 2, 2012, Lusaka. 
141 Street Vendors' Association. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
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After the 2011 elections, street vendors were to be found literally all over Lusaka—on 
the pavements, by the roadside, in the streets. This came as a surprise for many 
interview respondents, as they had expected President Sata, once in power, to return to 
harassment and evictions—which had been the common pattern in Zambian politics. 
As late as 2014, the then-Vice-President Guy Scott promised that the PF would not 
chase street vendors, but would seek to provide a conducive environment for them 
(Lusaka Voice 11.04.2014). After the death of Sata (October, 2014) and the election of 
his successor, Edward Chagwa Lungu, the PF government seemed to uphold its 
commitment to street vendors. In 2015, the new Vice-President, Inonge Wina, 
confirmed this promise. She stated that the government had put in place a program to 
empower all vendors to help their businesses grow (Zambia Daily Mail 2015). 
Indicative of the political clout of this constituency, even the up-and-coming 
opposition candidate Hichilema, during a rally in Kanyama in November 2014, 
assured street vendors that he would not remove them if he became president (Lusaka 
Voice 23.11.2014).  
The 2011 elections and their aftermath show that street vendors have remained an 
important constituency for PF also after it assumed office. While street vendors’ 
numerical strength is not sufficient in itself to determine an election outcome in 
Zambia’s first-past-the-post electoral system, their impact has been influential in 
combination with other (overlapping) political constituencies, yielding some informal, 
collective benefits for street vendors.  
Slum-dwellers and the contours of a programmatic linkage  
Mulwanda and Mutale (1994) claim that many of the people who voted the UNIP out 
of office in 1991 were squatters who felt betrayed by the party. However, after coming 
to power in 1991, the MMD continued to carry out housing demolitions in the illegal 
settlements. Michael Sata, in his role as MMD Minister of Local Government and 
Housing, had the homes of 500 families in Kanyama razed in 1991 (Weekly Post, 
1992, cited in Resnick 2014: 64). John Laing and Misisi compounds were threatened 
with similar actions throughout the decade. 
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While the MMD government made a series of declarations on housing policy, its 
policy was criticized as being an ad hoc response to political pressure from urban 
squatters, thus contributing to the low standard of urban housing (Schlyter 1998: 262). 
Although the MMD government had stated that it would focus on home ownership and 
rental housing, its first policy was extremely insensitive to the conditions of the poor. 
Sites and services schemes in Chunga, Chaisa, Kaunda Square and others were 
considered sub-standard, although the majority of the population would never be able 
to afford a house there. Under the Mwanawasa administration, the government’s 
National Housing Authority focused on houses for middle-class Lusakans, while Low-
Cost Housing Development Foundation within the Ministry of Local Government 
concentrated on rural areas (Resnick 2014: 69-70).  
In 2002, a series of squatter-compound demolitions made more than 700 families 
homeless. They were placed in refugee tents, causing disease outbreaks (Myers 2005, 
cited in Resnick 2014: 71). The same year, Lusaka City Council began a demolition 
campaign in squatter compounds throughout the city. Through police force, thousands 
of families in nine compounds were demolished, and some became refugees in other 
compounds, such as Mandevu (Myers 2006: 304). In Kalikiliki, the squatters fought 
back against the police, and two teenagers were shot by the police with live 
ammunition. However, there was significant disagreement within the City Council, as 
well as between the Council and the central government over these demolitions, as 
local party officials had made financial and political gains from illegal construction in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Myers (2006) claimed that the city was still divided between the 
“yard people” and the “compound people,” with the governing elite working to keep it 
that way.  
When Michael Sata left the MMD and began to develop the political platform for his 
new Patriotic Front party, he changed his approach to slum-dwellers. The party 
campaigned on a housing program to provide low-cost housing for squatters, through 
upgrading  (Resnick 2010: 11). Upgrading of shanty compounds through infrastructure 
improvement rather than demolition was stressed in both the 2006 and 2008 electoral 
campaigns. After the 2006 elections, riots spread in the compounds of Mandevu, 
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Matero, Garden and Chipata, because the people there expected Sata to win (Resnick 
2014: 75). In 2007, the government destroyed 100 homes in Kalikiliki compound 
under the protection of riot police. After the 2007 demolitions, Sata declared that he 
would sue the state on behalf of the people who had lost their homes. A 
comprehensive housing development program was the main pillar of the PF party 
manifesto in 2008, promising low-cost, decent housing to squatters. In both the 2006 
and 2008 elections, Sata conducted rallies in the shanty compounds. Resnick’s (2010: 
134) survey showed that respondents who lacked access to basic services in their 
homes, such as water, were more likely to support Sata than Banda (MMD).  
The PF manifesto of 2011 also had local government and housing development as one 
of four core programs. It accused the MMD government of having ignored the plight 
of the people in squatter settlements who “are living in absolute squalor” (Patriotic 
Front Party Manifesto 2011: 19). The manifesto highlighted that councils had been 
unable to increase their stock of houses for rent. The party promised to increase 
budgetary allocations to housing and introduce a social housing scheme that would 
empower councils to construct low-cost houses from government-guaranteed loans. It 
also promised to upgrade squatter settlements into statutory and improved areas with 
better living standards, and to provide infrastructure for water and sanitation.  
In contrast, the 2011 MMD manifesto (2011) highlighted how the party had made land 
available for housing development and improved basic services, by encouraging 
private-sector participation in estate development to increase housing units. For the 
next period, the MMD promised to facilitate the construction of 150,000 housing units 
every year through public–private partnerships, to increase housing stock for home 
ownership and rental, and mobilize cheap long-term finance for low-income private 
developers, as well as to review the housing policy to harmonize it with the Public–
Private Partnership programs.  
The party manifestoes thus stipulated different programmatic packages to address the 
low-cost housing shortage for slum-dwellers. Confirming Resnick’s (2014) findings 
from previous elections, the plight of urban slum-dwellers continued to be articulated 
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and mobilized through concrete, programmatic policy options that eventually were 
electorally successful. Thus we see that multiparty competition over time created a 
programmatic response to the informalization and illegalization of housing for urban 
slum-dwellers.  
Nevertheless, slum-upgrading programs post-2011 appeared to simply be a 
continuation of agreements between the previous government and its development 
partners, and did not signify any major deviations from the established path.142 For the 
Chibolya Urban Renewal Project,143 only those who had previously owned houses 
would thus be entitled to new houses, as tenants had no title. Although the majority of 
the residents in Chibolya were tenants, the new structures would go to owners of 
previous structures. The rent level was to be determined by the landlords, while 
structure owners could opt to get compensated for demolition of their dwelling 
instead.144 According to an interview respondent at the LCC,145 the intention was good, 
but the new housing structures would not go to the end-users, as there was no 
mechanism to ensure that these housing units for slum-upgrading, once completed, 
would benefit the poor tenants.  According to the slum-dweller organizations, while 
social housing bonds had been mentioned in the manifesto, no minister had been 
talking about it after the elections.146  
To sum up, the PF populist strategy was a response to the MMD’s abandoned 
promises to the urban poor, in particular to slum-dwellers and street vendors. After 
assuming office, however, it proved difficult for PF to deliver on the most elaborate 
programmatic components on housing, while the populist and direct linkage to the 
                                              
142 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
143 Previously, Lusaka City Council had provided its own concept notes for Kanyama and John Lang informal settlements, 
but these were not considered good enough, so a consultant was given the project. The LCC instead coordinated a UN-
Habitat participatory slum-upgrading project, sponsored by the European Union. This was meant to provide services through 
resident participation in areas such as water and sanitation, roads and drainage, and waste supported by the Japanese Jaicar, 
who gave technical support for planning, aimed at land readjustment apartment flats. The project was part of the Masterplan. 
The purpose was to provide housing on the one hand, and free land for the commercial sector and private sector on the other 
(Housing and Social services at Lusaka City Council, Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka). 
144 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
145 Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
146 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
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street vendors was more durable (at least in the initial years, which are the period 
under study here). Nevertheless, before concluding that the PF was an (ethno-) 
populist party based primarily on Leftist-programmatic linkages to the poor 
constituencies, we must analyze whether and how clientelism enters the equation. That 
will be done in Chapter 8.  
7.2 Kenya   
7.2.1 An unsuccessful ethnopopulist strategy towards a split urban 
vote (1992–2013)  
Mueller (2011: 102) claims that one of three root causes for the 2007 post-election 
violence in Kenya was that political parties were not programmatic, but were instead 
driven by ethno-clientelism. A winner-take-all view of political power and its 
associated rewards were seen as underpinning this violent outcome.147 Mueller argues 
that the political parties were barely distinguishable in terms of ideology, programs, 
platforms and organization, and that political leaders moved opportunistically between 
parties that were formed around ethnic coalitions (Mueller 2011: 104-105). Other 
writers, however, also find differences that are not attributable to ethnic coalition-
building, as well as continuity despite weak party institutionalization.  
ODM representatives claim that the thread from KPU, via other parties such as NDP, 
to ODM is a social democratic ideology, and a more equitable society.148 Although 
political leaders have switched and formed new parties, opposition leader Odinga’s 
(ODM) support base in the Kibera slum has followed him from party to party, and kept 
him in power as MP from 1992  (Smedt 2009: 585) until he became Prime Minister in 
2007. Gibson and Long (2009: 498) hold that, during the electoral campaigns 
preceding the 2007 elections, President Kibaki (NARC) and Odinga highlighted 
differences with regard to issue salience and solutions, and took differing policy 
positions. Kibaki appealed to Kenya’s wealthier and growing middle class, and 
                                              
147 The other factors were a decline in the state monopoly of violence and deliberately weak institutions to the benefit of the 
presidency (Mueller 2011). 
148 ODM Secretariat. March 7, 2014, Nairobi. 
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focused on his achievements on economic growth. Odinga had a more populist 
message, accusing Kibaki of ignoring the country’s poor and helping the rich. Odinga 
also campaigned on constitutional reform through the issue of majimbo (“regions’) and 
the reduction of presidential powers.  
Both camps sought to cultivate the youth vote, but Odinga had greater success in 
linking youth issues to joblessness and the urban poor, and framing the elections as an 
opportunity for young voters to throw out the ageing, corrupt political class (Gibson 
and Long 2009: 499). Gibson and Long’s findings showed that Kenyan voters who 
saw Kibaki’s governing party as not having delivered on the national economy and 
service provision supported the opposition, confirming claims that African voters 
increasingly base their decisions on economic performance. Kibaki’s supporters, on 
the other hand, deemed his performance as good on these issues. ODM voters were 
also more concerned with employment than with growth, and expressed a desire for 
new ideas rather than experience (Gibson and Long 2009: 500).  
Resnick (2010: 14–16) also found the opposition candidate, Odinga, to represent a 
more leftist, populist alternative to the market-oriented incumbent government in the 
2007 elections, and drew comparisons to Sata’s campaigns in Zambia (Resnick 2010). 
Odinga’s strong personal charisma attracted big crowds during the 2007 campaign. 
According to Resnick, “a discourse firmly targeted at ameliorating inequalities and 
catering to the needs of the urban poor proved central to Odinga’s 2007 campaign” 
(2010: 16). The campaign was framed as a struggle against economic apartheid, where 
Odinga portrayed himself as the defender of social justice and emancipation for the 
poor. Results from the 2007 parliamentary elections also showed that the ODM 
performed best in the poorest divisions of Nairobi, although Odinga, according to 
disputed election results, lost Nairobi Province to Kibaki (43.96 to 47.70 percent) 
(Resnick 2010). Moreover, “while the vast bulk of Kikuyu voters lined up behind 
Kibaki as ethnic tensions rose, many younger Kikuyus living in urban areas were 
found to be sympathetic to Odinga’s policies before the outbreak of violence” 
(Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 43). Cheeseman and Larmer argue that this suggests 
the possibility of a cross-ethnic populist movement more like the Zambian experience. 
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ODM’s invocation of majimbo (regionalism) and the “it’s our turn to eat” complaint 
had connotations that combined perceived ethnic marginalization from the Kikuyu, 
marginalization of the youth to the “old guards,” and more equitable distribution of 
resources in a common narrative (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 41). However, 
although Odinga mobilized support through pre-existing urban networks, he had to 
rely on regional “big men” to deliver the votes of ethnic communities, building a 
multi-ethnic coalition. Unemployed graduates, slum-dwellers and rural poor 
understood ODM’s campaign to mean jobs, as well as land and resources for building 
new and better housing (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015: 41). However, Cheeseman and 
Larmer conclude that ODM’s party machine ended up being more ethnic than 
populist.149  
Research on the underpinnings of the 2007 post-election violence indicates a social 
dimension in the slums, in addition to the ethnic component. Smedt (2009: 594) 
concludes that the violence in the slums was perceived as also concerning the have-
nots attacking the haves. Similarly, Rutten and Owuour (2009: 319) hold that the 2007 
post-election violence carried out by youth sometimes did not seem targeted at ethnic 
groups, but  at those who were well-off: in other words, that there was a class 
component to the violence. Unemployed, poor and disillusioned youth who looted and 
destroyed property were also protesting the lack of jobs, not necessary the lack of land. 
Rutten and Owuour drew up a scenario for the next Kenyan elections as less 
predictable and more of a class struggle, seeing the violence that targeted well-to-do 
politicians and business interests as a sign that the grievances experienced by the poor 
might be “pointed at the fighting elephants rather than the grassroots trampled 
underneath” (2009: 321).  
Consequences of 2007 post-election violence: a new constitution, and 
the threat of the International Criminal Court  
The violence finally came to an end after internationally-led negotiations resulted in a 
power-sharing agreement, whereby a prime minister post was established for Odinga. 
                                              
149 Also Resnick (2010) finds that Odinga mobilized his rural voters on the basis of Luo ethnic identity combined with other 
smaller ethnic groups in a clear anti-Kikuyu rhetoric, blaming class differences on the dominance of the Kikuyu. 
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The mediated peace agreement included four agenda items. Items 1, 2 and 3 concerned 
the restoration of peace through mediation, a peace agreement and the establishment of 
a coalition government. Item 4 concerned identifying the underlying causes of 
violence through the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediation team 
(Kanyinga and Long 2012). These causes were found to be poverty, historical 
injustices, inequitable distribution of wealth, youth unemployment, impunity, 
accountability, and the need for reforms in the judiciary, police, and land systems.  
The constitutional draft was subjected to a referendum in 2010. The referendum had a 
record 72 percent turnout, with 67 percent voting yes, and 31 percent no. A year later, 
the new Constitution had enormous public support, even in “no” areas, and 
expectations were high that it would make a major difference in terms of citizen 
welfare (Kanyinga and Long 2012).  Hence, ODM’s struggle for a new Constitution, 
which began in 2005, was facilitated by the internationally led process. However, this 
time the draft had been supported by both Odinga (ODM) and Kibaki (PNU), while a 
faction led by William Ruto (former ODM, now URP) opposed it. The internationally 
led process had thus helped ODM’s struggle for a new constitution that provided for 
devolved government.  
Furthermore, in 2012, three important Acts of Parliament were passed concerning 
land: the Land Act (No. 6 of 2012), the Land Registration Act (No. 3 of 2012), and the 
National Land Commission Act (No. 5 of 2012) (Manji 2014: 116). These followed 
the approval of a National Land Policy in 2009 and the embedding of land policy in 
the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Through these acts, the power to redistribute land was 
moved from the executive to a bureaucratic commission (National Council for Law 
Reporting 2010).  Public land is now vested in and held by either the county 
governments or the national government, depending on the classification, but both 
types are to be administered on their behalf by the National Land commission 
(Constituteproject.org 2014: 20-21).150  
                                              
150 Private land is defined as registered land held by any person under either freehold or leasehold tenure. Community land, 
by contrast, is to be vested in and held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar community of 
interest. 
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Furthermore, according to Article 32(b) of the 2010 Constitution, “every person has 
the right to accessible and adequate housing and to reasonable standards of sanitation” 
(Constituteproject.org 2014); the Parliament shall enact legislation that ensures that 
investments in property benefit local communities and their economies (Article 66 
(2).151 The 2010 Constitution also provides for the possibility of citizens to litigate on 
issues of land. Lastly, the National Land Commission is to be in charge of developing 
a national land policy, and advising the government on a program for registration of 
land titles throughout Kenya (Constituteproject.org 2014: 22).   
However, the Kibaki government did not initiate systematic prosecutions in domestic 
courts to hold anyone responsible for the post-election violence, although that had 
been part of the initial peace agreement. Brown and Sriram (2012) attribute this to how 
those in charge of these processes were often the same individuals who would be 
prosecuted, or their close allies. Despite being divided by ethno-regional identities and 
party rivalries, the interests of the political leadership still converged towards total 
impunity. Because of the failure to implement a process of prosecution of crimes 
against humanity in Kenyan domestic courts, the cases (and their evidence) were 
forwarded to the ICC. ICC’s decision to prosecute Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto 
for crimes against humanity, but not Raila Odinga, had a severe impact on political 
coalition-building before the 2013 general elections.  
In the 2013 elections, two new coalitions emerged—the Jubilee Alliance, headed by 
Uhuru Kenyatta; and the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), headed by 
Odinga (ODM). The winner of the 2007 elections, the Party of National Unity (PNU), 
had vanished. William Ruto (Kalenjin), who had been Odinga’s deputy in ODM in the 
2007 elections, established his own United Republic Party (URP), while Kenyatta set 
up the National Alliance Party (TNA). These two parties created the Jubilee Alliance 
in December 2012. The ODM was the only party to exhibit any sort of institutional 
continuity (Cheeseman et al. 2014: 5).  
                                              
151 Furthermore, public land can be disposed or otherwise used only through an Act of Parliament specifying the nature or 
terms. 
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Paradoxically, the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) seemed to 
have heightened the importance of ethnicity before the 2013 elections, although in an 
unexpected manner. Kenyatta and Ruto did everything they could to discredit the ICC 
and halt an international prosecution (Brown and Sriram 2012: 255).152 Although a 
2011 poll showed that 61 percent of Kenyans preferred ICC trial as opposed to either 
hybrid (24 percent) or regular courts (8 percent), Kenyatta and Ruto were received as 
heroes by their support bases on returning from their first hearings in The Hague the 
same year, portraying themselves as victims of national and international plots (Brown 
and Sriram 2012: 251).  
The Kalenjin and Kikuyu leadership chose to diffuse ethnic tensions, and campaign 
together on an anti-ICC coalition to protect themselves against prosecution for 
previous crimes against each other’s ethnic communities (Cheeseman et al. 2014; 
Lynch 2014). The Jubilee Alliance was successful among Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
supporters in Rift Valley through an effective campaign where individual and 
collective interests became highly intertwined with ethnic identity (Lynch 2014: 17). 
The ICC was depicted as a process where Odinga and his Luo followers “sought to 
tarnish ‘the Kalenjin’ as perpetrators, and remove “the Kikuyu” from power” (Lynch 
2014: 18). The research of Burbidge (2014) on young middle-class Kikuyu in Nairobi 
during the Kenyan 2013 elections has showed how, as elections approached, voting 
preferences shifted from supporting third-placed presidential hopefuls to a choice 
between the two top candidates representing two ethnic blocs. Thus, the ethnic 
component was thus still paramount in the 2013 elections.  
The strategy of the Jubilee Alliance worked, and they won the 2013 general 
elections.153  Kenyatta and Ruto became President and Vice-President, respectively. 
Uhuru Kenyatta received 50.7 percent of the vote in the presidential elections, while 
                                              
152 When the ICC began investigations in 2009, the Kenyan Parliament first passed a non-binding motion to withdraw from 
the ICC, legitimizing it in a larger pan-African movement to protest the ICC focus on Africa. The Kenyan government also 
failed to convince the permanent members of the UN Security Council that the trial would be a danger to international peace 
and security, and The Hague that it (Kenyan government) would conduct trials of the same perpetrators domestically (Brown 
and Sriram 2012). 
153 Of a population of 44 million, there were only 14.34 million registered voters as of December 1, 2012. Average voting 
turnout was 57.18 percent, and 12,330,028 votes were casted (IFES 2013a).   
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opposition candidate Odinga came in second, with 43.3 percent (Table 6). However, 
































Governor Senator Most 
const. 
seats 
Mombasa 408,747 69.77 23.79 ODM ODM Wiper ODM 
Kwale 174,433 80.74 14.04 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Kilifi 336,132 83.74 10.72 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Tana River 79,454 61.41 34.71 ODM Wiper FPK equal 
Lamu 52,346 51.98 40.02 ODM UDF TNA Other 
Taita Taveta 113,862 81.56 13.18 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Garissa 115,202 48.67 45.34 ODM Wiper TNA ODM 
Wajir 118,091 49.59 38.83 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Mandera 120,768 4.3 92.93 TNA URP URP ODM 
Marsabit 104,615 48.78 47.18 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Isiolo 54,462 29.61 55.41 TNA URP URP URP 
Meru 487,265 7.55 89.41 TNA APK APK TNA 
Tharaka 
Nithi 
155,487 5.12 92.38 TNA TNA TNA equal 
Embu 227,286 7.97 89 TNA TNA APK TNA 
Kitui 324,673 79.53 14.78 ODM Wiper Wiper Other 
Machakos 445,096 85.89 9.58 ODM Wiper Wiper Other 
Makueni 298,221 90.73 5.02 ODM Muung-
ano 
Wiper Other 
Nyandarua 255,984 1.21 97.11 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Nyeri 356,380 1.7 96.33 TNA GNA NRC TNA 
Kirinyaga 265,290 1.44 95.99 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Murang’a 452,841 2.43 95.92 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Kiambu 861,828 7.89 90.21 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Turkana 132,885 67.53 29.85 ODM ODM FRDK URP 
West Pokot 120,986 22.95 73.33 TNA KANU KANU URP 
Samburu 61,114 57.62 40.94 ODM URP URP TNA 
Trans Nzoia 244,640 46.03 37.24 ODM FRDK FRDK Other 
Uasin Gishu 330,618 21.09 74.26 TNA URP URP URP 
Elgeyo 
Marakwet 
134,568 4.85 92.07 TNA URP URP URP 
Nandi 263,254 8.7 81.52 TNA URP URP URP 
Baringo 173,653 9.41 87.63 TNA URP KANU URP 
Laikipia 173,905 12.56 85.49 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Nakuru 695,319 17.14 80.19 TNA TNA TNA TNA 
Narok 262,739 50.28 46.38 ODM URP URP URP 
Kajiado 304,346 44.44 52.36 TNA ODM TNA TNA 
Kericho 290,458 6.59 90.74 TNA URP URP URP 
Bomet 252,358 4.61 92.68 TNA URP URP URP 
Kakamega 567,460 63.84 2.63 ODM ODM UDFP equal 
Vihiga 202,822 46.44 1.52 ODM PPK UDFP Other 
Bungoma 410,462 52.83 12.25 ODM NFK FRDK Other 
Busia 251,305 85.62 3.71 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Siaya 311,919 98.47 0.31 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Kisumu 385,820 96.64 1.33 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Homa Bay 325,826 98.93 0.24 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Migori 283,862 86.38 9.97 ODM PDP ODM ODM 
Kisii 412,945 67.93 27.42 ODM ODM ODM ODM 
Nyamira 219,358 66.26 29.47 ODM ODM FRDK ODM 
Nairobi 1,728.801 49 46.75 ODM ODM TNA TNA 
TOTAL/ 
majority 
14,352,533 43.31 50.7 ODM     
(The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 2013) 
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The election results (Table 6) show that Odinga won all constituencies in several 
counties with a larger share of urban population, such as Mombasa (Kenya’s second 
largest city) and Kisumu. However, Kenyatta won all constituencies in other counties 
with urban populations, including Kiambu (the most populous county after Nairobi), 
Eldoret and Nakuru. This means that the urban vote in Kenya was split. Furthermore, 
in many counties, the contestant won all the constituencies. Moreover, areas where 
Ruto’s URP dominated delivered the presidential votes for their TNA ally, Kenyatta. 
As Ruto had been in an alliance with ODM’s Odinga in the 2007 elections, before the 
ICC charged him and Kenyatta with crimes against humanity, it is interesting to 
speculate the potential counterfactual outcome if the ICC had not decided to press 
charges.  
Urban voters in some regions mainly voted as did their rural ethnic counterparts, 
showing that ethnicity trumped any urban poor populist strategy.  However, voting 
patterns from the urban areas of Nairobi deviate somewhat from the national trend 
(Table 7). The Nairobian vote was split almost in half between the CORD coalition led 
by ODM’s Raila Odinga, and the Jubilee coalition led by TNA’s Uhuru Kenyatta. As 
to the presidential election results of Nairobi’s constituency, the opposition candidate 
Odinga (ODM) won by a small margin vis-à-vis Uhuru Kenyatta (TNA) (49 percent vs 
46.75 percent). Odinga had a clear majority in Langata and Kibra constituencies 
(previously one constituency) and also a smaller majority in Mathare. These are the 
constituencies with the largest slum populations, indicating an urban poor bias towards 
the opposition in Nairobi. However, the Nairobi urban vote was split, as Kenyatta won 
the majority in eight constituencies (including constituencies with slums) while 






Table 7: Presidential elections: Votes received per constituency in Nairobi County 
Constituency Votes received Raila Odinga Uhuru Kenyatta 
Westlands 97,646 53,552 37,893 
Dagoretti North 85,701 51,121 28,671 
Dagoretti South 74,614 21,606 51,272 
Langata 79,935 45,979 28,793 
Kibra 78,118 57,055 15,739 
Roysambu 90,481 18,927 69,751 
Kasarani 90,834 24,818 64,313 
Ruaraka 72,757 53,269 17,959 
Embakasi South 78,388 52,372 24,176 
Embakasi North 65,742 29,191 35,495 
Embakasi Central 82,509 37,750 43,385 
Embakasi East 79,161 44,220 32,684 
Embakasi West 84,406 40,734 41,891 
Makadara 87,788 46,042 39,196 
Kamukunji 71,195 31,730 36,762 
Starehe 109,781 45,102 61,497 
Mathare 69,420 37,688 30,013 
Total county 
percentage 
99.14 49 46.75 
(The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 2013) 
The distribution of constituency seats to political parties in Nairobi County further 
demonstrates the split vote in Nairobi (see Table 3 in Appendix A). The TNA won the 
majority of seats (ten), with the remaining seven going to the ODM. However, the 
elections in Mathare constituency, which gave the seat to a TNA candidate, were later 
nullified by a court ruling, and by-elections in 2014 resulted in the seat being won by a 
(Kikuyu) ODM candidate. In addition, Mike Sonko Mbuvi (TNA) was elected Senator 
of Nairobi City, while Evans Kidero (ODM) was elected Governor of Nairobi City. 
Moving to the distribution of seats in the County Assembly Ward elections (see Table 
4 in Appendix A), we find that the ODM and the TNA obtained an equal number of 
seats, 41 for each. Again, the ODM dominated in Langata, Kibra and Mathare.  
In total, the Nairobian election results show some consistency in the urban poor’s 
support towards ODM across government levels. The ethnic composition of Nairobi is 
based on immigration from the neighboring Kikuyu population (about 50 percent), and 
western Kenya (Luhya, Luo, Kisii, and other, approx. 40 per cent). Only 10 per cent 
originate from the north and east of Kenya (Bocquier et al. 2009: 26). While Kikuyu 
are the largest tribe, the Luo-opposition candidate Odinga won this county. 
Furthermore, whereas Langata constituency is Luo-dominated, Mathare constituency 
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has traditionally leaned more towards the Kikuyu.  The fact that the ODM won the by-
elections with a Kikuyu candidate could indicate rather flexible dynamics of ethnic 
identity and party affiliation.154 Luos also ran for positions under the TNA banner.155 
In constituencies such as Langata, several candidates from the same ethnic community 
competed for the same seat, under different political parties.156 In Nairobi, the 
relationship between ethnicity and party affiliation is thus not clear-cut.     
Few incidents of violence were reported in Nairobi during and after the 2013 elections, 
although the mood was tense, especially when Odinga challenged the election results 
in the Supreme Court (Cheeseman et al. 2014). When the court upheld the election 
results, however, the opposition chose to respect the decision, rather than embark on a 
protest campaign. According to Cheeseman et al. (2014), the traumatic experience of 
the 2007 elections, the peace and reconciliation efforts and reforms that had occurred 
in-between, as well as the ICC case lurking in the background, were all factors held to 
have made the 2013 elections fairly peaceful. 
The success of the unlikely multi-ethnic coalition of former rivals from the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin communities confirms the flexibility with which Kenyan political elites 
construct multi-ethnic coalitions in their favor (Arriola 2013; Elischer 2013; Lynch 
2014). According to ODM officials, their competitors also destabilized ODM’s 
organizational structures through infiltration.157 However, through the constitutional 
process, ODM had successfully accomplished some of its political goals, including 
regionalism and land reform, with wide-spread support. Although the ODM failed to 
mobilize the urban constituencies at the national level in the 2013 elections, 
demonstrating that ethnicity remains the predominant mode of linking political parties 
to voters, its electoral success in the capital city, Nairobi, makes it relevant to 
                                              
154 Andvig and Barasa (2014) find that Mathare consists of several “villages”, and that the historic perception of Mathare 
Valley as Kikuyu-dominated is not necessarily correct.  
155 Political aspirant TNA. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
156 Political aspirant Labour Party. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
157 ODM Secretariat. March 7, 2014, Nairobi. 
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undertake a deeper analysis of the ODM’s populist strategy towards the urban poor, 
and how it has differed from that of the incumbent government. The next sections 
examine the political mobilization patterns of street vendors and slum-dwellers over 
time.  
Street vendors and ad hoc populist linkages 
The KANU regime under Moi continued to be hostile to street vendors in the 1990s. 
Street vendors were relocated from the CBD on numerous occasions, often by the 
hundreds. Each time, the street fighting between the council police and traders was 
frequent and violent (Linehan 2007: 31). In the late 1990s, street traders were 
considered to belong to the political opposition involved in political riots and 
demonstrations, leading to a presidential directive to clear the CBD of these traders 
(Morange 2015: 251). A partial reason why the opposition coalition NARC won the 
2002 elections was poor economic performance with high unemployment among 
youth, who made up 45 percent of a total of 14.6 percent unemployed (Kamunyori 
2007: 12). NARC promised 500,000 new jobs annually, and recognized the role of 
informal micro-enterprises in achieving this goal. Informal trade was seen as the 
formula for poverty eradication, but through relocation to formal market spaces 
(Morange 2015: 251).  
However, upon assuming office, the NARC government tended to favor the formal 
sector. Its formalization policies affected informality adversely through massive 
“clean-ups” that included evictions and relocating street vendors and kiosks away from 
the CBD, and excluded their associations from strategies and planning (Kinyanjui 
2010; Linehan 2007). In 2003, NARC’s Local Government Minister, Maitha, 
encouraged the City Council to introduce a license system to control street vending 
(Linehan 2007). Each hawker had to pay 200 shillings, and was then offered a permit 
to operate from one of 23 designated back lanes in the CBD. The same year, street 
vendors were moved to quieter lanes and roads. By 2005, hawkers were deemed a 
“nuisance to the environment.” The ultimate decision to expel hawkers was taken at 
Cabinet level, where Askaris were instructed to clear the streets.  
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In 2006, President Kibaki announced that a dozen new markets would be built for 
hawkers across Kenya, including two in Nairobi: Muthurwa and Westlands. Hawking 
would be recognized an integral part of the economy (Linehan 2007: 34). Initiatives 
such as loans and trainings, and an entrepreneurial discourse, were the mobilizing 
points. However, violent confrontations ensued between street vendors and police. 
Riot police used tear gas and live ammunition, resulting in the city center being 
temporarily hawker-free.  
A few months before the 2007 election, street traders were again permitted to return to 
the city center, to ensure support for Kibaki’s re-election (Linehan 2007: 34). Despite 
2007 pre-election calls to recast hawkers and the jua kali sector as the nation’s 
entrepreneurs, Linehan (2007: 36) found that in practice, no arrangements were 
offered to street vendors, except the promise of new (formal) markets and temporary 
reprieve from expulsion from the city center. Nor did they feature in the Vision 2030 
(Kinyanjui 2010; Linehan 2007). Hence, the President’s mobilization of street vendors 
appeared to be very temporary and ad hoc compared to the Zambian PF (after the 2011 
elections).   
According to Kamunyori (2007: 31), differing objectives between the political 
governing structure and the executive body have also contributed to hawkers being 
used as a battleground for asserting authority. Tensions among councilors, MPs and 
ward managers have become salient around issues of removing the hawkers. Hawkers 
would label politicians and councilors as either “pro-hawker” or “anti-hawker.” As 
councilors needed the hawkers’ vote, they were reluctant to support the removal 
strategies of the technical arm. The fate of hawkers within a constituency depended on 
the political clout of the relevant MP. In 2007, for instance, the Lang’ata MP (ODM) 
was considered “pro-hawker,” so the City inspectors therefore left the hawkers alone 
(Kamunyori 2007: 31). This meant that both the country’s  President (from NARC) 
and opposition MPs (ODM) sought to attract street vendors during the 2007 elections, 
in contrast to in Zambia, where only the opposition voiced a consistent populist 
message to the street vendors.  
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In 2013, neither CORD nor Jubilee Alliance held clear positions in support or 
opposition to street vending,158 and this dimension did not constitute a party cleavage 
at the national level. The manifestos of both party coalitions promised to assist youth 
and micro-scale businesses with funding, provision of vocational and technical skills, 
licensing and zones, but did not address the laws that criminalized informal work 
(Coalition for Reforms and Democracy Manifesto 2013; Jubilee Coalition Party 
Manifesto 2013). Both CORD and Jubilee Alliance aimed chiefly at formalizing the 
operations of informal workers.  
The ODM manifesto (2013) criticized the current situation where insecurity tenure of 
business locations inhibited growth. It recognized the grievances of the informal sector 
in its manifesto, but stated that it would eliminate punitive and intimidating tendencies 
of the government against small-scale enterprises by streamlining licensing. ODM also 
promised physical infrastructure, by identifying suitable zones for small-scale 
enterprises and to ensure the autonomy of the private sector after leasing or selling the 
work-space to them. ODM stated that it would “initiate and regulate the formation of 
informal traders’ associations to enhance savings and create a membership platform 
through which affordable loans can be provided,” (Orange Democratic Movement 
Party Manifesto 2013: 28) and would ensure that licenses, tax compliance, and 
compliance with labor laws would be upheld following this expansion.  
In a similar vein, the Jubilee coalition (2013) promised that all deserving young 
entrepreneurs would have the opportunity to secure government tenders, and that 
special Industrial Parks and clusters would be developed in the counties, targeting the 
youth sector as well as women who wanted to start small businesses, with electricity, 
water, clean sanitary environments and road access. The Jubilee manifesto also 
focused on facilitating economic growth by introducing tax breaks and stimulating 
small-scale entrepreneuring, especially among youth, and through the creation of 
markets for jua kali products.  
                                              
158 KENASVIT. March 20, 2014, Naivasha. 
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In sum, both party coalitions focused on facilitating micro-enterprises in the informal 
sector and including them in the formal economy, without any clear policy differences 
with regard to street vendors.  However, ODM also promised to upscale and 
strengthen existing social security regimes and extend legal coverage to all workers, 
including those in the informal sector and their dependents (Orange Democratic 
Movement Party Manifesto 2013). This reflects a more Leftist, programmatic 
approach to informal workers in general.  
Programmatic cleavages between (Luo) slum tenants and (Kikuyu) slum 
landlords   
Since the onset of multipartyism, there have been clear party differences along the 
landlord–tenant dimension, consistently mobilized (in Nairobi) during multiparty 
elections. Odinga has supported his (Luo) voters in their demands for lower rent (and 
their refusal to pay rent) to the predominantly Kikuyu and Nubi landlords in Kibera 
constituency, thereby securing their votes and his re-election as MP (Smedt 2009: 
588). According to a representative of structure owners in Kibera,159 Odinga realized 
that tenants, who comprised the majority of voters in Kibera, would always vote for 
him, and campaigned on this issue in 1997, 2002 and 2011. In 2001, clashes occurred 
and some Luo tenants became de facto owners of rooms (Smedt 2009: 588). Odinga 
made KANU’s President Moi promise to lower the rents in Kibera. After negotiations, 
rent levels went down and most tenants resumed payments. However, in strongly Luo-
dominated areas, a situation of non-payment persisted up to 2007.  
The policies of NARC’s President Kibaki for addressing urban planning challenges 
and safety issues affected slum-dwellers negatively, through house demolitions and 
forced evictions, as well as violent crusades against criminal gangs. As related by 
Bocquier et al. (2009: 53), Nairobi witnessed demonstrations in the 2000s by slum-
dwellers who protested what they considered excessive rents, detoriating living 
conditions, and exploitation by wealthy and well-connected landlords. Such 
demonstrations were held in places like Kibera, Kariobangi and Mathare. In response, 
                                              
159 Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
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Odinga’s  (ODM) 2007 campaign focused on housing issues, such as rent levels, 
upgrading and protection from private property “speculators” (Resnick 2010: 16).  
When the 2007 election results were declared in favor of President Kibaki, Kikuyus 
were violently chased from Kibera, and their property destroyed. In this case, however, 
the looting groups came from all ethnic groups (Smedt 2009: 588). Interestingly, some 
of the internationally funded slum-upgrading projects that are managed by government 
entities have also been seen as following partisan lines. This is the case for the Kibera 
slum-upgrading project (KENSUP), financed by UN-Habitat,160 which was widely 
perceived as being a project of Prime Minister Odinga and the ODM—both by 
supporters and opponents to the projects at the grassroots level.161  
The ODM manifesto of 2013 promised to work with county governments in setting 
targets for the construction of housing units in urban areas, and, more importantly, to 
“expand the government’s slum-upgrading program to cover all major urban areas, 
with a view to ensure that the urban poor live a life of dignity” (Orange Democratic 
Movement Party Manifesto 2013: 48). The development of slum housing was blamed 
on lack of planning for the social needs of workers, which, ODM argued, had led to 
the proliferation of informal settlements to cater for the housing needs of people 
working in industry. Among the remedies the party proposed to counter the over-
reliance on land was to de-emphasize the role of land as collateral in accessing credit, 
the promotion of a manufacturing and service economy as alternatives to land 
resources, as well as government regulation and provision of housing (Orange 
Democratic Movement Party Manifesto 2013).  
While the 2013 Jubilee manifesto (2013) also promised to assist the new counties by 
providing new low-cost housing for rent, their emphasis was on a “property-owning” 
                                              
160 Through a Memorandum of Understanding, the Ministry of Housing was given responsibility for construction, location as 
well as beneficiaries of the project, through a consultative process with the regional administration and community 
representatives in charge of villages, such as chiefs, that were to plan for election and criteria for interest representation (UN-
Habitat, April 20, 2014, Nairobi).  
161 Kibera Inhabitant Forum. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
The Nubian Rights Forum. Oct 18, 2012, Nairobi. 
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society. According to a grassroots association formed by structure owners in the 
Kibera slum,162 the TNA and Kenyatta were seen as favoring the landlords and their 
objective of creating wealth by building multi-story buildings. The manifesto also 
promised to assist investors in setting up proper housing and other investments on land 
owned by communities. Urban development was to be controlled through local county 
zoning policies, with developers contributing to County Infrastructure Funds as part of 
their permits. Their ambition was “a massive expansion of land user and ownership 
rights, so that all Kenyans who want to own their own homes are able to do so” 
(Jubilee Coalition Party Manifesto 2013: 45). The Jubilee coalition also promised to 
supply affordable loans to low-income Kenyans to enable them to build their own 
homes, and to require the counties to formulate five-year Housing Plan proposals to 
ensure that enough new homes were built in their area. At the same time, the Jubilee 
government stated that it would continue with slum clearance programs, in order to 
replace slums with proper housing.163 
In addition, the Jubilee coalition stated that it would embark on the adjudication and 
titling of community land, to be done by giving “communities, rather than the National 
Land Commission, the titles to community-held lands” (Jubilee Coalition Party 
Manifesto 2013: 45). The resolution of property disputes over community land would 
be facilitated by creating special community land tribunals which would work together 
with traditional leaders. Thus, the coalition appeared to want to circumvent the 
constitutional process of dealing with land disputes through the newly established 
Land Commission, which was an outcome of the 2010 constitution, a process 
dominated by the opposition party, the ODM.  
In electoral campaigns and in party manifestoes we find clear programmatic 
differences pertaining to how to solve the problem of slum housing: the ODM focused 
on more government regulation and provision, while the Jubilee emphasized private 
                                              
162 Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
163 Both the Jubilee coalition and ODM promised to repossess illegally occupied land by government officials and private 
developers to address the issue of displaced populations, and ODM will furthermore tax idle land to discourage speculation 
and under-utilization of land. 
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ownership and market solutions. However, the landlord–tenant cleavage is highly 
confounded with ethnicity, which makes it doubtful whether all Kikuyu tenants 
consider the ODM to be the political party that works for their housing interests. This 
fusion of ethnicity and socio-economic interest was clear in the following reasoning 
given by a youth activist in Kibera. He argued that all elections were geared towards 
ethnicity, where aspirants were backed by their tribe. He added that “tribe was caused 
by landlords who own structures and who are not the same tribe as tenants. When they 
raised the rent, the tenants united against the landlord, but then it became more of an 
ethnic issue.”164   
To sum up, a main difference between the ODM (CORD) and NARC/TNA (Jubilee 
Coalition) towards the urban poor has centered on issues of housing along the 
landlord–tenant dimension, through programmatic as well as populist mobilization. 
However, this socio-economic cleavage is confounded with ethnicity. The issue of 
street vending has not emerged as a programmatic component that differentiates the 
two parties, although politicians of both camps have sought to mobilize the street 
vendors in a populist, ad hoc manner at election time.  
7.3 Pro-poor opposition strategies, and varying responses 
from the electorate  
The urban poor have become increasingly important for national-level party politics in 
both Kenya and Zambia, through pro-poor, populist opposition parties. These populist 
strategies reflect that opposition parties have come to incorporate and take up socio-
economic interests pertaining specifically to the illegality slum-dwellers and street 
vendors experience in the housing and job market.    
The presence of programmatic and populist linkages to the urban poor in national 
electoral politics suggests that the introduction of multiparty competition has in fact 
contributed to the urban poor being increasingly taken serious as citizens. Opposition 
parties keen to win office have become more responsive to the interests of these 
                                              
164 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. Oct, 2012, Nairobi. 
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constituents, even in Kenya where the urban vote is significantly smaller. Their 
increasing relevance in Kenyan national politics suggests that in terms not only of 
votes, but also their ability to mobilize and create political pressure, political elites 
have become more attentive.  
As regards the framing of collective benefits for various sub-constituencies of the 
urban poor, and its significance for party linkages in the two countries, we find 
interesting variations.  First, problems pertaining to slum-dwelling have increasingly 
been subject to the formulation of programmatic policies. In both Kenya and Zambia, 
the opposition has campaigned on pledges of more government regulation and 
provision of low-cost housing, in response to a heated private and informal housing 
market, and an end to evictions and demolitions affecting slum-dwellers. In contrast, 
party linkages to street vendors have usually taken a more ad hoc populist form. These 
have not been developed into written, comprehensive and cohesive policy programs, 
but been based more on personal promises from the party leaders to the street vendors.  
Second, in Zambia, the PF’s populist strategy towards street vendors stood in stark 
contrast to the campaign of the incumbent MMD government, and the policies the 
latter had been carrying out for the last decade. Rather, it resembled MMD’s President 
Chiluba’s approach to street vendors in early years. Also in terms of its promises of 
low-cost housing to slum-dwellers, PF distinguished itself from the incumbent 
government. Importantly, the opposition party was able to incorporate the various 
socio-economic interests of the urban poor into its electoral strategy, and marked itself 
as a clear pro-poor party in contrast to the incumbent MMD party.  
In Kenya, on the other hand, party mobilization of street vendors has overall been 
more ad hoc. Vague promises to this constituency have been provided by politicians 
across the party spectrum before elections. In addition, slum-dwellers have been 
divided along a landlord–tenant dimension, reflected in party cleavages. This cleavage 
was further confounded with ethnicity during political campaigns. The perpetuation of 
socio-economic conflict among the slum-dwellers in the capital was aligned with and 
served to reinforce a national party cleavage built on ethnic land disputes.  
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As to national voting patterns in recent elections, the Zambian PF won the urban vote 
nationally, as well as the presidency. In contrast, the opposition candidate for ODM 
(CORD coalition) did not win the presidency. ODM failed to mobilize a national 
majority in the face of the Ruto–Kenyatta Jubilee Coalition, in a country with a larger 
rural population and a divided urban vote.165  Still, the latter won the majority in 
Nairobi County, especially in the constituencies with some of the largest slums. The 
analysis indicates that, at least in the Kenyan capital, the urban poor may respond to 
the programmatic and populist appeals of the opposition.  
Because the Kenyan opposition did not win the presidency, we cannot trace the 
accountability of ODM’s populist and programmatic linkages in a manner similar to 
the more successful PF party in Zambia.166 As regards housing, there seemed to be 
limited change from the MMD government, and slum upgrading through private titling 
continued with PF.167 However, the PF’s populist commitment to not applying 
punitive laws on street vendors proved surprisingly long-lasting, compared to what has 
been a trend in both Zambia and Kenya. The PF also tried to implement minimum 
wage, and appeared committed to revising policies on social protection. The provision 
of collective benefits indicates that the Zambian urban poor are increasingly being 
treated as citizens. It should also be noted that the Kenyan ODM has been able to 
achieve some of its goals through its widely supported campaign for a new 
constitution.168 Hence, also in Kenya, there are indications of the urban poor’s 
influence as citizens. 
This chapter has shown how strategic and innovative opposition politicians in sub-
Saharan Africa produce changes in the party system, by politicizing new socio-
                                              
165 As has been pointed out (Resnick 2014; Cheeseman and Larmer 2013), both opposition parties relied on ethno-regional 
appeals to rural constituencies in order to mobilize sufficient votes, where the ODM’s Odinga emphasized devolution 
whereas the PF’s Sata appealed to Bemba marginalization.   
166 ODM representatives claim that they have sought to work towards, for instance, universal health care through NSSF, but 
claim that multinational companies and business interests opposed it (ODM Secretariat, March 7, 2014, Nairobi). 
 
167 Slum-housing might be more determined by the parameters already set by international partners, although there are not 
sufficient data to confirm or disconfirm this. 
168 Although the ICC trial led to a political realignment that negatively affected the ODM in the 2013 elections, the 
international community also contributed to accelerating the constitutional process led by the opposition.    
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economic cleavages to mobilize the urban poor. This reflects an increased citizen-
based agency of the urban poor through the ballot box. Due to their numbers, 
opposition parties that want to be competitive need to generate legitimacy by 
portraying themselves as being representative of and accountable to various 
constituencies of the urban poor. By choosing such a strategy, the Patriotic Front 
succeeded in winning national elections. Still, such programmatic and populist 
linkages between parties and citizens are only half the story. We must also examine 
the deeper dynamics underpinning these party linkages towards the urban poor. To 
what degree do they reflect a form of “perverted” accountability (Stokes 2005) by 
engaging the urban poor as clients? To this we now turn.    
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8. Transforming socio-economic grievances into 
clientelistic assets through neopopulism   
“Politicians have mastered the game. Two ingredients are key: ignorance and poverty.”169  
“Everyone [politicians] has been given a stake in the system by being given land (…) a perfect 
neo-colony.”170  
“We clarified we are not a gang. We just want a piece of land, you do not own it.”171  
Political discourses, manifestos and policy programs could be taken at face value. 
However, the massive literature on the prevalence of ethno-clientelism on the 
continent, as well as in the cases in question, suggest that programs and populist 
appeals are not the only linkages that exist between political parties and constituents. 
Much of the literature on clientelism in Africa focuses on clientelism that is distributed 
amongst politicians at various levels to mobilize voters along ethnic lines (Walle 2007; 
Posner 2007). Here, I will explore whether clientelist linkages forged with the urban 
poor work in a different manner, perhaps more similar to Latin-type party machines 
(Levitsky 2007; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013).  
Chapter 8 is concerned with how political parties generate material resources through 
clientelism, and how politicians forge power asymmetries between them and the urban 
poor for this purpose (research questions b/c in the introduction). For each of the 
country cases, I introduce the broker networks found in the respective capitals.172 The 
forms of clientelist brokerage targeting the urban poor will be analyzed, with an 
emphasis on its interaction or fusion with populist or programmatic linkages.  
The analysis will show that clientelism is used to transform the socio-economic 
interests of the urban poor into neopatrimonial assets for politicians. The combination 
                                              
169 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 12, 2014, Nairobi. 
170 ODM Secretariat. March 7, 2014, Nairobi. 
171 Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
172
 The focus on the capitals is because fieldwork data for exploring clientelism in urban areas were collected only there. As 
comparative data on clientelist relations towards sub-groups of the urban poor have been limited, these parts of the analysis 
build largely on interview data, supplemented with newspaper articles and secondary sources when available.   
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of pro-poor promises with clientelism indicates a typical neopopulist strategy. 
However, legacies from past structures of clientelism towards the urban poor under 
patrimonial rule have affected how today’s linkages are forged. Some have been 
continued while others have changed, depending on how political elites see new 
opportunities for or threats to generating political and material resources from the 
urban poor.  
8.1 The Zambian “cadres”: different, but same    
In Zambia, it is impossible to talk about clientelist politics without considering the 
Zambian version of a broker: the political “cadre.” The ‘cadre’ is such an ingrained 
and popularly used concept, that it seemed pertinent for the case study to understand 
the phenomenon better. According to Hansen (2010: 19), the term “cadre” is used for 
political involvement, and was a discourse commonly used in connection with the one-
party state and its disciplinary, vigilante youth wing. Adding to this, I find that the 
contemporary Zambian cadre may be considered to be anyone who claims to be a 
supporter of a political party. However, more than simply being a voter, there is a 
notion of being more directly linked to a party (or politician), acting as its intermediary 
agent. There are no formal membership criteria for party cadres, and anyone can thus 
claim to be a political cadre of any given political party, making it inherently difficult 
for others to assess the strength of their party ties. Usually, however, politicians are 
believed to give some kind of reward to their cadres—money or other assets. In return, 
the cadres work to mobilize for votes and support, sometimes by generating violence 
and fear. This understanding of brokers is in line with the conceptualization of Stokes 
et al. (2013).  
The Zambian cadres represent a stratum within the class of the poor who utilize their 
closeness to power to make claims that are supposedly for the poor.173 The cadres are 
perceived as consisting largely of young men who lack adequate income opportunities. 
Cadres are active in several informal sectors, the most important being street vending 
                                              
173 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
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and market trade, transport and land allocation. Many are full- or part-time idlers or 
underemployed, earning very little income in the informal economy. Some engage in 
crime. In Lusaka, the slum of Chibolya is known as a lawless area of crime and 
violence, where criminal youth gangs rule the streets. Police interventions with riot 
gear, teargas canisters, batons and rifles occur, effectively sealing off the township and 
carrying out home searches. Especially on the notorious “Gaza” street, several hundred 
have been arrested and structures removed that are supposedly used for drug trade 
(Lusaka Times 30.05.2014). According to one respondent,174 Chibolya represents an 
anomaly and a contradiction: a lawless area in the very center of the capital. He sees 
the area as the political epicenter where the real struggle for power is. The political 
elite are “very happy” to use this area for mobilization. However, the phenomenon of 
political cadres is not restricted to notorious places such as Chibolya.  
Although the political cadres are generally poor, they are considered influential in their 
communities.175 Cadres represent the compounds they come from. Some have mothers 
or sisters who need access to markets to sell goods. As the very poor are deemed 
unable to make key decisions themselves, it is the intermediary cadres that mobilize 
them.176 The cadres present demands to the patrons they campaign for, on behalf of the 
constituencies in the compounds, asking the politicians which rewards they can 
promise. When they get the green light, they go ahead, and the resources are expected 
to trickle down from the cadres to the community.177 As the cadres are often seen as 
doing things favorable for their communities, it can be dangerous for politicians to go 
against them, as the cadres are able to manipulate their constituencies. As for the 
cadres, they often have nothing to lose—they have no proper jobs or incomes, and 
often not a family of their own.  
                                              
174 Journalist and web-activist. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
175 Caritas. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
176 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
177 Caritas. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
 191
If they do their job well, cadres get money, employment or other assets from their 
political patrons. The incentive for cadres to enter politics is thus some kind of reward. 
Cadres are integral to how the parties relate to each other.178 Conflict is fueled by 
leaders paying cadres to instigate conflict. This also feeds into how cadres and the 
communities they represent understand political parties and the government. 
According to the Information Secretary of the MMD,179 all MPs form groups of 
campaigners that engage in violence (although he added that no MMD cadre has 
threatened other people). Political campaigning is all about politicians who are able to 
pay for such campaigns. According to one MMD youth leader,180 the main arena for 
mobilization is at the ward level where political parties recruit from community to 
community. Next in importance are the political rallies, or sometimes door-to-door 
campaigns. Competing politicians who are not loud and highly visible lose out, as they 
are seen as weak. Sometimes the only people who visit the constituencies on behalf of 
the parties are the cadres, who feel themselves entitled to be rewarded with jobs and 
Constituency Development Funds.181 
Within the cadre structure itself, there is a hierarchy based on the political clout of 
individual brokers. A cadre at the very bottom receives smaller rewards than those 
who have proven their ability to exercise more political influence, and have closer ties 
to the political elites. Politicians seeking youth to rally or create havoc would come to 
the lawless Chibolya slum and rent them for small sums, or even some beer. These 
people will hang around in bars to get a few coins for a meal. Many abuse alcohol or 
sniff glue to cope with their situation.182 Anyone who has an issue with a political 
party can rent these youths: “They are there to do it for you. It is just a matter of 
throwing a few kwacha to create havoc.”183   
                                              
178 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
179 Information and Publicity Secretary in MMD. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
180 MMD youth leader. Dec 3, 2013, Lusaka. 
181 Journalist and web-activist. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Regional Consultant for The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions Africa. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
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While MPs, once elected, have been accused of disconnecting from their electorate, it 
is difficult to say whether they disconnect from their cadres in-between elections. 
Many cadres have been recruited by politicians at a very young age, and are school 
dropouts.184 Some political candidates allow their cadres to generate their own 
revenues in-between elections (and sometimes they are believed to share the 
profits).185 This points to a reciprocity tie that goes beyond elections, to power 
struggles and money extortion on a daily basis. Cadres would probably not be able to 
act in this manner if they were not politically connected. Their insurance is their 
political party—without it, they would be “rotting in jail.”186 Some of the more 
influential and notorious cadres have been appointed to positions at various 
government levels or, according to respondents, have appointed themselves.187  
8.1.1 Party cadres from the MMD era until today: brief overview 
The cadre phenomenon began with the UNIP during the one-party era, and continued 
after the democratic transition. The combination of a winner-takes-all political system 
and a society where people are struggling for survival makes for high stakes and 
dangerous politics, as politicians would do anything to win a seat.188 Upon winning 
power, the MMD created the officially non-partisan but yet elected Residents’ 
Development Committees (RDCs) for the compounds, intended to replace the UNIP 
state apparatus in advocating and negotiating for resources with the Lusaka City 
Council, donors and the central government (Myers 2006: 298). These RDCs were 
introduced by the NGO Care International, and then copied by the government across 
the city. However, these committees quickly found themselves “surrounded by 
confusion” (Schlyter, 1999, cited in Myers 2006: 298).  
                                              
184 Former MMD/PF cadre. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
185 For instance. an aggressive cadre once demanded an extra fee from my taxi driver, assumed by the driver to be under the 
protection of a local politician with whom he would share the profits. 
186 AZIEA. Dec 9, 2013, Kitwe. 
187 Former MMD/PF cadre. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
Journalist and web-activist. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
188 SACCORD. Nov 26, 2013, Lusaka. 
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The problem of clientelism on the ground, brokered by cadres, should be seen in 
connection with an MMD leadership that was corrupt. President Chiluba (1991–2001) 
and his administration were charged in both Zambian and British courts on counts of 
large-scale corruption (Donge 2008: 71). There has been evidence of collusion at the 
top for channeling money from the state treasury to various private companies in 
Zambia and abroad. Thus, the low level of MMD party institutionalization (described 
in Chapter 6) has been underpinned by high-level corruption and clientelist networks 
down to the grassroots.   
When the opposition party, PF, entered the scene, it soon established its own cadre 
structures. During the 2006 campaign, a complementary and dynamic relationship 
started developing between emergent PF cadres, who dominated Zambia’s urban 
spaces during the campaign, and the rhetoric of Michael Sata (Larmer and Fraser 
2007: 627). On independent media and on tour, Sata developed ad hoc policy positions 
that responded to news and local conditions, enabled by the informal PF structures. PF 
supporters headed for events could appear threatening and lawless, singing, dancing 
and riding on bus roofs. PF cadres even blocked the roads for the President on one 
occasion (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 629). 
MMD cadres were increasingly chased from the streets. After the 2006 elections, PF 
continued holding mass rallies, triggering the MMD to imprison Sata on charges that 
were quickly dropped (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 634-635). After the elections, PF also 
established a committee of new councilors in the urban areas where it had won, to 
coordinate rapid implementation of its policies at the municipal levels and act as a 
“parallel government” (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 636). These councilors were 
supposed to reduce rates, build housing to replace shanty settlements, decentralize 
control of bus stations and review allocation of market plots—all important sites of 
political allegiance that had been controlled by MMD cadres.  
In 2008, PF’s difficulty in raising funds from a severely impoverished support base, 
and its ensuing financial dependence on political leaders, began to undermine more 
democratic governance structures (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 76). By the 2008 
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presidential elections, Sata had attracted a broad range of cadres, including former 
MMD colleagues, representatives of urban communities, as well as individuals who 
had left the UPND following the death of the former leader Mazoka.  Many of these 
cadres appeared less committed to PF’s ideological position: they simply needed a 
political home (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 76).  
A former MMD cadre described the 2011 election as a war, claiming that it was when 
the cadres began claiming positions or other resources that they started killing each 
other.189 When MMD lost power, ward chairmen and other low-level office-holders 
belonging to the former government party could be beaten up (and sometimes their 
family members as well), thrown out of their homes and offices, and replaced by 
cadres of the new government. Some of the PF cadres who were given positions were 
believed to have criminal records that were ignored after they gained office.190   
Non-merit-based appointments seemed to increase with the new PF government also at 
higher government levels. Many respondents described the new government as no 
longer based on merit, but on rewarding cadre loyalty or ethnic and tribal groups; they 
called the PF government a “family forest.” Several government officials were 
considered unable to carry out their mandate once in office, as they were “loud-
mouths” with grandiose promises but without the necessary competence. Professional 
and notorious cadres (with notorious nick-names), infamous for their violent methods, 
were believed to have been given jobs in the state intelligence.  
A new phenomenon of intra-party battles emerged in response to suspicions that Sata 
was ailing and would have to be replaced. According to Operation Young Vote,191 all 
those who had become politically connected to PF split up into factions, due to a 
power struggle between the “big fish.” Anyone who spoke out against these politicians 
would be “sorted out,” and individual politicians empowered cadres to fight their 
cause. Intra-party battles between various PF camps took the form of clashes in 
                                              
189 Former MMD/PF cadre. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
190 Operation Young Vote. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
191 Ibid. 
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Chibolya, with members of the two camps “hunting for each other,” resulting in 
several dead and injured (Zambian Watchdog 11.11.2013).192 The new incumbents 
were perceived as having nothing to lose, because they had “tasted office.” Because 
many PF cadres were not qualified for political office, they had to find other means to 
ensure they would stifle any threats to their acquired power.  
MMD cadres that had not yet shifted allegiance prior to the 2011 elections were still 
given opportunities to do so under the new government. In September 2014, 150 
MMD cadres defected to the ruling PF in Kanyama constituency, together with the 
MMD National Youth Secretary Tobias Kafumukache (Lusaka Voice, Sept 27, 2014). 
Their decision was said to have been made because of the “good leadership” and 
“developments” across the country undertaken by Sata and the PF. According to the 
news source, it was PF Lusaka Provincial Youth Vice-Chairman Daniel Kalembe who 
welcomed the new members, saying they would not be discriminated in any way as 
long as they were loyal to the party. However, a former cadre, who had withdrawn due 
to the increasing violence, expressed frustration that other cadres tried to force him to 
“come back to the party” (which I also observed myself).193  
These narratives indicate that while cadres are generally understood as belonging to 
the least privileged urban poor, aspiring and able cadres may move up the political/ 
economic ladder. These brokers exercise considerable political influence, although in a 
largely undemocratic and coercive manner. One respondent believed that the PF as a 
party did not want cartels like those common under the MMD government, but that 
PF’s own cadres were demanding this, as they belonged to the same criminal 
“underworld” or mafia.194  In any case, the use of cadres has been an important feature 
of PF’s mobilization of urban constituencies, just as it was for the former governing 
                                              
192 Violent conflicts between cadres and local politicians in Kanyama following the 2011 elections were widely discussed on 
blogs and other online sources. Furthermore, the police suspected a group of people commonly known as “Gaza” and 
operating in Chibolya, of travelling to Livingstone to engage in violence there before by-elections in 2013 (Lusaka Times, 
March 12, 2013).  
193 Former MMD/PF cadre, Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka.  
194 Journalist and web-activist. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
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parties. How do these cadre structures relate to the programmatic and populist 
components of party mobilization of street vendors and slum-dwellers?  
Street vendors and “legal” cadre distribution of trading space  
Many vendors were uprooted by the market and mall developments of the government 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and retreated to the Old Soweto Market (Hansen 
2004). In the markets of Lusaka, various groups of marketers quarreled over the 
collection of illegal fees, pitting marketers’ associations, the LCC and the Movement 
for Multiparty Development (MMD) party against each another. Despite the efforts of 
the Ministry of Local Government to implement the donor-required decentralization of 
the urban administration in the 1990s, which included market management by private 
firms, cadre politics complicated the issue (Hansen 2010).  
A decentralized reform strategy of market governance through stakeholder 
participation by marketers, consumer organizations, local government, commuter 
associations and the Chamber of Commerce in market management boards, reinforced 
the role of political interest groups and power-brokers instead of democratizing these 
relations (Hansen 2010: 19). Inside the City Market that was opened in 1997, and was 
meant to be managed by a private firm, the MMD maintained an office. By the late 
1990s, the LCC, MMD, other political parties, the Soweto Marketers Co-operative and 
Zambia National Marketers Association (ZANAMA) all had offices in the largest 
market, Soweto (Hansen 2010: 19).195  
The decentralized governance structure was dissolved in 2006, when the new Markets 
and Bus Stations Act of 2007 was passed (Hansen 2010: 19). From then on, board 
membership was based on party allegiance and political interests among cadres, 
political factions, committees and associations that collected levies (the PF at City 
Market; the MMD at Kamwala). Cadres of the MMD, as well as those of some 
opposition parties, remained in evidence in many markets, having a visible presence 
with offices and staff. In the wake of the 2007 elections, major clashes between 
political cadres erupted in the markets.  
                                              
195 Although it was slated for demolition, the market became severely congested (Hansen 2004).  
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How did patron–client relations change with Sata in the presidency? A clientelist 
structure based on street vendor brokers became highly visible in the aftermath of the 
2011 elections. When Sata decided to ignore the law prohibiting street vending, the 
power vacuum in the streets of Lusaka, following the restrained authority of the LCC, 
was soon filled by self-proclaimed PF cadres.196 There was arguably mutual benefit 
and dependency in this relationship between street vendors and the President. Since 
the discriminatory laws were not formally abandoned, this newly established freedom 
of the street vendors was directly tied to PF’s discretionary leadership.197 This secured 
continued loyalty that simple populist rhetoric could not provide.  
While the street vendor cadres apparently depend on the discretion of politicians, they 
have also viewed themselves as the ones who brought the PF to power, and able to 
unseat it if the party fails them. Both the PF itself and observers regard the party as 
being dependent on these cadres from the informal economy. Because the street 
vendors played a pivotal role, they could set their price (plots or streets for vending 
without harassment).198 This was a rather cheap price for PF to pay in exchange for 
support.  
While unofficial cadre structures and rules had existed in the markets for a long time, 
there was a qualitative change in this structure following the street-vendor free-card 
provided by Sata, because fewer people sold in the established markets as a 
consequence. However, this made it more difficult for politicians to exercise control 
over their brokers, as it is harder to control street vendors who move about freely than 
it is to control marketers operating from fixed premises.199 Instead, politicians would 
find a “boss” in an area for street vendors who already had a partisan preference, 
before giving the person money to mobilize or pay other people. 
                                              
196 Marketer/shoe seller at Soweto Market. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
197 AZIEA. Dec 9, 2013, Kitwe. 
198 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
199 Caritas. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
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By 2013, PF cadres were considered to have taken control over city space across 
Lusaka, on the roads and in the markets, based on brute force and an authority derived 
from being a self-proclaimed cadre of the current government. It was important for 
vendors not to be on bad terms with these cadres, who were charging fees and 
distributing space. The street-vendor constituency was hence controlled directly by 
these cadres, and not by the LCC, which is the formal entity intended to be in charge 
of such affairs. According to one market vendor,200 PF cadres had begun collecting a 
fee of two kwacha three times a week, which was twice the fee the LCC used to 
collect. The City Council was no longer present in the downtown Soweto Market.201 
An LCC official admitted that while the Council had some degree of control with the 
MMD cadres, it had very limited control after the shift in government, and no strategy 
for dealing with this problem.202  
As clients, street vendor brokers exercise considerable political agency, compared to 
when they were simply ignored and marginalized, and can reap personal benefits in 
terms of economic and political influence. However, also the street-vendor 
constituency as a whole can be said to have benefited—until the fees and harassment 
from the PF cadres start to surpass those of the LCC and previous market governance 
structures.  
Slum-dwellers and illegal cadre distribution of land 
Brown (2005) has studied the effects of the Zambian 1995 land reform in rural areas. 
One main trend she identifies, which also applies to urban areas, has been the ability of 
local elites— civil servants, shopkeepers, public officials, local chiefs and their family 
members—to secure privileged and irregular access to private titles at the expense of 
                                              
200 Marketer/shoe seller at Soweto Market. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
201 For example, one of the cadres now considered to be in control of the Soweto Market had his “office” under a plastic tent 
in the market. I was promised an audience with him by a marketer at the market the next time I visited (which I did not have 
time for), but the cadre could not be approached directly, only through another intermediary who would introduce him. 
Another example of these street vendor structures that I encountered was when I was taking a taxi from one of the busy 
streets close to the market. A young man aggressively stopped the car, and demanded a double fee from the taxi driver 
because the passenger was white. When the driver first refused, he pounded and kicked the car. I was told afterwards that he 
was the cadre who controlled that area, and everyone had to pay him for each trip they made with a customer.      
202 Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
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poor or middle-class households. Local party officials made financial and political 
gains from illegal construction in the 1990s and 2000s (Myers 2006: 304).  
Key challenges in land administration and management included patronage and 
corruption within the central government, and among local authorities and customary 
authorities, regarding land delivery and land access, as well as discriminatory land 
conflict resolution mechanisms (Zambia Land Alliance 2008). The land market has 
been characterized by illegality and “racketeering” (Zambia Land Alliance 2008: 19). 
Despite the limited amount of leasehold land in urban centers, there were cases where 
politically connected individuals received multiple grants of land within the same 
land-use category, to the disadvantage of more deserving individuals (Zambia Land 
Alliance 2008: 13). The way State Land was administered by the Commissioner of 
Lands on behalf of the President lacked transparency and accountability.  
Cadre occupants are typically associated with the Ward Chairmen of the 1st Republic, 
who would allocate plots.203 Before 1991, they did not own their own houses, but were 
tenants. Under the MMD government, however, the position of Ward Chairperson 
entitled those people to free access to plots, and privatization also opened up for 
selling this land. In all towns, the MMD government sold or gave away houses to 
sitting tenants. The Information Secretary in MMD explained that he had two houses 
himself, and that all members in PF also had benefitted from that program.204 Some 
land was also given to retirees with no income. 
Under the MMD government, new compounds emerged as councilors decided to 
demarcate and subdivide land. When the council divided plots amongst themselves 
and councilors, this process was already excluded from the general public.205 As even 
councilors have low salaries and sometimes work part-time, they could add onto that 
income and strengthen their support base by allocating plots. Officials in charge of 
                                              
203 Caritas. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
204 Information and Publicity Secretary in MMD. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
205 Geography lecture discussion at University of Zambia. Nov 21, 2013, Lusaka. 
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land allocations have also been accused of demanding money in order to issue 
approvals, making it cheaper and quicker to squat (Myers 2006: 304).  
According to a former Ward Chairman in Kanyama,206 poorer communities now 
depend on cadres to access land, because most urban land has been taken. The cadres 
have brought up most of the informal settlements.207 Therefore, land goes to the 
politically connected, instead of being reserved for the majority. Through party cadres, 
people can buy plots more cheaply than through the city council, which has resulted in 
“two-way traffic.”208 The system is considered better for the poor, but is illegal. The 
cadres go around and demarcate idle land owned by private persons. Even if they 
invade state (reserved) land, the government usually turns a blind eye,209 due to  fear of 
negative political implications. Bureaucrats find it difficult to antagonize politicians.  
Only cadres of the party in power can allocate land.210 When MPs are voted into 
Parliament, those who participated voluntarily in the campaign get paid through land 
invasion and/or sale in Lusaka.211 The “big guys” benefit at the expense of the poor, 
even though this system is claimed to benefit the latter. The lowest ranks in the 
political party often receive no payment at all. Demarcation involves a fee and is not 
meant for the very poor, but for the middle-men. Whenever there is a political election, 
political cadres or party chairmen unofficially distribute land to people, to gain votes. 
This they refer to as “empowerment programs.” This is also the reason for the high 
number of demolitions and evictions. When things backfire, and everyone knows the 
deal was illegal, the government opts out and distances itself. Unscrupulous people can 
sell one piece of land to some 10 to 15 people and get paid, and then disappear. If the 
                                              
206 Former Ward Chairman in Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
207 Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
208 Former Ward Chairman in Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
209 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
210 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
211 Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
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person is found he is prosecuted, but the question of who gets the land afterwards may 
remain open.212  
Also prior to the 2011 elections, political cadres and chairmen issued considerable 
amounts of land to people in return for votes, as “empowerment programs.”213 
According to the former Chairman of Kanyama,214 the compound residents had not 
been happy with the MMD cadres, after bad deals or having other negative 
experiences with them. He claimed this was the reason why MMD cadres were voted 
out of office. However, the PF cadres appeared to be largely the same. In 2013, more 
than 180 squatters in Lusaka South saw their structures demolished on the grounds that 
the houses were too near a major water source (Times of Zambia 09.11.2013). 
According to the newspaper, this marked the end of a longstanding battle between the 
Physical Planning Department and squatters, most of them civil servants who had 
acquired the plots illegally under the MMD government.  
In 2013, more than 300 suspected PF cadres were arrested and charged with criminal 
trespassing on a farm in Lusaka with the intentions of demarcating it into plots 
(Lusaka Times 26.09.2013). The police spokesperson allegedly cautioned members of 
the public against engaging in similar activities, stating that they would be arrested 
regardless of political affiliation. Local Government and Housing Minister Kabanshi 
called this a wake-up call for every Zambian on the need to follow correct procedures 
when acquiring land. A comment in the Zambian Watchdog prior to the 2015 elections 
urged voters who had been victims of, or were threatened by, land-grabbing from PF 
cadres to vote against the party (Zambian Watchdog 'comment' 18.12.2014). The 
comment warned that not even the police could stop PF cadres with pangas from 
demolishing houses in the night. The Kanyama MP, Colonel Gerry Chanda, revealed 
that he had not visited Chibolya compound since 2008, out of fear for his life (Lusaka 
Times 15.02.2014). As part of Chibolya was earmarked for a Japanese development 
                                              
212 Geography lecture discussion at University of Zambia. Nov 21, 2013, Lusaka. 
213 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
214 Former Ward Chairman in Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
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project, Chibolya residents had threatened to kill him if he attempted to demolish their 
illegal settlements.215 When he tried to enter with Chinese contractors, they were 
attacked by residents armed with pangas. 
This shows the importance of slum-dweller grievances in upholding a clientelist 
political system. While policy trends and political parties change, the underlying 
incentives to create clientelist dependency for electoral gains have remained. Party 
brokers at all levels play roles in this game, transforming the slum-dweller 
constituency into clients who depend on political patrons (cadres) to access housing. 
Not all squatter compounds are demolished or restructured each time. The logic of 
neopatrimonialism is to punish those who oppose you, and reward supporters in order 
to enforce and secure loyalty. It is not desirable to alienate everyone: people should be 
kept sufficiently dependent and content with limited resources. The structure is 
severely entrenched, to the extent that also politicians are punished if they try to 
redress illegal cadre distribution of land.    
While the PF formulated an alternative housing policy towards the urban poor, 
practices of using illegal house allocation through brokers to mobilize and sustain 
political support among slum-dwellers have continued. Thus we can say that 
multiparty competition introduced some superficial programmatic differences between 
the political parties with regard to slum-dwellers, but the underlying clientelist logic of 
neopatrimonialism has remained. In opposition, the PF could not distribute land 
illegally. Later, however, once in office, it could reward its supporters through 
clientelism. While this is a cheaper option (and in many cases, the only one) for the 
urban poor who cannot afford land in the formal, private market, the aspects of 
punishment, fear and manipulation indicate a linkage that benefits the elites and their 
middle-men at the expense of the slum-dweller population. Still, the fact that there is a 
programmatic difference that appeals to a cross-ethnic, urban poor constituency 
indicates that the urban poor are increasingly taken serious as citizens, and that 
political pressure from this constituency is mounting. The incumbent MMD 
                                              
215 The plan was to demolish the structures, relocate people, construct new houses for resettlement, and provide the structure 
owners (not tenants) with title deeds (Officer at Lusaka City Council, Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka). 
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government was voted out due to dissatisfaction among the urban poor—and that 
could happen again.  
To sum up, the PF’s strategy shows how an opposition party can build and challenge 
an ethno-clientelist party machine by combining pro-poor, programmatic appeals with 
easily redistributable clientelist rewards—in a word, neopopulism. According to 
Operation Young Vote,216 the politicians have realized that they cannot win without 
the support of young people. Therefore, they give “beautiful promises” of free 
education, but mobilize on “deceit.” The PF thrived on the promise of creating jobs for 
young people, but discontent grew when the party had to face the realities of life, and 
could not deliver. The cadres who were connected to the party reacted by taking 
control of markets and bus stations.217 A pertinent question is whether PF’s fallback on 
clientelism is due to lack of capacity. Considering the resource challenges facing the 
party, clientelism might be a last resort, not the first preference of many politicians. 
However, the extensive use of violence, generated from the top level, shows the strong 
vested economic and political interest of holding political office in Zambia. As seen in 
Table 11, most of the identified power asymmetries that forge client-based agency 








                                              
216 Operation Young Vote. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
217 Ibid. 
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Table 8: Mechanisms that forge clientship agency (through brokers) between Zambian political 
parties and their constituents 
Information  Non-verifiable party membership, based on claim of being a party cadre 
 Non-transparent nomination/election procedures for party positions 
 Non-transparent land management systems, allocation procedures and 
records 




 Lack of internal, democratic procedures within political parties 
 Ad hoc promises to local communities mediated by cadres, in exchange for 
votes 
 Payments to cadre networks in exchange for turnout at rallies 
 Appointment of cadres to (elected) political office (RDCs, WDCs), and 
establishment of ´parallel governance structures´ in exchange for votes 
 “Free-card” to ignore the law on street vending based on discretion of the 
President/party 
 Market board membership based on party allegiance  
 A land policy that vest land in the custody and care of the President 
 Ward Chairmen, councilors and local politicians in ownership/charge of land 
allocation, demarcation and subdivision 
Coercion  Criminalizing laws and regulations that facilitate evictions, demolitions, 
relocations, fines and arrests as political punishment 
 Non-passage and non-implementation of promised protective provisions and 
policies 
 Payment to cadres for harassment and violence to generate fear, and impunity 
and clearance of criminal records 
 Self-appointed jobs and political positions by cadres 
 Forced replacement of cadres of other parties and forced shifting of 
allegiance to other parties and cadre networks 
 Intra-party violence generated by paid cadres to protect acquired positions 
and power 
 (Threats of) demolition of squatter settlements to reward/punish  
 Cadre demarcation/invasion of idle land owned by private persons or the state 
to sell cheaper than formal land in exchange for delivering votes 
 Cadre threats/violence against officials who demand occupied land for 
development purposes 
 ´Free-card´ to extort illegal fees from traders (with sharing of profits between 
politician and cadre) 
 Violent clashes over market space by cadres 
8.2 Kenyan vigilantes, criminals and other hustlers 
While the term “political cadre” is not as frequently used in the Kenyan context, the 
brokers in Kenya can be said to resemble those in Zambia in many ways. However, 
more professionalized vigilante groups, often closely connected to organized crime, 
have dominated the Kenyan political scene. These vigilante groups are usually 
composed of idle youth, full- or part-time unemployed young people who roam the 
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streets without much to do, or, as one of them put it: “we’re just hustling.”218 A former 
Mungiki member described the idlers as “sitting devils.”219  According to the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC),220 all perpetrators of violence are 
urban poor who are not engaged in meaningful activities. In addition to 
unemployment, easy access to drugs and weapons has contributed to high levels of 
crime and violence in Nairobi.  
Criminal activity is often seen as the only option for youth who cannot get an income 
elsewhere.221 Many young people begin by stealing a phone or other small items, due 
to acute lack of money.222 Having entered the world of crime, leaving it is not easy. 
Whenever a poor person experiences problems and has no other income, there will 
always be nearby criminal gangs to join that have money. The life of a poor youth in 
Nairobi’s slums is brutal. Being a criminal in the city is life-risking, and there are 
countless stories of criminal youth being killed by police. A youth activist from 
Kibera223 estimated that the majority of the boys he grew up with in school were now 
dead, most of them killed by the police or other criminal youth.224 To make matters 
worse, many former criminals have had traumatizing experiences from watching 
fellow gang members and friends die, and often their communities fear or exclude 
them. However, while criminal gangs are considered a menace by their victims, there 
is also pressure from the community on these youth to engage in criminal activities. 
                                              
218 Former gang member in Korogocho. March 14, 2014, Nairobi. 
219 Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
220 National Cohesion and Integration Commission. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
221 Political aspirant UDF. Oct 22, 2012, Nairobi. 
222 Youth activist in Korogocho. March 10, 2014, Nairobi. 
223 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
224 Furthermore, support for youth trying to leave crime is minimal. For instance, a CBO formed by a former vigilante gang 
in Korogocho was created with the intention of reintegrating these youth by convincing community members to offer them 
small income opportunities whenever there was some work to be done. If nothing came up, these young boys would simply 
spend their days under a tiny tin roof held up by four posts, where they would try to convince each other not to re-enter 
crime. 
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According to a former gang member,225 their community would ignore them, and 
girlfriends and family members reject them, if their income should drop.  
Idleness, crime, political vigilantism and ethnic militias are closely connected in 
Nairobi. LeBas (2013: 243) argues that “vigilantes” and “ethnic militias” are two 
terms that should be kept analytically distinct. “Vigilantes” are neighborhood-level 
groups that provide policing and sometimes other public goods to communities, 
aiming to create order through vigilante justice in a context of state failure and 
increasing crime. “Ethnic militias,” by contrast, use group insecurity as justification 
for more organized and politically consequential activities. In practice, however, the 
borders seem fluid. In Gatwikira in Kibera, for instance, the ODM had an unofficial 
office, which served as a base for local party mobilizers (Smedt 2009: 595). Youths 
would hang around, ready for any job, forming groups that easily adjusted to the 
circumstances. They shifted between working as vigilantes, protecting landlords, plain 
crime, charging of repair or protection tax, and making up the party youth wings.  
Many community leaders—whether elders, religious figures or women—refuse to 
campaign and mobilize communities during elections, even despite receiving threats, 
due to the violent and corrupt nature of politics.226 Usually, it is youth that engage in 
violence during elections—masterminded by politicians.227 Many young people see 
elections as an opportunity where top politicians buy them “to destroy people they are 
against.”228 Vigilante groups employ a mix of incitement and favors to create political 
conflict in the communities, based on (false) promises and on attacks.229 They punish 
or reward community members according to the political camp these voters are 
assumed to belong to.  
                                              
225 Former gang member in Korogocho. March 14, 2014, Nairobi. 
226 Youth activist in Korogocho. March 10, 2014, Nairobi. 
227 National Cohesion and Integration Commission. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
228 Youth activist in Korogocho. March 10, 2014, Nairobi. 
229 Former vigilante member. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
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Vigilantes function as brokers to ensure that clientelist rewards accrue to the 
communities that politicians target as voters. Due to poverty, voter demands are often 
as simple as trading their vote for some food. When vigilante groups come for votes, 
they may pay between 200 and 500 shillings. However, the clientelist mechanism 
often works through the logic of creating fear among people of losing the little they 
have, individually or collectively, rather than receiving rewards. In 2007, groups such 
as the Mungiki would threaten community members that if they did not vote for a 
certain candidate, all would be killed the following day.230  
Many vigilante groups have clear partisan preferences. According to one human rights 
activist, a political candidate he considered genuinely good would never win because 
of the “brainwashing” of the poor: “If you only call out her name at the [bus] stage, 
they will kill you. Any leader must be challenged. If you challenge the prime minister 
outdoors, you’ll get killed.” 231 However, vigilante groups that were predominantly 
used by the TNA-PNU (Mungiki), would also accept money from ODM leaders,232 
illustrating the bargain between broker networks and politicians (Stokes et al. 2013). 
Vigilantes do not hold politicians to account towards the communities because they 
themselves are on the politicians’ payroll.233  
The patronage tie is based on mutual dependence. Brokerage for political patrons 
requires a “reward” for a job well done. However, accountability between political 
candidates and their vigilantes varies greatly. For instance, during mass 
demonstrations following the 2007 elections, youths were simply paid 100–200 
shillings each for digging up the railway in Kibera (Smedt 2009: 595). After elections 
at ward level, some politicians continue to keep on their payrolls vigilantes who have 
worked hard for them. Other vigilantes are “paid” by being allowed to engage in 
criminal extortion activities.234 It is deemed suicidal for a politician to attempt to put a 
                                              
230 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
231 Human rights activist. Oct 18, 2012, Nairobi. 
232 Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
233 Journalist and activist. March 3, 2014, Nairobi.. 
234 Ibid. 
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halt to vigilantism. Operations of the vigilante groups, for instance at bus stops, occur 
in public and close to local political offices and police stations. Everyone is aware of 
these practices that have long been commonplace and that exercise considerable 
power. Office-holders find it difficult to do things if they are out of favor with the 
vigilante groups. In slums such as Kibera, chiefs and other officials have become 
increasingly afraid to go after gang members, as they fear they are connected to high-
level politicians (Mueller 2011: 106).  
Usually, however, it is the top leadership in the vigilante groups that benefits the most, 
while only minor rewards trickle down to the lower ranks.235 Politicians tend to engage 
with the leaders of vigilante groups in separate meetings where they are given money. 
However, when gang leaders have been seen as taking really big amounts, for instance 
when they build spacious houses for themselves, gang members further down in the 
hierarchy—the ones who have been doing the actual fighting—have become 
disgruntled and left.   
Politicians may also default in keeping their part of the deal. Some politicians cut the 
ties to their brokers immediately after an election or once a dispute has been resolved 
in their favor. Idle youth at the lowest level of the broker hierarchy, who have been 
promised education, grants or other rewards from politicians, often discover that their 
candidates are nowhere to be found after elections and have switched off their 
phones.236 Several respondents who had engaged in violent vigilantism during 
elections expressed extreme bitterness and distrust of politicians. Many had not 
anticipated the level of violence and damage that was being orchestrated, and some 
lost friends in the process. Seeing how politicians who encouraged them to fight 
against injustices later shook hands with their presumed enemy and gained privileges, 
while ignoring their supporters, gave rise to anger, disillusionment and frustration. One 
respondent said he saw politicians as “devils” and not human beings.237 On the other 
                                              
235 Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
236 Former vigilante member. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
237 Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
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hand, despite their contempt for politicians, former gang members felt it would be 
difficult to refrain from vigilantism in the future as long as they were jobless and their 
anger had not been dealt with: “they can get you anytime they want, they can still use 
us.”    
8.2.1 Brokers from the KANU era to today: brief overview 
High-level actors in Moi’s government were behind the “ethnic clashes” that took 
place from the 1991 onwards (Klopp and Zuern 2007: 136-137). KANU officials hired 
violence specialists from the military and the administrative police to form militias that 
would recruit youth from localities where these “ethnic clashes” were to take place. 
Where electoral support for the regime was unpredictable due to multiethnic 
populations, ethnically exclusive “night meetings” were organized with militia leaders, 
local administrators and ordinary citizens, to plot who to target and when. In rural 
areas, houses were burned and villagers killed. The opposition was ethnicized, as 
Kikuyu opposition leaders were perceived as posing the greatest threat to the Kalenjin 
President. The purpose was to discredit the opposition by placing the blame for 
violence on them (Klopp and Zuern 2007: 137). Political leaders thus deliberately 
ethnicized local land disputes through multiparty competition.  
While ethnic electoral violence was initially orchestrated mainly in rural areas, by 
1997, the ruling party’s youth brigade was deployed in Nairobi to violently disrupt 
rallies for constitutional reforms and attack opposition leaders (LeBas 2013: 247). 
KANU initially used the “Kalenjin warriors” in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill 
and displace opposition voters from other ethnic groups before and during the 1992 
and 1997 elections. This triggered the formation of other gangs and militias, including 
the Mungiki, Sungu Sungu, the Saboat Land Defense Force, the Taliban and Bagdad 
Boys. Politicians began hiring gangs to intimidate members of anti-government 
parties, to protect themselves against pro-government gangs, or to engage in other 
activities aimed at keeping their opponents from winning (Mueller 2011: 103).  
Across the country, these state militias and gangs took on a life of their own. Many 
moved into the slums of Nairobi, offering various types of protection and services for 
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fees. They used kickbacks to ensure that officials and police turned a blind eye. Gangs 
like Mungiki infiltrated many businesses and operated basically like mafia; some 
gangs took on several functions of the government. This led to the simultaneous 
processes of privatization of public violence and political appropriation of private 
violence (Katumanga 2005, referred to in LeBas 2013: 247).  
During the 2002 elections, individual politicians hired or organized their own vigilante 
groups to attack rivals, intimidate voters and disenfranchise ethnic groups. 
Increasingly, relations between politicians and vigilante groups became more complex 
and commercialized. While the state outlawed all vigilante groups and ethnic militias 
in 2002, this had little effect (LeBas 2013: 249). In Mathare Valley, Mungiki was in 
constant conflict with the Taliban youth gang.238 Mungiki became notorious in the 
Nairobi “taxi wars,” fighting the youth militia Kamjesh over control of matatu routes. 
By the turn of the century, Mungiki was estimated to have a fee-paying following of 
one and a half million.  It had developed into an organization characterized by the 
intersection of class, generation, religion and ethnicity (Frederiksen 2010: 1065), 
operating in rural and urban areas, providing income opportunities, service delivery 
and extortion/protection. Ethnic identification was mixed up with discourses of being 
young and poor.  
Mungiki has a history of switching political sides; in the 2007 elections both the 
opposition and the government cultivated links to the organization. However, Mungiki 
also sought representation in formal and parliamentary politics, through a registered 
party, the National Youth Alliance (Frederiksen 2010: 1083). Prior to the 2007 
elections, the ruling NARC coalition was also implicated in a massive political 
corruption scandal —the Anglo-Leasing and Finance Scandal—which concerned 
raising campaign funds (Mwangi 2008: 275).239 The deals were made by senior cabinet 
ministers and bureaucrats in the Kibaki administration for campaign funds and the 
                                              
238 Mungiki emerged from the Rift Valley and the struggle between “settlers” and “newcomers”.  
239 The total amount of these ongoing projects was in February 2006 at USD 202 million. Anglo-Leasing was a fictious 
company designed to receive funds from lucrative government contracts, and channel them back to those who created the 
scheme (Mwangi 2008). 
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general elections. As in Zambia, high-level political corruption was combined with 
brokerage at the grassroots level. 
Following the announcement of the 2007 electoral results, senior politicians from the 
largely Luo- and Kalenjin-dominated opposition alliance led by Odinga’s ODM called 
for mass action (Waki report, referred to in Frederiksen 2010: 1066). Youth gangs, 
together with party supporters and activists, held demonstrations, engaged in heckling, 
and destroyed lives and property in Nairobi, Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza and Coast 
provinces. The incumbent PNU and its allies responded with similar actions in 2008, 
to retaliate and protect the economic interests of the Kikuyu population, especially 
through Mungiki.  
According to Mueller (2011:106), the gang problem intensified after the 2007 
elections, as community vigilante groups initially formed to protect themselves from 
militias increasingly came to resemble them and operate like shadow states. The result 
was that ordinary members of the public were extorted on multiple fronts. Youth that 
initially made money from looting began levying taxes on the inhabitants of Kibera for 
“protection” on the streets at night, putting up roadblocks for collecting fees or even 
offering their service to Kikuyus who needed transport out of Kibera, as vigilante 
groups. Politicians were increasingly beholden to the gangs or afraid of them.240 The 
government turned on Mungiki after the 2007 elections. The Kenyan police formed a 
special anti-Mungiki unit, which in practice operated as a death squad against Kikuyu 
youth in the slums, allegedly responsible for over 1000 extrajudicial killings (LeBas 
2013: 249). Two human rights activists who had been documenting these extra-judicial 
killings by the police were executed in their car in Nairobi in 2009 (Press 2012: 450).  
Vigilante groups have thus played an important part of electoral politics in Kenya 
since the onset of multiparty rule. The next sections will show how brokers have 
sought to transform the socio-economic grievances of slum-dwellers and street 
vendors into neopatrimonial assets for political elites.  
                                              
240 Mueller (2011) claim that less is known about the ordinary perpetrators of election violence and the incentives making 
them use machetes against citizens from other ethnic groups, their motives and the extent to which politicians were involved. 
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Informal traders, broker distribution of trading space and forced removals 
Under the KANU regime, trade spaces were owned by cartels, where the KANU youth 
wing played an important role by appropriating and allocating spaces.241 While it was 
more usual for trade spaces to be owned by cartels under the KANU regime, such 
inner dynamics of higher and lower cartels has continued to exist up to today.242 
However, while some vigilantes were seen to “brutalize” the markets, they were also 
used by traders for nighttime security,243 which showed their embeddedness in current 
market dynamics and their role as providers of law and order. 
Government responses to informal activities, including trade, have generally been 
unpredictable and brutal.244 According to Macharia (2007: 152), government responses 
to entrepreneurs who invade vacant land and run businesses have long been influenced 
primarily by politics and corruption. Officers from the central government or the city 
council have violently uprooted such businesses, even when the land is not needed for 
any immediate societal purpose. Officials would arrive without notice in early morning 
hours to demolish operations, to make the land available for powerful politicians or 
well-connected businessmen.   
Robertson (2007: 28) claims that cases of suspected arson, which had been a problem 
under the one-party regime, continued in the multiparty era. Competing explanations 
were often given when fires or other destruction of informal trading spaces occurred. 
For instance, in the Gikomba Market, where outdoor spaces were occupied by semi-
legal or illegal retailers, a great fire destroyed most of the market in 2002. Suspected 
causes ranged from a cooking fire at a kiosk, a homeless child’s campfire, to 
accusations of arson by rival business owners, disputes between market “owners” and 
stallholders and tenants, and corrupt government-sponsored arson to obtain land to sell 
to developers (Robertson 2007).  
                                              
241 Professor at Institute for Development Studies (University of Nairobi). March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
242 Ibid. 
243 NISCOF. March 19, 2014, Nairobi. 
244 Political clientelism associated with informal trade has received rather scant attention in the scholarly literature, compared 
to political clientelism targeting slum-dwellers.  
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While the issue of street vending is not reflected in party cleavages, clientelist tools 
have still been utilized by politicians to mobilize (sub-groups of) informal traders in 
electoral politics. The informal sector “goes wild” as elections approach, since no 
politician wants to lose those votes. 245 As long as street vending is illegal, officials use 
this illegality as a means of manipulation and control.246 Clientelist strategies toward 
informal traders include land-grabbing and allocation of market stalls to (ethnic) 
groups within this constituency, as well as selective application of existing laws. 
Politicians or government officials may reward or punish vendors by discriminatory 
allocation of space, while removing (or threatening to remove) others.  
If there are several political candidates competing for the same political office, 
candidates pay leaders in markets to make vendors clash against each other, along the 
lines of tribal groupings.247 While this strategy is most common for ward 
representatives, also county commissioners and MPs may be involved in such 
activities. This type of clientelism typically works through promises of allocation of 
space in new markets under construction.248 Politicians promise plots and space to 
people who are unaware that these politicians have no authority to allocate space. 
When the markets are completed (and the elections are over), the people with the 
rightful legal entitlement either acquire the land, or violent conflicts persist between 
different claimants to the space.  
During the 2007 elections, there was considerable violence among traders (Mitullah 
2010: 197). The fact that the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC) 
supported the Kenya National Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders 
(KENASVIT) to engage in peace-building among traders in response to the post-
election violence (Mitullah 2010: 197) illustrates how electoral violence manifested 
                                              
245 Professor at Institute for Development Studies (University of Nairobi). March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
246 By-laws represent a significant income source for the City Council, and bribe extraction by the police (Linehan 2007).    
247 KENASVIT. March 20, 2014, Naivasha. 
NISCOF. March 19, 2014, Nairobi. 
248 KENASVIT. March 20, 2014, Naivasha. 
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itself also amongst informal traders. Such violent clashes were also common in the 
markets during the 2013 elections.249   
Slum-dwellers, brokered land/housing  distribution and ethnicity  
Social organization in the slums of Nairobi was based mainly on patterns of property 
ownership, which has been shaped historically through patronage politics and ethnicity 
(Rigon 2014: 263). Multiparty elections created new opportunities for land-based 
clientelism. In her study of politically allocated land rights in rural areas in the early 
1990s, Boone (2011) found that politicians competing for election could promise their 
constituencies the restitution or protection of property rights as a patronage resource. 
This was a profound source of potential political instability, especially in densely 
populated and heterogeneous constituencies (Boone 2011: 1332-1335). She attributed 
this to a property regime with the state as a landlord who could grant property rights in 
more or less lawful and arbitrary ways. “Land seized from settlers was given to 
militants of the ruling party, local officials, and the unemployed youth who were 
recruited as so-called Maasai warriors and Kalenjin warriors to do the dirty work of 
burning houses, terrorizing and killing people, and chasing ‘settlers’ and ‘immigrants’ 
from their homes” (Boone 2011: 1328).  
Klopp (2000) argues that patronage in land can be recycled. When former occupants 
are removed, land is freed for distribution to loyal clients. Politicians can even use land 
as a patronage resource without actually owning any land to distribute to their brokers. 
According to one youth activist,250  most youth die in the process of trying to acquire 
land promised by politicians. Before elections, they are promised “heaven,” as 
politicians know that the problem is land. However, politicians on each side promise 
their vigilantes the same land. To reward these boys, politicians simply point them to a 
piece of land that they actually do not own the title for. When the youth start building 
structures they are chased and chaos erupts— and whoever is the strongest person on 
the land survives.   
                                              
249 NISCOF. March 19, 2014, Nairobi. 
250 Youth activist in Korogocho. March 10, 2014, Nairobi. 
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Politicians also grab land to sell to business tycoons in return for campaign money. 
The mere sight of a well-known tycoon with ties to local politicians is enough to make 
communities fear that their land will be grabbed and they will be evicted.251 Well-
known criminals in the slums have used their power to forge alliances and 
collaborations with corrupt local politicians or administrators, helping them to rise to 
political power as MPs, in return for public land. For political elites who are also 
structure owners, the use of vigilantes enable them not only to win office, but also to 
protect their property.252  
In addition to the problem of evictions, Mwangi (1997: 147) considered the lack of 
tenant participation in planning to be at the core of the overall policy model followed 
in Kenya, where local administrative officers (local chiefs, sub-chiefs, district officers) 
have forced people to give money and other resources in situations where 
contributions should be voluntary.253 There has been a lack of consultative provisions 
in tenancy agreements, and no culture of informing and consulting the parties 
involved. 
The opposition party, the ODM, countered the tactics of the incumbent government 
with another clientelist strategy. With the onset of multipartyism, ODM leader Odinga 
(who was an MP from Kibera at the time) combined patronage tactics with his populist 
call to tenants not to pay rent and programmatic components of slum-upgrading and 
regulation (Smedt 2009: 588). Kibera has seen several violent conflicts between Luos, 
Nubians and Kikuyu connected to rent, where Luos refuse to pay their landlords.  In 
2001, when Odinga was pressuring President Moi to promise to lower the rents in 
Kibera, clashes resulted in some Luo tenants becoming de facto owners of rooms. 
Although rent levels went down after negotiations, some occupants were allowed to 
remain in the houses, with no reprisals. There were also persistent rumors that Odinga 
                                              
251 Youth activist in Mathare. March 2014, Nairobi. 
252 During the 2007 elections, for example, Mungiki members were paid by a land-grabbing politician for defense. The deal 
was that they could engage in all activity—good or bad—but if the Luo competitor got the seat, there would be no pay (as it 
was believed that the land would be given to the Luo) (Former member of Mungiki, March 25, 2014, Nairobi). 
253 According to Mwangi, “tenant participation in planning and developing rental housing should be seen in the broader 
context of community participation in municipal decision-making on urban planning and implementation” (1997: 147). 
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had paid rents for many of his supporters for years, or monthly allowances to his main 
mobilizers (Smedt 2009: 595). Smedt sees Odinga’s strategy as an “almost 
paradigmatic illustration of the patron–client relationship in Kenyan politics” (2009: 
585).  
 The threat of land-grabbing is also used to manipulate ethnic communities to vote for 
certain political parties. For instance, in a ward dominated by Kikuyu, residents would 
fear that if another tribe were elected, that tribe would confiscate the Kikuyu 
property.254 In the slums of Nairobi, the 2007 post-election violence led to evictions of 
communities from areas where they were numerically smaller. Their houses were 
occupied by youth from the evicting community, resulting in the zoning of slums into 
distinct ethnic territories (Kanyinga 2011: 93). Influential economic and political elites 
at the local level supported these youth by providing financing so that they could evict 
“enemies” (Kanyinga 2011: 101). According to the Waki Report on the 2007 post-
election violence, Mungiki used the violence to opportunistically evict squatters from 
rental properties (LeBas 2013: 251). 
The conflict between the vigilante groups Taliban and Mungiki represents the 
phenomenon of confounding programmatic, ethnic and clientelistic linkages in its 
most extreme manifestation. Some observers see the Taliban mainly as a vigilante 
gang; however, in their own view, Taliban was formed by Luo tenants who first 
pleaded, and then tried to force their Kikuyu landlords to lower house rents or give 
them their own house structures.255 Mungiki protected the landlords. When Taliban’s 
demands were not met, they began demolishing houses. Eventually, violent 
confrontations with Mungiki resulted in several deaths and imprisonment for many 
Taliban members.256 Upon release, Taliban members were given land for 100 of their 
members, after negotiations with local leaders.  
                                              
254 Youth activist in Mathare. March 2014, Nairobi. 
255 Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
256 Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
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Simply allowing Luo tenants not to pay rent and take control of houses in the slums 
represents a clever patronage reward from Odinga’s side. This strategy, however, 
placed him in a dilemma after he became Prime Minister, following the 2007 post-
election violence (Smedt 2009: 597). While expectations from his constituencies grew 
even higher, he was obliged to follow the law. In 2008, when his personal assistant 
accompanied the local administration to announce to people in Kibera that they would 
have to leave the houses that they had occupied, the crowd reacted violently and 
chased them (Smedt 2009: 597). This illustrates the reciprocity component of the 
patronage system. The Kikuyu landlords received scant assistance from the local 
authorities (District Officer and chiefs), as even the latter feared entering these areas 
(Smedt 2009: 593).257  
To sum up, also Kenya is an example of how opposition parties can combine pro-poor, 
programmatic appeals with clientelism in the form of neopopulism to challenge the 
ethno-clientelist party machine of the incumbent. The opposition party, ODM, used 
patronage rewards and punishment that reinforced its programmatic message to 
tenants, while also enabling it to build an effective party machine of foot soldiers who 
could challenge that of the incumbent in Nairobi. However, the neopopulist strategy 
was also confounded with ethnicity. Multiparty competition induced political parties to 
use brokers to divide slum-dwellers in Nairobi according to a narrative of Luo tenants 
and Kikuyu landlords. Regarding informal traders, however, both parties seemed to 
rely primarily on ethno-clientelism.  
Although an ethnic component was clearly present in the tenant–landlord cleavage, the 
disloyalty of vigilante groups towards any given political party, as well as the success 
of Odinga in winning the Nairobi vote, still indicate that the party linkages to the urban 
poor in the capital city act work different from simple ethno-clientelism.  While it is 
clear that the great majority of brokers exercise extremely limited agency as clients for 
the political patrons who manipulate them, the very existence of a programmatic 
cleavage concerning socio-economic issues indicates that slum-dwellers, and 
                                              
257 After the 2013 elections, however, Odinga returned to the position as the opposition leader of ODM, but was no longer an 
MP.   
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especially tenants, have gained some political momentum in the capital. However, the 
highly violent and coercive ways in which party brokers are used is also evidence of 
the vested politico-economic interests of the political elites, as shown in Table 12.   
Table 9: Mechanisms that forge clientship agency (through brokers) between Kenyan political 
parties and their constituents 
Information  Non-transparent nomination/election procedures for party positions 
 Non-transparent land management systems, allocation procedures and records, 
and eviction plans 
 False (unverifiable) promises to give land, housing, education  (and lack of 
access to politicians after elections) 
Decision- 
making 
 Lack of internal, democratic procedures within political parties  
 Community pressure to engage in crime  
 Ad hoc promises to local communities mediated by vigilantes, in exchange for 
votes 
 Group punishment and rewards based on assumed party camp 
preference/voting, carried out by vigilantes 
 Payments to cadre networks in exchange for turnout at rallies 
 Food as payment for votes or turnout at rallies 
 Kickbacks to officials and politicians from organized crime 
 ‘Free-card’ to ignore the law on street vending, based on discretion of the 
President/party 
Coercion  Criminalizing laws and regulations that facilitates evictions, demolitions, 
relocation, fines and arrests as political punishment 
 Harassment and charging of informal fees by police 
 Vigilante protection, justice and public goods through illegal tax/extortion (due 
to state withdrawal) 
 Criminal gangs for rent to politicians  
 Intelligence/military training of ethnic militias to carry out killings in order to 
generate fear and conflict 
 Vigilante attacks on political competitors 
 Police death squads targeting unruly vigilantes 
 Clientelism for votes based on threats/fear (murder), not rewards  
 Politicians are opposed by vigilantes for policies in the latter´s disfavor 
 Evictions and displacement by government and private landowners (bulldozers) 
of individuals/communities as punishment for voting 
 ‘Free-card’ to brokers to occupy houses and refuse to pay house rent to 
structure owners as payment for delivering votes 
 Landlord protection by hired vigilantes 
 Setting up violent conflict among brokers by promising different brokers the 
same reward (land)  
 Land-grabbing for business tycoons in exchange for campaign financing 
 Recycling of land patronage by removing occupants 
 Payment to brokers through non-interference in extortion (markets/bus stops) 
 Politically connected cartels that appropriate and allocate trading space, and 
uproot trade businesses to reward/punish voters  
 Arson in markets, paid by politicians or business to punish opponents 
 Selective application of street vending law to reward and punish  
 Market leaders instigate ethnic clashes in markets to mobilize votes by 
promising to allocate the same market stalls to different individuals/groups  
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8.3 Neopopulist versus ethnically divisive clientelist linkages  
The empirical findings confirm that the dominant party linkage between the urban 
poor and political parties is one of clientelism. It is the same socio-economic 
grievances of the urban poor—access to housing and a livelihood—that are targeted by 
populist/programmatic party linkages, which are also transformed into assets for 
patron–client relations. This resembles the neopopulist strategies found in Latin 
America, where pro-poor populist promises are underpinned by clientelism to the same 
constituencies. 
Party brokers exercise some political agency through clientelism, by advancing their 
personal interests as well as those of the communities they have brokered for. They 
use elections to obtain limited material gains that would otherwise not be accessible. 
Brokers are rewarded by their political patrons by being allowed to expropriate and 
distribute land and work space to themselves and their followers, and exercise 
considerable power in the urban poor communities (for instance through extortion). 
Nevertheless, the urban poor brokers primarily act as clients vis-à-vis their political 
patrons, rather than as citizens. Instead of politicians being representative of and 
accountable to the urban poor, the relationship is turned upside-down, what Stokes 
(2005) terms “perverse” accountability. However, whereas brokers target street 
vendors and slum-dwellers in both Zambia and Kenya, the ways in which these sub-
constituencies have been linked to parties have differed.   
In Zambia, cadres have engaged in illegal land distribution to please followers, as well 
as to reward themselves, or punish the cadres and followers of other political parties. 
Even if their land distribution to poor squatters was illegal, it resonated with the 
opposition party’s promise of low-cost housing to slum-dwellers. Furthermore, the 
Zambian opposition eyed another opportunity to align populist and clientelist linkages. 
The PF’s promise of non-harassment of street vendors would indiscriminately benefit 
the whole constituency. At the same time, street-vendor cadres were rewarded by their 
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new patron with a ‘free-card’ to exercise power in the informal markets and streets, 
extorting money and distributing work space. The PF strategy of fusing these 
programmatic and clientelist linkages towards the urban poor indicates a hybrid form 
of agency for the urban poor. Some benefits are collective, others are contingent. 
In Kenya, a programmatic cleavage has emerged along the landlord–tenant dimension 
in the slums, with the opposition siding with the tenants. At the same time, however, 
slum-dwellers’ access to housing depended on political brokerage. Brokers combined 
threats and persuasion to rally or suppress voters in slum communities, creating party 
machines (but with an ethnic underpinning). Clientelist redistribution was aligned with 
programmatic cleavages for tenants and landlords, again indicating a form of 
hybridity. While political clientelism was a feature also for mobilization among 
Nairobi’s street vendors, none of the Kenyan political parties endorsed this 
constituency—although all mobilized them on an ad hoc basis through ethno-
clientelist and populist means.  
Again, a main difference between the two cases is the role of ethnicity. In Zambia, 
many of the clientelist rewards (or punishments) do not appear to have a clear ethnic 
component, such as the street vendors’ ‘free card’, or cadre distribution of land and 
housing. In contrast, ethnic, programmatic and clientelist strategies reinforce each 
other in Kenya. The structuring of slums in the form of ethnic “villages” may be a 
short-cut for these party machines to monitor and punish groups of voters. Hence, the 
country comparison shows that the various party linkages targeting the urban poor 
have been strategically combined to reinforce one another, using past legacies of 
socio-economic (and ethnic) conflict as an entry point for molding support. Whereas 
slum-dwellers and street vendors in Kenya were mobilized through (ethnic) divide-
and-rule party strategies, they were united through the opposition strategy in Zambia.  
The extent to which political parties mobilizes material resources by turning the socio-
economic grievances of the urban poor into patronage assets is illustrated by the 
plethora of power asymmetries they forge with the urban poor. Nominations and 
internal decisionmaking are carried out in a closed, secretive and highly elitist manner. 
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Lack of a card-holding and formal mass-membership means that the majority of party 
members and supporters are excluded from democratic decisionmaking processes, and 
limits their insights into internal party activities. Possibilities of influencing stem 
mostly from activities and mobilization by the urban poor outside the formal party 
structure.  
The sheer number of power asymmetries indicates that attempts to address only a few 
of them (the symptoms) are unlikely to solve the real problem—which is how political 
parties mobilize material resources (the disease). The forging of patron–client 
dependency relations does not necessarily mean that political leaders and brokers feel 
no commitment to their programmatic linkages. For opposition parties, low inclusion 
in party activities could arguably be a result of limited resources for building such 
administrative and organizational capacity. Another obstacle could be the limited 
political space available for governments to pursue their policies with regard to street 
vending and tenancy in the face of already established development programs. As 
such, clientelism could be understood in the Kitscheltian sense as a form of (inferior) 
democratic party linkage.  
Still, the violent and coercive measures used by incumbent and opposition parties to 
garner the political support of the urban poor would seem to indicate differently. It is 
the use of coercion—in the form of demolitions, evictions and brute violence, or the 
threat thereof—that most clearly demonstrates what Stokes (2005) has termed a 
“perverse” form of accountability, whereby the urban poor act as clients in the interest 
of their political patrons. Thus, the problem also lies in the ways in which political 
elites amass political and economic resources through political office, landlordism and 
the distribution of land and work space. There is an inherent conflict of interest 
between politico-economic elites and the urban poor.  
As we have seen, political parties have offered the urban poor only a hybrid form of 
agency that is strongly tilted towards clientship. One response to the lack of political 
accountability has been the emergence of social movements as an alternative to 
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political empowerment of the urban poor. Chapter 9 will consider whether these 
movements provide another political channel for the urban poor to engage as citizens.   
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9. Replacing clientelist party linkages with 
extraverted, member-based movements 
 “[person x] and [person y] are not youth. They do not understand and feel what youth feel. 
They earn a salary, while we shall volunteer. They sit on top.”258  
The democratic transitions in Kenya and Zambia also brought about political pluralism 
in the civil society sphere, in addition to multiparty competition. Although the 
democratic turn initially resulted in a type of civil society with weak links to the urban 
poor, grassroots-based social movements by and for the urban poor gradually evolved, 
as this chapter will show.  
These transnational social movements were supposed to function differently from 
traditional development partners and NGOs with regards to democratic representation 
and accountability to constituents (Weru 2004), as they were formed and led by the 
urban poor themselves (Batliwala 2002). This gave them greater legitimacy (Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite 2007), while international networks empowered domestic affiliates 
(Mitullah 2010; Lindell 2009). However, these and other scholars acknowledge that 
due to the extraverted resource mobilization strategies of many SMOs, they might 
establish dependency relations towards external actors that reduce their representation 
of and accountability to grassroots constituents (Pommerolle 2010). They may also 
become prone to rent-seeking behavior and clientelism (Wit and Berner 2009). 
By the early 2000s, SMOs that sought to organize and mobilize informal traders and 
slum-dwellers had been established in both countries. Chapter 9 identifies the most 
prominent SMO umbrellas (federations, unions, alliances and NGOs), and discusses 
the extent of movement consistency in terms of Diani and Bison’s (2004) collective 
identities, networks and joint conflictual action. It focuses on how these SMOs 
mobilize the urban poor in terms of collective benefits, as well as how their resource 
mobilization strategies affect the kind of agency they provide for their constituents 
                                              
258 Youth activist in Nairobi. March 12, 2014. 
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(corresponding to research questions a/b/c in the introduction).259 The chapter will 
show that the movements vary in terms of movement consistency, and the extent to 
which they engage their constituents as citizens or clients.  
9.1 Power asymmetries: narratives from Nairobi’s youth 
activists  
I begin by presenting a stylized illustration of how power asymmetries between 
representative civil society organizations and their constituents may deprive grassroots 
activists of citizenship, effectively capturing them in clientelist relations. Given the 
sensitivity of these issues, it seemed best to use a narrative based on a compilation of 
individual stories. The data material is drawn from a range of interviewed grassroots 
activists in Nairobi who belonged neither to the slum-dwellers’ organizations, nor to 
the street vendors’ organizations. This material is supplemented by my own 
observations. While anecdotal evidence cannot reveal the full magnitude of such 
problems, it can indicate the mechanisms through which clientship may be forged 
within movement structures. Here, then, is the narrative I offer: 
A donor has a development program. It funds a national umbrella body/NGO as a 
partner to implement its program (in reality, many donors choose to fund such 
umbrella bodies jointly). The implementing partner, together with the donor, identifies 
or creates a national organization that is intended to be member-based and internally 
democratic, with an elected leadership. This organization will have branches at the 
county, city and local levels, also with elected leadership. Donor funds are to be 
channeled to members to support their activities, via the implementing partner to the 
executive branches at various levels. As a general rule, the donor engages only 
indirectly with the member-based organization, through the implementing partner. 
While the implementing partner has salaried staff, the member organization is meant 
                                              
259 Civil society generally, as well as the movements of slum-dwellers and street vendors more specifically, have been more 
extensively covered in the scholarly literature from Kenya than Zambia. This has had implications both for the depth of the 
analyses, as well as the diversity in data sources. 
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to operate on a voluntary basis, where only allowances for lunch, transport costs or 
resources for activities are provided. 
After a while, grassroots members on a city-level committee discover, through pictures 
and reports on a website, that the implementing partner is claiming to have funded 
and supported activities by the grassroots that have either not taken place, or that 
have been carried out by the grassroots, without any financial support. The members 
have not been provided with information from either the donor or the implementing 
partner on the total budget provided to support the activities of the organization, nor 
the funds that are to accrue to the specific activity they are said to have been funded 
for.  
In contrast, the grassroots branches are required to be transparent and report 
upwards to their implementing partner regularly. As the implementing partner 
controls the information flow to the donor, this increases the information asymmetry 
between the implementing partner and the grassroots. The activists ask the 
implementing partner for budget information, but it is not forthcoming. They contact 
staff at the donor agency and ask them to forward the budget information as well as 
the report that the donor has received from the implementing partner regarding these 
activities. The donor representative responds that all such communication is to go via 
the implementing partner.  
The grassroots activists are not satisfied, and continue to demand an answer from both 
the implementing partner and the donor. Through communication with other local 
branches within the city, and also in other counties, they find that others have similar 
experiences. They encourage grassroots members across branches to request similar 
types of information, and begin questioning whether the funds have been appropriated 
by staff at the implementing office. The implementing partner responds with 
allegations that the local committee itself has appropriated these funds at the expense 
of the members they represent.  
The implementing partner initiates a “participatory process” to solve the dispute at 
the grassroots level, with one potential outcome being new elections of the executive 
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committee that has been requesting insights. It bypasses the elected committee and 
calls all the members for meetings in the various constituencies of the city to decide 
“collectively” how to solve the conflict. The meeting agenda is organized as follows: 
the amounts that the implementing partner accuses the grassroots committee of 
embezzling are written on a blackboard, presented as “evidence.” When a member 
demands to see the official bank statement, the implementing partner promises that 
everyone who wishes to do so can view the bank statement in the office of the 
implementing partner. Lastly, the members vote on whether new elections shall be held 
for the executive committee, by show of hands in front of the other members and the 
implementing partner. A superficial hand count leads the implementing partner to 
conclude that the executive committee will have to stand for re-election. 
During the run-up to the election, one of the opinion leaders among the grassroots 
members is paid by staff at the implementing agency as a “mole” to report on the 
strategies and moves of his fellow members, and to participate in a smear campaign 
against them. The “mole” informs the other activists that he had to accept the quite 
substantial bribe due to poverty, but promises that he would not plant information to 
the extent that the others could end up in jail. Other activists also begin to informally 
communicate with staff from the implementing agency, and the activists start to 
become increasingly insecure regarding the strategies and loyalties of others in the 
group. They also increasingly fear violence from paid “thugs,” especially after dark.   
Mass meetings to debate the allegations and new elections are characterized by 
tension, and armed police are called by the implementing partner for monitoring. 
Elections for a new executive committee are eventually organized by the implementing 
partner, and the sitting committee members are voted out of office. They decide to 
establish a parallel, informal structure, and continue to demand insight into the budget 
and reports of the implementing partner, although they are no longer formal members 
of the organization. They arrange a protest against the implementing partner in the 
city center. “Hooligans” break up the protest, and in the violence that escalates, one 
youth is killed. No one is charged or held responsible for the crime.  
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The implementing partner threatens to take the former committee members to court on 
allegations of fund embezzlement. As the activists are no longer on the elected 
committee, they have no access to the committee’s bank account or any other material, 
which places them at a disadvantage as regards collecting evidence in their favor. By 
contrast, the implementing partner has the resources to bribe bank officials, police 
and lawyers, in addition to members of the association, gang members and journalists. 
As the youth activists have no dialogue with the donor and have few powerful allies, 
an arrest, accident or disappearance would most likely not be investigated or followed 
up. Faced with such pressure, the whistleblowers decide to abandon their demands for 
insight into the budgets and reports. Some return to the organization; others opt to 
leave it altogether.260  
The above narrative shows how citizen-based agency for grassroots working with 
externally funded civil society organizations that claim to represent their interests 
requires access to information, collective decisionmaking power and protection from 
coercion. The deprivation of information curtails the grassroots’ ability to take 
informed decisions, and make them vulnerable to manipulation (clients). Without 
participation in collective decisionmaking processes, the grassroots simply become 
subjects who carry out the objectives of their superiors (clients). The lingering threat 
of physical retribution further undermines autonomous decisionmaking (clients).  
The mechanisms at play resemble those of authoritarian state practices. Attempts to 
exercise political agency by the grassroots are quelled due to the extreme power 
imbalances in the relationship between the grassroots and their “representative” 
organizations. The whole set-up encourages compliance with corruption, and punishes 
whistle-blowers. A range of measures were initiated to prevent the grassroots from 
being able to hold their representatives to account (including the election of 
representatives, engineered by a non-elected leadership at the top level).  
                                              
260 Nonetheless, it is the skills that youth activists acquire through such participation in civil society organizations that enable 
them to try, not always successfully, to hold their superiors to account. Their own political agency has probably improved as 
a result of such experiences, although it is still severely restrained.  
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How such power asymmetries affect the political agency of the grassroots at the 
individual level should be borne in mind when assessing the agency available to urban 
poor constituents through SMOs that claim to represent their socio-economic interests. 
This is especially relevant when the resources that may accrue from clientelism are 
quite substantial and consequential for the stakeholders involved, in terms of material 
gains or other forms of power.  
9.2 Zambia 
Before narrowing in on the movements of the urban poor specifically, we need to 
situate them in an overall civil society context characterized by external dependency. 
Zambian civil society has become increasingly dependent on foreign aid, which has 
led to problems of rent-seeking behavior and clientelism. International agencies are 
highly influential in determining which Zambian organizations, in the public as well as 
the civil society sector, will survive and be able to take on mandated functions, provide 
employment and other benefits (Duncan et al. 2003: 49). This creates challenges 
regarding political and financial accountability.  
According to the Zambian Draft Decentralization Policy, a weakness in the operations 
of NGOs was that their loyalty tended to lie with the donors, so that the NGOs were 
not fully accountable to their communities (Schlyter 1998: 267). The terms of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, for example, were largely determined by the 
international community, reducing the local ownership of Zambian civil society to this 
process (Duncan et al. 2003). Mwansa (1995: 74) found that the self-interest or 
mandate of Zambian NGOs could led to the imposition of development programs that 
failed to respond to the pressing needs of those meant to be helped. NGOs were found 
to define the developmental needs of people, and simply inform them of their projects 
and expect them to participate (Mwansa 1995).  
While there were thousands of registered NGOs in Zambia, only a small number were 
considered “good ones” (Duncan et al. 2003: 41). There was evidence of competition 
between donors for this elite group of NGOs. Other NGOs could be considered merely 
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as personal businesses. “Briefcase NGOs” would change their objectives in line with 
changing agendas and fashions within the international donor community (Rakner 
1998: 253-254). According to Rakner, donor funding has contributed to giving civil 
society associations themselves a “client status,” entailing limited attachment and 
commitment to local membership and causes. A patronage culture evolved where 
workshops for volunteers “were only successful if attendees were paid sitting 
allowance, per diem and transport, often in sums amounting to more than a day’s 
work” (Rakner 1998: 253-254).261 
The effectiveness of community-based associations has also been found to vary 
greatly, depending on the quality of the people who lead them (Duncan et al. 2003: 
41). It is often questionable whether they represent the poor, as they tend to be 
dominated by the relatively well-educated and well-off. Furthermore, Myers (2006: 
298) found that the scheme by the well-known NGO, Care International, showed what 
Cooke (2003) identifies as the “replication of colonialist power relationships,” where 
the core dimensions of modern-day “participatory development” had their ideological 
and intellectual roots in British colonial rule. International partners formed 
“representative local organizations” with their own version of democratically elected 
leadership, rather than using pre-existing associations under “guided participation.” 
However, also the Zambian state became increasingly dependent on foreign aid in the 
1990s. The donors’ role in the dual economic and political liberalization reforms in the 
1990s evoked mixed responses from Zambian civil society (Rakner 1998: 250). 
According to Rakner, the main interest groups of labor, agriculture and business, as 
well as associations representing religion, gender, development issues and the press, 
became increasingly critical to the influence of the international donors over national 
decisionmaking institutions on issues of economic policy.  
                                              
261 The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction network (Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka) found that, while rural communities held their 
political leaders to account constantly, urban communities were always asking for more money, and were not well-organized. 
For programs like social cash transfers, it was difficult to ensure that the right people received support, as the community 
committees that were supposed to identify the poorest people focused instead on their own relatives. 
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According to a political scientist at UNZA,262 foreign funding brings a foreign agenda. 
He argues that organizations must plan on the basis of their funding.263 If funding was 
different, and the organizations worked closely with urban poor, this would change 
their mindset. Support to top-level workshops was perceived as helping international 
agencies to push their own agenda, which created rent-seeking. While “everyone” used 
the urban poor for funding, there was a disconnection to these groups.264 Lilanda 
community members also appealed to the international community to “associate with 
local people who tell the truth” regarding elections and rights reports.265  In a focus 
group discussion (approximately 30 people) with a women’s club in Kanyama,266 
which according to the representatives had 3000 members, frustration at the lack of 
dialogue with NGOs, donors and government was prevalent.267  
From the onset of multiparty rule, the extraverted nature of civil society funding has 
contributed to dependency to the extent of establishing client relations.  A main 
challenge has been the lack of connection and dialogue between the urban poor 
communities on the one side, and NGOs, donors, and government on the other. Still, 
social movements for sub-segments of the urban poor have emerged over time.268  
                                              
262 Political scientist at University of Zambia. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
263 One journalist and web-activist (Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka) explained that he could not make a living working on the issues 
connected to the media that he found most urgent and relevant, and therefore survived on grants for gender research. 
264 Political scientist at University of Zambia. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
265 Lilanda community meeting (focus group). Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
266 Women's Club Kanyama (focus group). Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
267 Members of the Women’s Club expressed a lack of everything, from skills and work tools, schools, school fees and 
teaching materials, clothes, drainage, toilets, water, maternal and old people’s care, food (resulting in “low energy”), and had 
problems of widows, HIV/AIDS, cholera, psycho-social problems, idleness, orphans and alcoholism. They proposed a range 
of suggestions regarding small businesses they were eager to create, and indicated the machines and tools needed (hammars, 
mills, sewing machines, peanut machines, sausage machines, pottery, chicken boilers, farming manufacture, hair dressing, 
carpentry, stone crushing, broom making, table cloth, door mats, poultry, transport, domestic laundry, fertilizers and seeds), 
and stated that the “whole community is willing to learn” by working together in groups. They also felt frustrated at not being 
able to communicate properly as they did not speak English. 
268 Other, movement-based organizations have also emerged. The youth NGO, Operation Young Vote (Nov 28, 2013, 
Lusaka), was created around 2000s as an NGO run by youth. A main motivation for its establishment was to mobilize youth 
to register as voters for the 2001 elections as well as to stand as political candidates. The youth felt they were being left out of 
the political structure as, even after ten years of multiparty rule, the political space was dominated by “independence freedom 
fighters” from before the 1990s. Due to marginalization, they put up structures to engage and participate in electoral politics 
and with CSOs to mount pressure, so that youth were not only used as “king makers” due to their numbers, but also were able 
to affect decision-making and policies. To establish a mass movement, they formed structures at community, constituency 
(150), district (108), provincial and national levels for bottom-up participation. As youth lacked finances, they wanted to use 
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9.2.1 Street vendor marginalization in a fragmented movement for 
informal traders 
Introducing the umbrella SMOs  
Within the area of trade, the emphasis was previously on organizing marketers into 
associations, and forcing street vendors to work in the markets. In response to calls 
from external advisors urging participation, market associations emerged in the 1990s 
that were allowed membership and inclusion in decisionmaking processes within 
governance structures, such as market boards (Hansen 2010: 20). Most of these 
associations were trade-specific, dealing in second-hand clothing, the fish trade or 
cross-border trade. One umbrella body, the Zambia National Marketer Association 
(ZANAMA), used to manage several markets in Copperbelt towns and parts of 
markets in Lusaka (Chawama and Soweto). Another, the Zambian Traders and 
Marketers Association (ZATMA), was mostly based in the Copperbelt area (Jongh 
2013).  
The Alliance for Zambian Informal Economy Associations (AZIEA), formed in 2002, 
is an umbrella body for informal sector associations across 16 sectors.269 The Alliance 
became the main organizational body for representing and organizing street vendors 
and informal traders, under its broader umbrella. AZIEA represents marketers, street 
vendors, tinsmiths, carpenters, tailors, farmers and other sectors, and sees itself as 
engaged in a class struggle, representing the lowest-ranking workers who live from 
hand to mouth.270 AZIEA’s main offices are in Kitwe, with branches in five districts 
across three provinces, including Lusaka. Informal associations, and not individuals, 
register as members. Altogether, AZIEA had approximately 23,000 members in 
2013.271  
                                                                                                                                             
their comparative advantage of numbers over resources to be recognized within party structures, and to participate in forums 
and committees at all levels. 




AZIEA’s overall objectives for its members are to organize the unorganized and 
establish formal bargaining institutions with the government. The Alliance lobbies the 
government for legislation in the interests of informal workers, as current laws are 
considered highly unfriendly. AZIEA also engages in a range of activities towards its 
members, such as educating workers on their civic, economic and workers’ rights, in 
order to empower them through knowledge. Prior to the 2011 elections, AZIEA 
trained thousands of street vendors on their socio-economic rights (War on Want 
2014). In addition, it works to establish of a trust fund for members. However, member 
priorities are seen to differ within the Alliance, with Lusaka-based members being 
more focused on social protection, empowerment and the management of urban 
space.272  
AZIEA is affiliated to Streetnet International, and thus belongs to the transnational 
social movement for street vendors (Streetnet International 2014). The Alliance has 
participated in several activities with this international partner (although it currently 
did not have a member in the latter’s council or committee). AZIEA claims that it was 
one of Streetnet’s founding members, together with KENASVIT in Kenya.273 
Regarding its role in the global movement, AZIEA considered Zambia to be a model 
country in the past that most foreign member organizations of Streetnet International 
visited. AZIEA is also a partner to War on Want, a British NGO formed in 1952. The 
latter has supported AZIEA in training marketers and street vendors in business and 
leadership skills, as well as strengthening the relationship between informal economy 
associations, and bringing their difficulties to national attention (War on Want 2014). 
War on Want is financed by British development agencies (UKAid and IrishAid) as 
well as other donors.  
In addition to AZIEA, the Street Vendors’ Association (SVA) was registered in 
1996.274 The SVA has attempted to organize street vendors in Lusaka specifically, but 
                                              
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Street Vendors' Association. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka.    
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without much success recently, especially after the 2011 elections. The association 
wanted the government to amend the act forbidding street vending, which it 
considered “a colonial, terrorist act.” 275 The SVA argued that if street vendors could 
not sell products on the street they would die, so the government would be committing 
a gross violation of life and the right to work. The association held that street vendors 
could not afford the additional costs of being formalized, and that harassment from 
local authorities further obstructed them from earning a livelihood to escape poverty. 
The SVA considered street vendors to be businessmen (sometimes working 18 hours a 
day, from 3 o’clock in the morning) who needed to become connected to the 
production line and incorporated into the mainstream.  
The SVA sought to become a vehicle for smaller organizations to defend member 
rights, address policy issues, and provide training for business and leadership skills, 
and wanted to organize cooperatives for street vendors to enable them to borrow 
money. It also maintained that street vendors should be properly empowered to enable 
them to move from the streets to the markets, without disorder and chaos. However, it 
saw any dialogue with the government as being motivated by the objective of getting 
vendors to work in sanitary places and generate revenues. The association has received 
external support from Streetnet and War on Want, amongst others, for worker 
education, financial management and book-keeping. However, it had difficulties in 
getting member subscriptions, and was uncertain about membership figures. In 
contrast to AZIEA, SVA seemed to be a rather dysfunctional association at the time of 
my fieldwork, struggling to mobilize members and lacking an organizational 
infrastructure.276   
The two trade union federations, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the 
Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), also wanted to extend their 
services to informal workers, but argued that this would require some order and 
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regulation.277 Through a program funded by cooperative partners in Denmark, “Decent 
Employment,” ZCTU has sought to help formalize the informal economy together 
with the government through insurance programs, social protection and regulation, and 
to educate informal workers on how paying tax leads to benefits.278 ZCTU has also 
suggested new laws to regulate informal workers, and lobbied for a review of 
employment and labor market policy, which currently applies only to the formal 
sector.  
The ZCTU represents street vendors indirectly through AZIEA, which is one of its 
affiliates.279  The ZCTU is also an affiliate of ITUC-Africa (ITUC-Africa 2014).280 
The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Union (LO) has supported ZCTU on women’s 
issues, organizational development, administration and membership recruitment, 
HIV/AIDS projects, “decent work” programs, capacity building on negotiation skills, 
281 and social dialogue.282 In contrast to ZCTU, FFTUZ did not represent street 
vendors at all as their activities were considered criminal.283    
A divided movement in terms of interests (marketers versus street 
vendors), and inter-organizational conflict    
Political pluralism opened up for the creation of two formally autonomous trade union 
federations, as well as multiple affiliated unions and organizations that represent 
(informal) traders, including marketers and street vendors. In terms of framing of 
collective benefits, there are joint activities within the labor movement to review and 
reform the informal sector. These have been spearheaded by the ILO, and various 
                                              
277 FFTUZ. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
ZCTU. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
278 ZCTU. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
279 The informal sector can also affiliate directly to ZCTU, instead of via AZIEA. 
280 International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 
281 LO also works with Zambian employer organizations and state ministeries.  
282 Regional Consultant for The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions Africa. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
283  FFTUZ. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
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partners have been invited to join the endeavor.284 There has been a need to redefine 
the ideology of the labor movement towards informal work, as the Zambian trade 
union movement previously had a patronizing and paternalistic approach to the 
informal sector, with revenue generation being an important aspect.285 The labor 
movement leadership has now realized that unionization with representation is the best 
model for attracting workers in the informal sector.286  By working to de-criminalize 
street vending, reduce harassment, and secure rights and protection for informal 
workers, the labor movement in effect is working to provide its constituents with 
formal citizens’ rights that will reduce their dependency on political clientelism. While 
ZCTU admits that the process is slow, it is seen as moving forward on issues of social 
protection.287  
Nevertheless, the movement representing informal traders is fragmented and internally 
inconsistent. The two trade union federations, FFTUZ and ZCTU, differ with regard to 
whether they recognize street vending as a legitimate occupational category. AZIEA 
also recognizes that being the umbrella body for the whole informal economy entails 
some difficult challenges and internal contradictions, especially between marketers 
and street vendors.288 In addition to representing street vendors, AZIEA organizes the 
marketers (represented by ZANAMA and ZATMA), who have a conflict of interest 
with street vendors. Instead of being united around shared objectives and interests, the 
main body for representing traders has been faced with contentious issues among its 
members. 
In addition to diverging views on street vending, and conflicts of interest between 
trader sub-groups, there have been inter-organizational conflicts between the SMOs 
                                              
284 ZCTU. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
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286 ZCTU. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
287 The dialogue with the government is complicated by the fact that responsibility for the informal sector belongs to several 
different ministries. Marketers and street vendors fall under the Ministry of Local Government, while farmers fall under 
Ministry of Agriculture (AZIEA, Dec 9, 2013, Kitwe). 
288 AZIEA. Dec 9, 2013, Kitwe. 
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that constitute the labor movement. Concerning the ties between the two trade union 
federations, ZCTU claims there have been talks about merging with the FFTUZ, 
especially as their members “down there” wish they would merge to gain strength as a 
movement.289 However, this process has been stalled, as relations between the two 
federations are not considered “very good”. AZIEA, on the other hand, is affiliated to 
the ZCTU, and was in fact was the result of a project carried out in 2002 between the 
ZCTU and the Workers’ Education Association of Zambia (a UK-based charity) to 
organize the informal economy (WIEGO 2014). As AZIEA is grouped into different 
occupational groups, ZCTU tries to link these groups to formal unions based on 
similar occupations, although the process had not made much progress.290   
There have also been various conflicts among the organizations that represent street 
vendors. While the Street Vendor Association (SVA) also was a founding member of 
AZIEA, the association was later accused of not having complied with rules for 
subscription (fees), and its membership elapsed in 2006.291 The SVA was therefore de-
registered by the trade union center (ZCTU), and is no longer collaborating with the 
others. In addition to failure to pay for subscriptions, another reason for the end of the 
AZIEA/SVA collaboration were conflicts where they blamed each other for lack of 
commitment, or for an overemphasis on workshop activities at the expense of 
engaging with the grassroots. According to the SVA,292 Streetnet International even 
attempted to act as mediator to solve the problems between the two organizations, but 
with no success. Consequently, prior to the 2011 elections, Lusaka’s street vendors 
were no longer formally represented and connected to AZIEA and ZCTU through an 
organization that catered for their interests specifically. Previous SVA partnerships 
with the corporate world, Lusaka City Council and UNZA (university) to find joint 
solutions and provide input to the government on the way forward had also been 
broken off.  
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Hence, the movement representing informal traders, embedded in the larger labor 
movement, found itself struggling as regards movement consistency, due to conflicts 
of interests among its constituents as well as to inter-organizational conflicts. Hence, 
collective identities and networks are fragmented, while they agree on joint action 
(with the exception of FFTUZ). Furthermore, regarding Amenta et al.’s (2010) four 
categories of political impact, movement mobilization had not yet resulted in the 
passage of legislation or the establishment of formal bargaining institutions for street 
vendors and other informal traders. However, President Sata’s passage of a 
Presidential Decree in 2011 to allow street vending, indicates an impact on collective 
benefits (War on Want 2014).  
Limited agency for street vendors: resource constraints and growing 
disconnect between SMOs and constituents 
As street vendors constitute the most marginalized group among traders, I will focus 
on how their agency has been affected by the social movement. Despite internal 
conflict, and the lack of formal ties between the umbrella bodies and street vendor 
association, the movement has arguably had some impact on the agency of the street 
vendors. War on Want (2014) found that street vendors were able to mount 
considerable pressure on the government in the run-up to the 2011 elections, and 
attributed this to AZIEA’s success in training thousands of vendors. An official from 
the Lusaka City Council explained that the street vendors’ movement was very 
difficult to stop because it was a global phenomenon—which confirms that the 
movement is indeed becoming politically powerful.293  
A representative from the SVA argued that the government did not understand the 
problems of street vendors, and stated that “we are the experts.”294 As elite actors from 
the bank sector and corporate world often depended on street vendors, through their 
supply chain, the SVA claimed that street vendors would have the political power to 
change things if they were properly organized. However, he claimed that the street 
vendors themselves did not realize this, and would instead argue about petty issues and 
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be easily cornered. Although many small vendor associations existed, they would 
break easily. While freedom of association allowed them to be independent, the 
biggest challenge was destitution and achieving representation through one strong 
voice.295  
An additional problem for the ability of the SMOs to empower the street vendors was 
limited resources. AZIEA’s overall membership of approximately 23,000 (in 2013)  
shows that only a tiny fraction of the Zambian informal sector is organized by the 
alliance. 296 An AZIEA representative explained how limited resources had prevented 
them from being able to recruit more members, by restricting their capacity to provide 
information and training to their grassroots base.297 While AZIEA needed to be 
perceived by informal workers as working for their interests, any ability to empower 
and mobilize informal traders was severely curtailed as long as there were no 
resources for communicating with (potential) members about their socio-economic 
rights. The organizations therefore had to rely on external support to carry out their 
activities. 
Another challenge pertaining to recruitment was that members were impatient to 
receive immediate benefits after organizing, which the unions and AZIEA could not 
supply.298 AZIEA found it hard to identify a mechanism that could provide benefits to 
informal workers, such as social protection, due to problems in assessing who is 
earning what. Street vendors do not deposit their earnings in bank accounts.299 The 
Alliance had tried to establish a revolving trust fund, but found it difficult to convince 
people of the long-term benefits. 
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At the same time, membership meant an extra cost for members. Street vendors were 
reluctant to be levied by the government, as taxation would affect their profits. And 
since regulation equals taxation, the informal sector overall was highly skeptical.300 
Living on the economic margins, street vendors found these costs unaffordable, and 
shunned any strong body that would bring them close to the government.301  Thus, 
AZIEA could not attract members because it could not provide tangible benefits seen 
as worth the extra cost of membership. Failure to mobilize members in turn limited the 
Alliance’s resource base. As mentioned already, one reason that the Street Vendor’s 
Association had been de-registered was its failure to pay the subscription fee.  
The consequence of the conflict between AZIEA and SVA was that while the street 
vendors had previously been formally organized by these SMOs, their collective 
agency was later restrained through this channel. After ZCTU de-registered the SVA, 
street vendors only had indirect representation, and lacked decisionmaking power 
within the organizational structures representing them. The street vendors were 
therefore primarily empowered through trainings and collective mobilization, but such 
trainings were few in number. The marketers’ associations, by contrast, were affiliated 
to AZIEA and had formal representation within the movement.   
To sum up, the movement seeking to organize informal traders, and street vendors in 
particular, has been highly dependent on scarce, external resources. Although external 
resource mobilization appears to have given the movement some leverage that it might 
otherwise not have had, these SMOs have struggled to establish a material resource 
base aggregated from its constituents. It has also suffered from internal conflict and 
fragmentation—partly as a result of conflicting interests, and partly as a result on 
disagreements on how to spend scarce resources. Apparently, the solutions that 
AZIEA and the Lusakan Street Vendor’s Association were offering the street vendors 
failed to mass-recruit this constituency. Whether this was due to failure to resonate 
properly with the interests of the street vendors, to resource constraints, or distrust of 
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these organizations is unclear. Endogenous challenges seem partly to blame for this 
failure. However, Chapter 10 will show how the weakening of the movement also was 
a result of political re-encroachment by the Patriotic Front (PF), which exploited the 
movement’s weaknesses to effectively co-opt the street vendor constituency, during 
and after the 2011 elections. According to the SVA,302 street vendors were easier to 
organize when they were chased and hassled—not when business was going well.  
9.2.2 Emerging citizen-based agency through a consistent slum-
dweller movement  
Introducing the umbrella SMOs  
In the 1990s, some international and local NGOs began to push for action in response 
to the lack of adequate housing programs for Zambia’s poor (Schlyter 1998: 262). 
According to Schlyter, NGOs carried out projects of housing improvement in 
cooperation with residents and, to varying degrees, with support of the government. 
While the local authorities were expected to allocate land and provide services, they 
had not been able to provide services in low-income areas, nor maintain what was 
once provided. In the new housing strategies of the 1990s, the government and local 
authorities were therefore given a facilitating role, while the implementing actors were 
to be the private sector, NGOs, CBOs and individual households (Schlyter 1998: 260).  
This approach was based on recommendations from the Habitat Agenda adopted by 
governments at the UN Conference on Human Settlement in Istanbul in 1996. 
Community projects were carried out in cooperation with, and funded by Oxfam, Irish 
Aid, World Vision, NORAD, UNICEF, Project Urban Self-Help (by the World Food 
Program) and a few other NGOs. Three INGOs were also mentioned in the National 
Housing Development Program: Project Urban Self-Help (PUSH), CARE, and Habitat 
for Humanity. A national NGO coordination committee was created, to be replicated at 
provincial and district level (Schlyter 1998: 267).  
In the early 2000s, two organizations for slum-dwellers were established: the People’s 
Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia (PPHPZ) and Zambia Homeless and Poor 
                                              
302 Street Vendors' Association. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka.    
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People’s Federation (ZHPPF).303 The latter is a grassroots federation of the urban poor 
that was established in 2001; the PPHPZ is an NGO established in 2005 to support the 
federation (People's Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia 2014).  These two 
organizations define themselves as a movement of slum-dwellers that have joined 
hands to fight homelessness and poverty through savings. Their close ties are 
demonstrated by sharing the same office premises and the same director, and I will 
therefore refer to them jointly: PPHPZ/ZHPPF.  
The slum-dwellers’ movement emerged in response to the slum demolitions of the 
former MMD government, and recognition by civil society and the private sector that 
people needed to be able to provide housing for themselves.304 The issue of 
community-led approaches to housing development is therefore a relatively new 
phenomenon in Zambia. The movement blamed the difficult housing conditions on 
free market capitalism. A representative of PPHPZ/ZHPPF argued that to expect the 
free market to provide housing when 70 percent of the population was unemployed 
was “a fallacy, a joke.”305 The government, the private sector and the banks were seen 
as having conflicting interests to those of slum-dwellers. The private sector was 
perceived to amass land from the government by giving money to corrupt government 
officials. The banks were not considered community-friendly, as they would not 
provide mortgages that people could afford, and only to the formally employed.  
The SMOs also felt that development agencies such as the World Bank and EU 
institutions did not consider housing a serious development challenge.306 As there was 
little state involvement in housing in the West, such institutions did not understand the 
connection between housing and other issues such as HIV/AIDS, poverty and 
corruption. Frustration was expressed at the international organizations’ belief that one 
size fits all, and the lack of assistance from donors and the government to help 
                                              
303 Little academic research has been produced on recent social movements for slum-dwellers in Zambia. By implication, my 
material on movement organization of slum-dwellers will rely mostly on interview data.  




vulnerable people build housing structures. UN-Habitat, for its part, argued that “some 
NGOs, especially Habitat for Humanity and People’s Process, are managing to build 
down to the low earnings in Zambia, but it often involves some unsustainable practices 
such as subsidized land and interest rates. Their dwellings cost between USD 2,400 
and USD 4,250 with ‘sweat equity’” (UN-Habitat 2012: 4).  
The PPHPZ/ZHPPF works with poor, homeless communities for their right to decent 
and adequate shelter in urban areas, and to improve living conditions through 
community-led housing delivery. It has a two-pronged approach: access new land for 
informal settlers to build their own houses; and work with the communities living in 
these settlements to improve their conditions through service delivery on matters such 
as water, roads, and housing structures.307 The movement works to obtain individual 
and community titles for residents.  It also wanted to establish a slum-upgrading fund 
where every community would be given money according to its needs. To upgrade 
houses, they argued, occupant certificates were important, but also the opportunity to 
borrow money for construction. 
The members are residents of slums—both landlords and tenants (the latter constituted 
¾ of the members).308 By 2015, 48000 families had joined the movement through 
saving schemes, which is the rallying point.309 The federation, ZHPPF, is thus 
member-based, and aggregates material resources through its constituents. The 
PPHPZ/ZHPPF considers itself as Zambia’s third largest social movement, after the 
Congress movement with affiliated unions (labor), and the churches. The federation 
attributed its size to how people were united through savings groups, where they could 
discuss the issues facing them and have a stake in the process. There are branches at 
the local, district and national levels. At the local level, there are between 15 and 50 
members; these groups define their own rules. They save money, make their own 
decisions and initiate projects themselves. The ZHPPF mobilizes members by 
                                              
307 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
308 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
309 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
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identifying key people—for instance relatives or church members—who know the 
federation. Those key persons call friends and neighbors and talk with them. If 
interested, they form a group. The federation explains their approach to homelessness 
and poverty, and their expected contributions.310  
The saving groups begin with a daily capital fund (monthly) and health savings, which 
are the backbone of the federation. When the groups have learned which members are 
credit-worthy, they can apply for loans to the district and national level. If proposals 
are viable, and there are recommendations and proof of performance, bigger loans can 
be approved for larger businesses or land projects. For house construction, members 
use the capital fund, and are given materials, not cash. This enables them to stop 
renting as tenants, and become landowners.311 The movement thus has a holistic 
approach to urban poverty, integrating land and housing issues with business-
enhancing projects, acknowledging how these two dimensions overlap.  
ZHPPF/PPHPZ is affiliated with Slum/Shack-Dwellers International (SDI). According 
to Slum/Shack-dwellers International (2015), ZHPPF is one of its 14 affiliates that 
represent a mature federation (of a total of 34 country affiliates), meaning it has 
achieved national or citywide scale and worked with governments on behalf of its 
constituents. Members of the federation have also visited sister-organizations in other 
countries, such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, to share information on their 
experiences.312 The SMOs receive no government funding, but list the following 
(“like-minded”) partners on their homepage: Zambian Governance Foundation, Tides, 
Homeless International, Comic Relief, Huairou Commission, Civil Society 
Environment Fund, Misereor, Cordaid and Lusaka City Council (People's Process on 
Housing and Poverty in Zambia 2014). 
While the federation is not funded by the government, member savings, though small, 
are meant to provide leverage for resources from the government or international 
                                              
310 Ibid. 
311 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
312 Ibid.. 
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partners. According to the PPHPZ, the movement has built a critical mass able to 
engage the power-holders, and members can now approach local councils when they 
have saved money, as the government is supposed to assist them.313 The NGO, 
PPHPZ, provides technical support and mobilizes financial resources to augment the 
financial contributions of the poor in the federation (People's Process on Housing and 
Poverty in Zambia 2014). It facilitates the development of linkages and partnerships 
with central government, local authorities, CBOs, NGOs and other stakeholders.  
The partnerships between the government and ZHPPF are based on what the 
government can provide within its capacities.314 Local governments can provide free 
land, as well as refrain from taking charges for approval of plans from their own 
architects and engineers. Local governments have also offered to supervise and 
monitor projects free of charge. At the central level, the PPHPZ wants the government 
to contribute with the same or double amount as that of the savings groups, as is the 
practice in Namibia.  
A main obstacle facing the movement is that the local government councils have 
simply run out of land. In Lusaka, most land has been taken up by privatization.315 
Therefore, the movement also tries to negotiate with private owners whose land is 
occupied by squatters. In these cases, the federation argues in favor of a “50/50,” 
“win–win situation,” where the poor contribute some money for compensation. 
ZHPPF/PPHPZ has also partnered with Lusaka City Council. They mark and map land 
for upgrading, and people in the settlements are given occupier licenses.316 While 
Lusaka City Council collaborates with the PPHPZ on the slum-upgrading program, 
this program falls under the partnership with the UN-Habitat conducted in 
collaboration with a Japanese development agency.317    
                                              
313 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
316 Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka.. 
317 Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
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In addition to ZHPPF/PPHPZ, the Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) is a far-reaching 
umbrella body on land issues of concern to the poor. It was established in 1997 as a 
network of NGOs, faith-based organizations and CBOs that share a vision of fair land 
policies and laws that take into account the interests of the poor, by securing them 
access, ownership and control (Zambia Land Alliance 2008). The ZLA caters for 
various interests and issues across the country, including women’s issues, the urban 
and rural poor, the environment, agriculture, democracy and human rights issues, and 
is meant as a platform for collective action. Its main activities are lobbying and 
advocacy, research and community participation. However, the Alliance does not 
provide land: it has an information-sharing role.318 
Uniting slum-dwellers to acquire formal tenure for land and house 
ownership  
As regards framing for collective benefits, all slum-dwellers—whether structure 
owners or tenants—belong under the same federation via their grassroots affiliates. 
They are considered to have similar interests and objectives—to obtain formal tenure 
for housing, by acquiring land titles and constructing houses.319 There do not appear to 
be any other SMOs representing conflicting sub-interests among the slum-dwellers.320 
According to the ZHPPF/PPHPZ,321 only the federation and UN-Habitat were doing 
low-cost housing in Lusaka, and the two were working together. Hence, ZHPPF is the 
only SMO umbrella representing and organizing slum-dwellers on a large scale, 
                                              
318 ZLA is governed by a Board of Directors made up of member organizations, District Land Alliances (DLAs), with an 
Executive Director and an independent legal advisor. Every second year, a General Assembly is convened that elects the 
Board of Directors. The General Assembly is attended by all members, DLAs, partners and donors. The ZLA has a 
secretariat in Lusaka with seven members, eight DLAs and other civil-society partners. The Secretariat provides a 
coordination role for members, engages in awareness-raising and information-gathering on land dispossessions, establishes 
and builds DLA capacity, and publishes land disputes. The DLAs have their own member network and management 
committees, but ZHPPF/PPHPZ was not listed as a member of the Lusaka branch. The Lusaka District Land Alliance has the 
following members:  Women Environs; Caritas Lusaka; Zambia Institute of Environmental Management; Zambia Alliance of 
Women; and Katuba Women’s Association.The ZLA also seeks to network and collaborate with national, regional and 
international bodies to share experiences on land issues (Zambia Land Alliance 2015). Oxfam, a well-known international 
NGO with a strong focus on pro-poor change, and a policy of working only through local partners, was involved in the 
promotion of the ZLA (Duncan et al. 2003: 40).  
319 The slum-dwellers federation has a holistic approach to homelessness and poverty, and their saving schemes can be used 
for micro-business, health or food production in addition to housing, if the members decide so. 
320 In Kenya, such conflicts are quite frequent and create high levels of tension in the slums, as will be shown later.  
321 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
 246
through membership with rights and obligations. Its objectives and strategies reflect 
those of the transnational movement.  
Although the PPHPZ/ZHPPF is not a member of the Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) nor 
part of the latter’s District Land Alliances (DLAs), according to the ZLA website 
(2015), PPHPZ has nevertheless been consulted for ZLA’s Land Policy Options Paper 
(Zambia Land Alliance 2008). This illustrates how the slum-dwellers’ movement is 
embedded in a broader Zambian movement for poor people’s right to land. The 2008 
ZLA report, written in conjunction with member organizations and partners (including 
international experts), identified the key challenges and civil society’s policy options 
for a new land policy (Zambia Land Alliance 2008: 3). Its recommendations were 
largely in line with those of the ZHPPF/PPHPZ on fundamental points.  
Like the PPHPZ/ZHPPF, the ZLA report was critical to the first draft Land Policy, 
which leaned heavily on the principle of privatization and supply–demand 
mechanisms, as well as excessive state control, while communities remained 
disempowered (Zambia Land Alliance 2008: iv).322 The ZLA report noted that new 
land policy should take cognizance of informal/squatter settlements in urban areas and 
devise a mechanism for achieving security of tenure, in line with what PPHPZ/ZHPPF 
wants. It further recommended a moratorium on forced evictions and removals without 
provision of adequate alternative land and shelter, or compensation for land in real 
market terms.  
The report also called for provisions for land redistribution for the many Zambians 
squatting on council and corporate land (Zambia Land Alliance 2008: vii-viii), as well 
as land-use planning through a consultative process that would make these plans 
available to the general public in the given localities, and ensure access to resources 
necessary for livelihoods and fair benefit-sharing for local communities through 
collaborative and participatory land-use planning. Lastly, the report called for a 
decentralized Land Commission to be in charge of land allocation (Zambia Land 
                                              
322 This is in line with the World Bank Poverty and Social Impact Analysis on the Land Policy (2004, referred to in Zambia 
Land Alliance 2008: 5), which also concluded that the draft Land Policy would not contribute to poverty reduction. 
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Alliance 2008: 22). It attacked the cadre problem, stating that the “operations of party 
cadres and any other unauthorized persons in land allocation should be made illegal 
with stiff punishment for defaulters” (Zambia Land Alliance 2008: viii).  
To sum up, a fairly consistent movement for slum-dwellers has emerged in Zambia, 
around collective identities/interests of access to secure tenure, and joint action. The 
SMOs rely on external support, but also on membership contributions, that come with 
rights and obligations. The joint report (Zambia Land Alliance 2008), as well as the 
activities and objectives of the slum-dwellers organizations, clearly show that the 
movement for accessing land and secure tenure for the poor seeks to dismantle the 
political clientelism that accrues from the informal land market. That means that the 
social movement for slum-dwellers is challenging the foundation of the neopatrimonial 
state. None of the social SMOs were explicitly partisan: instead, they pursued a 
political strategy of engaging the government of the day. The organizations worked 
with all government levels, depending on the issue at stake, and sought to provide 
input into legal processes, regulations and policy.  
Regarding Amenta et al.’s (2010) four categories of political impact, the draft for the 
new national land policy was not yet finalized by 2015. However, the slum-dwellers’ 
movement has achieved some progress for its members in terms of accessing land and 
support for house construction, through collaboration with local government bodies as 
well as donors (UN-Habitat’s slum-upgrading project). Seeking partnerships and 
collaboration with the government is considered a cumbersome process, but more 
fruitful in the long run.323 According to the ZHPPF/PPHPZ, local governments and 
councils have demonstrated some commitment. The movement has successfully 
engaged local authorities in seven towns to provide land and other support to 
grassroots affiliates. 
                                              
323 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
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Emerging citizenship agency for slum-dwellers who commit to savings 
and government/donor collaboration: partial evidence 
Previous research on CSOs engaged in slum-housing and upgrading has found that the 
Zambian land associations were the community-based associations that most clearly 
represented the interests of poor people (Duncan et al. 2003: 41). According to Duncan 
and co-authors, the collaboration between ZLA and Oxfam showed that it was possible 
for an international NGO to act as a facilitator for local groups without imposing its 
own agenda.  
However, examples of the converse have also been identified. Ishani and Lamba 
(1996, referred to in Schlyter 1998), assessed a partnership between a local NGO, 
Human Settlements in Zambia (HUZA), and the international NGO, PUSH, who 
worked on upgrading informal settlements in the 1990s. The two organizations 
disagreed on whether food for work on public works in settlements was an incentive 
that enhanced or distorted long-term sustainability in community-based upgrading. 
Mainly female “volunteers” were working in the local community, simply for the food. 
The local NGO felt that while it was trying to instill self-reliance in the community, 
the international NGO, PUSH, was thwarting this through these food incentives 
(Ishani and Lamba 1996, referred to in Schlyter 1998: 268). When the local NGO 
pulled out of the partnership, the PUSH program continued with former employees of 
HUZA, which thereby lost experienced staff (Schlyter 1998). This example illustrates 
how decisionmaking has been made from the top, while financial incentives have been 
used both for “volunteer” participation and potential staff recruitment.    
While far from the majority of Zambia’s slum-dwellers are members of the slum-
dwellers’ federation, ZHPPF, an estimated membership of 48,000 families in 42 local 
municipalities (People's Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia 2014) still reflects 
a movement whose framing and mobilizing strategy resonate with substantial 
segments of its constituency. As explained by one grassroots member,324 community 
people who feel they need to work together form housing savings schemes to have a 
voice for the whole group. As resource mobilization is based on members’ 
                                              
324 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
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contributions, these savings demonstrate their willingness and ability to invest in the 
movement.  
Formal mechanisms are in place to provide members with autonomy to elect 
representatives and decide on their own economic priorities within certain parameters. 
There is also supposed to be a democratic process of vetting how many members from 
each group ought to benefit (the most vulnerable) when land is given for free by local 
councils.325 Thus, the federation appears to have a legitimate claim to represent its 
constituents.  
Furthermore, the chain of actors from the grassroots to the top does not appear long or 
hierarchical within the movement, at least in Lusaka. The NGO and federation body, 
which constitute the link between the grassroots associations and the donors and 
government, share office premises in Lusaka that are highly open and accessible for 
their members.326 Hence, there would seem to be fewer physical barriers to accessing 
information and communicating with the leadership. Provided that information about 
the movement’s internal organizational processes is transparent and accessible, and 
that elections and decisionmaking are actually conducted in a democratic manner, 
these SMOs would represent a case of representative and accountable actors that 
enhance the citizen-based agency of constituents to advance their housing interests. 
However, due to lack of data, it is not possible to say anything about the informal 
dynamics and power asymmetries within the movement, beyond what has been 
provided here. Therefore, I will use its “sister” movement in Kenya to illustrate how 
power asymmetries may manifest themselves if the economic and political incentives 
are present.  
However, one main barrier of entry to the movement is that members must contribute 
with their own savings. That means that the most destitute will not be able to become 
formal members of the movement. Still, according to a representative of 
                                              
 
326 I base this conclusion on personal observations while visiting their office premises. Members from grassroots affiliates 
would move in and out of the buildings, and the office staff was available and forthcoming.  
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PPHPZ/ZHPPF, the fact that considerable funds are raised by churches, and that 
people can afford to buy beer, means that there are opportunities for people to save 
small sums.327 As formal land plots and houses are too expensive for individuals, and 
access to government and landowners is limited, such savings groups may be the only 
opportunity for people to acquire their own homes. In addition, the PPHPZ, together 
with the Zambia Land Alliance, has provided input to policy and law drafting 
processes that would, if adopted,  protect the rights of all slum-dwellers (ban on 
evictions), and not only members. 
Furthermore, while the movement aggregates resources from its constituents, it also 
depends on the ability of the PPHPZ to mobilize technical, financial and material 
resources for operation and project support from the government and external funders. 
The collaborative partnerships between the PPHPZ/ZHPPF, government and donor 
agencies place certain restrictions on which slum-dwellers are allowed to participate, 
and on what terms. For instance, as the role of the slum-dwellers’ movement in UN-
Habitat’s slum-upgrading project is one of participation and consultation,328 but the 
houses will benefit the owners of the former housing structures, tenants are 
marginalized within such public–private projects. Tenants will be subjected to market 
mechanisms that will force those who cannot afford the new rent levels to leave and 
seek accommodation elsewhere.  
As regards agency, the movement has created a platform for voice, 
inclusion/participation in land and housing processes, and the organizational 
infrastructure (savings groups) for formally acquiring land and support for housing 
construction. Successful grassroots members have been able to leave the informal land 
markets characterized by insecurity, forced evictions and demolitions, which have 
been used as instruments for political clientelism. However, without broader legal and 
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policy reforms, the transformational potential of the movement is still limited, given its 
non-confrontational stance, membership criteria, and limited land available for its 
current approach. The scope and number of beneficiaries are still small and depend on 
savings ability. 
Table 13 summarizes the power asymmetries between SMOs for informal traders and 
slum-dwellers on the one hand, and their constituents on the other, which contribute to 
clientship or even subalternity (exclusion) for the latter. The analyses has shown that 
problems of exclusion are encountered by both tenants and street vendors within 
movement structures. Formal membership criteria, and projects with partners 
(government and donors) can result in the more marginalized groups being excluded, 
or finding it in their best interest to remain outside. A top–down approach based on 
pre-defined agendas, together with the lack of collective decisionmaking that would 
include all stakeholders, has limited the agency available to the grassroots through 
these movements. However, resource constraints also limit the ability of the movement 
umbrellas to reach their constituents with information, and to engage them. Overall, 
the slum-dweller movement has been more successful in recruiting members (tenants 
as well as structure owners), and appears to be a vehicle for more autonomous, citizen-
based agency. The street vendors have recently become less connected to the 
movement umbrellas, without much agency within the SMOs.  
Table 10: Mechanisms that forge clientship agency between Zambian CSOs and their 
constituents   
Information  Exclusion from participation and consultation 
 Lack of communication channels/information on activities and programs  
 Lack of training on rights and benefits of organizing 
Decision- 
making 
 Formal membership and inclusion in projects depend on ability to save/pay 
fee  
 Participation without collective decisionmaking rewarded with financial/food 
incentives 
 Engagement in donor-financed slum-upgrading projects based on 
consultation, not collective decisionmaking  
 Exclusion of tenants from slum-upgrading projects for house ownership 
 Lack of formal representation of associations for sub-interests (street 
vendors) within umbrella body that also represents conflicting interests 





 As in Zambia, Kenyan civil society is highly dependent on external resource 
mobilization. In 2005, 91 percent of the total funds of USD 213 million that Kenyan 
NGOs reported to raise came from international sources, while only USD 1.5 million 
came from the Kenyan government (Brass 2012: 210). Hearn (1998: 98) claims that 
the involvement of the Kenyan voluntary sector and non-state actors in the official aid 
system has had four major consequences. First, Western actors have expanded their 
intervention in African societies, making alliances with those they “can do business 
with” and who speak the same language. Second, these partnerships have created high 
dependency and an un-rooted civil society. Third, NGOs have become political actors 
and implementing agents of new policy agendas drawn from the West. Fourth, their 
community-based model of development has deviated from an understanding of 
development as social transformation with universal services and equity (Hearn 1998: 
98-99).  
After Kibaki’s electoral victory in 2002, most donors shifted their funding into a 
government-run fund, rather than channeling funding directly to various activist 
organizations (Press 2012: 453). Most large donors operating in Kenya use a basket 
system where they pool money to civil society umbrella bodies,329 such as Uria 
(“responsible citizenship”) and Amkenyi Wakenya (“citizens arise”).330 By 2012, 
several “foot soldiers” from the democracy and human rights movements of the 1990s 
had moved into various professional positions in NGOs, where they were doing non-
confrontational civic education and democracy/human rights advocacy, relying heavily 
on foreign donors and their particular agendas (Press 2012: 453). 
The NGOs’ financial dependency on donors has been seen as threatening their 
autonomy and accountability to the public (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 13). Few NGOs were 
considered to cultivate internal democratic institutions, and some were accused of 
                                              
329 The Norwegian Embassy. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
330 When I tried to pay a visit to Amkenyi Wakenya, a guard told met that the taxi was not even allowed to stop outside the 
premises, and that it was impossible to enter the area without an invitation (my e-mail request had not been responded to). 
The experience illustrated how inaccessible these civil society umbrella bodies are to ordinary citizens.  
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embezzling funds. Kameri-Mbote (2000: 15) found that problems of internal 
democratic procedures became aggravated when donors were more interested in short-
term, output-oriented project methodologies, regardless of the management structure 
of NGOs. Loss of autonomy, however, was considered to be reduced through clearly 
articulated principles that funders adhered to, effective coordination among 
themselves, as well as by avoiding competition for resources and attention (Kameri-
Mbote 2000: 15).  
Earlier findings were confirmed by my interview respondents. Some interviewed NGO 
staff were open about being donor-driven, and that their engagement was based on 
donor needs and wants.331 For instance, one respondent explained that the issue of 
housing rights for informal settlements was not considered very suitable in 2012, 
because donors wanted to build capacity before the elections. A journalist and activist 
claimed that elites from the NGO sector, including himself, knew what the donors 
wanted and tried to write proposals accordingly; he also described the donors as their 
“cash-cow.”332  
Representatives of almost every grassroots organization I spoke with stated that their 
organizations were in search of donors and that without them, it would be difficult to 
continue their work. However, donors were generally perceived as highly inaccessible 
to grassroots respondents. Donors commonly use implementing partners, such as 
NGOs, to carry out their programs, due to the drain on resources that implementation 
entails.333 When NGOs entered communities to organize them and initiate activities, 
they often arrived with a clear agenda, and met with local people only after decisions 
had been made.334 There has been the feeling among grassroots actors that as the 
support of these external actors is based on helping and welfare, anything they give is 
good enough.335 It was considered difficult to hold accountable someone who is 
                                              
331 Journalist and activist. March 3, 2014, Nairobi. 
332 Ibid. 
333 The Norwegian Embassy. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
334 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. Oct. 2012, Nairobi. 
335 Professor at Institute for Development Studies (University of Nairobi). March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
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“giving” money or support voluntarily. However, if ordinary people are to claim 
rights, they need to know what to expect from the aid they receive, and be able to 
budget expenditures. Whereas international agencies were perceived as having good 
intentions, the dependency created by aid could “kill initiative and imagination.”336   
In areas where many donors are engaged, such as youth groups, there has been 
duplication of activities and fragmentation. Some youth groups have themselves 
suggested joining into larger units in order to establish a critical mass.337 The type of 
funding that donors put into training activities has also been criticized. There has been 
a tendency among NGOs to give sitting allowances to participants in trainings: “There 
are so many NGOs that make money in the name of Kibera. We have been trained 
enough.”338 The problem has been described as one of “professional” conference-goers 
who participate because of the allowances they receive, not motivation.339 Donors are 
also accused of paying people to attend protests: “We organized Occupy Parliament, 
but donors give money even for protests. It is my life, my children. But if I have to be 
paid for protest, seriously?”340 
Although much of the engagement of local activists is officially based on 
“voluntarism,” travel allowances or the lunch provided at such activities may be their 
only income. Most would prefer having a job, but they need to volunteer more than 
full-time for a broad range of donors and different projects in order to ensure food on 
the table. This situation obviously presents dilemmas for funders, who wish to provide 
some support but cannot employ these activists. In any case, without proper 
mechanisms to ensure that the projects actually reflect local community interests and 
needs, the result may be a waste of time and effort for all parties.  
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The dependency relations created through the extraverted resource strategy of civil 
society make it increasingly difficult to differentiate donors from political patrons who 
buy political support for money. Yet, engagement with the urban poor grassroots 
seems more prevalent in Kenya than in Zambia. Furthermore, member-based social 
movements explicitly dealing with the socio-economic interests of the urban poor have 
also evolved in Kenya over time.  
9.3.1 Street vendor clientification through a business-oriented 
movement for informal trade  
Introducing the umbrella SMOs 
In the 1990s, several associations for informal traders, hawkers and street vendors 
emerged. The Nairobi Hawkers’ Association comprised all hawkers—vegetable 
sellers, kiosk operators, mitumba (second-hand goods) dealers, tailors, textile sellers, 
open-air garages, woodcarvers, watch repairers, furniture makers/ carpenters, charcoal 
dealers and more (Chune and Egulu 1999: 18). These associations, however, were 
fragmented and weak (Mitullah 2003: 17). During the 2003 relocation of street 
vendors from the CBD to new market sites, street vendor associations were not 
effectively used. The city authorities engaged representatives of street traders from 
various areas of the CBD, but their role was mainly to hear about the packages offered 
by the authorities, rather than being engaged in negotiation and dialogue—and that 
made most street traders “feel betrayed”(Mitullah 2003).  
Currently, the social movement for informal traders is centered on the Kenya National 
Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders (KENASVIT) and its affiliates. 
However, other umbrella bodies, such as the Nairobi Hawkers’ Association and the 
Jua Kali Federation are still present and active. KENASVIT was established in 2005 
through a joint proposal from the Institute for Development Studies at the University 
of Nairobi and stakeholders among street vendors and informal traders (Mitullah 
2010). KENASVIT was initiated based on research on women and street vendors that 
concluded that street vendors lacked the capacity to organize themselves and have a 
strong voice on matters that affected them at local and national level (Alila and 
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Mitullah 2000). Their problems included lack of trading sites, credit, infrastructure and 
services, as well as harassment by local authorities.  
KENASVIT’s chief aim is to move beyond welfare to improve business through 
lobbying and policy influence, as well as by building street-vendor capacity to 
dialogue and negotiate, to reduce harassment from authorities (KENASVIT, March 29, 
2014; Mitullah 2010). KENASVIT pursues an amicable lobbying strategy towards the 
government—“a marriage of convenience.”341 The main objective is for policies to get 
accepted. KENASVIT argues that, without legal backing, unwritten decrees will 
change with the mood of politicians, and be in “quicksand.” 
The organization is managed by a National Executive Committee (NEC), which is 
composed of a Management Committee, Urban Alliance Committees and Local 
Association Committees (Mitullah 2010: 189). This is facilitated by its Secretariat in 
Nakuru, which coordinates KENASVIT’s activities and serves as contact point for 
members and other development partners. Eight key leadership positions—including 
chair, secretary and treasurer—are filled through elections, every fourth year. Every 
urban affiliate is entitled to elect one representative to sit on the NEC. The 
Management Committee works closely with the Secretariat, while the NEC and the 
Annual General Assembly meet quarterly and annually, respectively (Mitullah 2010: 
191). The Alliance Constitution prohibits political positions.  
By 2010, KENASVIT had 3000 members from 140 local associations in seven urban 
alliances, mostly traders and service providers.342 It holds meetings (funded by DFID) 
with the leadership of markets to inform about their organizations and opportunities.343 
For those who show interest in following up, closer collaboration is established. The 
organization planned to expand from 16 to 47 counties, as they considered their focal 
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issues—harassment, adequate market access, political interference, HIV/AIDS, 
disabilities and youth unemployment—to apply to all towns.344  
Streetnet International leveraged the seed funding for activities that led to the 
establishment of KENASVIT (Mitullah 2010: 189), and has later provided capacity-
building training to organize members. KENASVIT also had an agreement with DFID, 
which has been a main support partner, but this agreement was to end in a few months 
after my interview.345   USAID has supported KENASVIT, but only through small-
scale activities; the Alliance has also had voluntary interns from abroad.  
The Nairobi Informal Sector Confederation (NISCOF) is a KENASVIT  affiliate that 
represents small groups of street vendors, hawkers and marketers in Nairobi. Their key 
mandate is to advocate for a good work environment, including policies, work sites 
and formalization; access to capital and training; inclusion in policymaking bodies for 
more comprehensive planning; and good market locations.346 NISCOF conducts 
advocacy for rights enshrined in the 2010 Constitution as well as for change in county 
policies that can be “brutally” applied. For the short term, work sites and evictions 
were considered the largest challenges, as members were evicted without being given 
a new space (for instance when a new road was to be constructed).  
NISCOF especially focuses on inclusion in policymaking processes at the county 
level, based on the Urban Areas Act. The county governments are accused of poor 
planning, and of responding only when there is a crisis. Markets planned for 6000 
people may end up accommodating twice as many. Market sites may also be sold to 
private developers, and the traders would not know of this until actual demolition work 
begins.347 The county government is also accused of charging informal fees, including 
on roadsides. At the Stakeholders’ Forum on Taxation and Accountability in 2006, 
NISCOF argued that street vendors do pay tax indirectly, through bribes to city 
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inspectors, and that they would be able and willing to pay tax in return for services 
(Kamunyori 2007: 17). 
NISCOF has approximately 1100 members, through its affiliated associations.348 In 
2005, an estimated 70 percent of NISCOF’s members were considered to be street 
vendors (Kamunyori 2007: 15). While the membership is primarily Kikuyu (the street-
vendor population in the CBD is 65 percent Kikuyu), its Secretariat has representation 
from other tribes as well. NISCOF has work to ensure that all tribes are welcome, and 
does not consider itself to be ethnically-based (author interviews; referred to in 
Kamunyori 2007: 53). According to NISCOF,349 most members are engaged in micro-
businesses and live and work in poor areas like Kibera. Vendors with more capital 
have not been interested in organizing.   
The Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) is a private agency 
formed by prominent corporate firms in 1997. The agency has been anchored in the 
Indian business community and has approximately 100 corporate members from the 
manufacturing industries and hospitality industry (including Hilton Hotel, Total 
Kenya, British American Tobacco), representing a group that contributes about 20 
percent of Kenya’s GDP (Morange 2015: 255). The NCBDA has sought to stop 
undesirable activities such as street vending, resulting in street vendors’ displacement 
to Muthurwa Market in 2007. It focuses on revitalizing the CBD through public–
private partnerships and privatization of services. Its activities range from management 
of street trading to community policing, upgrading of public toilets, and greening. The 
NCBDA’s programs are funded by private donors such as Ford Foundation, but also 
USAID and UNDP (Morange 2015: 255).350  
Eventually, the NCBDA concluded that its objective of a clean, modern-looking city 
for its businesses (especially in the CBD) could be solved by providing appropriate 
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worksites for street vendors (Kamunyori 2007: 66). NISCOF was the result of a 
project undertaken by the NCBDA in 2003, funded by USAID under their 
“Appropriate Governance for Informal Trading” program. The project culminated in a 
socio-economic survey of street vendors in the CBD, and also the inception of 
NISCOF (Kamunyori 2007: 40).   
In 2003, The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) was created as an alliance of 
formal, private businesses as “the single voice for the private sector,” to provide input 
to national policies and reforms to improve the business climate in Kenya (Kamunyori 
2007: 42). It was born out of a forum of 74 associations that came together to provide 
input for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process, due to IMF and 
World Bank conditionalities of “participatory” processes. The Alliance focuses on 
areas such as security, access to credit, overregulation, unfair competition and high 
taxation, and aims to become an equal partner with government in the formulation of 
economic policy.  
The willingness to engage with micro- and small enterprises was attributed to the 
NARC’s government political platform of including the informal sector (Kamunyori 
2007: 45). Street vendors, through NISCOF, are members of KEPSA. According to 
Kamunyori, KEPSA has supported and funded capacity-building workshops for 
NISCOF members, and NISCOF members attend monthly meetings. Both NISCOF’s 
Chairman and Secretary had seats on the Informal Sector Board of KEPSA, and the 
Vice-Chairman of the Board was NISCOF’s chairman (Kamunyori 2007). KEPSA 
provides most outlets for the products of NISCOF members.351 In addition to NCBDA, 
KEPSA and KENASVIT, NISCOF partners with the Jua Kali Federation, and also 
cooperate with the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). According to 
NISCOF, these organizations work to speak with one voice when they face a “very big 
challenge.”352 The confederation also has had a range of international funders, 
including DFID. 
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The COTU, formed in 1965, is the only trade union federation in Kenya. COTU’s own 
membership estimate is 1.5 million, with the largest sectors being agriculture, building 
and construction, followed by county government employees.353 COTO’s strategy 
towards informal sector workers includes plans for the provision of services to 
informal groups, and the organization of informal workers into cooperatives and 
welfare associations (Omar 2008). While the transport sector has shown considerable 
interest in organizing, COTU does not have a formalized relationship with the street 
vendors and hawkers.354 According to COTU, the organization wants to cover the self-
employed, but the employer’s associations  claim that the informal self-employed 
belongs to them.355   
Uniting informal traders under employer/business groups by bypassing 
pre-existing umbrella organizations     
The movement for informal traders appears to be growing increasingly consistent in its 
work to organize informal traders. Their strategy for legalizing and formalizing 
informal traders in practice serves to dismantle the informal and often clientelist 
manner in which informal traders have been engaged in politics. The SMOs work for 
the recognition and rights of informal traders who engage in micro-and small-scale 
business, to reduce harassment and improve their working conditions. None of the 
organizations are explicitly party-partisan, and they seek collaboration across the 
political spectrum to achieve their objectives.  
To build a stronger movement, KENASVIT encourages networks with other NGOs to 
team up on relevant issues of informal settlements, land ownership or sanitation. The 
Kenya Land Alliance, for instance, facilitated KENASVIT’s participation in the 
formulation of a national land policy (Mitullah 2010). The movement has also 
collaborated closely with transnational actors, such as StreetNet International. 
KENASVIT was also assisted by Streetnet, together with the Kenya Land Alliance and 
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Pamoja Trust, to participate in the World Social Forum in Nairobi, Kenya. The UUSC 
facilitated KENASVIT’s participation in the development of MSE Act. 
Nonetheless, there are challenges within the movement for informal traders, leading to 
fragmentation and inter-organizational conflict. In contrast to Zambia, the dominant 
SMOs for informal traders affiliate with private-sector bodies and not the traditional 
trade union structures. While COTU claims that it wants to organize the informal self-
employed, KENASVIT argues that it has tried hard to link up with COTU, without 
much success.356 For instance, KENASVIT claims that COTU did not send a 
representative when KENASVIT and Streetnet International organized talks on the 
informal economy. KENASVIT is of the opinion that COTU prefers members who 
can provide direct deductions, and that it fears that COTU members would not be 
elected in a collaborative arrangement.  
There have also been conflicts and fragmentation among the associations that 
represent informal traders specifically. Kinyanjui (2010: 28) has criticized 
KENASVIT and NISCOF for disregarding existing jua kali clusters by superimposing 
new jua kali welfare associations, sometimes creating parallel organizations that front 
the same agenda, but with different strategies and poor integration. While these groups 
are considered “progressive” because they meet the prescriptions and requirements of 
the government and development practitioners, she claims that they do not necessarily 
command the constituents of jua kali clusters that have multiple social formation 
dynamics (Kinyanjui 2010: 28). The original associations have not been allowed space 
or opportunity to use their coordination and organizing strength in markets and 
societies without losing their identity, and may even be branded as troublemakers who 
defy government regulations and “progression” (Kinyanjui 2010: 33). Also Moyi 
(2014: 22) finds that conflicts between Kenyan umbrella associations for MSEs can be 
ugly and difficult to resolve. 
As for securing collective benefits for their members, KENASVIT and NISCOF seem 
to have drawn the longest straw, in terms of engaging with government bodies. 
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Already in 2006, the Nairobi City Council formed the NCC Stakeholders Forum to 
build relationships between the informal sector and the regulatory arms of the 
government (Kamunyori 2007: 41). NISCOF participated in the review process of by-
laws used by the City Council Inspectorate to harass hawkers. The Ministry of Local 
Government and the Ministry of Labor and Human Resources also held stakeholder 
forums where NISCOF participated through KEPSA (Kamunyori 2007: 46). Through 
these processes, street vendors were promised ten new markets as well as upgrading of 
existing ones in the CBD and surrounding areas.  
The Presidential Decree of 2007 to establish Muthurwa Market was well-received by 
NISCOF (Kamunyori 2007: 45). Muthurwa was initiated to take into consideration the 
livelihood needs of the vendors and be centrally located, which illustrates the 
increasing influence of mobilization of informal traders. The market was intended to 
shelter between 6500 and 8000 vendors who would occupy 1.75m2 each. However, 
“the agendas of the NCBDA and of public authorities met on a territorial consensus,” 
(Morange 2015: 257) whereby Muthurwa market became part of a scheme to make all 
traders operate from designated areas outside the CBD. Street trading thus became 
strictly forbidden after the 2007 municipal bylaws were passed. This shows the 
ambiguities in the approach that is intended to empower street vendors. During the 
vendor relocation to Muthurwa, at least two hawkers’ associations were active in 
trying to organize the relocation, and both claimed that their association had been 
assigned main responsibility for coordinating the move (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 
123). These associations did not collaborate, which led to fragmentation and conflict; 
and the relocation was characterized by violence.  
Another accomplishment from the perspective of KENASVIT and NISCOF was the 
passing of the MSE Act (2012). The MSE Act was the result of a “tedious process” of 
consultation and negotiations between the private sector and the government.357 
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According to KENASVIT,358 the organization joined hands with other actors, 
including MPs, in lobbying for the MSE Act, which is intended to provide a legal 
shield for informal workers, including street vendors. The MSE Act has several 
provisions that are deemed friendly and protective. The Act established the MSE 
Authority, which has the mandate to develop, promote and regulate the MSE 
sectors.359 The Authority is to function as a bridge between the organizations and the 
government, and its directors include members of the most successful umbrella SMOs, 
among them KENASVIT and NISCOF.360  The MSE Act also established a tribunal to 
deal with cases of disputes in the MSE sector.361  
Devolution has also had implications for the MSE Authority and the SMOs. As some 
of the laws and regulations that affect informal traders lie within the mandate of the 
local/county government, this limits the Authority’s ability to impact on street vendor-
friendly outcomes. It may review existing laws, but only give advice and 
recommendations to county and national government, and report any problems 
discovered. However, devolution has also “forced” the national management board of 
KENASVIT to engage with county level rather than the national level. 362 This is 
considered a “gift” by the Alliance as it has made negotiations and policy influence 
easier, and brought them closer to the grassroots. The Urban Areas and Cities Act 
(2011) provides for one member to sit on the board at county level. This makes it 
easier for the organizations to exert pressure from the inside, rather than through 
politicians who are often considered more interested in rewarding their cronies.363  
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More than 1000 MSE associations already registered under the old Societies Act 
would retain their status under the new regime.364 However, the new act differentiates 
among four MSE sectors—manufacture (furniture, pottery), service (car mechanic, 
mobile operator), trade (newspaper, roasted maize, hawkers/vendors), and agro-
business (anyone in agriculture) —and associations are expected to re-organize to 
reflect these. The new law and policy frameworks have thus strengthened the new 
umbrella SMOs at the expense of existing federations and associations. According to 
the MSE Authority,365 the Jua Kali Federation is one of the existing umbrella 
organizations that have grassroots associations that are not organized according to 
sector, and thus will have to be re-organized.  
The reason for re-organization is that these sectors require different kinds of 
regulations and development interventions.366 As hawkers need markets for their 
products, in a harassment-free environment, the idea is to create government-owned 
“incubation” spaces to produce entrepreneurs that are allowed to operate in that space 
for 10 years. Privatization of this land would mean that land facilities would be 
exhausted. However, as most land in Nairobi has already been privatized, 367 the 
Authority can only encourage assistance to pool resources to buy land, or engage the 
county governments to set aside land for development.  
To sum up, the movement for informal traders has obtained several collective benefits 
for its constituents in terms of legislation and policies, and the establishment of 
institutions and formal representation. The SMOs are nonpartisan and engage with 
government bodies. Thus, in practice they seek to replace the existing informal 
structures of governing that have been characterized by insecurity and clientelism. 
Still, the main approach towards street vendors is to formalize them and have them 
work in designated spaces, rather than on the streets. The new, extraverted approach 
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has also contributed to marginalizing existing organizational structures for informal 
traders, in turn leading to fragmentation and inter-organizational conflicts among the 
organizations representing informal traders. Hence, both in terms of joint action, 
identities and networks, there is fragmentation. 
Resource mobilization leaning towards clientship 
By 2007, tensions between the hawkers and the authorities were so high, after the  
presumed killing of a hawker by the city police, that the Ministry of Local 
Government described the situation as follows in a Cabinet Memorandum: “The 
problem of dealing with hawkers has become critical and urgent because of the 
increasing ferocity of conflict between the Council enforcement structures and the 
traders. The threat of a general and widespread breakdown in law and order is now 
very real” (cited in Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 121). Thus, the informal traders have 
been able to mount considerable pressure on the government, and create instability in 
response to unfavorable policies.  
According to Mitullah (2010), street vendors and traders were unable to engage the 
urban authorities before KENASVIT was established. Mitullah (2010: 190) claims that 
neutral third parties represented by research institutes and transnational organizations 
(Streetnet, WIEGO and UUSC) were required to initiate alliance-building, leverage 
resources for start-up, and engage authorities and member affiliates in policy dialogue 
on street vending. The new SMOs for informal traders have close transnational links, 
and especially the newer organizations mobilize their resources from external funders 
or the business community.  
As a consequence of re-organizing, their working environment is considered to have 
improved: now they are engaged in several government initiatives, including the 
national land policy, the 2010 MSE Act, development of city by-laws, as well as the 
establishment of a hawkers’ market in the CBD. According to KENASVIT,368 vendors 
have increasingly been provided with alternative locations when they are removed; 
harassment has been reduced; and the authorities act in a more predictable fashion.  
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Affiliated member organizations have also increased their visibility, confidence and 
ability to influence urban policies (Mitullah 2010: 194). Furthermore, whereas a large 
corporation previously would have the resources to take MSE businesses to a high 
court, the latter are now encouraged to take their business disputes to the tribunal, even 
if the dispute is with the government or the authority (e.g. as with a refusal of 
registration).369  
On the other hand, while more resources can enhance the opportunities for a stronger 
movement for street vendors and informal traders, the structuring of these resource 
flows have also contributed to engaging the latter as clients. KENASVIT considers its 
strength to lie in the number of informal traders, as their constituency represents the 
largest population, creating sizeable government revenues and participating in 
nominations and elections.370  However, whereas transnational networks have 
strengthened KENASVIT and NISCOF’s own capacity and political leverage to 
influence policy, their membership base is still small, compared to the number of 
informal traders in existence.371 A main challenge for KENASVIT has been to 
establish a sustainable resource base. The Alliance depends on donors, as it can only 
rely on small contributions from its members.  
There are several reasons for the low membership base. According to Chune and 
Egulu (1999: 22), the failure of the unions to reach out to the informal sector is partly 
attributable to the small size of the workforce in these enterprises. As most are family 
businesses or employ less than five people, they argue that family or ethnic loyalties 
may count more than working class solidarity —indeed, collective action might even 
be interpreted as rebelling against one’s family members or relatives (Chune and 
Egulu 1999: 22).  
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Limited financial resources have also restrained the scope and objectives of NISCOF 
and KENASVIT. To improve the situation, KENASVIT has directed all the urban 
alliances to embrace a national social security fund for retirement.372  Saving schemes 
to bring people together is considered another important component. According to 
NISCOF,373 the main reason why vendors do not organize is that they are poorly 
informed, and want benefits that are tangible. The benefits from policy are too abstract 
to communicate. Many traders become “dormant” members, and the income base 
shrinks below the level that can maintain staff for the organization. Furthermore, while 
transnational networks tend to focus on national bodies, the local grassroots 
organizations sometimes remain largely untouched (Mitullah 2010: 201). Resource 
problems for KENASVIT and its affiliates have resulted in ineffective communication 
to members, which can create suspicion and destroy synergies and collective identity 
(Mitullah 2010).   
Another recurrent problem within the labor movement and among associations 
representing informal sector workers has been the emergence of “briefcase 
associations.” Many hawkers may refuse to join associations altogether, due to distrust 
and earlier disappointments, when their interests have been misrepresented or 
insufficiently protected (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 130). Many unregistered 
“briefcase unions” simply function as employment for their founders.374 They receive 
deductions from employers, but their members do not receive any services, and that 
destroys the image of the overall movement. Members on the ground might not even 
know that the association is not a legal entity, and it is expensive to take the leaders to 
court. 
Leadership conflicts in MSE associations also emerge when incumbent leaders fail to 
comply with their organization’s own constitution and do not call elections.375 Some 
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leaders do not account for the resources provided to the association’s members. If 
members become dissatisfied and angry, sub-groups may emerge that establish an 
interim office. These interim arrangements do not have legal power or access to 
accounts, but they may have the support of masses on the ground, resulting in clashes. 
Also in savings groups, a team of leaders may disappear with the money.376 As 
members are often ignorant of organizational matters beyond their own contribution, 
they face difficulties holding anyone to account. A consequence of such scams has 
been widespread suspicion of people who approach workers, seeking to support them.  
However, it is easier to judge associations that actually do provide facilities or 
services, and also allow insight into budgets. That can remove grassroots suspicions 
that funding is being abused.377 Registration under the new MSE Authority is also 
intended to safeguard members against “briefcase associations.” According to the 
MSE Authority,378 one of the first questions members now ask the leader of an 
association is whether the association is legal, or privately owned by an individual.      
The umbrella associations usually have the upper hand in relations with the primary 
associations. When street traders were recognized as fully fledged partners in 
government-led consultative discussions on the National Land Policy and SME Act in 
the early 2000s, the NBCDA approached them, seeking to get them to share the goals 
and visions of other stakeholders through consensual debates, and to refrain from 
political protest (Morange 2015: 258). However, internal tensions have risen between 
traders (and their associations) who have benefitted from formal market space,  and 
those who have remained excluded and on the outside (Lindell 2008). 
Lastly, the law also creates limits of operation and compels members to tax payments. 
The main approach towards street vendors is still to formalize them and have them 
work in designated spaces, and not on the streets. If the new legal and policy 
framework is not followed up with adequate resources to improve the working 
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conditions of informal traders, street vendors will continue to be marginalized, also 
under the new system.  
There are thus several mechanisms whereby informal traders are engaged as clients 
rather than citizens through their SMOs. The structuring of resource mobilization 
creates a paradox. On the one hand, because of their limited access to resources, the 
umbrella bodies depend on support from the business community and external funders 
to extend their outreach to these groups and include them in policy development. On 
the other hand, these sources of funding create dependency and incentives for rent-
seeking behavior, at the grassroots level and also further up the chain. At the umbrella 
level, the struggle over representation and resources has been won by the associations 
that have been supported and aligned with the business community. At the grassroots 
level, street vendors who are not organized by the proper entities still have limited 
empowerment and access to vending space. Marginalized street vendors who cannot 
afford the fees, or informal traders organized under pre-existing organizations, may 
lose out to the now-predominant organizations that operate under the auspices of the 
business community. These informal traders may be excluded, or choose to opt out of 
the formal movement structures.   
9.3.2 Tenant clientification in a joint movement for slum-dwellers  
Introducing the umbrella SMOs  
Beginning in the 1990s, a social movement for slum-dwellers with strong transnational 
networks has been steadily developing in Kenya. It is made up of networks of a range 
of CBOs, national and international NGOs, alliances and federations, with Pamoja 
Trust and Muungano wa Wanavijiji as focal points. The following section sketches the 
activities of some prominent movement actors.    
Muungano wa Wanavijiji (formed 1996/7) is a federation and a settlement-based 
network of slum-dwellers, supported by a technical secretariat—Muungano Support 
Trust (Muungano Support Trust 2015). The federation describes itself as a movement 
of the urban poor, formed to address problems of forced evictions, insecure tenure and 
land-grabbing, as well as to improve livelihoods in poor communities. The federation 
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is established in 15 counties, representing more than 64,200 members in 300 informal 
settlements (Muungano Support Trust 2015). According to SDI (2015), Muungano is 
one of its 14 affiliates that represent a mature federation (of a total of 34 country 
affiliates), meaning it has achieved national or citywide scale and worked with 
governments on behalf of the urban poor. 
Muungano organizes and mobilizes communities through daily saving schemes, 
community-led enumeration, city profiling and cross-settlement learning exchanges, 
and implements community-driven housing and infrastructure projects. Mobilization 
takes place through regional leaders who introduce the network and its core activities 
to communities by establishing of a leadership committee representing the interests of 
the street/block, as well as task teams (Muungano Support Trust 2015). Muungano 
operates an urban poverty fund—Akiba Mashinani—to provide affordable project 
financing and livelihood loans to its members. The federation also engages in 
advocacy and lobbying, as well as litigation, where community participation in the 
engagement with authorities on planning and implementation is central.  
The technical secretariat—which consists of professionals—“interprets” the 
aspirations of the poor communities to assist them in transforming their 
neighborhoods, and is meant to be driven by community demand, which is considered 
“essential for success” (Muungano Support Trust 2015). The Secretariat builds 
collaborations with (foreign) universities, likeminded NGOs, CBOs, banks, donors, 
service providers and government agencies at various levels, and mobilizes social, 
technical and financial support for the federation. The Secretariat mentions 
Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford 
Foundation, Forum Syd, UN-Habitat and the Government of Kenya as notable partners 
(Muungano Support Trust 2015).  
Pamoja Trust is an NGO that promotes access to land, shelter and basic services for 
the urban poor (Pamoja Trust 2015). It originated from the need for institutional 
support to the anti-evictions movements that arose in Kenya in the late 1990s. Pamoja 
Trust uses strategies such as community-based saving schemes, “slum” enumerations 
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and house modelling to create consensus on upgrading and tenure (Weru 2004). It 
develops pro-poor models and does advocacy work for participation of the urban poor, 
and works to strengthen the federations’ own capacity to participate in 
decisionmaking. Pamoja Trust seeks to build a critical mass of communities that 
engage with municipal authorities or national government, by building internal 
capacity to oppose demolition and forced evictions. It collaborates closely with 
Muungano wa Wanavijiji and is an affiliate to SDI (Pamoja Trust 2015).  
Other NGOs work with slum-dwellers’ access to housing as part of their broader 
agenda.379 The international human rights organization Amnesty International (AI) has 
the right to adequate housing as a main focus in Kenya.380 Amnesty Kenya works 
against forced evictions and for tenure security in slums, as well as the provision of 
essential services that are often privatized.381 It brings together a large number of 
stakeholders, including landlords and tenants, in committees to train them on the draft 
bill on evictions, and strategize with the slum residents on specific eviction issues. The 
NGO has also established Rapid Response Teams to potential victims in the slums at 
grassroots level.  
Also the international NGO, Global Communities,382 has engaged slum-dwellers 
through mediation, peace and reconciliation building, via the USAID-funded Kenya 
Tuna Uwezo two-year program and through collaboration with PeaceNet and Kituo 
                                              
379 The Kenya Land Alliance, also an NGO, describes itself as an advocate for land laws and policies to ensure equitable 
access to land and natural resources in Kenya. It has lobbied, participated in and contributed to several government 
commissions to reform land law systems and the Constitution to ensure provisions of relevance for farmers, women, 
squatters, informal sector residents, traders (hawkers), among other groups. It also works for awareness-raising among 
communities and the general public on land issues (Kenya Land Alliance 2015).  
380 Amnesty International. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
381 The role of Amnesty Kenya is to implement AI’s global campaign, “Demand Dignity,” where a core theme is adequate 
housing. These demands are based on the UN Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, to which Kenya is a signatory. 
Amnesty also aims to include slums into Kenya’s Master Plan with the elements of adequate housing, schools, human rights 
clubs and gender equality. One of its main strategies involves capacity-building among rights-holders and stakeholders by 
training in strategic campaigning, petitions, media, digital monitoring of evictions, documentation, and lobbying (Amnesty 
International, interview, March 2014). 
382 Global Communities works closely with communities worldwide to bring sustainable change and improve the lives and 
livelihoods of the vulnerable, based on the philosophy that people understand their needs best. The organization was founded 
in 1952, initially named the Foundation of Cooperative Housing (Global Communities Kenya 2015). 
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Cha Sheria.383 After the 2007 post-election violence, it initiated mediation efforts 
between Taliban and Mungiki to prevent new clashes between them. Despite initial 
threats of being kicked out of the slum areas, it managed to organize meetings between 
the fighting groups. Dialogue eventually resulted in the two rival groups agreeing on a 
set of common goals, and the formation of a joint CBO. According to its 
representatives, both vigilante groups have now been disbanded.384   
Introducing the grassroots associations (in Kibera)   
At the grassroots level, more specific interests of sub-groups of slum-dwellers 
dominate. To illustrate this diversity, I focus on grassroots associations in Kibera. 
While some of these organizations mobilize on conflict dimensions that apply to all 
slum-dwellers, other grassroots associations organize around conflicting issues.   
The Nubian Rights Forum works to obtain community-based ownership of land in 
Kibera, as opposed to government-provided slum-upgrading or private titling.385 For 
the Forum, ethnicity is totally engrained in their socio-economic interest; it holds that 
the only way Nubians can be empowered economically and politically in the face of 
discrimination, historical land injustices and government land-grabbing, is through 
community ownership of land.386 In addition to litigation, the Nubian Rights Forum 
organizes demonstrations and petitions, and lobbies politicians and government to 
support their claim for community land. After a sustained campaign by the Nubian 
Rights Forum, newly elected President Kenyatta in 2013 decided to grant the Nubians 
land title in Kibera . A task force led by the Cabinet Secretary negotiated the size of 
land (reduced from 600 to 300 acres) to be given to the Nubians; the remaining 300 
                                              
383 Global Communities. March 11, 2014, Nairobi.. 
384 Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
385 The Nubian Rights Forum. March 6, 2014, Nairobi.. 
386 The Nubian Rights Forum also addresses other discriminatory practices, such as the problems that Nubians experience in 
obtaining identity cards. 
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acres would be used for slum-upgrading for other ethnic communities staying on the 
land.387 
Kibera Stakeholder Forum was formed to protect the structure owners who rent out 
housing units on the land that was to become Nubian community land.388 This Forum 
wanted the government to provide private titles that would allow dwellers to demolish 
their squatter structures and build proper housing structures to rent out themselves.389 
They argue that if structure owners were allowed to build five-story buildings, these 
could create wealth for all dwellers (including tenants) and empower them. All 
dwellers were seen as suffering under the current Kibera landowners, most of whom 
were said to be rich people who lived elsewhere. The Forum claimed to be 
championing the interests of the tribes (Kemba, Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin) which may 
be affected by a Nubian community title, but it was also perceived as representing the 
interests of the Kikuyu ethnic group.390  
The Kibera Inhabitant Forum was also established to mobilize other tribes against the 
granting of a community title to the Nubians without the involvement of other 
communities.391 They mobilized due to fears about the consequences for individuals 
with structures within the land area, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the 
procedures for evacuation and compensation. In contrast to the Kibera Stakeholder 
Forum, the Kibera Inhabitant Forum has supported government-provided slum-
upgrading to benefit slum-dwellers, in addition to the provision of private title deeds. 
The forum stated that it was composed of NGOs, churches, title-deed holders, tenants 
and members of the various ethnic communities, although it was also seen as 
representing the Luo.  
                                              
387 The Nubian Rights Forum. March 6, 2014, Nairobi. 
388 Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
389 My respondent informed me that although he was born in Kibera, he was no longer living in the slum himself, but that his 
brothers and sisters did. 
390 Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
391 Kibera Inhabitant Forum. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
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The Kibera branch of the Railway Dwellers Federation of Kenya,392 representing 6000 
dwellers, was formed in response to another government eviction plan to relocate 
squatters away from the railway tracks, as part of the government’s strategy for 
upgrading the railway.393 As the railway dwellers needed proximity to their workplace 
as guards/domestics/casual workers, and since their churches and schools were close to 
the railway, relocation was considered difficult. Following a successful litigation 
process against the government (with the help of Amnesty), the Kibera railway 
dwellers were to move into the new structures by July 2015, followed by demolitions 
of the old shanty structures. However, questions remained as to who would own the 
housing structures and how the rent level would be determined. The Federation’s 
scheme was for the dwellers to own the houses, and pay a low rate of 500 shillings per 
year, as the dwellers themselves had built the shanties that were to be demolished. The 
dwellers formed savings groups to prepare for relocation.394 As the houses were 
constructed, people were to be vetted, and a grievance committee led by locals was to 
be established.395  
Contradictory interests (tenants versus landlords), but joint movement     
Relations between the grassroots actors mobilizing on access to housing for slum-
dwellers are often characterized by conflict. Grassroots organizations have emerged as 
a direct response to what is perceived as a threat to from other grassroots actors. They 
are deeply divided as to the correct (re-)distribution of rights and strategies towards 
ensuring them access to housing. While nearly all the Kibera associations purportedly 
represent the slum-dwellers, they still see their interests as being in conflict with one 
                                              
392 The Railway Dwellers Federation of Kenya (founded in 2005) champions the rights of dwellers along the Kenyan railway 
who face evictions threats due to railway upgrading. These people live in small shanties and iron-sheet constructions located 
dangerously close to the railway, but they are too poor to move elsewhere. The federation caters for dwellers nationally 
through branches in Mombasa, Gazia Chori, and Kibera, Nairobi. Its affiliate groups are formed by persons potentially 
affected by an eviction, and the federation claims to represent several thousand squatters. The federation elects its 
representatives. In collaboration with other organizations, including Muungano and Amnesty, it has litigated against evictions 
on behalf of its Kibera members, and entered into negotiations with the government to secure alternative housing for its 
members (Railway Dwellers Federation in Kibera, March 23, 2014, Nairobi).  
393 Railway Dwellers Federation in Kibera. March 23, 2014, Nairobi. 
394 A renumeration process had been carried out, by taking pictures of people in houses that subsequently were given 
numbers. 
395 Railway Dwellers Federation in Kibera. March 23, 2014, Nairobi. 
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another.396 These conflicts were, like land conflicts in Kenya generally, rooted in how 
access to land and housing in the informal settlements have been structured around 
ethnicity. While people were similarly disempowered because of the uncertainty 
created through informality, the informal rules operating in the settlements have 
created groups that would benefit differently, depending on which type of rules and 
procedures for formalizing and distributing rights was chosen.    
However, all umbrella SMOs frame their objectives and activities around slum-
dwellers’ shared interest in adequate housing and secure tenure. They seek to mediate 
conflicts among slum-dwellers, and empower them vis-à-vis the politically and 
economically powerful, by organizing them into joint associations that cut across 
existing conflict lines. The organizations Pamoja Trust and Muungano focus on 
building consensus among the inhabitants of informal settlements around issues of 
land and structure entitlements to overcome the ongoing conflict between landlords 
(structure owners) and tenants (Weru 2004).397 Huchzermeyer (2008), in her in-depth 
analysis of the housing markets in the slums of Nairobi,398 brings up the example of 
Pamoja Trust’s savings and housing project in Huruma as a relatively successful 
participatory process that eliminated existing interest conflicts.  
Furthermore, the umbrella SMOs employ a non-partisan political approach, targeting 
the government through strategies of protest, rights-based litigation, lobbying and 
participation in policy development, as well as project implementation. Amnesty 
International has even established procedures for disengaging staff or activists if they 
engage in party campaigns during elections.399  Hence, the umbrella bodies of the 
social movement for slum-dwellers in practice work to dismantle divisive partisan 
clientelism based on the tenant–landlord dimension.  
                                              
396 These conflicts of interest, however, did not prevent some of my grassroots respondents from providing me with contact 
details for representatives of other organizations.  
397 It should be noted that the author (Weru 2004) was also the executive director and a founder of Pamoja Trust. 
398 Huchzermeyer (2008), in her in-depth analysis of the housing markets of the slums in Nairobi, does not focus much on 
social actors working on behalf of or representing the slum-dwellers, or sub-groups thereof. Instead, she argues for more state 
regulation, public housing, community participation and the encouragement of “social landlords”.  
399 Amnesty International. March 17, 2014, Nairobi.. 
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Some political achievements have been made by the social movement vis-à-vis the 
government. A new draft Act that prohibits evictions is underway, the first of its kind 
in Africa.400 If implemented, the Act is intended to safeguard the rights of all slum-
dwellers vis-à-vis the state and powerful private interests. Kenya’s 2013 Master Plan 
also includes slums and adequate housing. The movement has also carved out spaces 
for slum-dweller participation and collaboration with government and donors in slum-
upgrading projects. For instance, the UN-Habitat-financed Kenya Slum Upgrading 
Program (KENSUP) in Kibera involved local actors organized through SDI.401 
Stakeholders from the slum communities, like CBOs, residents, youths and women, 
were brought in after initial preparation in collaboration with the government.  The 
SMO umbrellas have also contributed to grassroots associations entering into dialogue 
and negotiations with government authorities over land allocations, housing rights and 
tenure in the slums.  
Challenges nonetheless arise among these actors. First and foremost, different types of 
title claims from slum-dwellers associations (community/private/tenancy) may 
contradict each other in a given area, resulting in conflict. These inconsistencies show 
that efforts to organize slum-dwellers have not yet produced a coherent social 
movement with collective interests, strong and sustained networks or joint action. 
Often, these organizations collaborate only around specific objectives and projects, 
without a strong collective identity as a social movement. Attempts to build a social 
movement that bridges conflicts among slum-dwellers have also been elite-driven. 
While the chief aim is to break the vicious cycle of ethnic conflict and 
disempowerment of the urban poor vis-à-vis the political and economic elites, the 
scale shift also covers up inherent conflicts of interests, especially between tenants and 
landlords.   
                                              
400 Ibid. 
401 UN-Habitat. April 20, 2014, Nairobi. Skype interview. 
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Resource mobilization leaning towards clientship 
The movement has had political impact in terms of laws and policy outcomes, but we 
must also consider how these representative bodies engage with their constituents, in 
order to understand what kind of agency they provide for the slum-dwellers. 
Muungano’s membership of more than 64,000 people is evidence of how the 
movement responds to the interests of at least some segments among slum-dwellers. 
The membership enrollment indicate that they consider this movement relevant to 
further their socio-economic interests.  
Furthermore, there was no doubt among the interviewed grassroots activists in Kibera 
that the federations, NGOs and donors had strengthened their agency and helped them 
tackle conflicts and dependency resulting from political clientelism. Grassroots actors 
considered financial and technical support by these umbrella bodies as fundamental for 
their work. Kibera Stakeholder Forum claimed that NGOs like Mungaano had helped 
them end violence and engage with the government constructively.402 Similarly, 
Kibera Inhabitant Forum mentioned interventions of NGOs like Global Communities 
and Amnesty as helpful in managing conflict.403 The Railway Dwellers Federation saw 
the assistance from Amnesty as instrumental in enabling them to take the government 
to court and avoid relocation. According to this federation, before Amnesty got 
involved, the government could “just come and kill them;” they claimed that while 
donors listened to people, the government “emplaces bottlenecks.” 404 The Nubian 
Rights Forum relied on support from the Kenya Land Alliance and other NGOs in 
their struggle for community titling.405  
However, Harbeson (2012: 26-27) claims that Kenyan civil society has been less 
effective in making up for shortcomings of political parties in taking up land-tenure 
issues than the constitutional reform agenda on civil and political liberties. He 
                                              
402 Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
403 Kibera Inhabitant Forum. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
404 Railway Dwellers Federation in Kibera. March 23, 2014, Nairobi. 
405 The Nubian Rights Forum. Oct 18, 2012, Nairobi. 
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indicates that the urban, middle-class character of most CSOs, with leaders and 
constituents who are themselves not immune to sharing in land-tenure-related 
corruption, might be part of the explanation.   
Returning to Muungano’s national-level membership, it is difficult to ascertain the 
degree of support the federation has among slum-dwellers who are not formal 
members, especially tenants. According to Weru (2004), some community savings 
schemes tend to be dominated by structure owners or particular ethnic groups. For 
instance, out of five community saving schemes in Huruma in 2002, only one was able 
to meet the requirements for receiving financial support for house construction for its 
members, and this consisted of only 84 tenants and 270 structure owners (Weru 2004: 
60). The challenge of mediating the right of urban poor to manage their own savings, 
versus the need for external audit to ensure that these groups are accountable to 
members and the outside world, has been addressed by providing external support in 
response to groups’ own savings (for instance for house construction). However, this 
may bias support in favor of the more privileged structure owners (Weru 2004). 
Rigon (2014) provides an account of how internationally-funded development projects 
in Nairobi contributed to institutionalizing pre-existing power imbalances between 
landlords and tenants through their creation of structures of community governance 
and “participatory enumeration.” She highlights how scholars often fail to 
problematize the communities themselves, but focus instead on the community versus 
the state, even though slums are highly unequal settlements. Using “Kwa-maji” as a 
pseudonym for a Nairobian Urban Development Project, Rigon (2014) demonstrates 
how elections for a Residents’ Committee, as well as a “participatory enumeration” 
process, served to institutionalize pre-existing inequalities by creating a power bloc 
within the Committee. The process was captured by local elites (structure owners) who 
effectively controlled the election outcome. They became the representative voices and 
implementers for the “community,” at the expense of tenants (Rigon 2014). By 
ignoring the specificities and details through which the enumeration process affected 
the power distribution within the community, development partners allowed the 
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process to be captured by elites, while the target group of poor slum-dwellers were 
excluded.  
Such problems seem to be a recurrent feature of projects and activities initiated by 
SMOs dealing with housing for slum-dwellers in Nairobi. According to Weru (2004: 
49), the landlord–tenant conflict, and the threat that any accountable community 
organization poses to “leaders” and landlords in the informal settlements, make work 
with the urban poor difficult. She provides an example of when Pamoja Trust initiated 
an enumeration process in Korogocho in 2001. The structure owners’ organization 
(KOWA) opposed the process and spread the rumors that the enumeration was meant 
for selling the land to Indians, and that the director of Pamoja Trust was their land 
broker (Weru 2004: 52).  
KOWA sought a court ruling, followed by threats against both the director and the 
provincial commissioner. The community became split between Kikuyu (landlords) 
and Luo (tenants). Truckloads of police, with the provincial administration, as well as 
SDI, had to be present in the initial phase of the project. The elected committee 
consisted of representatives who were village elders and structure owners, and were 
part of the informal political control system (Weru 2004: 52). In addition, some 
enumerators asked households for payments, and structure owners tried to pressure 
their tenants into providing inaccurate information. Nevertheless, by having the 
enumeration conducted by community members, and through verification processes, 
manipulation was more easily exposed (Weru 2004: 56).   
The above-mentioned issues have also been encountered by grassroots associations in 
Kibera. According to respondents, the Kibera railway housing project, which included 
the Railway Dwellers Federation, Pamoja Trust, Amnesty, the government and the 
World Bank, created several informal obstacles to entry for the railway dwellers. 
These created uncertainty among the dwellers and opened up opportunities for, and 
suspicions of, clientelism within the project. Lack of information about the list of 
beneficiaries created suspicions among some grassroots activists that the list was being 
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meddled with.406 Another problem was the absence of clear guidelines stipulating who 
could join the member associations. People feared that the property would be rated and 
not given to community members for free. This fear was strengthened by rumors that 
membership in the associations was not based on voluntarism, but on payment of a fee 
that excluded the most marginalized railway dwellers.407 The lack of insight into the 
processes of enumeration and other procedures led people to form groups simply based 
on assumptions and hopes that they might be able to secure ownership after creating 
such associations. Critics of the project considered the railway dwellers’ associations 
to be benefitting aspiring “businessmen” that dreamed of becoming project owners. 
The railway federation has also experienced problems in previous election processes. 
In 2009, vigilante youth were mobilized by an elected representative who “reigned 
terror” on members when new elections were scheduled for his position.408 Two youth 
were killed as a result. In this case, however, international partners intervened by 
freezing the leadership until the dispute was solved. Thus, within the slum-dwellers’ 
movement structures, actors may employ clientelist tools even to the extent of 
vigilantism that causes death.  
The empirical findings show that the social movement for slum-dwellers in Kenya 
currently engages the slum-dwellers both as citizens and clients, in a complex, 
multilevel structure. Hence, the agency that slum-dwellers can enact through this 
movement should be seen as being of a hybrid nature. The violent incidents show the 
high stakes involved in these processes of housing allocation for the poor. Often, these 
organizations are turned into clientelist tools, with slum-dwellers ending up as clients. 
Overall, the movement has been able to have some impact on legal and institutional 
changes that tilt the power, or at least participation, in the slum-dwellers’ favor. Due to 
                                              
406 Youth activist. March 2014, Nairobi. 
407 Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
408 Amnesty International. March 17, 2014, Nairobi.. 
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the problematic merging of structure-owner and tenant interest, however, tenants are 
particularly prone to become reduced to clients.  
Table 14 summarizes the power asymmetries between Kenyan SMOs for informal 
traders and slum-dwellers on the one hand, and their constituents on the other, which 
contribute to clientship or even subalternity (exclusion) for the latter. We have seen 
how lack of adequate information to the grassroots makes them unable to evaluate the 
activities of their umbrella bodies, and leaves them ignorant and vulnerable to 
manipulation. Further, formal membership criteria and project designs may result in 
the exclusion of the more marginalized groups. Priority has been given to formalizing 
land, housing and trade, by providing space to those who can pay for it. Power has not 
been adequately balanced among members. Lack of, or manipulation of, democratic 
procedures obstructs collective decisionmaking, and the use of financial or other 
incentives for participation is widespread. Even more problematic is the use of 
coercion in order to make the grassroots comply. The many examples of coercive 
practices demonstrate the extent to which these movements are involved in high-stake 
issues, which creates strong incentives for keeping the grassroots as clients. However, 
we have also seen examples of how the grassroots have been able to engage as 
autonomous citizens by using these organizations as vehicles for advancing their 









Table 11: Mechanisms that forge clientship agency between Kenyan CSOs and their constituents   
Information  Unclear membership criteria 
 Lack of information to expose briefcase associations (partly addressed by 
MSE Act) 
 Lack of training on rights and benefits of organizing 
 Irrelevant skill training 
 Lack of insight into budgets, accounts, project plans, beneficiary criteria/lists,  
reports on activities and programs, and election procedures from umbrella 
bodies/donors (while grassroots must be transparent) 
 Intermediary partners in control of information flows between donor and 
grassroots, which create suspicions of and opportunities for manipulation of 
information. Lack of verification checks/feedback loops 
 Paid moles report on strategies of grassroots during conflict 
 Inconvenient timing for participation (enumeration) 
Decision- 
making 
 Formal membership and inclusion in projects depend on ability to save/pay 
fee  
 Non-democratic (or manipulated) procedures for electing representatives 
 Participation without collective decisionmaking rewarded with financial/food 
incentives 
 Overruling of established procedures for collective decisionmaking (e.g. 
through the creation of parallel governance structures) 
 Lack of oversight mechanisms to control and regulate  rent-ceiling for tenants 
in slum-upgrading projects  
Coercion  Engagement of vigilantes and security forces that disrupt activities and 
internal elections with impunity, and arbitrary detentions 
 Threats of court cases, where lack of finance and information (evidence) 
prevent the grassroots from fair trial 
 Lack of protective mechanisms for whistle-blowers 
 Unclear or manipulated procedures for market relocation that result in space 
distribution based on physical force 
 Threats to tenants to lie during enumeration processes 
 
9.4 Extraversion and members—varying levels of political 
agency  
In both Kenya and Zambia, the same pair of social movements of the urban poor 
stands out—those of slum-dwellers and informal traders. The member-based 
federations and alliances are all affiliated to the transnational movements —either 
Streetnet International or Shack/Slum-Dwellers International. They largely share the 
same core principles, objectives and strategies as their transnational movements. These 
umbrella bodies try to organize their constituents around collective interests in 
affiliated grassroots associations, through membership with rights and obligations. In 
addition, they lobby the government to provide formal rights, policies, as well as 
institutional arrangements for these constituencies. To mobilize support from both 
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external actors and their constituents, they depend on a legitimate claim to represent 
these groups.  
All the SMO umbrellas are explicitly nonpartisan as regards political parties, and in 
practice work towards dismantling political clientelism that exploits the 
criminalization of the livelihood strategies of the urban poor. That being said, the 
complexities found in the comparatively larger civil society sector in Kenya, as well as 
other contextual differences between the two cases, are also reflected in these 
movements, giving them somewhat different dynamics.  
In terms of Amenta et al.’s (2010) categories of collective benefits (agenda setting, 
legislative content, passage, implementation, and policy), the movements have differed 
in terms of the collective benefits they have obtained. In Kenya, the informal traders’ 
movement has contributed to the MSE Act, the formation of an MSE authority (where 
they have formal representation), a tribunal, as well as formal inclusion in 
decisionmaking bodies at all government levels. In Zambia, there has, paradoxically, 
been no formulation of new policy or legislation for street vendors, even though the 
street vendor constituency was an important support base for the new government. The 
degree to which the Zambian movement had an impact (agenda setting) on President 
Sata’s decision to ignore the laws prohibiting street vending is difficult to ascertain, 
but no institutionalized collaboration between these SMOs and the government has 
been established. An interesting difference between the two countries is that while the 
informal traders’ SMOs have affiliated with private business associations in Kenya, 
they affiliate with the trade union federation, ZCTU, in Zambia.     
The Kenyan movement for slum-dwellers has also contributed to a Draft Act (pending 
in Parliament) that prohibits evictions. Rights to housing have been included in the 
2010 Constitution, while the land reform process has removed the authority to allocate 
land from the executive arm of the government to the bureaucracy. The slum-dweller 
movement has also facilitated participation for its grassroots members in slum-
upgrading projects to formalize land in the slums of Nairobi. In Zambia, a new land 
policy has not yet been drafted. However, the Zambian slum-dwellers’ movement has 
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been able to establish amicable, albeit small-scale, collaborative relations and project-
based partnerships with the government, and has successfully negotiated with local 
governments for land and support to construct houses for its members. Nevertheless, 
the scope is still limited and the process moves slowly.  
The differences in terms of impact seem highly attributable to country context. Lack of 
legislation in Zambia should be seen in a broader context, whereby legal reform 
processes, including constitutional revision, face setbacks and often do not come to a 
conclusion due to politicization (Berrisford 2011; Gould 2006) . However, it could 
also be seen in connection with movement consistency and the leverage provided by 
international actors to various SMOs. The dominant SMOs have relied on technical 
and financial support from external actors. 
The four movements studied here vary in terms of movement consistency, due to 
differing levels of fragmentation and conflict. The Kenyan movement for informal 
traders has remained fragmented, with several umbrella bodies seeking to represent 
similar constituencies of street vendors, hawkers and informal traders. However, the 
recently formed KENASVIT and its affiliate NISCOF have increasingly become the 
most influential vis-à-vis the government, through collaboration with donors and the 
business community. In Zambia, there have been conflicts among the organizations 
that represent informal traders, concerning failure to meet subscription fees 
requirements, as well as on how they engage their grassroots through activities. 
Although external partners tried to mediate, the Street Vendors’ Association was 
deregistered. As a result, street vendors (in Lusaka) lacked a formal association that 
catered for their specific interests prior to the 2011 elections, and were represented 
only indirectly by the umbrella body for all informal workers (AZIEA).  
In Kenya, the SMO umbrellas for slum-dwellers have focused on bridging divisions 
among slum-dwellers around the ethnicized landlord–tenant dimension, and many 
domestic and international partners have engaged in this endeavor. Nevertheless, 
several of the grassroots associations they support continue to be organized precisely 
around these highly conflictual sub-interests. In Zambia, on the other hand, a relatively 
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consistent slum-dwellers’ movement has focused on organizing squatters (structure 
owners and tenants) jointly, in order to obtain formal land and housing for its 
members, through project collaborations with the government and donors.   
Although support from external partners has strengthened the ability of the SMO 
umbrellas to lobby and engage the government, these organizations are still struggling 
to establish a sustainable resource base aggregated from their constituents, especially 
from the more marginalized groups. However, the slum-dweller movements are 
significantly better at recruiting members than those of the informal traders, which 
indicate that these SMOs resonate with the interests of a substantial segment of their 
constituencies.409 In contrast, the Zambian alliance for informal workers (AZIEA) does 
not have an affiliated street vendors’ association in Lusaka, whereas the Kenyan 
alliance and its Nairobian urban affiliate represented 3000 and 1100 members, 
respectively.  
The low level of member-enrollment should be seen in connection with how the SMO 
umbrellas engage with their grassroots. While some organizations seem to engage the 
urban poor as autonomous citizens, others do so only partly; and yet others subsume 
them to clientship or set up barriers that make them choose to opt out. The analysis 
shows that the most marginalized urban poor, such as tenants (as opposed to structure 
owners) or street vendors (as opposed to marketers) are underrepresented. They face 
difficulties in meeting the criteria for formal membership, and may also be overrun by 
other interests, in line with what Pommerolle (2010) and Wit and Berner (2009) 
suggest. The more disadvantaged also face challenges in obtaining and understanding 
information, and are more prone to trade their autonomy for small material rewards. 
These problems, which result in exclusion or clientelism, are common in both 
countries. In all these cases, it is questionable whether these organizations’ claim to 
represent and be accountable to the more marginalized groups is legitimate.  
                                              
409 The slum-dwellers’ federation in Zambia counted 46,000 families enrolled in savings groups, while the Kenyan federation 
covered 64,200 members. 
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While a lack of information and procedures for collective decisionmaking may be due 
to resource constraints within the organizations themselves, the deliberate 
manipulation of information, decisionmaking, and especially the use of coercion, 
indicate how some organizations also work as engines for amassing material wealth 
and/or political power through clientelism. Coercive mechanisms for clientelism seem 
more prevalent within the Kenyan movements. However, when SMOs are highly 
reliant on external partners, this also limits the SMOs’ ability to be accountable to their 
constituents. 
The findings suggest that if the urban poor are to be able to act as autonomous citizens 
through SMOs, they must, at a minimum, be provided with adequate information that 
allows them to make informed decisions on whether these organizations are indeed 
acting in their interest. Whether due to resource constraints or other motivations, top–
down approaches that limits engagement with the grassroots deprives them of the 
ability to act as citizens, thereby making them a ready target for clientelism. Hence, 
not only through neopopulist party strategies, but also extraverted movement 
strategies, the agency of the urban poor becomes of a hybrid nature. Overall, the 
hybrid agency that the Kenyan urban poor, especially tenants and street vendors, 
exercise through these movements is tilted towards clientship. The Zambian street 
vendors face more problems of marginalization, while the members of the Zambian 
slum-dwellers’ movement appear to engage more as citizens.       
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10. Interaction between political parties and SMOs   
“A perception has been created that they [NGOs] tend to further the interests of foreign 
countries. Nonsense! Was it not for these, I do not know where this country would have 
been.”410  
“[Organization X] wants soft people (…). It is the same tricks that are used in political parties, 
of course it is similar.”411  
In the previous chapters, we have seen how, through multiparty elections and political 
pluralism, the political role of the urban poor has changed. They have become the 
targets of opposition parties and SMOs claiming to represent and mobilize them for 
political action. However, changes in political opportunity structures created two 
contradictory chains of resource mobilization for these representative organizations—
legitimacy was generated through (promises of) collective benefits, portraying 
themselves as representatives of the urban poor. At the same time, material resources 
could be mobilized by keeping the grassroots as clients (contingent benefits) (Figure 1 
in the introductory chapter).  
In order to compete with the incumbent party, opposition parties restructured their 
linkages to sub-segments of the urban poor, whereby they fused clientelism with 
Leftist, populist party links. Social movements emerged in parallel that sought to 
represent sub-segments of the urban poor through member-based organizations that 
operated outside the electoral arena. However, citizen agency was also curtailed within 
these structures due to their extraverted resource strategy. Consequently, groups of 
urban poor have advanced from being mere subalterns, but have been engaged only 
partly as autonomous citizens, and partly as clients, reflecting a situation of hybrid 
agency. 
The urban poor undoubtedly have received significant political attention from both 
camps, but I have not yet covered the interaction between opposition parties and 
SMOs. Chapter 10 is concerned with this, and the implications for the agency of the 
                                              
410 Human rights lawyer and politician. March 20, 2014, Nairobi.   
411 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 25, 2014. 
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urban poor (research question d in the introduction). Civil society extraversion can 
also contribute to a reforming authoritarianism (Pommerolle 2010), and “reinforce 
patrimonialism by providing a parallel chain of supply via preferred actors from civil 
society” (Duncan et al. 2003: 49). Research has shown how political elites in sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America threaten to co-opt or weaken movements (Larmer 
2010; Levitsky 2007), creating hybrid social movements. However, Cheeseman and 
Larmer (2015) and LeBas (2011) have also suggested that a legacy of autonomous, 
cross-ethnic labor movements or other organizational structures can provide incentives 
and opportunities for opposition parties to align with social movements to overcome 
incumbency advantages.  
This chapter will show that the urban poor often are mobilized at different scales by 
opposition parties and SMOs, and that these organizations lack institutional links. 
However, it also finds that the interaction between the two mobilizing structures 
sometimes adds another layer of hybridity through political co-optation. As a 
consequence, the urban poor find themselves in highly complex and sometimes self-
defeating processes if trying to engage as citizens. 
10.1 Zambia  
MMD’s success in Zambia in the 1990s bears some resemblance to neopopulist parties 
in Latin America in the same period. Whereas Zambia’s first democratically elected 
president in the 1990s, Frederick Chiluba, was a former trade union leader, the MMD 
soon broke with the trade unions, who on their side insisted on retaining their 
autonomy (Rakner 2003). In 1993 and 1994, strike action resumed against the MMD, 
and the churches and interest groups began criticizing government policy openly 
(LeBas 2011: 223). By weakening and circumventing organizational interests and 
institutionalized forms of representation in Zambia, the MMD government cleared the 
way for direct, unmediated mobilization of non-organized masses by personalist, 
neopatrimonial leaders (Rakner 1998: 284)—similar to what neopopulist parties in 
Latin America (Levitsky 2007) did in the same period. In response to economic 
decline and dissatisfaction with the old corporatist model, Zambia’s highly un-
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institutionalized and executive-heavy MMD used its momentum from popular 
disgruntlement to introduce wide-reaching neoliberal reforms, and thereafter sought to 
retain its support base through clientelism. However, in contrast to neopopulists in 
Latin America, the MMD increasingly relied on pre-existing ethno-regional clientelist 
networks to mobilize party support. 
During the MMD era, some of the slowest reforms that development partners engaged 
in were those which most threatened the patrimonial powers of the state (Duncan et al. 
2003). In addition, some NGOs were considered party-affiliated, although this was not 
their public position, or had even been established by the government to promote a 
pro-government agenda. CBOs were also prone to politicization and manipulation by 
political actors (Duncan et al. 2003: 42). When civil society organizations supported 
the government, this could be due to anticipated rewards in the form of political 
appointments or payments from discretionary funds. Hence, Zambian civil society 
remained vulnerable to political co-optation and patronage under the MMD. However, 
the party also applied authoritarian tools to repress dissent and control civil society 
(Freedom House 2015b). In 2009, the MMD government passed the NGO-Act. The 
Act established a government-appointed board to provide guidelines to regulate 
NGOs, and gave the government broad discretion to refuse registration. 
When the opposition party PF developed its strategy after the turn of the century, it 
began aligning with the issues of discontent raised by critical CSOs, on constitutional 
and democracy matters as well as on pro-poor issues. In the 2006 elections, urban civil 
society was still suspicious towards Sata and the PF (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 630-
631). The Post warned against voting for Sata. The ZCTU refused to endorse any of 
the candidates. The leader of FFTUZ, Nonde, personally supported Sata, while 
underlining that FFTUZ was autonomous from the PF. Although civil society shared 
much of Sata’s “anti-neo-liberal rhetoric,” they were skeptical given his political 
record, and were also incorporated into elite decisionmaking processes and distrustful 
of street politics (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 631). 
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According to one legal expert,412 the PF benefitted from civil society prior to the 2011 
elections, and perfected its art of aligning with stakeholders to foster perceptions that 
they were on the same side. Many civil society actors took partisan stances in support 
of the PF in the run-up to the 2011 elections, including newspapers like The Post. 
Hence, as an opposition party, the PF could be considered to have formed part of a 
broader social movement advocating pro-poor and democratic political change. After 
winning office, there was a honeymoon period between the PF government and civil 
society.413 Because many CSOs had supported the PF, they were initially apologetic 
and compromised, and feared to criticize old friends. Upon assuming office, however, 
the PF government quickly resorted to applying many of the same strategies of co-
optation and repression used by its predecessor.  
According to a representative from Caritas,414 people had over-rated Sata prior to the 
elections because of The Post; and after the elections, the relationship became even 
stronger. The Post, which was “pro-poor” and took a partisan stance, was later seen as 
doing propaganda for the new government.415  A few newspapers, such as The Daily 
Nation, were viewed as oppositional, but these did not have wide outreach.416 The PF 
government sought to include its CSO supporters in government, and absorbed many 
critical voices.417 A platform for civil society was therefore lacking after the 2011 
elections.418 Many organizations that had supported the PF during MMD rule had in 
practice been turned into government-organized NGOs (GONGOs).  
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According to a legal expert,419 the PF knew it was in their favor to weaken CSOs and 
the media after assuming office, and they opted for a more quiet, workshop-type 
participation in hotels, rather than mobilization of people. The CSPR, for instance, had 
sought to build a clique of MPs to work for poverty reduction, but found that only 
some appeared committed, while many were not in evidence until the next elections.420 
While the PF did not consist of a homogeneous group, and there were still some 
features of a social movement, many PF politicians were people who had left the 
MMD, and there was no clear identity or ideology.421 However, some civil society 
actors who had supported the MMD were more critical of the PF government. As 
frustration with the PF government began to grow, especially in the sphere of 
democracy and human rights, several respondents believed there was some 
realignment within civil society.  
The PF government also began to show more authoritarian tendencies. According to 
Operation Young Vote, PF politicians began pouring in huge resources aimed at 
instilling fear in other interest groups, and were considered “ready even to kill.”422 The 
PF government resorted to enforcing the Public Order Act, and also tried to implement 
the 2009 NGO Act, which had been signed by Banda (MMD) but not implemented 
(Freedom House 2015b). Against its promise to review the Act, PF instead tried to 
implement it by requiring all groups to register. Many resisted, citing violation of their 
freedom of association, and mounted a legal challenge. In 2014, the government and 
NGOs decided to resolve the dispute out of court, leading to a suspension of forced 
registration and negotiations for a self-regulatory framework (Freedom House 2015b). 
Other youth and women’s groups had started campaigning for a new constitution, and 
some CSOs were building coalitions against the poor governance of PF.”423  
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Thus, after its first years in office, the PF government had cut off both the citizenry 
and critical CSOs from information and participation. More importantly, it had 
resorted to violence, intimidation and repressive laws in order to silence its critics in 
civil society and the media. These general developments should be borne in mind 
when we consider the interaction between SMOs of the urban poor and party politics.    
10.1.1 Informal traders: co-optation  
From opposition alignment to neopatrimonial co-optation   
The Zambian labor movement has always had a complicated relationship to party 
politics, and the country has a history of former trade union leaders taking on 
leadership positions in government via opposition politics. Although President Chiluba 
of the first MMD government had been the leader of the Zambian Congress of Trade 
Unions, the MMD adopted a policy of not consulting with the ZCTU, and continued to 
carry out the economic reforms of privatization and liberalization that the UNIP had 
initiated (Rakner 2001: 533).  
By 1994, the ZCTU had again become an outspoken critic of the new MMD 
government that it had supported a few years earlier. In response, the government 
abolished the provision of union monopoly. In 1994, the trade union split in two over 
the issue of privatization, with the mine workers’ union supporting privatization 
(Rakner 2001: 533). Five unions (mostly representing private-sector workers) left for 
the FFTUZ, so that the ZCTU lost one third of its membership. The split resulted in 
ZCTU losing 80 percent of its revenues (from the mineworkers and teachers) (LeBas 
2011: 223). Further, the MMD began to threaten with deregistration of ZCTU and 
other unions.  However, while the MMD undercut the influence and negotiating power 
of the labor movement in the 1990s, this did not translate into MMD control over these 
constituencies (LeBas 2011: 230). According to the Norwegian Confederation of 
Trade Unions (LO),424 international partners such as LO, ILO, ITUC and the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation came to the rescue of ZCTU; after a while, some of the unions 
returned to the federation.  
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National party politics have continued to be intertwined with trade union politics in 
Zambia.425 Politicians have tried to interfere with the unions, which has led to 
disorganization and disunity within the movement. According to the FFTUZ,426 the 
MMD government tried to change its leadership by issuing a statutory instrument to 
prevent the federation from proceeding with elections. The FFTUZ has had to spend 
its resources on taking the MMD government to court in response (the court case was 
still ongoing at the time of my interview).  
Interference from politicians has also been a problem for the organizations of informal 
workers. AZIEA claims that individuals within informal associations as well as trade 
unions may use the name or resources of organizations they belong to in order to rally 
voters for political candidates or parties.427 People may also establish similar 
organizations to steal members from organizations that are seen as a threat to their 
preferred political party, thereby weakening their movement base. AZIEA has been 
approached by political candidates who come to their offices and ask for help in 
organizing their campaigns. There have also been incidents where politicians have 
sought to blackmail or threaten people in these associations into providing support.428 
Since the turn of the century, however, the objectives of the movement for informal 
traders, in particular as regards street vending, increasingly converged with the 
mobilization strategy of the opposition party, the PF. War on Want (2014) viewed 
President Sata’s “legalization strategy” towards the street vendors during the 2011 
elections as one of AZIEA’s successes. AZIEA was initially positive about the PF’s 
stance of not penalizing or evicting street vendors.429 Both trade union federations 
were positive to the PF approach towards workers during its first period in office. 
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ZCTU considered the PF government to be good for workers as it reviewed the 
minimum wage, and began working on a social protection plan for the informal 
economy.430 The new government also appeared willing to enhance redistributive 
elements. The FFTUZ also expressed satisfaction with how the PF government 
ignored the legal instrument that the FFTUZ had been fighting in court and how it 
stayed out of union elections.431  
Nevertheless, also during the 2011 elections, relations between the FFTUZ and the 
ZCTU were not considered “very healthy,” and both parties accused each other of 
doing a lot of politicking.432 The ZCTU was accused of having strong ties to the MMD 
and of campaigning for the former government party in the 2011 elections, which 
distanced the ZCTU from the PF government.433 At the same time, the new Minister 
for Labor and Social Protection under the PF government was the former president of 
the ZCTU, Fackson Shamenda. The lack of social dialogue with the PF government 
was considered a problem by all the former organizations representing street vendors, 
including the ZCTU, AZIEA and the SVA.434 This is a paradox, considering that the 
PF also mobilized this constituency. Moreover, upon assuming office the PF actively 
contributed to weakening AZIEA and co-opting the street vendors by creating its own 
United Street Vendor Foundation (USVF).435  
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Previously, it was the trade associations within the markets that were the main targets 
of political clientelism. Jongh (2013: 50-51) finds that the power shift from MMD to 
PF had a heavy impact on the circumstances under which the marketers and street 
vendors could operate, and describes it as a “honeymoon” between the PF government 
and street vendors. Upon assuming office, the PF decided to fully implement the 
Market and Bus Stations Act of 2007 (Jongh 2013: 32). One of the Act’s previously 
dormant regulations were the prohibition of the existence of organizations for 
operating in the markets. Implementation of the regulation led to de-registration of 
what had been the largest national marketer organizations, ZANAMA and the 
ZATMA, both affiliated to the AZIEA. According to ZANAMA (referred to by Jongh 
2013: 52), they had decided to become politically affiliated to the then leading party, 
the MMD, in order to protect their existence after the passage of the 2007 Markets and 
Bus Stations Act. ZATMA, on its side, had been affiliated to the PF. As a consequence 
of the implementation of the Act, AZIEA’s membership was halved. For marketers, 
de-registration affected the quality of facilities such as toilets and storage, as well as 
security in the markets, and left the local authorities fully responsible for running the 
markets (Jongh 2013: 32).436 
The USVF was established in 2011 by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing, to represent street vendors vis-à-vis the local and national authorities. The 
foundation was completely dependent on government funding (Jongh 2013: 36). The 
PF stimulated the formation of the foundation after entering office. A main task for the 
USVF was to advise the authorities on how to deal with street vending. They zoned 
different streets and appointed representatives for each zone. The objective was to 
group together street vendors with similar businesses, to invest in procurement of 
equipment for better profits, as well as to improve sanitary facilities and legalize 
certain streets for street vending (Jongh 2013: 31). Their regional coordinators were 
elected by local street vendors. The local street branches tried to govern the streets by 
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encouraging vendors to behave properly, and by mediating disputes. If unable to solve 
these problems, they reported to regional coordinators.  
The USVF only had links to the government and local authorities, and was not 
connected to AZIEA or other domestic or international informal economy associations 
(Jongh 2013: 36). The closeness of the PF government and the USVF is reflected in 
how the then Vice-President Guy Scott gave a vehicle to the USVF Cooperative in 
Lusaka during a speech in support of street vendors in 2014 (Lusaka Voice 
11.04.2014). Upon assuming office in 2015, the new Vice-President, Inonge Wina, 
stated that the government had put in place a program to empower all vendors to help 
their businesses grow (Zambia Daily Mail 2015). Approximately 900 street vendors, 
under the leadership of the new USVF, marched to her office to show solidarity with 
her appointment as the first-ever female vice-president, and in “gratefulness” to the 
government for allowing them to trade on the streets. 
According to SVA,437 some of the smaller street-vendor associations were formed by 
politicians. After the PF came to power it had become very difficult for the SVA to 
recruit members, because NGOs representing the informal sectors had become 
politicized and were now weak. Politicians did not want the street vendors to be 
associated with NGOs, fearing loss of popularity, and there was therefore competition 
between politicians and NGOs. As the primary goal of the NGOs had been to legalize 
street vending, they were able to mobilize the street vendors only at times when 
politicians were harassing them.438 The street-vendor cadres in Lusaka were also 
hostile towards the SVA. Its attempts to approach street vendors after the 2011 
elections resulted in threats of violence. The SVA representative argued that if the PF 
cadres would even fight within the party, they would definitely fight those outside, 
such as the NGOs, through “muscles” and brute force. He attributed this to their high 
illiteracy levels and lack of understanding.  
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Hence, the SMOs representing informal traders became further divided and weakened 
due to the implementation of a dormant regulation, and the establishment of a 
competing, non-autonomous organization for street vendors. Only the umbrella bodies 
representing the informal workers as a whole were affiliated to the transnational 
movement, while the association that represented the street vendors was tied to the 
government, which funded it. The USVF was not part of the structures of the labor 
movement which so far had sought to organize this group. These developments 
resemble earlier attempts at fragmenting the labor movement. Thus, PF’s neopopulist 
strategy of mobilizing street vendors by bypassing existing organizations and 
supplement electoral promises with clientelism was combined with more classic style 
co-optation, through the creation of a parallel, party-loyal association.   
Street-vendor agency: preferring neopopulism to movement 
disconnectoni 
The political agency of street vendors must be considered to have been strengthened 
during the past decade. Previously, they were simply considered a nuisance and illegal 
element to be removed. Prior to the 2011 elections, Lusaka’s street vendors had been 
politically mobilized through two separate structures: an opposition party, and a social 
movement. These were not mutually contradictory in principle. After the 2011 
elections, the rights and interests of street vendors were recognized by SMOs as well 
as by the new incumbent government.  
However, while Sata’s Presidential Decree allowed vendors to ignore discriminatory 
laws, he was yet to amend the laws in favor of street vendors. AZIEA grew concerned 
as they wanted some form of legislation for their members.439 The Alliance considered 
President Sata’s gesture a payback for the vote, and wanted it to move beyond 
patronage. There had been no response to the initiatives of the already existing 
organizations representing street vendors to pass favorable legislation and policy and 
to establish bargaining institutions. As a consequence, the street vendors had to depend 
on the discretion of the political leadership and a non-autonomous association, as well 
as the party cadres who had imposed their own controls over the markets and streets.  
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However, the options open to Zambia’s street vendors did not seem like much of a 
dilemma, neither before nor after the 2011 elections. Despite the clientelistic features, 
the political agency obtained by the street vendors through the PF’s neopopulist 
strategy must be considered to have improved, in the short run at least. Street vendors 
have gained a voice, legitimacy and political recognition at the highest government 
level, as well as the liberty to work on the streets without being harassed and rejected 
by government authorities and the police. Their pre-election mobilization seemed to 
have paid off. A few years later, the street vendors were still holding the PF to account 
for what it promised them—less tax, more jobs, and more money in their pockets—
based on the logic that they should have the right to operate freely to earn a livelihood 
until the government could come up with something better to offer. 
While a patronage component is evident in the PF-formed street vendor foundation, 
the strategy seems to resonate better with the street vendor constituency.  In part, this 
might be due to the fact that the USVF represents only the interests of street vendors. 
The PF filled a vacuum, as the social movement structure lacked well-functioning 
grassroots associations to the street vendors in Lusaka. In addition, implementation of 
the Act that effectively outlawed marketer organizations from the markets (Jongh 
2013) served to politicize the sub-conflict between marketers and street vendors, 
whereby the incumbent party was in favor of the street vendors. According to the 
SVA,440 donors (here: the European Union) in Zambia had their own agenda when 
financing modern markets, and did not side with the poor. The SVA representative 
argued that participation should come with respect, mutual understanding and genuine 
consultation, rather than slave/master consultation.  
At the same time, the streets and markets in Lusaka were, as a consequence of the 
withdrawal of formal authority (LCC), increasingly run by self-proclaimed cadres of 
the PF. It was important for vendors or others not to be on bad terms with these 
informal controllers of work, as vendors depended on these cadres’ good-will, rather 
than any legally enforceable rights. The street vendors may face a dilemma if the PF 
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continues the same strategy. In order to maintain at least a minimum of improvement 
in working conditions—non-harassment from the authorities and freedom to work in 
the streets—street vendors have been subordinated to the discretion and informal rules 
of the party leadership and their political cadres, who  increasingly seemed to be 
creating a shadow government through informal taxation and violence.  
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the recognition of the plight of street vendors 
by the PF leadership is a result of earlier work of the SMOs. Political clientelism, 
however, is undermining the social movement’s work towards more long-term and 
institutionalized benefits for the street vendors (given that they actually reflect what 
the street vendors want). Hence, by supporting the PF so as to obtain short-term gains 
through clientelism, street vendors may weaken the movement’s prospects of 
influencing long-term changes. On the other hand, as the movement was already 
internally fragmented and represented the (Lusakan) street vendors only indirectly, the 
latter may not have seen this as a competing alternative to the PF. Considering their 
lack of ties to any autonomous SMOs, the street vendors’ political agency 
predominantly reflect clientship through a neopopulist party. Nevertheless, the case 
also shows that clientelist relations combined with a programmatic component may 
improve political agency, as opposed to mere exclusion.   
10.1.2 Slum-dwellers: government collaboration    
Government collaboration: a limited threat to clientelist resource 
mobilization  
In the 1990s and early years of the 2000s, collaborative partnerships between the 
MMD government, donors and civil society on issues of urban land management were 
structured in ways that weakened the ability of CSOs to engage autonomously vis-à-
vis political elites. Schlyter (1998) claims that community projects on housing carried 
out in cooperation with external NGOs and donor agencies were followed by conflicts 
due to unclear responsibilities. One example was the MMD government’s freezing of 
support to the NGO, CARE, in 1995, after the NGO was accused of acting too 
independently and without coordination with the proper authorities (Tait, 1997, 
referred to in Schlyter 1998: 262).  
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Berrisford’s (2011) account of the Zambian revision process on spatial planning 
legislation, which began in 2007, is illuminating for understanding how the MMD 
government sought to restrain the SMOs that were working for slum-dwellers. 
Berrisford, who was a consultant in the revision process, argues that consensus and 
lack of resistance from the stakeholders pointed to a flawed “participatory” process, 
given the controversial, substantive issues that the legislation was to deal with. He 
attributes this failure to erroneous assumptions made by the consultancy and donors.    
First, while all stakeholders were to read prepared documents and provide detailed 
comments to the drafts, in reality, few people outside government structures were able 
or willing to engage (Berrisford 2011). Civil society had few organizations dealing 
with housing and urban development, as their focus was on rural areas. However, 
Berrisford also found that the NGOs were under strain during the drafting, due to 
government efforts to control their activities and funding. This problem was 
aggravated by the fact that the main priority of the donors and the consultancy was to 
get the ministry officials on board—not acknowledging that without broad support 
within and outside government, implementation would be difficult. Consequently, only 
a handful of individuals contradicted or questioned the proposals from the consultants.  
Additionally, main blocs of stakeholders held strong interests in the current planning 
system, both politically and materially, and the reform process could threaten their 
livelihoods, professional status, political power and even their homes (Berrisford 
2011). Keeping the status quo posed less risk. Thus, the assumed support for the 
existing Housing Act, lauded internationally as a “good regulatory practice” with 
provisions for land-tenure regime where large numbers of poor were living, was 
simply not present. On the contrary: most dominant voices wanted to repeal the 
Housing Act (Berrisford 2011).441 Furthermore, parallel legal reforms process in other 
areas, such as on land and decentralization, could leave the residents of informal 
settlements highly vulnerable to eviction if a time-lag occurred between the new 
planning act and the land act that was to replace the housing act in catering for tenure 
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arrangements, as the residents would have no protection in the interim period  
(Berrisford 2011).442 Hence—and in line with Pommerolle’s (2010) argument—this 
form of extraverted engagement, as well as the neglect of the vested interests of the 
political elites in terms of resources, contributed to upholding the political status quo.   
Representatives from the slum-dwellers’ movement in the ZHPPF/PPHPZ generally 
perceived its relationship with the government (both the old and the new) as amicable 
and collaborative. Initially, most municipalities had believed that the federation was an 
NGO and therefore assumed that it had its own funding.443 When the municipalities 
realized what type of federation it was, they have generally wanted to help, although 
the response has differed from one municipality to another. The federation engaged the 
government through housing forums, teaching government officials about how the 
federation works in other countries. In the beginning, it was difficult to convince the 
municipalities that a strategy based on group members saving one kwacha a day would 
be a feasible project, who had though “they were dreaming.”444 Through visits to 
Zimbabwe, municipalities understood the benefit and gave the federation members 34 
plots. The councils were seen as appreciating the work of the federation because it 
supplemented their own efforts. They also contributed by negotiating with electricity 
companies, surveyors and materials.  
While nonpartisan and autonomous, the PPHPZ/ZHPPF did blame the former MMD 
government for demolitions and forced evictions.445 Furthermore, one year after the 
2011 elections, the Director of the organizations expressed a slight hope that the new 
PF government would follow up on some of its electoral promises, despite indications 
that the party appeared caught up in the “MMD syndrome of non-implementation.” 
The implication was that if the PF would implement its electoral promises in office, 
that would not contradict the goals and objectives of the slum-dweller movement, but 
                                              
442 Berrisford (2011) suggests that more incremental reforms would also make it difficult for a consultancy to transplant laws 
made elsewhere to a context for which it was not designed. 
443 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
444 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
445 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
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rather be considered a positive development. There was therefore some alignment in 
the articulated goals of the movement and the PF.   
However, federation members later observed that the change of government affected 
their work negatively.446 PF’s promises concerning housing seemed to follow the 
pattern of non-implementation.  Cadre allocation of urban land was widespread also 
during the 2011 elections, and led to demolitions and evictions afterwards. With new 
staff, PF officials began demarcating idle land, continuing existing practices under the 
previous MMD government. Some officials were accused of giving land to people 
who were not entitled to it, or of removing files proving that land had been granted. 
Still, at least one incident was mentioned where the movement was able to halt an 
illegal land transfer after the 2011 elections. The federation intervened by demanding 
to know who had authorized the demarcation. After meeting with the town clerk, the 
federation successfully stopped this illegal acquisition of land.447    
ZHPPF/PPHPZ representatives did not bring up aggressive political encroachment in 
the form of co-optation or repression from the government—the old or the new—as a 
challenge.448 A reason may be that the land patronage structure is not considered 
particularly threatened by the current activities of the movement. Simply by not 
implementing land and housing policies, the clientelist practices of the government or 
political cadres are allowed to continue. The limited encroachment by political patrons 
can be attributed to the strategy pursued by the ZHPPF/PPHPZ towards the 
government, basically complementary and non-confrontational. Their engagement was 
described as “boot-licking” the government, or like an African woman told by her aunt 
that if her husband beats her, that shows he loves her.449  Long-run involvement was 
still considered more fruitful, slowly leading to change.   
                                              
446 Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
447 Ibid. 
448 The grassroots associations of the federation might also be approached by political patrons seeking political support in 
exchange for land and housing. I do not have data to verify whether this has been the case.  
449 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
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Hence, while not being a target itself, the work of SMOs was hurt by the prevalent 
political clientelism that exploited the informal land markets. The continuation of 
clientelist use of land indicates that the PF strategy towards slum-dwellers proved to 
be one of populism underpinned by clientelism, similar to Latin American neopopulist 
parties. The limited scope of collaboration and transformation from the side of the 
slum-dwellers’ movement did not interfere with or undermine the neopopulist strategy 
of the PF, which was based on limited institutionalization and direct ties to slum-
dwellers. The movements could be seen as complementary: the two could operate side 
by side, and even collaborate, arguably without problems for the PF party.  
Slum-dweller agency: one for the short run, one for the long run 
Also in the area of slum housing, the success recipe of the opposition party was to fuse 
its clientelist linkage brokered by cadres with a programmatic linkage that centered on 
affordable low-cost housing. Hence, whether convinced by cadres or programmatic 
promises, the slum-dweller constituency was effectively mobilized by the opposition. 
Furthermore, in the 2011 elections, the programmatic aspects of the PF’s political 
campaigns did not contradict the objectives of the movement. In 2012, the 
ZHPPF/PPHPZ was still hopeful that the PF might lend them an ear and work in 
partnership, as the party was seen as being quite tolerant.450 Hence, the movement and 
the opposition party were pulling slum-dwellers in the same direction. 
For slum-dwellers, their best short-term chance of obtaining access to housing was in 
the informal market, which contributes to its demand-side. Some slum-dwellers had an 
almost Robin Hood-perspective on the cadres who provide land brokerage. Even one 
of the experts who were interviewed suggested that, since illegal, informal land 
distribution tended to be more efficient and reach the target groups, the government 
should employ a similar mechanism.451 However, the counter-argument is that such 
brokered deals are unpredictable and insecure, leading to recurring episodes of 
                                              
450 ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
 
451 Geographer at the University of Zambia. Oct 3, 2012, Lusaka. 
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demolitions and evictions as new political parties enter government. In the aftermath 
of the 2011 elections, conflicts over cadre redistribution of land began to re-surface, 
with resultant evictions. Political dependency relations were reproduced.  
To access (land for) housing through member-based SMOs requires personal 
investments, time, patience and collective action. While this strategy may pay off for 
slum-dwellers in the long run through secure tenure, the number of people to have 
benefited from this arrangement is still low. Most slum-dwellers must rely on the 
informal land market. Slum-dweller participation in both mobilization structures was 
not necessarily contradictory around the 2011 elections. The slum-dwellers benefit 
from the informal land markets in the short run, while the long-term process of 
acquiring land legally can be pursued. While the aggregate impact of mass 
engagement in informal land markets probably is severe delays in the legal process, 
the urban poor have few options, since they need housing immediately.  Furthermore, 
due to the low levels of contention between the (new) government and the movement, 
a slum-dweller would probably not be punished for being active in the slum-dwellers’ 
movement while also taking part in the cadre-mediated informal housing market. 
Voting for the PF in the 2011 elections based on its programmatic content was also not 
contradictory to the goals of the slum-dweller movement.  
Nevertheless, if the PF fails to deliver on any of its housing promises to the slum-
dwellers before the next elections, and only provides highly insecure, particularistic 
and even violent, clientelist land transfers, slum-dwellers might face more of a 
dilemma between party and social movement mobilization the next time around. 
Interestingly, also the PF government might find itself in a dilemma. The new 
government has arrested some cadres who had engaged in illegal land distribution. 
However, when interviewed, a ZHPPF/PPHPZ representative indicated that the PF’s 
arrest of people who had engaged in illegal cadre distribution would ensure that the 
party would not be re-elected, because if the PF followed the law, the majority would 
not have land.452 As with street vending, clientelism has begun to resemble ties of 
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accountability and representation of a more democratic nature in a context of limited 
state capacity and resources, following the logic of Walle (2007) and Kitschelt (2000). 
However, the violence that underpins these transactions, and how they reproduce 
political and economic asymmetries, is more reflective of the reproduction of a 
neopatrimonial order. Slum-dweller agency through political parties can thus be 
considered predominantly as clientship, while the slum-dwellers have a channel to 
engage more as autonomous citizens through the SMOs, within certain parameters.   
10.2 Kenya  
In Kenya, neopatrimonial encroachment on civil society was carried out with highly 
violent and punitive authoritarian measures in the beginning of Kenya’s multiparty era. 
Although the Kenyan NGO sector was guaranteed independence in law, this was not 
realized in practice (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 14). During the KANU era in the mid-
1990s, at the height of tensions, Kituo cha Sheria and Kenya Human Rights 
Commission were firebombed six times, several NGOs were banned and their 
meetings violently disrupted by police.  
In 2001, a survey showed that 56 percent of rural NGO activists and employees 
reported interference and harassment by local authorities, especially in opposition 
areas, as harassment and intimidation of political opposition grew (Orvis 2003: 58, 
referred to in LeBas 2011: 233). Orvis (2003) found that NGOs that sought to establish 
a rural presence through civil education and paralegal programs began to achieve a 
measurable impact on citizens’ understanding of politics, but did so by relying on 
ethnic, clan, partisan or other “non-civil” networks to build supporters. These networks 
nearly always involved patronage flows, with constituencies mainly from these 
networks. Despite this, Orvis argued, such CSOs could at least serve as (underfunded) 
alternative sources of patronage that could limit the power of the state.  
Kenyan CSOs have periodically expressed support in favor of the incumbent party or 
opposition. As many civil society actors are also involved in party politics, Orvis 
(2003) considered a presumed distinction between civil and political society to be 
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artificial and unhelpful. After the 2007 post-election violence, Kanyinga (2011) found 
civil society to be divided in its response to the crisis along partisan lines, between 
conservatives (status quo) and progressives. The former considered peace an end in 
itself, while the latter focused on justice and truth as a foundation for peace. The 
“peace” position was in line with the incumbent PNU, who wanted to close the chapter 
on alleged electoral fraud. The progressives, who demanded accountability for the vote 
count and the state’s role in violence, were in line with the ODM. The churches in 
particular formed part of the conservative civil society side, while a second bloc of 
organizations and individuals from the governance and human rights sector coalesced 
around the Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice group. In addition to consonant 
positions, civil society actors also stood for election as candidates of political parties, 
or campaigned for change through the ODM (Kanyinga 2011: 94). However, 
Kanyinga did not consider the main ethnic divisions of the political conflict to affect 
the civil society groups, who were more divided on ideological issues. Also ODM 
representatives claim that they mobilize together with civil society on critical issues, 
such as the constitution, devolution, or historical injustices.453  
When donor priorities determine funding there has been a danger of the public sector 
corralling the voluntary sector, “which could deflect attention away from issues of 
accountability to the poor, and also bring the whole sector into disrepute” (Kameri-
Mbote 2000: 16). When projects came with large resources, or had agendas that might 
challenge the political status quo, they became vulnerable to political capture. 
Grassroots respondents expressed frustration with NGOs (implementing partners) that 
functioned as engines of vested government interests, and were run or “owned” by the 
elites. NGOs were believed to be hijacked by the government before entering the 
communities.454 A common opinion among my interview respondents was that donors 
should surpass implementing partners and engage directly with the grassroots actors, 
as NGOs were considered patronage tools for political elites. Co-optation of critical 
voices in civil society was also seen as a problem. When activists got appointed to 
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political positions, they were perceived to become demoralized and soft on issues they 
had previously criticized.455 Another strategy for silencing critical voices was to 
appoint them to positions not in line with their area of expertise, thereby diverting their 
focus to other, less threatening issues.  
Grassroots organizations become linked to political patronage through different means 
or for different purposes than for instance NGOs. They are closer to the voters. Youth 
organizations were concerned about what they would have to give in return if they 
asked an MP to raise their issue in parliament.456 To stay out of partisan politics, they 
sought to build MP caucuses of supporters from different political parties. However, 
youth groups were considered an easy target for politicians, as these were seen as 
being less aware of what they were being drawn into. The problem of vigilante groups 
causing havoc often began with politicians approaching these groups with promises of 
supporting their work. Later, the politicians would take control over the 
associations.457  
Grassroots activists who had challenged their representatives on the use of 
constituency development funds, after being informed about the actual budget 
transfers, had received death threats in front of witnesses, and been forced into hiding, 
while their witnesses were threatened into silence.458 When activists began to oppose 
the authorities, a smear campaign against them targeting their community or other 
stakeholders could follow, with the activists being accused of corruption, lies or 
instigating violence. Politicians also interrupted CSO projects organizations by 
planting “moles.” When a project was against the interest of a political party or 
candidate, or when it could benefit their “own”—whether family members, cronies or 
tribes—moles were used to sabotage and manipulate the organization from the inside, 
eventually resulting in project failure.459 When organizations experienced hostility 
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from the government, it was considered important to ensure that people who applied 
for membership were vetted, to avoid government moles.460  
After being elected into office in 2013, the Jubilee government has continued 
government interference in civil society. In 2013 and 2014, it proposed amendments to 
the Public Benefit Organization Bill that would cap foreign funding of NGOs at 15 
percent, which sparked protests from civil society (Freedom House 2015a). In 2014, 
the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Board de-registered more than 340 
NGOs accused of not submitting financial records, claiming they were vulnerable to 
terrorism financing and money laundering. However, even if denied registration, some 
have chosen to operate outside formal channels through movement structures, such as 
Bunge la Mwananchi.461  
The ability of the executive branch to use security agencies as its prolonged arm has 
been somewhat reduced after recent police reforms following the post-election 
violence.462 Still, movement activists are placed in custody numerous times without 
any criminal charges. Others experience that government officials intimidate their 
social surroundings (such as teachers or girlfriends) to isolate them.463 They may be 
denied admission into schools or have their bank accounts frozen. Some activists do 
not rent housing in their own names, for fear of being monitored or kidnapped. Some 
use only public transport, taking different routes every day to avoid the authorities. 
Witnesses against Rutu and Kenyatta for the ICC trial disappeared or withdrew amid 
threats (Freedom House 2015a). 
Thus, Kenyan CSOs operate in a rough environment where the government and 
politicians use legal means as well as co-optation, repression and violence to curb their 
activities. The interaction between the movements of the urban poor and party politics 
should be seen against this backdrop.  
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10.2.1 Informal traders: government collaboration and ethnic co-
optation  
Government collaboration and ethnic “divide and rule” co-optation 
Unlike in Zambia, the conflict dimension of marketer versus street vendors does not 
appear to have become a rallying point for political parties or for the dominant 
movement umbrellas in Kenya. Instead, both seek to organize them jointly under the 
bracket of informal traders, with the aspiration of formalizing them and have them 
work in stipulated trading spaces.  
Moyi (2014: 18) argues that as the formation of most MSE-organizations has been 
driven by pressures from government policy, political interventionism and donor 
funding, this top–down influence has reduced the “self-help spirit” that should drive 
collective action processes in Kenya. As shown in the previous chapter, the agenda of 
the movement and its collaboration with the business community do not directly 
challenge the agenda of the incumbent government, which is considered business-
friendly. In addition, the majority of street vendors in Nairobi are considered to be 
Kikuyu, the ethnic group associated with the incumbent government.464 This may be a 
reason why the opposition party, the ODM, has not targeted the street vendors in the 
same manner that the opposition party PF did in Zambia. 
NISCOF is of the opinion that all party manifestoes reflect that politicians know their 
constituencies’ problems.465 Although speaking the same language as the movement, 
in practice, none of the political parties can be considered to have a stronger 
programmatic link to this constituency or the movement. The Jubilee coalition, for 
instance, promised substantial budget allocations for women and youth businesses. It 
is the implementation, and the ability for lay persons to access this money, that are 
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problematic.466  KENASVIT claims that politicians do not share their interests and do 
not even talk about them in their campaigns.467  
Instead, organizations that seek to represent and organize informal traders experience 
an encroachment from political patrons trying to bring these constituencies (back) into 
their neopatrimonial structures. The challenge has been to develop a consistent 
movement that can protect the rights and interests of informal traders from being 
manipulated by patrons for political or material gain. According to KENASVIT,468 the 
government can more easily take advantage of a divided people. It fears unity, as it 
would then be bound to listen.  
During the 2007 market relocation of street vendors, political interference contributed 
to weakening the vendors’ collective organization. Competition and antagonism were 
created through divide-and-rule activities by politicians (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 
128). Because the market was considered a positive accomplishment at the time, 
politicians from different party blocs competed in taking credit for the new market in 
order to rally this constituency before the elections. By creating divisions among the 
street vendors, it became easier for politicians to intervene and rally votes (Lindell and 
Ihalainen 2014: 123). One of the associations was suspected of having been 
“encouraged” by a politician to carry out the relocation on its own, with the promise 
that its members would get ownership of some of the market facilities and permission 
to enter the market before it opened, in order to secure the most lucrative sites for 
themselves. Street-vendor associations have also faced considerable interference when 
attempting to gather their members for meeting: hooligans hired by politicians have 
appeared to start fights and disrupt their activities. According to the chairman of one 
association,  politicians feared the organization of people in the informal sector 
because they could endanger the positions of some politicians  (Lindell and Ihalainen 
2014: 123). 
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In fact, KENASVIT claims that their main opponents are local authorities and 
politicians that prey on their members, either directly or through mushrooming 
associations created by them.469 NISCOF confirms that there are problems of 
leadership in the informal economy, and argues that politicians “kill off” organizations 
by making sure they are disorganized and disenfranchised.470 While organizations 
register as non-political, individual members engage in party mobilization on their 
own, sometimes due to corrupt payments.  Politicians would always “poke in” to these 
associations to have them work for them, using ethnicity as a linkage.471 When 
grassroots associations are formed, members form “silent” sub-groups within the 
associations with their own interests, secretly connected to politicians. Some 
politicians also start their own trade associations to reward cronies. 
Politicians have also interfered with the internal politics of SMOs. A KENASVIT 
interviewee provided an example of county elections for one of its affiliates.472  The 
alliance went to the county to organize and educate its members. The process went 
well up to election day, but then, police had to intervene and elections were postponed. 
Five factions were sponsored by five different political parties. Manipulation by 
politicians was considered a major reason why the informal traders’ organizations 
would not support the CORD or the Jubilee coalition. Instead, their strategy has been 
to identify and engage supportive, individual policymakers, and to manage and 
balance divisions in town halls and between government levels.473  
The SMOs for informal traders and their grassroots are continuously targeted by 
politicians trying to co-opt or weaken them. However, the movement on the whole is 
not considered to directly challenge the government in ways leading to an aggressive 
backlash. The dominant SMOs have aligned with the business community and 
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engaged in more institutionalized and collaborative relations with the government, 
sometimes at the expense of pre-existing organizations. This might help to explain 
why there has not been any close alignment between the opposition party and the 
movement. Nevertheless, the SMOs are systematically undermined by politicians of all 
stripes and at different levels, seeking clientelist brokers to access voters, or wanting to 
sabotage organizations that might threaten their clientelist resource base.  
Informal trader agency: ethno-clientelism or exit 
A fragmented movement, troubled with briefcase associations and patronage, makes 
many informal traders prioritize action through other channels. The informal traders 
are caught up in contradictory mobilization structures that are also entangled with one 
another. The SMOs try to include the street vendors under the umbrella of informal 
traders. The fact that politicians encroach on the SMOs for informal traders is a clear 
sign that the movement actually has access to a constituency of interest to politicians. 
However, membership is low, considering the potential. Their extraverted strategy, ties 
with the business community and close collaboration with the government with 
formalized representation, has not been translated in a strong grassroots foundation. 
Although informal traders have obtained formal rights and participation through the 
dominant SMOs, which should facilitate citizen-based engagement, only a small 
minority have chosen to do so.  
Due to constant political encroachment on these SMOs by politicians, as well as the 
forging of clientelist ties to the grassroots by association leaders themselves, informal 
traders face difficulties in knowing whom to trust and how to further their own 
interests most effectively. While street vendors as a political constituency are not 
reflected in programmatic party cleavages as they are in Zambia or as tenants are in 
Kenya, political clientelism is still systematically used to divide and disorganize their 
movement. Even when informal traders are aware of this form of manipulation, they 
face a dilemma. If relocated to the market, they have no common enemy (Lindell and 
Ihalainen 2014: 126), and internal conflicts emerge over the limited space available. 
Without a political patron, informal traders are likely to lose out in the markets, as 
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SMOs often lack the capacity to safeguard their rights, and grassroots associations are 
politicized.  
Also for vendors who choose not to enter the markets but prefer operating on the 
streets, it is difficult to know which associations to engage with. As access to trading 
space is restricted and subject to regulation and fees, street vendors have limited voice 
through the current institutional collaboration between the movement bodies and the 
government. Poorer vendors who have abandoned their slots in order to go hawking 
seem to be particularly unprotected and vulnerable to “order restoring” raids and 
hostilities from other vendors (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 126). According to Lindell 
and Ihalainen, the entanglement with politics illustrates how street vendors become 
part of vertical clientelist networks that facilitate the penetration of the power of the 
state into the lower echelons of society. By becoming “politically disconnected, 
deserted by the market committee, and unable to count on whatever association they 
may have belonged to prior to the relocation, the hawkers were left to fend for 
themselves” (Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 129).  
As a consequence, street vendors may prefer to collaborate in small-scale groups and 
networks instead of upscaling into visible and vocal associations, as a way of 
deflecting political attention and avoiding co-option and pressure of politicians (M. 
Kinyanjui, personal communication, quoted in Lindell and Ihalainen 2014: 130). By 
either withdrawing from political engagement altogether, or by participating in ethno-
clientelist politics, they passively or actively contribute to upholding the 
neopatrimonial power structure. Still, as the MSE Act is relatively new, it remains to 
be seen if its provisions will create more citizen-based agency for informal traders 
over time.  
10.2.2 Slum-dwellers: government collaboration and co-optation of 
sub-groups   
A movement at odds with the neopopulist strategy     
As the objectives of the umbrella SMOs—to formalize and secure tenure for slum-
dwellers—directly interferes with the clientelist mechanism of party elites, a backlash 
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from the government party, with repression or co-optation, might be expected. 
However, as the party cleavages between NARC/TNA and ODM reflect sub-conflicts 
between tenants and landlords that are organized at the grassroots level, there are 
incentives for both the incumbent and opposition party to fragment and/or co-opt parts 
of the movement. These movement actors have since their inception been operating 
under the threat and influence of existing political patronage networks. This is not 
surprising, given the political influence and economic resources that are generated 
through clientelist control over slum housing in Kenya.  
In the end of the 1990s, initial efforts to establish a network of local organizations to 
promote rule of law and just governance in the management of public land (the project 
was called Operation Firimbi) faced difficulties in mobilizing due to repression from 
the government of President Moi (Klopp 2000: 21). According to Weru (2004: 48), 
disagreements emerged in the 1990s over the role of Nairobi’s NGOs towards the 
repressive and anti-poor KANU government. While some preferred protest and 
demands that targeted the state without close engagement, Indian and South African 
members of Slum/Shack Dwellers’ International encouraged Kenyan NGOs to use the 
methodologies of urban poor federations. The representative community organizations 
based on saving schemes were developed precisely for the purpose of turning the 
communities into agents rather than objects in their relationship to the state, while 
recognizing that only the state could solve some of their problems (Weru 2004).  
Initially, the Moi government tried to close down Pamoja Trust. Their offices were 
even firebombed, and its community organizers arrested (Weru 2004: 50). This 
illustrates the perceived threat that such community organization posed to the 
government. Although the governments that succeeded President Moi and his KANU 
party have been less repressive, politicians and the state have continued to encroach on 
these SMOs to undermine their work.  
A more recent slum enumeration process in 2010, which was a part of the “Kwa-
maji”(pseudonym)  slum-upgrading project (Rigon 2014), can illustrate how the 
government extended its neopatrimonial rule through co-optation (although Rigon did 
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not see it that way). The project was funded by an international development agency, 
and was to be implemented through a participatory approach that involved 
development agencies, an NGO, a government agency and community organizations. 
However, the  Resident Committee from the NGO, which was dominated by structure 
owners, consented to enumeration only if that took place under their control and by the 
government agency, rather than the UN body that originally had the implementing role 
(Rigon 2014: 267). The donors accepted this demand. A housing survey was hastily 
conducted, during business hours. The results were completely out of line with 
previous population and household estimates, and negatively affected tenants. 
Verification checks to avoid errors were dismissed as unnecessary by the government 
agency, as the Resident Committee representing “the community” was supervising the 
process.  
According to Rigon (2014), the government dismissal represented its failure to 
consider how the Resident Committee was an expression of the structure owners and 
their interests, as well as its fear of confronting the structure owners, which would be 
time-consuming and conflictual. She therefore argues in favor of a stronger display of 
power from the “outsiders”—the government and development agencies—to manage 
participation and avoid local elite capture. However, I will argue that the government 
agency was probably well-aware of this local elite capture, and that Rigon’s 
conclusions lack understanding of how these processes intersect with clientelist party 
politics. The property-owners belong to the constituency mobilized by the incumbent 
government party through its fusion of programmatic and ethno-clientelist linkages: 
the project was co-opted by the political interests representing landlords. 
As the opposition party ODM has been mobilizing another sub-constituency of the 
slum-dwellers—the tenants—through a neopopulist strategy, any close alignment to 
the SMO umbrellas is not expected. Rather, the ODM has established closer ties to the 
grassroots associations that predominantly represent tenants. One example can be 
drawn from Kibera. Grassroots associations there are deeply ingrained in partisan 
politics, along the main division between the CORD and Jubilee coalitions. The 
Nubian Rights Forum’s struggle for community titles was fought mainly outside the 
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electoral arena, because the Nubians are a small ethnic minority without political 
representation at the party level.474 However, when newly elected President Kenyatta 
in 2013 decided to grant the Nubians a land title in Kibera , that immediately triggered 
a backlash from two grassroots associations more aligned with political parties: the 
Kibera Stakeholder Forum and the Kibera Inhabitant Forum.  
It may seem puzzling that two forums in Kibera both claim to represent structure 
owners and tenants in response to the perceived threat of the Nubian community title, 
especially since the conflict between landlords and tenants is considered a major 
conflict issue. However, the Kibera Stakeholder Forum was established with the 
specific purpose of protecting structure owners,475 and for the transferal of private 
titles to these owners.476 By contrast, the Kibera Inhabitant Forum has been supportive 
of the UN-Habitat slum-upgrading project,477 initiated by the previous government and 
Prime Minister Odinga, which was intended to grant tenure to all dwellers—landlords 
and tenants. The Kibera Stakeholder Forum is seen as being aligned to the Jubilee 
Coalition, which focuses on a property-owning society, while Kibera Inhabitant Forum 
is aligned to the ODM, which has taken the credit for slum-upgrading projects. The 
leader of the latter forum has even been the ODM campaign organizer in Kibera.478  
The transfer of the community titles to the Nubians was halted due to massive 
demonstrations in Kibera (Daily Nation 08.12.2013), and led to new rounds of 
consultations. The Kibera Inhabitant Forum staged protests and demonstrations against 
the government, including a large-scale demonstration to prevent President Kenyatta 
from visiting Kibera to hand over the Nubian community title, eventually forcing him 
to cancel the event.479 The tenants’ representatives in the forum mobilized this group 
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for demonstrations. According to the Kibera Inhabitant Forum,480 the difference 
between them and Kibera Stakeholder Forum was that the latter had no teeth to bite 
with and no political good-will, since they were seen as belonging to the Jubilee 
Alliance, and Kibera is ODM territory. Although some NGOs were involved in 
bringing the conflicting parts together for negotiations, we can see how the opposition 
party, ODM, was more attuned to the interests of grassroots associations catering for 
tenants.  
Although the above example may show how grassroots associations and the opposition 
party jointly mobilized for a common cause, other instances illustrate how the 
opposition party also applies neopopulist strategies. The slum-upgrading project 
KENSUP in Kibera, which initially adopted a participatory approach that included 
donors, the Kenyan government, NGOs (including Shack/Slum-Dwellers’ 
International) and CBOs, can be seen as an example of how the movement structures 
become intertwined with patronage politics of the opposition. The project, financed by 
UN-Habitat, was deemed a failure by many grassroots respondents from Kibera 
because it did not reach the intended beneficiaries—the marginalized slum-dwellers. 
KENSUP was considered the flagship of ODM’s Odinga (at the time Prime Minister 
in the coalition government). However, many interview respondents in Kibera, 
including ODM supporters, felt that the project had been turned into a campaign tool. 
Oversight mechanisms to ensure that slum-dwellers were the beneficiaries of the 
housing project seemed lacking, such as additional regulations to penalize those who 
sub-let or increased rents.481 The non-transparency involved in the transfer and 
implementation resulted in politically connected middle- and upper-class families soon 
taking over the newly constructed housing units.482   
                                              
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid. 
482 District Officer in Kibra Constituency. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
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Political clientelism towards slum-dwellers has also emerged in projects that do not 
follow the main party divisions. The railway relocation project shows how politicians 
and government officials may intervene in these social movement efforts, reproducing 
dependency. Interview respondents claimed that, at the outset, the ministries and 
donors did not provide clarifying information directly to the communities about the 
process, only through intermediaries that were perceived as withholding 
information.483 When conflicts grew around the enumeration process that was to map 
out intended beneficiaries of the new housing structures, bulldozers were brought in, 
without warning, to demolish parts of the squatter settlement, destroying evidence of 
existing housing patterns among the dwellers. As a result, the beneficiary list became 
prone to manipulation based on backdoor deals negotiated with brokers, while the 
dwellers lost most of their leverage power. Speculations arose about the complicity of 
government officials, NGO actors and local politicians who were involved in the 
project, but this was difficult to verify, given the lack of transparency.     
When grassroots associations try to hold land-grabbing politicians to account, they can 
be exposed to harsh attacks. A youth organization sought to hold their local MP 
accountable for illegal evictions and grabbing of public land reserved for a health 
center and a school, with the intention of building a commercial mall.484 The youth 
group collected evidence that included official records for land-use planning of the 
area, which they were to present for discussion at a community meeting. In response, 
police broke into the home (shack) of the leader of the association, confiscated the 
material, and beat and arrested him. The arrest prevented the activists from 
participating in the community meeting. While the leader, upon release, came under 
the protection of an NGO that provided him with secure accommodation (a hotel 
                                              
483 Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
484 Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi. 
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room), he was brutally attacked on the street and ended up in hospital.485 This clearly 
shows the vulnerability of grassroots associations vis-à-vis political elites.486  
To sum up, while the slum-dweller movement seeks to unite the grassroots 
associations of structure owners and tenants, the latter associations are divided along 
partisan lines. The opposition party, the ODM, and the movement are not closely 
aligned. While both the government and opposition parties have been engaged in 
slum-upgrading projects in collaboration with donor agencies and slum-dweller 
organizations, they simultaneously exploit these organizations and the projects for 
clientelist purposes. Politicians from both camps also seek to co-opt or repress smaller 
organizations that challenge their clientelist assets. 
Tenant agency: neopopulism or marginalization through movement  
The political agency that Kenyan slum-dwellers can enact through their representative 
bodies is complicated by two factors. The first concerns at what level their socio-
economic interest is best taken care of—slum-dwellers jointly, or through organization 
of sub-interests. The second factor concerns the incentives that current resource 
mobilization structures create for engaging the slum-dwellers as clients and not as 
citizens. These two aspects are intertwined. Here I will focus on the tenants, who 
besides constituting the weaker economic group who are marginalized both by the 
incumbent government and through the movement structures.  
The structuring of political mobilization of Kenyan slum-dwellers is highly complex 
and contradictory, leaving them in tricky dilemmas that are sometimes self-defeating. 
On one side, they are mobilized by SMOs that seek to bridge their internal divisions as 
(Luo) tenants and (Kikuyu) landlords and organize them around joint socio-economic 
interests, by engaging with the government of the day. On the other side, political 
parties seek to mobilize slum-dwellers by appealing to internal conflicts of interest 
among them, and strategically use their housing grievances as assets to punish or 
                                              
485 This happened during my fieldwork, a day after our second interview. 
486 Later, however, newspapers reported that the election results for the politician had been nullified by the courts, and he was 
not re-elected in the subsequent by-elections.  
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reward them. By engaging in one of these mobilizing structures, the slum-dwellers 
simultaneously contribute to undermining the other. Tenants may be involved in social 
movement processes of enumeration and allocating of formal land for housing in 
schemes that bring together tenants and landlords in a given area, which may 
reproduce inequalities among them. At the same time, tenants may engage in divisive 
political clientelism against landlords to secure informal access to housing as a reward 
from their political patron, which maintains clientelist structures.   
What reinforces partisan loyalty is the confounding of programmatic and ethno-
clientelist linkages, whereby ethnic identity, socio-economic interest and clientelist 
rewards all pull in the same direction through a shared narrative. Moreover, clientelist 
tools commonly associated with practices of authoritarian states are also found within 
the social movement structures. The consequence of this has been to empower the 
structure owners, who are also considered to be the constituency base of the party in 
power. As allocation of housing is an important aspect of the clientelist structure of 
partisan politics, political patrons also encroach on the SMOs, sometimes effectively 
co-opting them.   
If slum-dwellers felt confident that they could achieve secure housing through 
predictable procedures as equal members of a social movement, this could enable them 
to refrain from vigilante activities or other forms of clientelism. Today, however, the 
lack of information, exclusion from decisionmaking processes and the threat of 
violence that the slum-dwellers meet from elites in both camps severely weaken the 
prospects for having their interest in housing guaranteed through the social movement. 
The potential cost of not abiding by political patrons becomes highly risky. 
Furthermore, it may be hard to distinguish between political patrons and social 
movement patrons. This makes it highly questionable whether the political agency that 
Nairobian slum-dwellers exercise through their representatives reflects citizenship at 
all. 
Despite the clientelist features of opposition mobilization, the ODM and the grassroots 
associations collaborate to mass-mobilize tenants. The Kibera Inhabitant Forum 
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representative claims that they were able to mobilize against the President’s Decree to 
give Nubians land in Kibera because they had the political goodwill of the MP and 
county commissioner, who were both ODM.487 Therefore, most community members 
joined Kibera Inhabitant Forum instead of the Kibera Stakeholder Forum. The ability 
of this grassroots association affiliated to the ODM to mass-mobilize may be an 
indication that the opposition party is more in tune with the tenant interests. While 
being engaged through both programmatic and clientelist means by the ODM, tenants 
may experience more agency through this structure than through the movement 
structure, which is dominated by structure owners.  
10.3 Caught between a rock and a hard place  
 Chapter 10 has shown that in addition to the hybrid agency the urban poor experience 
through either movements (due to an extraverted strategy), or party politics (due to 
clientelism), the interaction between the two mobilization structures sometimes adds 
another layer of hybridity: political co-optation.  
 The Zambian opposition party, the PF, was able to leverage support by aligning with 
the pro-poor civil society prior to the 2011 elections (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). 
Also the Kenyan opposition party, the ODM, has drawn strength from mobilizing 
together with pro-poor civil society groups.488 Despite a shared focus on pro-poor 
issues, however, the SMOs and opposition parties have not developed close affiliations 
or institutional links to each other. I find this to be rooted in how the two types of 
players mobilize their resources.  
The movement umbrellas depend on external support, whereas opposition parties 
amass political and economic resources through clientelism. Extraversion and 
neopopulism have led to a consensus on weak ties between the movements and 
opposition parties. External actors generally do not want to be involved in party 
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488 ODM Secretariat. March 7, 2014, Nairobi. 
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politics, and adhere to a pluralist ideal of separation of the civil and political spheres. 
This ideal is reflected in the domestic organizations, and reinforced by their past 
experiences with non-autonomy from the state. By contrast, the neopopulist strategies 
of the opposition parties rely on flexible, personalistic links to the voters and clientelist 
exchange.  
Weak links between opposition parties and the SMOs are reinforced when social 
movements differ from the opposition parties regarding which sub-constituencies are 
their main targets. While the Kenyan ODM party emphasized tenants, the Kenyan 
slum-dweller movement sought to unite slum-dwelling tenants and landlords. In 
Zambia, the PF targeted street vendors, while the movement for informal traders 
sought to unite marketers and street vendors under its umbrella. Thus, the movements 
sometimes operate at a higher scale than the opposition parties.489   
The weak links seem to be further reinforced when the approaches of the SMOs are in 
line with those of the government party. The approaches of the Kenyan movements for 
informal traders and slum-dwellers have resulted in increasingly institutionalized 
collaborations with the government. Also the Zambian slum-dwellers’ movement have 
had amicable, albeit small-scale, collaborative relations and project-based partnerships 
with both the old and new government. Paradoxically, however, although the Zambian 
SMOs for informal traders mobilized the street vendors, who were also a target 
constituency of the PF when in opposition, the PF gave these SMOs the cold shoulder 
once in government.  
The varying levels of interaction or cooperation between political parties and SMOs do 
not simply reflect different ideological positions or accountability to different 
grassroots constituents. Despite the officially weak ties between SMOs and political 
parties, SMOs experience attempts at political co-optation and fragmentation from 
incumbent as well as opposition parties. The fact that these movements are constantly 
being encroached upon by political patrons who are interested in their members 
                                              
489 However, while conflicts between marketers and street vendors have also occurred in Kenya, these have not been reflected 
in party cleavages, whereas Zambian slum-dwellers were mobilized jointly by both the opposition party and the social 
movement.   
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confirms a perceived political influence of these SMOs, as well as ties to their 
grassroots base. However, rather than supporting strong, autonomous movements, 
politicians try to fragment them if they are perceived as threats, and/or politically co-
opt them into their clientelist networks. Successful attempts to co-opt or clientify the 
SMOs illustrate what Pommerolle (2010) identifies as a reforming authoritarianism, 
resulting in hybrid movements (Waal and Ibreck 2013). How do the interactions 
between social movements and party politics affect the political agency of the urban 
poor? 
Kenyan slum-dwellers find themselves in a difficult situation. Their socio-economic 
interests as either tenants or landlords are infused with ethnicity. These divisions are 
mobilized by political parties by combining programmatic and clientelist linkages. 
Simultaneously, tenants and landlords are mobilized as one collective group by SMOs 
that target the government of the day. However, the movement itself is ridden by 
clientelism due to rent-seeking behavior, as well as political co-optation. As a result, 
tenants are marginalized to the advantage of structure owners both within the 
movement itself and by the government party, while the opposition party provides 
them with a neopopulist linkage. 
The situation is somewhat different for Zambian slum-dwellers. Slum-dwellers are not 
systematically split along sub-cleavages such as landlords and tenants or along ethnic 
lines. The opposition party, the PF, mobilized the slum-dwellers jointly on a populist 
platform with promises of low-cost housing, in line with the social movement’s 
position. However, after the PF assumed office, slum-dweller access to land and 
housing continued to depend on political allegiance to the right party cadres. As the 
tide shifted towards the PF, remaining with the incumbent MMD camp increasingly 
posed a risk to (informal) tenure. The slum-dwellers’ engagement in informal cadre 
allocations of land is counterproductive to the social movement’s objectives of 
achieving land for its members through formal procedures. However, slum-dwellers 
who can commit to the movement’s approach of member-based contributions and 
government collaboration are provided with a more citizen-based agency in the long 
run.  
 324
The street vendors in Zambia have also been mobilized by the PF through a populist 
linkage, intertwined with clientelist cadre structures. Street vendor entitlements depend 
on the discretion of the PF government and its street-vendor cadres, but at the same 
time street vendors are allowed to carry out their livelihood strategies. However, the 
PF government weakened the existing SMOs representing both street vendors and 
marketers under a joint umbrella, and created and funded its own non-autonomous 
street vendor organization, leading to further fragmentation and co-optation of the 
street vendors’ movement. Recently, however, the street vendors have obtained greater 
agency through neopopulism than via the SMOs, where they no longer had formal 
representation through an association for street vendors.   
In Kenya, informal traders are mobilized jointly by both the main political parties and 
SMOs, through an approach of formalization and the facilitation of trade.  
Furthermore, both political parties mobilize street vendors on a populist, ad hoc basis. 
However, informal traders are also opportunistically mobilized by political brokers 
who allocate or deprive them of work space and other benefits to mobilize votes, often 
on the basis of ethnicity. Furthermore, politicians use a similar strategy for co-optation 
and fragmentation of the SMOs. Lastly, as SMO membership requires a personal 
investment that most informal traders have been unwilling to provide, and closer 
engagement with the government, street vendors in particular remain marginalized 
within both the movement and party politics.   
All four social movements struggle to establish a sustainable resource base from their 
grassroots constituents, especially from the more marginalized segments such as 
tenants and street vendors (perhaps with the exception of slum-dwellers in Zambia). 
These groups are effectively mobilized by neopopulist opposition strategies. A 
Zambian opposition politician from one of the smaller parties provided an anecdote 
that can illustrate the difference in strategy between “populist” politicians and an 
“extraverted” civil society.490 A call-in radio program on “urban renewal” focused on 
how unplanned settlements could be transformed into habitable areas through urban 
                                              
490 ZED. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
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planning. The politician criticized the forum for not taking its audience into 
consideration. The term “urban renewal” would not be understood because they were 
communicating to semi-literates. He argued that while politicians were seen as using a 
“populist language” (understood in a negative way), idealists who were 
communicating in abstract terms, such as equity, would not be understood, and would 
thus fail to mobilize.491 “Populist” strategies by politicians may thus reflect a better 
understanding of their constituents, compared to the extraverted, elitist movement 
organizations and their donors. Nevertheless, the violence and coercion that underpin 
neopopulist strategies are evidence of a strategy that is motivated less by 
accountability and representation of the urban poor, and more by neopatrimonialism. 
I find that the mobilization/recruitment challenges facing SMOs are attributed to 
power asymmetries between these movement actors vis-à-vis the urban poor, which 
result in disengagement and alienation. These power asymmetries may be a result of 
these organizations’ resource constraints, which limits their outreach and ability to 
engage with their members. However, SMOs may also fail to mobilize because their 
agenda do not resonate with the interests of their potential members, their barriers to 
entry are too high, or they are not deemed trustworthy. In such cases, they will not be 
seen as legitimate representatives by their constituents. 
If the grassroots are not meaningfully engaged by SMOs in collective decisionmaking, 
are not allowed insights into organizational processes, and especially if they fear 
repercussions if a conflict erupts, they may feel safer sticking to the devil they know. 
A failure of SMOs, or their funders, to consider the vulnerable and complex position 
the urban poor are positioned in, or the suspicions that certain arrangements create, 
given the grassroots’ experiences with clientelism and corruption for decades, may 
make engagement in patronage politics seem a safer bet for the poor.  
                                              
491 Ibid. 
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11. Hybrid agency of the urban poor – navigating 
between citizenship and clientship 
“We spent a lot of time speaking with people and they promised to make sure it was a peaceful 
election. We proposed a youth from the slum as a county representative, but we did not know 
the caliber. We voted as a bloc, Mungiki and Taliban, and thought it was better with a ghost 
you know. He became a headache (…) At least we changed the situation by picking one of 
us.”492  
“We will try to see in the next election (…) then we are ready for a new guy. The community 
believes in us now. They see we do all we can (…) If you want to catch a thief, use a thief.”493  
This study has shown how the conditions of illegality in which the urban poor in 
Zambia and Kenya pursue their livelihood strategies constitute a basis for political 
mobilization through the available political channels. The two country comparison was 
based on expectations that Zambia could be considered a most-likely case for 
enhanced citizen-based agency for the urban poor, and Kenya a least-likely (though 
possible) case.  
Zambia had a successful, pro-poor opposition party (Resnick 2014; Cheeseman and 
Larmer 2015), a large urban population, and cross-ethnic mobilizing structures within 
society—most prominently, the labor movement (LeBas 2011). In Kenya, by contrast, 
the opposition party has emerged as an ethno-clientelist party machine (although with 
some pro-poor populist features) (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015), there was a smaller  
urban population, and mobilizing structures within society (especially economic 
interest groups) were characterized by ethnic brokerage and fragmentation (LeBas 
2011). However, the emergence of social movement organizations (SMOs) in both 
countries, with close ties to transnational actors, was seen as having the potential to 
create another political avenue for the urban poor to enhance their agency as citizens, 
outside the electoral sphere.   
The study finds that the introduction of multiparty competition and political pluralism 
in these former patrimonial autocracies has strengthened citizen-based agency for the 
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urban poor through opposition parties as well as SMOs in both countries. There is a 
convergence towards neopopulism and extraverted movements. A dynamic political 
game has evolved in response to changing political opportunity structures. Due to 
political competition, opposition parties and SMOs increasingly need to offer 
legitimate claims of representing the urban poor in order to remain relevant. If they are 
unable to deliver benefits and an agenda that resonate with this sector, other actors will 
enter to fill the vacuum. The diverging patterns of political mobilization of the urban 
poor illustrate this dynamism. 
We have seen the variation in how collective benefits have been mobilized by different 
actors, and that the contentious issues that surround “illegality” are far from settled. 
Some mobilize slum-dwelling tenants and landlords jointly, while others mobilize on 
the basis of interest conflicts among them. The same applies to marketers and street 
vendors. Varying constellations of collaboration or conflict have emerged among 
SMOs, incumbent and opposition parties, and various forms of legislation, policy, and 
programs have been articulated (sometimes implemented) by different actors, 
depending on the sub-constituency targeted. Increasingly, the urban poor are being 
taken seriously as citizens.  
Also important, however, are the opportunities and incentives that exist for amassing 
material resources at the expense of the urban poor. While opposition parties and 
SMOs may mobilize on the basis of collective benefits, in practice they often end up 
providing contingent benefits to their constituencies. Both types of organizations have 
incentives for accumulating economic and political resources by engaging the urban 
poor as clients. This may be motivated by personal reasons—rent-seeking, or the 
protection of economic privilege—but also at the organizational level, the cheapest or 
easiest way of generating material resources is often by turning the urban poor into 
clients.  
The ways in which political parties and SMOs mobilize material resources have led to 
the exclusion of the more marginalized groups, or deliberate attempts to reduce their 
autonomy by restricting their access to information and decisionmaking. In cases 
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where elites are challenged by the grassroots on their practices, and if grassroots actors 
are not susceptible to bribes or other clientelist rewards, patrons have at their disposal 
a range of methods for forcing compliance, sometimes through well-orchestrated and 
prolonged efforts to weaken or frighten them. Such situations create dilemmas for the 
urban poor: should they engage as clients, or opt out? However, power asymmetries 
may also be present without any deliberate attempts by the elites to turn their 
constituents into clients, for instance due to unawareness of how these power 
asymmetries contribute to clientifying them, or due to a lack of capacity.  
Hence, under conditions of political competition and pluralism, opposition parties and 
SMOs in Kenya and Zambia mobilize resources through two contradictory 
mechanisms: legitimacy through collective benefits; and material resources through 
contingent benefits. The result is hybrid agency for the urban poor.  
11.1 The history of urban poor mobilization 
Chapter 5 demonstrated how the criminalization of the urban poor has been a feature 
since the colonial era. The illegality of informal trade and street vending reflected a 
deliberate attempt to discourage the African populations from settling in the cities. The 
laws and policies that criminalized the livelihoods of the urban poor were largely 
continued in the post-colonial state. As urbanization continued, this illegality produced 
distinct socio-economic grievances and conflicts of interests between the urban poor 
and more affluent economic groups. The latter often overlapped with political elites. 
The processes of economic liberalization and privatization that began in the 1980s 
usually resulted in the transferral of formal property rights to political and economic 
elites, and reinforced a formal-informal dichotomy. Thus, slum-dwelling and street 
trade continued to be illegal under the new economic model of “neoliberalism”. 
The grievances and interest conflicts stemming from illegality created opportunities 
for various forms of political mobilization. Chapter 6 showed that in the first 
multiparty period after independence, slum-dwellers and informal traders were 
mobilized by political parties, including opposition parties, often through ethno-
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clientelism. In response, these regimes imposed de jure one-party states to contain 
political contestation at the local level. However, pro-democracy opposition forces 
capitalized on how the economic mismanagement of the one-party regimes aggravated 
the economic grievances of the urban poor. As urban poor, middle- and upper class 
groups coalesced around calls for democracy, the pressure eventually led to 
democratic transitions. 
Chapter 7 found that multiparty elections and political pluralism did not initially 
translate into enhanced political agency for the urban poor. The democratic struggle 
was led by the middle- and upper classes, and the urban poor were mobilized on an ad 
hoc basis. The new government parties reverted to ethno-clientelism. Furthermore, 
although a new form of civil society emerged, largely supported by the international 
donor community, these organizations were more concerned with democracy, human 
rights and service delivery. Thus, the urban poor continued to be politically 
marginalized. However, a democratic foundation had been created for increasing 
political mobilization of these large urban segments in the longer run. 
11.2 Neopopulist opposition parties  
Seeking to challenge ethno-clientelist incumbent parties that emerged in the wake of 
the democratic transitions, more Latin-style, neopopulist parties (Weyland 2003; 
Levitsky 2007; Burgess and Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005) have developed in Kenya 
and Zambia (Chapter 7 and 8). These neopopulist strategies should be seen in 
connection with the low institutionalization of party structures and how the opposition 
parties depend on charismatic leaders, in turn according great flexibility to the party 
leadership.   
New programmatic linkages have been provided to street vendors and/or slum-
dwellers through promises of (government-provided) low-cost housing and trading 
spaces, and an end to evictions, criminalization and harassment.  However, it is 
precisely these aspects of illegality that are used by the same parties for clientelist 
purposes. In practice, low-cost slum housing and access to trading space have been 
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informally redistributed through party brokers as rewards and punishments for voters, 
often by highly coercive and violent means. The brokers usually belong to the urban 
poor segments themselves, and the extent to which they benefit from brokerage varies 
substantially. The neopopulist strategies have either replaced pre-existing clientelist 
structures (as with Zambian street vendors), or added to them (Kenyan tenants and 
landlords). Although the opposition parties rely on a pro-poor, programmatic linkage 
to compete with incumbent parties, also for them, the urban-poor vote becomes 
cheaper if they combine such appeals with clientelism, in line with the argument of 
Stokes et al. (2007). The hybrid agency that the urban poor exercise through party 
politics is highly skewed towards clientship.  
Although ethno-clientelism still operates at the national level to mobilize the vote in 
rural areas (Resnick 2014; Cheeseman and Larmer 2015), empirical analyses of the 
interaction between the urban poor and political parties in Nairobi and Lusaka indicate 
a shift in these cities towards neopopulism. Socio-economic interests, not necessarily 
ethnicity, have become the basis for party linkages. However, the role of ethnicity 
differs in the two countries. Through its pro-poor strategy, Zambia’s PF was able to 
mobilize all urban constituencies in the country, thereby winning the presidency and 
the majority of MP seats in all urban areas. By contrast, although the Kenyan ODM’s 
presidential candidate won the majority in the capital, he did not win the Presidency, 
and the urban vote at the national level was divided. Ethnicity trumps pro-poor 
populism also in urban areas. Paradoxically, the ICC intervention seems to have 
aggravated the importance of ethnicity and negatively affected the ODM, as the 
former ODM ally, the URP (Ruto), switched to an alliance with Kenyatta (Jubilee).  
Another difference between the two countries concerns how ethnicity and sub-
conflicts among the urban poor are perceived to overlap. Considering Stokes’ (2005) 
argument of how “perverse” machine politics requires administrative infrastructure, 
ethnicity could be seen as a short-cut for garnering votes. However, empirical findings 
indicate that Kenyan party brokers are not necessarily loyal to their political parties, 
and that Kikuyu and Luo may mobilize for both political coalitions. The Kenyan case 
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highlights the difficulty of knowing whether party linkages should be understood 
primarily on the basis of ethnicity or of socio-economic interest.  
11.3 Extraverted, member-based social movements 
In response to the lack of democratic representation of and accountability to the urban 
poor, member-based social movements have emerged to fill the void in both Kenya 
and Zambia (Chapter 9). They do so through mobilization of the urban poor outside 
electoral politics. These SMOs seek to provide collective benefits through laws, policy 
and projects in which their grassroots constituents are meant to play a fundamental 
role through democratic participation as well as personal investment, as also claimed 
in the literature (Ballard et al. 2005; Bieler 2012; Kapoor 2007; Köhler and Wissen 
2003). However, movements differ in terms of their consistency and what kind of 
agency they provide for different sub-constituencies of the urban poor. 
According to Pommerolle’s (2010) “extraversion” argument, dependence on external 
resources produces winners and losers among SMOs. New forms of coercion emerge 
as external modalities come to dominate, sometimes resulting in the exclusion of more 
marginalized groups. Further, their dependence on external resources creates problems 
of clientelist relations and rent-seeking, similar to those that Wit and Berner (2009) 
found in India.   
SMO umbrellas in both Zambia and Kenya seek to organize informal traders under a 
joint movement. In both countries, however, these umbrella bodies struggle to 
mobilize their large constituency base, due partly to problems of clientelism and 
briefcase associations within the movement structure, and partly to membership 
requirements, which marginalize street vendors. The SMOs for informal traders in 
Zambia, which belong to the labor movement, have experienced inter-organizational 
conflicts between AZIEA and the Street Vendors Association, as well as conflicts of 
interest between marketers and street vendors united under the joint umbrella of 
AZIEA. Because of organizational conflicts, street vendors in Lusaka had no formal 
representation by an association catering specifically to their interests prior to the 2011 
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elections, and that led to marginalization. In Kenya, the dominant SMOs for informal 
traders have bypassed pre-existing organizational structures. They have aligned with 
the business community and engaged in closer government collaboration. In this way, 
the umbrella bodies have achieved formal representation and what they consider 
advantageous legislation and policies for their members, but these laws still make 
street vending illegal.  
In both countries, SMO umbrellas also seek to unite slum-dwellers (tenants and 
landlords) under a joint movement. In both cases, these movements have been able to 
recruit considerable memberships, and collaborate with governments on land and 
housing projects for their members. Especially in Kenya, the SMOs have been 
perceived by grassroots activists as enhancing their agency, enabling them to work 
together and with the government in a less conflictual manner. They have also 
contributed to the formulation of new legislation on land and evictions. However, the 
Kenyan movement has also become caught up in landlord–tenant conflicts, and tends 
to reproduce clientship in their housing projects, which marginalize the tenants. It is 
perhaps the Zambian slum-dweller movement that has best managed to create a 
citizen-based agency for its members. Its projects mainly benefit those who can meet 
membership requirements, but expected contributions are fairly low. However, its 
scope and approach is limited and non-confrontational, and it has not effectively 
contributed to legislation.  
Overall, the extraverted strategy of the movements has produced collective benefits for 
their constituents, but also resulted in patron-client relationships and/or 
marginalization. More clientelist mechanisms have been identified within the social 
movements in Kenya than in Zambia. In the latter case, marginalization of the weaker 
groups seems more problematic, which is correlated with weak organizational 
capacity.494  
                                              
494 However, as the study could rely on more secondary sources on Kenyan SMOs, further research should be carried out on 
the interaction between SMOs and their grassroots in Zambia. 
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11.4 Interaction between party politics and social 
movements 
LeBas (2011) and Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) indicate that opposition parties can 
leverage support by aligning with broad-based organizational structures in society. 
However, Weyland (2003) and Levitsky (2007) argue that neopopulist parties have an 
interest in weakening, rather than strengthening, interest organizations in society in 
order to establish direct, populist relations with the urban poor. In addition, a pluralist-
oriented civil society accords greater weight to autonomy from the state and from 
political parties (Rakner 2003). Given that opposition parties pursue a neopopulist 
strategy, and SMOs pursue an extraverted strategy that conform to predominant 
pluralism ideals, weak institutionalized links between opposition parties and civil 
society were expected.   
The thesis confirms these expectations (Chapter 10). In neither Kenya nor Zambia 
have opposition parties and SMOs tried to establish strong, institutional links to each 
other. However, politicians from both the incumbent and opposition parties have 
sought to capitalize on these organizations through co-optation, or to weaken or 
fragment these SMOs if they are perceived as a threat. Thus, SMOs treat their 
constituents as clients also because of co-optation by political patrons, resulting in 
what Waal and Ibreck (2013) and Larmer (2010) consider hybrid movements. These 
tend to reproduce the existing (authoritarian) order. 
Attempts at co-optation and fragmentation indicate that the SMOs have organized their 
grassroots constituents in a manner that challenge the clientele base for politicians. 
However, the difference in scale between the SMOs and opposition parties—slum-
dwellers versus tenants, or informal traders versus street vendors—give rise to 
questions as to which of these “representative” organizations are in fact more 
representative and accountable towards their constituents.  
In Zambia, as the PF aligned with pro-poor calls from civil society while in opposition, 
these SMOs initially held (moderately) positive expectations as to what the opposition 
party would do on these issues when in office. However, they were soon disappointed, 
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as PF began using its cadres for informally allocating and redistributing trading space 
and land for housing through coercion and violence. Although the Zambian SMOs for 
informal traders initially welcomed the new President’s decision to ignore laws 
prohibiting street vending, they later experienced direct attempts at fragmentation and 
co-optation when the PF government de-registered its marketer organizations and 
created its own street vendor foundation. However, the Zambian street vendors 
endorsed the neopopulist strategy of the PF, as they had become marginalized within 
the SMOs. The relationship between the Zambian SMOs for slum-dwellers and the 
government remained amicable, perhaps because the movement’s strategy did not pose 
a threat to clientelist party linkages. Slum-dwellers would therefore engage in PF-
brokered, informal land deals while also pursuing formal, secure tenure through the 
SMOs’ engagement with the government for the longer run.  
In Kenya, the opposition party, ODM, also portrayed itself as a pro-poor party, 
concerned with evictions and low-cost housing, as the slum-dwellers movement also 
did. However, because the SMOs for slum-dwellers were dominated by (Kikuyu) 
landlords, seen as the main constituency for the incumbent party, grassroots 
associations representing (Luo) tenants were used for mobilization by the opposition 
party. This strategy was combined with brokered clientelism, providing a neopopulist 
linkage to tenants through the opposition party. Furthermore, as the Kenyan movement 
for informal traders had developed collaborative relations with the business 
community and the government, informal traders did not constitute a main 
constituency for ODM. As the Kikuyu were seen as overrepresented among informal 
traders, they were even less likely to become a main support base for the opposition 
party. Instead, politicians of all stripes would seek to mobilize or clientify sub-groups 
of informal traders and their associations (often based on ethnicity), in order to gain 
their votes. For Kenyan informal traders, the choice often stood between engaging in 
ethno-clientelism or exiting, especially in the case of street vendors who found it 
difficult to meet SMO requirements.  
These dynamics show that despite SMOs trying to remain autonomous from party 
politics, and engage the government of the day, the two mobilization structures are 
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bound to interact as long as these actors compete over the same grassroots 
constituents. When the neopatrimonial political order permeates these SMOs, the 
result is hybrid movements. However, although political parties use neopopulist tactics 
towards the urban poor, and seek to weaken the organizations representing these 
groups, it often remains unclear whether the SMOs are more representative of and 
accountable to the interests of their constituents (even if they are not co-opted by 
politicians). 
11.5 A shared framework: resource mobilization and power 
asymmetries 
How do supposedly democratic representatives of the urban poor clientify them? 
Despite the empirical complexities, these political dynamics can be analyzed within a 
shared framework of resource mobilization and power asymmetries. The urban poor 
do not want to live in the insecurity that stems from illegality. If an incumbent party 
provides benefits that are contingent and only for the few, other organizations may 
garner legitimacy by claiming to represent the collective interest of the many. If the 
urban poor can choose between which organizations to support, they will prefer those 
that not only provide them with contingent ad hoc benefits, but also more durable, 
long-term collective benefits. If, however, SMOs depend on external, material 
resources while opposition parties generate material resources through clientelism, 
both will also have incentives for engaging the urban poor as clients.  
This contradictory pattern of resource mobilization—legitimacy versus material 
resources—is what causes hybrid agency for the urban poor. The outcome can be 
understood in light of Elster’s (1998) Type B mechanisms: the triggering of two causal 
chains (resource mobilization) that affect an independent variable (democratic 
competition) in opposite directions, leaving the net effect (agency) indeterminate.495 
As political parties and SMOs need to generate both legitimacy (through collective 
                                              
As mentioned in the methods chapter, Type A mechanisms concerns the indeterminacy of which (if any) of several causal 
chains that will be triggered, but that are mutually exclusive (scared animals either freeze or flight). 
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benefits) and material resources (through contingent benefits), the urban poor are 
engaged simultaneously as citizens and clients.  
It is easy to identify outright violent suppression or total neglect of democratic 
procedures. However, when opposition parties and SMOs depend on a legitimate 
claim to democratically represent their constituents, attention to how mechanisms 
deprive constituents of agency in ways that are not immediately apparent becomes 
more important. By depriving their constituents of necessary information, of collective 
decisionmaking power, or by subjecting them to (subtle) coercion, these constituents 
may easily fall prey to clientelism. It is the most hidden, discreet or non-deliberate 
mechanisms that are the most relevant for explaining clientship in these contexts. The 
more sophisticated these systems become, the more focus should be placed on the 
devil in the details. As shown in the empirical chapters, power asymmetries forged 
towards the urban poor can be manipulated and combined in an almost infinite number 
of ways. Such clientelism can be expected when the incentives are in place.  
Grassroots responses to attempts at clientification vary. Some simply exit. Those who 
remain, either accept being clients, or they fight these asymmetries. Much of the data 
that has informed the development of this framework have been drawn from 
interviews with respondents who have struggled to obtain reliable information, to 
participate in supposedly collective decisionmaking, and to avoid coercive sanctions. 
The urban poor do fight to enhance their political agency and socio-economic 
interests, despite the obstacles put in their way. It is they who must bear the 
consequences of decisions made by influential SMOs or political parties. 
11.6 Is the glass half empty or half full? 
Do the political developments witnessed over the past decade, which have resulted in a 
hybrid form of political agency for the urban poor, reflect a path that will continue in 
the same direction, eventually enabling the urban poor to engage as autonomous 
citizens in pursuing their interests? Or might this be a cyclical trend, which will 
regress back to (ethno-)clientelism?  
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Is the glass half full? The urban poor studied here have arguably become more 
politically influential through dual mobilization by opposition parties and SMOs, 
despite the prevalence of clientelism. Instead of being mere subalterns or opting to 
exit, the urban poor engage through the political channels available. They have 
become freer to choose which organizations to support or not. As they gain experience 
from interacting with political parties and SMOs, they can make increasingly informed 
decisions as voters, members and activists.  
We have seen many examples of how urban poor grassroots have appreciated SMO 
efforts to advance their interests, and have increasingly become empowered as citizens 
vis-à-vis the state. Especially the slum-dweller movements have attained a rather large 
membership base. In Kenya, the SMOs are satisfied with new legislation and increased 
institutionalized collaboration, which indicate a more robust process. In Zambia, the 
urban poor have learned that they can change the political leadership at the national 
level. Although the study has exposed how neopopulist parties engage the urban poor 
through clientelism, it remains to be seen whether these parties will follow up on their 
programmatic promises once in office. The new PF-government in Zambia shows 
indications of following up on some of its promises but seems restrained by capacity 
and its own cadres. ODM has not yet won the general elections, but it delivered on 
some goals through the constitutional process (facilitated by the international 
community). As new collective benefits are provided to some constituents, other 
struggles may emerge from those who were left out.  
Is the glass half empty? As shown in Chapter 6, the urban poor have been mobilized 
before, and subsequently ignored or harassed, while ethno-clientelism has resumed. 
There might be a difference between when a political party is in opposition and after it 
enters office. As long as widespread poverty prevails, large cohorts of inexperienced 
poor youth will remain vulnerable to clientelist exploitation. Politically trained brokers 
have spiraled out of control, resulting in increasing levels of crime and violence. 
Furthermore, in Kenya, the urban vote is split at the national level. The ethno-regional 
voting pattern may indicate that the Kenyan urban poor population is simply not large 
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enough to make pro-poor populism the predominant strategy—although the 
possibilities for political entrepreneurism cannot be discounted.  
Further, the new governments in both countries have recently sought to limit the space 
for civil society. Hence, a neopatrimonial backlash against civil society from the 
government can also result from mobilization. Worries about attempts of the terrorist 
group Al-Shabaab to recruit youth from the slums of Nairobi have surfaced from civil 
society as well as from the government.496 This has been used for government 
crackdowns on NGOs (Freedom House 2015a), but it also reflects the dangers of not 
engaging the urban poor in meaningful ways. Social movements with differing 
constituencies and goals have also ebbed and flowed. They depend on shifting donor 
trends, and are vulnerable to co-optation.  
*** 
The overall findings from this study indicate that in pluralist, competitive regimes in 
Africa where the “poor” constitute the urban majority, not only ethnicity, but also the 
socio-economic interests of the urban poor are used for establishing clientelist 
linkages, often in combination with (promises of) programmatic benefits. As the socio-
economic grievances of the urban poor largely stem from the illegality of their 
livelihood strategies, this illegality becomes an effective tool for both programmatic 
and clientelist mobilization.  
Currently, political parties do not seem inclined to abandon their clientele base among 
the urban poor, as clientelism constitutes such an important source for material 
resources. The extent to which party clientelism relies on coercion and violence 
supports this argument. SMOs and their funders might be more willing to address 
barriers to engaged and active citizenship, especially if the forging of clientelist 
relations has not been deliberate. However, if SMOs do not allow their constituents 
insight into how they conduct their business, and fail to create space for their 
constituents to shape the agenda, the urban poor may end up acting in the interests of 
                                              
496 Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March, 2014, Nairobi. 
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SMOs or donors, rather than the other way around.497 In such cases, civil society does 
a poor job in shaping civic-minded citizens, as Schmitter and Karl (1991) indicate, and 
the urban poor may find their interests better served through neopopulism.  
In this thesis, a main focus has been how opposition parties mobilize the urban poor to 
win political office. A pertinent follow-up to this study would be a more 
comprehensive analysis of how pro-poor, populist parties follow up on their electoral 
promises for collective benefits when in office, through legislation, policy and budget 
transfers. Second, research on internal processes in the party organizations and 
parliamentary processes would provide insights into the nature of these parties, as well 
as the effects of populist party strategies on party system developments. Third, this 
study found that urban poor brokers, activists and party members in Nairobi 
increasingly mobilized for political parties on other grounds than ethnicity. It would be 
interesting to study the extent to which such fluctuations are reflected also among 
voters, and the degree to which voters are punished or rewarded on the basis of 
ethnicity or party loyalty (as the latter seems to be the case in Lusaka). Fourth, 
research on how programmatic and clientelist mobilization of the urban poor may vary 
across urbanized regions in a country would be valuable to differentiate between 
national and more regional/local processes. Fifth, the study found clientelism to be 
more prevalent in Kenyan SMOs than in Zambian ones. However, this finding may be 
attributed to the fact that the analysis could rely on more secondary literature from 
Kenya. Further research is needed on the relationship between Zambian SMOs and 
their constituents to understand whether similar types of movement organizations 
create different incentives for clientelism, and why.  
                                              
497 Information is essential for being able to act autonomously. SMOs and donors provide their constituents with far less 
insight into what they do than they themselves might tolerate from their own representatives—whether politicians, trade 
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Appendix A:  Tables  
 
Table 1: Diani and Bison’s (2004: 281-309) typology of collective action processes 
Dense vs. sparse 
informal networks 




  Conflictual action Consensual action 
Dense informal 
networks 
Strong network identity Social movement Consensus movement 
Dense informal 
networks 
Weak network identity Conflict coalition Consensus coalition 
Sparse informal 
networks 
Weak network identity Conflict organization Consensus 
organization 
 











Central 3 9 2 0 14 
Copperbelt 18 5 0 0 23 
Eastern 1 15 0 3 19 
Luapula 13 1 0 0 14 
Lusaka 8 4 0 0 12 
Northern 15 4 0 1 20 
North-
Western 
0 9 3 0 12 
Southern 0 1 17 0 18 
Western 2 7 6 2 17 
Total     149 









Table 3: Number of constituency seats to political party, by county in Kenya 
County ODM TNA URP Others Total Majority 
Nairobi 7 10 0 0 17 TNA 
Mombasa 4 0 0 2 6 ODM 
Kwale 2 1 0 1 4 ODM 
Kilifi 4 0 1 2 7 ODM 
Tana River 0 1 1 1 3 Na 
Lamu 0 0 0 2 2 Other 
Taita Tavela 3 1 0 0 4 ODM 
Garissa 3 1 2 0 6 ODM 
Wajir 5 0 1 0 6 ODM 
Mandera 6 0 0 0 6 ODM 
Marsabit 2 0 1 1 4 ODM 
Isiolo 0 0 2 0 2 URP 
Meru 2 4 0 3 9 TNA 
Tharaka-Nithi 0 1 1 1 3 Na 
Embu 0 3 0 1 4 TNA 
Kitui 0 0 0 8 8 Other 
Machakos 0 0 0 8 8 Other 
Makueni 0 0 0 6 6 Other 
Nyandarua 0 4 0 1 5 TNA 
Nyeri 0 5 0 1 6 TNA 
Kirinyaga 0 4 0 0 4 TNA 
Muranga 0 6 0 1 7 TNA 
Kiambu 0 12 0 0 12 TNA 
Turkana 1 1 3 1 6 URP 
West Pokot 0 0 3 1 4 URP 
Samburu 0 2 1 0 3 TNA 
Trans Nzoia 0 0 1 4 5 Other 
Uasin Gishu 0 0 6 0 6 URP 
Elgeyo-
Marakwet 
0 0 4 0 4 URP 
Nandi 0 0 6 0 6 URP 
Baringo 0 0 5 1 6 URP 
Laikipia 1 2 0 0 3 TNA 
Nakuru 1 7 1 2 11 TNA 
Narok 0 1 4 1 6 URP 
Kajiado 1 4 0 0 5 TNA 
Kericho 0 0 5 1 6 URP 
Bomet 0 0 5 0 5 URP 
Kakamega 6 0 0 6 12 Na 
Vihiga 2 0 0 3 5 Other 
Bungoma 1 0 0 8 9 Other 
Busia 3 0 2 2 7 ODM 
Siaya 5 0 0 1 6 ODM 
Kisumu 5 0 0 2 7 ODM 
Homabay 8 0 0 0 8 ODM 
Migori 5 0 1 2 8 ODM 
Kisii 4 2 0 3 9 ODM 
Nyamira 3 0 0 1 4 ODM 
Total/majority 84 72 56 77 290 TNA/URP 
(The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 2013) 
 354
Table 4: Distribution of seats based on political party in 2013 County Assembly Ward 
representatives, Nairobi County498 
Constituency ODM seats TNA seats URP seats Others  Total 
Westlands 4 1 0 0 5 
Dagoretti North 4 1 0 0 5 
Dagoretti South 0 4 0 1 5 
Langata 5 0 0 0 5 
Kibra 3 1 0 1 5 
Roysambu 0 5 0 0 5 
Kasarani 0 5 0 0 5 
Ruaraka 5 0 0 0 5 
Embakasi South 3 1 0 1 5 
Embakasi North 1 4 0 0 5 
Embakasi Central 1 4 0 0 5 
Embakasi East 4 1 0 0 5 
Embakasi West 1 3 0 0 4 
Makadara 3 1 0 0 4 
Kamukunji 1 4 0 0 5 
Starehe 2 4 0 0 6 
Mathare 4 2 0 0 6 
Total 41 41 0 3 85 














                                              
498At national level, elections in 35 wards were postponed while 11 wards were unopposed. 
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Appendix B: Interviews  
 










UDF (political aspirant, Kibera) 
ZED 
2nd ODM Secretariat (2 
representatives) 
Safina (political aspirant) 
TNA (political aspirant) 
UDF (political aspirant) 
MMD (Information Secretary) 
MMD (youth Leader) 
UPND (MP) 
Trade unions 1st COTU (2) FFTUZ  
ZCTU 
2nd COTU FFTUZ 





1st Jua Kali Kamukunji Area 
Association 
AZIEA (Lusaka District) 
Street Vendors Association (2) 
2nd KENASVIT (2) 
NISCOF 
AZIEA (2) 
Street Vendors’ Association 
Land/housing 
organizations 
1st Nubian Rights Forum  PPHPZ/ZHPPF 
Zambia Land Alliance 
2nd Kibera Inhabitant Forum 
Kibera Stakeholders Forum  
Nubian Rights Forum 
Railway Dwellers Federation 
PPHHZ/ZHPPC    
ZHPPF (2 grassroots members) 
Media 1st Pamoja FM   
2nd Journalist and activist  
Pamoja FM 
Journalist and web-activist 





2nd Amnesty International  
Global Communities  
Inuka Ni Sisi! 
2410 
FODEP 




1st 8 activists (6 associations in 
Kibera and Mathare) 
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activists 2nd 9 youth activists from various 
associations in Kibera (6), 
Korogocho (1), Mathare (1), and 
central (1) 
Bunge la Mwananchi (3) 
Human rights activist/lawyer 
Women’s group Kanyama (focus 
group: 30 +) 
International 
community 
1st  Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka (2) 






1st Geographer (Institute for 
Development Studies) 
Geographer (UNZA) 
Political Scientist (UNZA) 
2nd Professor (Institute for 
Development Studies) 
Center for Policy Dialogue 
Geographer (UNZA) 
Political Scientist (UNZA) 
Panos Institute Southern Africa 
PMRC 
Churches 1st  Caritas 
JCTR 
2nd  Caritas 
Central 
government 
1st   
2nd Micro- and Small Enterprise 
Authority 
National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission 
Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing 





1st District Officer, Langata/Kibera MP office staff (Kanyama) 
2nd District Officer, Langata/Kibera Former Chairman, Kanyama Ward 
Housing and Social Services 
(Lusaka City Council) 
Officer at Lusaka City Council 
Cadres/brokers/ 
vigilantes 
1st   
2nd 1 former Mungiki member 
1 former Taliban member  
Former gang in Korogocho (focus 
group: 4) 
Former PF/MMD cadre 
Other 1st   
2nd  Geography class discussion 
(UNZA) 
Lilanda community meeting (focus 
group: 8 persons) 
Market vendor (Soweto Market) 




Alphabetical list of interview respondents as referred to in the thesis (note that several 
individuals have similar reference): 
Kenya: 
Amnesty International. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
Bunge la Mwananchi. March 2014, Nairobi (3 representatives). 
Community Leader in Kibera. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
COTU. Oct 29, 2012, Nairobi (2 representatives) 
COTU. March 13, 2014, Nairobi. 
District Officer in Kibra Constituency. Oct 19, 2012, Nairobi. 
District Officer in Kibra Constituency. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
Former gang member in Korogocho. March 14, 2014, Nairobi (focus group: 4 persons). 
Former member of Mungiki. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
Former member of Taliban. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
Former vigilante member. March 17, 2014, Nairobi. 
Geographer at Institute for Development Studies (University of Nairobi). Oct 23, 2012, Nairobi. 
Global Communities. March 11, 2014, Nairobi. 
Human rights activist/lawyer. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Inuka Ni Sisi!. March 28, 2014, Nairobi. 
Journalist and activist. March 3, 2014, Nairobi. 
Jua Kali Kamukunji Area Association. Oct 27, 2012, Nairobi. 
KENASVIT. March 20, 2014, Naivasha (2 representatives). 
Kibera Inhabitant Forum. March 4, 2014, Nairobi. 
Kibera Stakeholder Forum. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
Legal Resources Foundation. Oct 22, 2012, Nairobi. 
MSE-Authority. March 18, 2014, Nairobi. 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission. March 25, 2014, Nairobi. 
NISCOF. March 19, 2014, Nairobi. 
ODM Secretariat. March 7, 2014, Nairobi (2 representatives). 
ODM Ward/County representative. Oct 26, 2012, Nairobi. 
Pamoja FM. Oct 17, 2012, Nairobi. 
Pamoja FM. March 5, 2014, Nairobi.  
Political aspirant Labour Party. March 5, 2014, Nairobi. 
Political aspirant Safina. March 27, 2014, Nairobi. 
Political aspirant TNA. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Political aspirant UDF. Oct 22, 2012, Nairobi. 
Political aspirant UDF. March 24, 2014, Nairobi. 
Professor at Institute for Development Studies (University of Nairobi). March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
Railway Dwellers Federation, Kibera. March 23, 2014, Nairobi. 
The Norwegian Embassy. March 20, 2014, Nairobi. 
The Nubian Rights Forum. Oct 18, 2012, Nairobi. 
The Nubian Rights Forum. March 6, 2014, Nairobi. 
UN-Habitat. April 20, 2014, Nairobi. Skype interview. 
Youth activist in Korogocho. March 10, 2014, Nairobi. 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. Oct, 2012, Nairobi (5 persons) 
Youth activist in Langata/Kibera. March 2014, Nairobi (6 persons) 
Activist in Mathare. Oct 27, 2012, Nairobi (3 persons). 
Youth activist in Mathare. March 12, 2014, Nairobi. 








2410. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
AZIEA Lusaka District. Oct 6, 2012, Lusaka.  
AZIEA. Dec 9, 2013, Kitwe (2 representatives). 
Caritas. Oct 3, 2012, Lusaka. 
Caritas. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
Expert at Panos Institute Southern Africa. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
FFTUZ. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
FFTUZ. Dec 5, 2013, Lusaka. 
FODEP. Oct 2, 2012, Lusaka. 
FODEP. Nov, 26, 2013, Lusaka. 
Former MMD/PF cadre. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
Former Ward Chairman in Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka. 
Geographer at the University of Zambia. Oct 3, 2012, Lusaka. 
Geographer at the University of Zambia. Oct 18, 2013, Lusaka. 
Geography lecture discussion at University of Zambia. Nov 21, 2013, Lusaka. 
Grassroots member in ZHPPF. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka (2 members). 
Housing and Social Services at Lusaka City Council. Nov 29, 2013, Lusaka. 
Information and Publicity Secretary in MMD. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection. Oct 5, 2012, Lusaka. 
Journalist and web-activist. Nov 19, 2013, Lusaka. 
Legal expert. Nov 26, 2013, Lusaka. 
Lilanda community meeting. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka (focus group: 8 persons). 
Marketer/shoe seller at Soweto Market. Dec 4, 2013, Lusaka. 
Member of Parliament (UPND). Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka.  
Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Dec 5, 2013, Lusaka. 
MMD youth leader. Dec 3, 2013, Lusaka.  
MP office staff in Kanyama. Nov 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
National Pension Scheme Authority. Des 4, 2013, Lusaka.  
Officer at Lusaka City Council. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
Operation Young Vote. Nov 28, 2013, Lusaka. 
PMRC. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
Political scientist at University of Zambia. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
Political scientist at University of Zambia. Nov 20, 2013, Lusaka. 
Regional Consultant for The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions Africa. Nov 25, 2013, 
Lusaka. 
Researcher at Center for Policy Dialogue. Nov 25, 2013, Lusaka. 
SACCORD. Nov 26, 2013, Lusaka. 
Street Vendors' Association. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka (2 representatives). 
Street Vendors' Association. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka. 
The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka. 
The Norwegian Embassy. Oct 1, 2012, Lusaka (2 representatives). 
Women's Club Kanyama. Nov 27, 2013, Lusaka (focus group: 30+ members). 
Zambia Council for Social Development. Oct, 2012. Lusaka. 
Zambia Council for Social Development. Dec 2, 2013, Lusaka. 
Zambia Land Alliance. Oct 11, 2012, Lusaka 
ZCTU. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
ZCTU. Dec 6, 2013, Lusaka. 
ZED. Oct 12, 2012, Lusaka. 
ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Oct 4, 2012, Lusaka. 
ZHPPF/PPHPZ. Nov 22, 2013, Lusaka. 
                                              
 
